Informazione
From: http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org
1. TWO SECRET WITNESSES ALLEGE THAT THEY SURVIVED EXECUTION ATTEMPT
(June 2nd)
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg060203.htm
2. SYNOPSIS FOR THE MILOSEVIC "TRIAL" JUNE 03 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg060303.htm
3. MILOSEVIC "TRIAL" SYNOPSIS FOR JUNE 04 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg060403.htm
4. MILOSEVIC TRIAL SYNOPSIS FOR JUNE 05 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg060503.htm
5. SYNOPSIS FOR THE MILOSEVIC “TRIAL” JUNE 10 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg061003.htm
6. SYNOPSIS OF THE MILOSEVIC “TRIAL” JUNE 11 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg061103.htm
7. SYNOPSIS OF THE MILOSEVIC TRIAL JUNE 12 - 16
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg061603.htm
=== 1 ===
TWO SECRET WITNESSES ALLEGE THAT THEY SURVIVED EXECUTION ATTEMPT
June 2, 2003 - www.slobodan-milosevic.org
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Monday at the Hague Tribunal the prosecution called 2 more irrelevant
witnesses at the Milosevic trial. The two secret witnesses testified
under the pseudonyms "B-1455" and "B-1098." Neither of these witnesses
had anything to do with Milosevic.
Both men were Muslims who claimed to have survived execution by firing
squad in the vicinity of Zvornik in 1992. The only problem was that
they couldn't identify their would-be executioners. They tried to say
that it was the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) who was trying to execute
them, but at the time they were testifying about the JNA had already
vacated Bosnia. Therefore, whoever was trying to kill them was not the
JNA because the JNA wasn't there to do it. So now we have a situation
at The Hague where unknown persons are the victims of crimes at the
hands of unknown criminals. How can one even allege that Milosevic
could be guilty of anything here? We don't even know who was
perpetrating the crimes, and so you certainly can't allege that the
unknown criminals were acting on orders from Milosevic.
In the case of "B-1098" there was no forensic evidence to prove that
any execution had taken place at all.
"B-1455" might have been telling what he thought was the truth, but
"B-1098" was obviously lying. "B-1098" claimed that himself and 63
other men were taken to a meat processing facility where they were
shot. How did they get there? All 64 men got there on a 2 TON TRUCK
the witness said. The only problem is that it is impossible to fit 64
men on a 2 ton truck. The witness fell into a very common trap for
people who tell lies. He gave a lot of details to prove that he was
telling the truth, and then he couldn't remember all of the details
later, so he said something that was quite impossible.
In a case related to the Milosevic trial. The former JSO commander,
Franko "Frenki" Simatovic, plead innocent to all five counts that the
Tribunal accused him on. Frenki is jointly indicted with Jovica
Stanisic. Both men are accused of being a member of the so-called
"joint criminal enterprise." Frenki's innocent plea should put an end
to the media speculation that he would testify against Milosevic in
exchange for a lighter sentence.
Meanwhile, Jovica Stanisic is undergoing medical treatment in
Belgrade. A decision on his extradition is possible this week.
=== 2 ===
SYNOPSIS FOR THE MILOSEVIC "TRIAL"
FOR JUNE 03 2003
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - June 3, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Today at the Milosevic trial, President Milosevic concluded the
cross-examination of the secret witness “B-1098.”
In an attempt to be dramatic Mr. “B-1098” said that he was taken
prisoner along with 700 other Muslims and that “none of those people
were ever seen again.”
President Milosevic asked “B-1098” how many of those 700 people could
he identify. The witness responded that he could identify only 4 of
them.
President Milosevic then asked the next logical question. He asked the
witness how it was that he could say that these people were “never
seen again” when he didn’t even know who the people were to begin
with. How could the witness possibly know if the other people, whom he
couldn’t identify, were seen again or not?
Seeing that President Milosevic had captured this witness in a lie,
“Judge” May intervened to save the witness. Mr. May became indignant,
asking President Milosevic in a rather rude manner how he could
possibly think that this witness was making up stories. Then he accused
President Milosevic of attempting to provoke the witness and demanded
that he move on to another topic.
Following the conclusion of the cross-examination by President
Milosevic; the Amicus Curiae, Mr. Tapuskovic cross-examined the
witness. In his cross-examination Mr. Tapuskovic established a useful
fact. This witness had given two written statements he gave one
statement to the authorities in Tuzla on June 17, 1992 and he gave
another statement to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of The Hague
Tribunal on November 24, 1996.
In the first statement of June 17, 1992, just days after the alleged
executions by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) had allegedly taken
place; the witness never mentioned the JNA at all. Not once in his
1992 statement was the JNA even mentioned at all. It wasn’t until he
gave his statement to the OTP in 1996 that the JNA suddenly appeared.
Upon the conclusion of Mr. “B-1098’s” testimony another secret witness
was called by the prosecution. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff called the secret
witness testifying under the pseudonym “C-47.”
Mr. “C-47” was examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff until the hearing
adjourned for the day. Mr. “C-47’s” examination in chief is expected
to take another hour, and conclude early in the day on June 4th.
Following his examination in chief, he will be cross-examined by
President Milosevic.
Mr. “C-47” professes to be a former member of the Serbian Radical
Party (SRS). He says that he was a policeman in Serbia, and he claims
to have been a Chetnik volunteer.
After the trial was adjourned for the day, a motion hearing was held.
President Milosevic was not present at the motion hearing.
At the motion hearing, the Prosecutor, Mr. Nice complained that the
government of Serbia-Montenegro (formerly known as FR Yugoslavia) was
not cooperating. Mr. Nice claimed that they were not providing the
documents, and the access to documents that was requested by the OTP.
Lawyers for the Serbia-Montenegro (SCG) government were present at the
hearing. The SCG’s lawyers denied the prosecutor’s allegations that
the government was not cooperating.
The SCG lawyers accused the prosecutor of wanting to go on a “grand
fishing expedition” through the state archives of Yugoslavia.
In my opinion, if the prosecution is granted unrestricted access to
the archives of FR Yugoslavia, then President Milosevic and his
associates should be granted the same unrestricted access to state
archives, not only in Belgrade and Podgorica, but also in Zagreb,
Sarajevo, Pristina, Skopje, and Ljubljana.
“If it’s good for the goose it’s good for the gander”
In my opinion, If the Tribunal should rule that access to the archives
of a state should be unrestricted and that a party should have
unfettered access to them, then that should apply equally to the
prosecution and the defense, and it should apply equally to all of the
states that this illegal Tribunal considers to be under it’s so-called
“jurisdiction.”
At the end of the motion hearing the so-called “Judges” announced that
they would rule in due course, and then the motion hearing was
adjourned.
---
Chronology of events:
1. Milosevic finished the cross-examination of secret witness
“B-1098”
2. The Amicus Curiae, Mr. Tapuskovic cross-examined secret witness
“B-1098”
3. The Prosecutor, Mr. Nice briefly re-examined secret witness
“B-1098”
4. The Prosecutor, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff called the secret witness
“C-47” his examination in chief is expected to last for another hour
on June 4th.
5. The trial adjourned at 1:45 PM (Hague Time).
6. A Motion Hearing was held at 3:00 PM and lasted until
approximately 4:30 PM
=== 3 ===
MILOSEVIC "TRIAL" SYNOPSIS FOR JUNE 04 2003
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - June 4, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
It seems to me that Mr. “C-47” is a secret witness simply because he
is not who and what he professes to be. He is one of many false
witnesses who have testified against Milosevic. As I said yesterday,
this secret witness claimed to be a member of the Serbian Radical
Party (SRS) and a Chetnik volunteer.
The first thing that Slobodan Milosevic did in the cross-examination
was set the record straight regarding the treatment of Croats and
Hungarians by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). This “C-47” person
tried to say that the SPS was collaborating with the SRS to intimidate
Croats and Hungarians in Vojovodina. Milosevic explained that this was
nonsense because the SPS had hundreds of Croat and Hungarian members
in Vojovodina and that the SPS chairperson in Vojovodina was a
Hungarian woman. It is quite illogical that the SPS would want to
threaten its own members.
For a member of the SRS this “C-47” seemed to know remarkably little
about the party. For example this so-called “C-47” claimed that he had
joined the SRS in 1990, and that he had even spoken with Vojislav
Seselj in the autumn of 1990 about matters pertaining to the party on
an occasion when Mr. Seselj came to his village.
As Slobodan Milosevic pointed out there are 2 problems here. The first
problem is that the SRS was not founded until 1991, and so there was
no Serbian Radical Party for the witness to join in 1990. The second
problem is that Vojislav Seselj was in jail when this secret witness
claims to have talked to him about the still nonexistent SRS.
When President Milosevic confronted the witness on these points this
secret witness asked to go into closed session.
The next point is that the witness spoke about the SRS presidency in
Vojovodina. President Milosevic pointed out that the problem here was
that there is no SRS presidency in Vojovodina, because (unlike the
SPS) the SRS opposes the existence of provinces and favors one unified
Serbia with no provinces. Therefore, the SRS has only one presidency
for all of Serbia. So it is impossible for this witness to have had
anything to do with the SRS Presidency in Vojovodina because that is
something that doesn’t exist.
Another false claim from this secret witness was that the SUP
controlled the SRS. The witness arrived at this conclusion, because he
said that certain members of the SUP were members of the SRS.
Milosevic pointed out that a problem here was that all of the people
whom this secret witness had enumerated in the SUP were not members of
the SRS at all. Another problem is that it doesn’t matter what the
political orientation that some members of the SUP had was. Just
because one holds a position and at the same time has a political
leaning doesn’t mean that one is using their position to control their
political party. That is an absurdity. Upon being confronted with this
information the secret witness asked to go into closed session again.
Another falsehood was when the witness claimed that he had seen
Vojislav Seselj at a rally, on September 13, 1991, in which 5,000
people took part, where Mr. Seselj was allegedly threatening to “gouge
out the eyes of Croats with rusty spoons.”
Milosevic began to explain that Seselj had never said this. Milosevic
was explaining that this so-called “quote from Seselj” came from a
parody done on a Minimax comedy TV show -- at that point for some
unknown reason the Tribunal abruptly cut off the audio/video feed.
As far as the Chetniks were concerned “C-47” said that one of their
aims was to overthrow Milosevic. It is interesting to note here that
many witnesses have testified at Milosevic’s trial about crimes
committed by so-called "Chetniks." Does it seem logical that Slobodan
Milosevic would be in command of this group whose stated purpose was to
overthrow him?
In fact, as far as the command of volunteers is concerned it was all
done by the local commanders in the combat theatre. If for example,
the Army of Republika Srpska, or the Army of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina, or if some units of the TO needed help; they would call on
these groups of volunteers, and these volunteers would go to the
combat theatre, where they would receive their weapons, and their
orders from the local commanders in the field.
Whatever some volunteer unit did or didn’t do has absolutely nothing
at all to do with Slobodan Milosevic. He had nothing to do with any of
that – he didn’t issue any orders, and he didn’t issue any weapons.
Those volunteers went to the combat front on their own free will, and
helped the local Serb units in the field.
Even this secret witness testified when he left the theatre of combat
that him and all of the volunteers were searched at the border by the
Serbian authorities of Bosnia and Croatia to ensure that they weren’t
keeping any of the weapons that they had been given.
A number of manipulations were perpetrated by the Tribunal today. The
use of closed sessions was abused. The majority of the
cross-examination took place in closed session in spite of the
objections made by President Milosevic.
Because President Milosevic is innocent, and therefore has nothing to
hide, he wants this so-called “trial” to be held out in the open for
the public to see. The Tribunal, on the other hand knows full well
that this is a show trial, and therefore it wants to hold the “trial”
in secret.
The prosecutor changed the order of witnesses around again today,
which makes it difficult for Milosevic to prepare for
cross-examinations. Then the prosecutor requested that the hearing for
tomorrow be extended. The problem here is that President Milosevic can
only meet with his associates from 3 PM until 4:45 PM after the
hearings, and as it stands now even with the hearings adjourning at
1:45 PM he still can’t always get to the prison by 3 PM. His
associates do his research for him and when his access to them is
limited his defense is hampered.
---
Sequence of events for 4 June 2003:
1. The Prosecutor, MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF - Concluded the examination in
chief of the secret witness “C-47”
2. President, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC - Cross-examined the secret witness
“C-47” NOTE: “C-47’s” cross-examination is not yet complete.
=== 4 ===
MILOSEVIC TRIAL SYNOPSIS FOR JUNE 05 2003
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - June 5, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
The secret witness “B-24” claimed to have been a member of the crisis
staff in the Serb Municipality of Zvornik from the inception of the
crisis staff until 12 April 1992, while serving in the crisis staff
“B-24” says that he was the commander of the police station. “B-24”
also claimed that he was a member of the SDS, and president of the
local government in Zvornik (i.e. he was the Mayor) from February 1993
until September 1993.
"B-24" provided some useful information, but it was also apparent that
he was testifying under threat.
We will start with the useful information that Mr. “B-24” provided.
First and foremost, under cross-examination from President Milosevic,
“B-24” explained the sequence of events that lead up to the Serbian
counterinsurgency operation that took place on 8 April 1992 in Zvornik.
“B-24” explained that the Muslims began to form armed paramilitary
formations of the so-called “Patriotic League” in 1991 before the
outbreak of any hostilities in Bosnia. He said that the Muslims had
substantial man power, and that they were well armed.
“B-24” explained how the Muslim paramilitaries would recruit
criminals, arm the criminals, and then make the criminals into the
police, and that they did this with a view to intimidating the Serbs.
“B-24” explained how the Serb population fled from Zvornik and how the
counterinsurgency operation of 8 April 1992 enabled them to return,
along with some 15,000 Serb refugees who had fled from central Bosnia.
“B-24” explained that the Muslim paramilitaries seized control of
Zvornik on 5 April 1992.
“B-24” explained that on 6 April 1992 five soldiers of the Yugoslav
People’s Army (JNA) were massacred in Zvornik by the Muslim armed
extremists. 6 April 1992 was the 2nd day of Muslim control over
Zvornik. 6 April 1992 was also the day that Bosnia was recognized as
an independent state, and in addition to that 6 April is the
anniversary of Hitler’s first attacks on Yugoslavia.
On 8 April 1992 the Territorial Defense (T.O.) of the Serb
Municipality of Zvornik, along with, various volunteers, and Arkan’s
Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG) launched a counterinsurgency operation
and took control of Zvornik away from the Muslim paramilitaries.
“B-24” explained that no JNA personnel and no government personnel
from Serbia took part in the counterinsurgency operation.
“B-24” explained that the Serbian authorities in Zvornik did all they
could to protect the Muslim civilian population of Zvornik, but as the
war raged on they couldn’t maintain control over the municipality, and
illegal paramilitaries, criminals out to exploit the situation, and
civilians angry at the whole situation made it so there was virtually
no government in Zvornik from roughly May to June of 1992. And that in
this chaotic situation Muslims were victimized, their mosques were
destroyed, and they fled.
Contrast this with the situation in just across the Drina River in
Mali Zvornik (in Serbia). As President Milosevic pointed out, passions
were high there too, but the authorities of Serbia managed to keep
order and nobody harmed that town’s 20% Muslim population, or laid a
finger on their Mosque, which was being guarded around the clock by
the MUP of Serbia.
It was also noted by Milosevic, and confirmed by “B-24” that members
of an illegal paramilitary formation that victimized Muslims at the
Chelopek Cultural Center were arrested and prosecuted by the
Government of Serbia on the basis of information provided by the
authorities of the Republika Srpska.
In spite of these useful things that “B-24” explained it was apparent
that he was at the Tribunal under threat of an indictment against
himself.
As I stated above “B-24” was a member of the crisis staff and served
as the commander of the police station in the Serb Municipality of
Zvornik. He held this position during the counterinsurgency operation.
“B-24’s” story about how the counterinsurgency operation came about is
a little odd. “B-24” claimed that Arkan and 24 of his men beat-up the
members of the Zvornik crisis staff and forced the T.O., which
numbered over 500, to launch the operation against their will. So are
we are to believe that Arkan and 24 members of the SDG were able to
force the 500 member T.O. to do something that it didn’t want to do?
“B-24” systematically avoided taking any responsibility even though he
was in a command position. Instead he blamed Arkan, in an effort to
remove command responsibility from himself.
“B-24’s” story doesn’t make sense here, because he told Milosevic in
the cross-examination that he was the one who personally went and got
Arkan and his men, brought them back, and arranged for their
accommodations. So it looks as if the plan was already made when Arkan
was brought in.
“B-24” tried to link Arkan to Milosevic by saying that he saw Arkan
getting out of a vehicle that had a license plate that indicated that
it belonged to the federal SUP, and that he had acquired Arkan’s
services on the advice of * a friend of his * who just happened to be
a member of the Serbian MUP.
The part about Arkan using the federal SUP’s vehicle is as much of a
lie as the part about Arkan and his 24 men beating-up the whole crisis
staff and forcing the 500 man T.O. to launch an operation against
their will. Arkan had his own vehicles, why on Earth would he use the
vehicle of the federal SUP? It doesn’t make sense.
I believe that “B-24” said this stuff about Arkan because the Tribunal
made a deal with him. I think that they sat “B-24” down and said,
“Testify against Milosevic or else we will slap a war crimes
indictment on you.”
The last question Mr. Groome asked “B-24” in his examination in chief
was: “Are you getting anything in exchange for your testimony?” To
which B-24 said, “No.” The real question is what B-24 was * not *
getting in exchange for his testimony? Was he * not * getting indicted
for war crimes perhaps?
---
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR 5 JUNE 2003:
1. Prosecutor Mr. Groome finished the examination in chief of the
secret witness testifying under the pseudonym “B-24”
2. Slobodan Milosevic cross-examined the secret witness testifying
under the pseudonym “B-24”
3. The Amicus Curiae Mr. Kay cross-examined the secret witness
testifying under the pseudonym “B-24”
4. The secret witness testifying under the pseudonym “B-1098” was
recalled and gave secret testimony in a closed session.
===
There were no proceedings scheduled between June 6 and June 9.
Proceedings resumed on June 10.
=== 5 ===
SYNOPSIS FOR THE MILOSEVIC “TRIAL” JUNE 10 2003
www.slobodan-milosevic.org – June 10, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
After a four day weekend the so-called “trial” of Slobodan Milosevic
resumed at The Hague Tribunal. President Milosevic finished the
cross-examination of the secret witness testifying under the pseudonym
of “C-47.” Then the prosecution called another secret witness who
testified under the pseudonym of “C-17.”
“C-47” continued to make an ass of himself. It is no wonder that he is
a secret witness. If I was saying the things that he was saying I’d be
embarrassed to show my face too.
“C-47” explained that nobody ordered the Chetnik volunteers to kill
and loot, but that they allegedly did simply because they didn’t have
anything better to do. “C-47” went on to say that his unit didn’t do
such things, but that he saw others doing it.
President Milosevic asked “C-47” if he ever reported any of the crimes
that he says the Chetniks were committing, and “C-47” replied that he
didn’t report anything to anybody.
After “C-47” finished, the prosecutor called another secret witness.
They call this one “C-17.” “C-17” testified about events around
Mostar. In particular “C-17” was talking about a camp that was being
used as a base for Chetnik volunteer units and the Krajina Red Berets.
The prosecutor kept on referring to a volunteer unit from the SAO
Krajina, known as the Krajina Red Berets as simply the “Red Berets.”
It is obvious that the prosecutor was attempting to confuse people
into thinking that the Serbian JSO (also known as the Red Berets) was
at this camp in Mostar.
The commander of the Krajina Red Berets, one Dragan Vasiljkovic, has
already come to the Hague Tribunal and testified that they were not
under the command of Slobodan Milosevic, and that the Serbian JSO had
nothing to with the Krajina Red Berets – these two totally separate
units just had the same name that’s all.
“C-17’s” testimony consisted of what the Krajina Red Berets and the
Chetniks, based at this camp, allegedly did around Mostar.
Seeing as how “C-47” testified that the Chetniks wanted to overthrow
Milosevic, and seeing as how the commander of the Krajina Red Berets
has already denied that they were under Milosevic’s command; I fail to
see what either one of these witnesses has to do with Milosevic.
The Tribunal recently gave the prosecution an additional 100 days to
present its case against Milosevic, because the original deadline for
them to finish their case had expired. Seeing such worthless witnesses
makes me wonder what the point of giving them more time was.
The only thing that the prosecution has proven beyond any doubt is
that they don’t have a case.
After the indictment against him was read-out at the beginning of the
“trial” President Milosevic said that it was written at the
intellectual level of a “retarded seven-year-old child.” After seeing
the prosecution, for nearly 2 years now, trying to prove this false
indictment, I’m afraid that I have to disagree with President
Milosevic. I think that a retarded seven-year-old could have done
better than the prosecution.
---
Sequence of Events for June 10, 2003
1. Judge Kwon was late because he got stuck in traffic.
2. Slobodan Milosevic concluded the cross-examination of the secret
witness testifying under the pseudonym “C-47.”
3. The prosecutor, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff examined the secret witness
testifying under the pseudonym “C-17.”
=== 6 ===
SYNOPSIS OF THE MILOSEVIC “TRIAL” FOR 11 JUNE 2003
www.slobodan-milosevic.org – June 11, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Today at the Hague Tribunal the secret witness testifying under the
pseudonym of “C-17” concluded his testimony.
During the conclusion of his examination-in-chief this so-called
“C-17” told Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff about an incident where a Canadian
volunteer took members of UNPROFOR hostage, and attempted to use them
as human shields during the NATO bombing.
The secret witness, together with that woman from the other side,
proceeded to present that shameful taking of hostages as some sort of
act organized by Slobodan Milosevic’s envoy, Jovica Stanisic. They
explained that Jovica Stanisic came to Bosnia and wanted to take over
the hostages, but they didn’t explain why.
In the cross-examination Slobodan Milosevic cleared this whole thing
up. It was explained that the Government of Serbia had actually
negotiated the release of the hostages, and that Jovica Stanisic was
sent to Bosnia by President Milosevic in order to take over the
hostages so that they could be brought back to Serbia and set free.
This typical for that so-called “prosecution.” They took a
humanitarian act where the Government of Serbia secured the release of
hostages, and then tried to make it look like evidence of some sort of
crime.
This secret witness gave a statement to the tribunal consisting almost
exclusively of things that he says he heard from other people. A
typical example was when he said that the Government of Serbia was
providing weapons to the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS).
The witness said that he saw civilian trucks from Serbia and that
somebody told him that the trucks contained weapons. “C-17” never
actually saw the weapons, he only heard about them from other people.
There was so much hearsay in “C-17’s” statement that President
Milosevic came right out and asked him what the point of his so-called
“evidence” was. “C-17” explained that he couldn’t answer that question
because didn’t work for the tribunal, and that he was only testifying
because they asked him to. In other words, this secret witness was so
useless that he didn’t even know what the point of his own testimony
was.
This witness was so ill-informed that it was pathetic. Yesterday I
accused the prosecution of trying to manipulate public perception by
calling the Krajina Red Berets, simply the “Red Berets.” I thought
that they were trying to create a misleading perception that the
Serbian JSO was involved in Bosnia.
Apparently, the witness really was talking about the Serbian JSO. The
problem here, as President Milosevic pointed out, is that the Serbian
JSO didn’t even exist during the time that the witness was talking
about, so the witness couldn’t have seen the Serbian JSO in Mostar or
anywhere else, because they didn’t exist.
More evidence that this secret witness was ill-informed came when he
was speaking about the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) being in Mostar as
late as the middle of June 1992.
As President Milosevic pointed out, the JNA didn’t exist in Bosnia
after May 19, 1992. The JNA was ordered to withdraw from Bosnia,
however Bosnian-Serb JNA members remained on their homeland, and the
JNA equipment which they had in their possession remained in Bosnia
with them and that is how the VRS was formed. So it is obvious that
“C-17” was either lying or seeing things that weren’t there when he
says that he saw the JNA in the middle of June. Either way whether he
was hallucinating or lying; the repeated references that this secret
witness made to the JNA being in Mostar in June of 1992 calls his
credibility into question.
All in all this was just another worthless witness in this shameful
political circus that they call a “trial.”
---
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR THE MILOSEVIC “TRIAL” FOR 11 JUNE 2003
1. The Prosecutor, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff concluded the examination in
chief of the secret witness testifying under the pseudonym of “C-17.”
2. President Slobodan Milosevic cross-examined the secret witness
testifying under the pseudonym of “C-17”
3. The Amicus Curiae, Mr. Tapuskovic cross-examined the secret
witness testifying under the pseudonym of “C-17”
4. The Prosecutor, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff re-examined the secret witness
testifying under the pseudonym of “C-17”
=== 7 ===
SYNOPSIS OF THE MILOSEVIC TRIAL JUNE 12 - 16
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - June 16, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
The prosecution called Osman Selak. Selak tried to say that the VJ
(FRY Army) was in direct command over the VRS (Army of Republika
Srpska).
During cross-examination, President Milosevic asked Mr. Selak if he
could cite any order that the VJ ever issued to the VRS. Selak
couldn't produce any orders or examples or anything like that, but he
did have a diagram that he drew where he drew a line between a box
marked "VJ" and another box marked "VRS." I guess that this line drawn
between the 2 boxes is what passes for "evidence" at the Hague
Tribunal.
To top off the absurdity of this whole thing, Mr. Selak hates Serbs.
Mr. Kay was talking about the history of the JNA, and he mentioned the
Second World War. Mr. Selak couldn't restrain himself he had to take a
shot at the Serbs and so he lied and said that the Chetniks supported
the Nazis.
Serb Chetniks saved the lives of more than 500 U.S. Airmen during the
2nd world war. Those Americans were saved from the Nazis by the
Chetniks. Draza Mihailovich is a hero in the fight against fascism and
this witness tried to call those honorable men Nazis! As an American I
am deeply offended by that remark.
The prosecutor must be scraping the bottom of the barrel, because
after calling the racist Selak to testify, they resorted to calling
Dr. Budimir Babovic, a political scientist from Montenegro, to testify
about the Serbian police.
This guy's claim to fame was that he wrote a book, which was paid for
by the Soros Foundation. In the book he talks about how Milosevic
"abused the police." He gets all of his information in his book from
"the international and domestic media" and through his own "personal
analysis of the laws and constitution of Serbia," even though he isn't
a lawyer or anything like that. He's just, as Mr. Kwon put it, "a
layman."
Dr. Babovic had no direct knowledge of anything. The only thing that
the so-called "expert witness" managed to prove was his own ignorance
of the Serbian Constitution and the Serbian penal code. President
Milosevic would ask the so-called "expert" questions about the law and
this dummy didn't have a clue what he was talking about. If it wasn't
so funny to watch it would be sad.
Following Babovic was "B-1047." Allegedly, Arkan's men unsuccessfully
tried to execute "B-1047."
After the alleged attempted execution, "B-1047" made his way to a VRS
base and the VRS arranged for him to be transported to a hospital in
Banja Luka for medical treatment. It is important to note that Banja
Luka was always held by the Serbs.
"B-1047" is an invalid because of his wounds, and he tells a very
harrowing story, but he has nothing to do with Milosevic. I would
really like to see the prosecution explain why he should be brought in
to testify against Milosevic.
What does "B-1047's" plight prove against Milosevic? They aren't
saying that Milosevic ordered that "B-1047" should be shot, and so I
really don't see what the point here is.
This isn't unique. Witnesses who aren't relevant to anything Milosevic
is accused of testify against him all the time. All I can see is that
the prosecution is wasting time.
The prosecution doesn't need extra time for presenting their case.
They don't have a case. The more they try to prove their false
indictment the dumber it makes them look.
Anyway, tomorrow should be interesting. The Former Yugoslav President,
Zoran Lilic will be testifying.
---
ORDER OF WITNESSES
1. Former JNA colonel / Logistics Base Commander, Osman Selak
2. Political scientist from Montenegro, Dr. Budimir Babovic
3. A secret witness testifying under the pseudonym of "B-1047"
All witnesses were examined by the Prosecution, cross-examined by
President Milosevic, cross-examined by the Amicus Curiae, and finally
re-examined by the Prosecution.
1. TWO SECRET WITNESSES ALLEGE THAT THEY SURVIVED EXECUTION ATTEMPT
(June 2nd)
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg060203.htm
2. SYNOPSIS FOR THE MILOSEVIC "TRIAL" JUNE 03 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg060303.htm
3. MILOSEVIC "TRIAL" SYNOPSIS FOR JUNE 04 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg060403.htm
4. MILOSEVIC TRIAL SYNOPSIS FOR JUNE 05 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg060503.htm
5. SYNOPSIS FOR THE MILOSEVIC “TRIAL” JUNE 10 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg061003.htm
6. SYNOPSIS OF THE MILOSEVIC “TRIAL” JUNE 11 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg061103.htm
7. SYNOPSIS OF THE MILOSEVIC TRIAL JUNE 12 - 16
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg061603.htm
=== 1 ===
TWO SECRET WITNESSES ALLEGE THAT THEY SURVIVED EXECUTION ATTEMPT
June 2, 2003 - www.slobodan-milosevic.org
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Monday at the Hague Tribunal the prosecution called 2 more irrelevant
witnesses at the Milosevic trial. The two secret witnesses testified
under the pseudonyms "B-1455" and "B-1098." Neither of these witnesses
had anything to do with Milosevic.
Both men were Muslims who claimed to have survived execution by firing
squad in the vicinity of Zvornik in 1992. The only problem was that
they couldn't identify their would-be executioners. They tried to say
that it was the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) who was trying to execute
them, but at the time they were testifying about the JNA had already
vacated Bosnia. Therefore, whoever was trying to kill them was not the
JNA because the JNA wasn't there to do it. So now we have a situation
at The Hague where unknown persons are the victims of crimes at the
hands of unknown criminals. How can one even allege that Milosevic
could be guilty of anything here? We don't even know who was
perpetrating the crimes, and so you certainly can't allege that the
unknown criminals were acting on orders from Milosevic.
In the case of "B-1098" there was no forensic evidence to prove that
any execution had taken place at all.
"B-1455" might have been telling what he thought was the truth, but
"B-1098" was obviously lying. "B-1098" claimed that himself and 63
other men were taken to a meat processing facility where they were
shot. How did they get there? All 64 men got there on a 2 TON TRUCK
the witness said. The only problem is that it is impossible to fit 64
men on a 2 ton truck. The witness fell into a very common trap for
people who tell lies. He gave a lot of details to prove that he was
telling the truth, and then he couldn't remember all of the details
later, so he said something that was quite impossible.
In a case related to the Milosevic trial. The former JSO commander,
Franko "Frenki" Simatovic, plead innocent to all five counts that the
Tribunal accused him on. Frenki is jointly indicted with Jovica
Stanisic. Both men are accused of being a member of the so-called
"joint criminal enterprise." Frenki's innocent plea should put an end
to the media speculation that he would testify against Milosevic in
exchange for a lighter sentence.
Meanwhile, Jovica Stanisic is undergoing medical treatment in
Belgrade. A decision on his extradition is possible this week.
=== 2 ===
SYNOPSIS FOR THE MILOSEVIC "TRIAL"
FOR JUNE 03 2003
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - June 3, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Today at the Milosevic trial, President Milosevic concluded the
cross-examination of the secret witness “B-1098.”
In an attempt to be dramatic Mr. “B-1098” said that he was taken
prisoner along with 700 other Muslims and that “none of those people
were ever seen again.”
President Milosevic asked “B-1098” how many of those 700 people could
he identify. The witness responded that he could identify only 4 of
them.
President Milosevic then asked the next logical question. He asked the
witness how it was that he could say that these people were “never
seen again” when he didn’t even know who the people were to begin
with. How could the witness possibly know if the other people, whom he
couldn’t identify, were seen again or not?
Seeing that President Milosevic had captured this witness in a lie,
“Judge” May intervened to save the witness. Mr. May became indignant,
asking President Milosevic in a rather rude manner how he could
possibly think that this witness was making up stories. Then he accused
President Milosevic of attempting to provoke the witness and demanded
that he move on to another topic.
Following the conclusion of the cross-examination by President
Milosevic; the Amicus Curiae, Mr. Tapuskovic cross-examined the
witness. In his cross-examination Mr. Tapuskovic established a useful
fact. This witness had given two written statements he gave one
statement to the authorities in Tuzla on June 17, 1992 and he gave
another statement to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of The Hague
Tribunal on November 24, 1996.
In the first statement of June 17, 1992, just days after the alleged
executions by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) had allegedly taken
place; the witness never mentioned the JNA at all. Not once in his
1992 statement was the JNA even mentioned at all. It wasn’t until he
gave his statement to the OTP in 1996 that the JNA suddenly appeared.
Upon the conclusion of Mr. “B-1098’s” testimony another secret witness
was called by the prosecution. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff called the secret
witness testifying under the pseudonym “C-47.”
Mr. “C-47” was examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff until the hearing
adjourned for the day. Mr. “C-47’s” examination in chief is expected
to take another hour, and conclude early in the day on June 4th.
Following his examination in chief, he will be cross-examined by
President Milosevic.
Mr. “C-47” professes to be a former member of the Serbian Radical
Party (SRS). He says that he was a policeman in Serbia, and he claims
to have been a Chetnik volunteer.
After the trial was adjourned for the day, a motion hearing was held.
President Milosevic was not present at the motion hearing.
At the motion hearing, the Prosecutor, Mr. Nice complained that the
government of Serbia-Montenegro (formerly known as FR Yugoslavia) was
not cooperating. Mr. Nice claimed that they were not providing the
documents, and the access to documents that was requested by the OTP.
Lawyers for the Serbia-Montenegro (SCG) government were present at the
hearing. The SCG’s lawyers denied the prosecutor’s allegations that
the government was not cooperating.
The SCG lawyers accused the prosecutor of wanting to go on a “grand
fishing expedition” through the state archives of Yugoslavia.
In my opinion, if the prosecution is granted unrestricted access to
the archives of FR Yugoslavia, then President Milosevic and his
associates should be granted the same unrestricted access to state
archives, not only in Belgrade and Podgorica, but also in Zagreb,
Sarajevo, Pristina, Skopje, and Ljubljana.
“If it’s good for the goose it’s good for the gander”
In my opinion, If the Tribunal should rule that access to the archives
of a state should be unrestricted and that a party should have
unfettered access to them, then that should apply equally to the
prosecution and the defense, and it should apply equally to all of the
states that this illegal Tribunal considers to be under it’s so-called
“jurisdiction.”
At the end of the motion hearing the so-called “Judges” announced that
they would rule in due course, and then the motion hearing was
adjourned.
---
Chronology of events:
1. Milosevic finished the cross-examination of secret witness
“B-1098”
2. The Amicus Curiae, Mr. Tapuskovic cross-examined secret witness
“B-1098”
3. The Prosecutor, Mr. Nice briefly re-examined secret witness
“B-1098”
4. The Prosecutor, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff called the secret witness
“C-47” his examination in chief is expected to last for another hour
on June 4th.
5. The trial adjourned at 1:45 PM (Hague Time).
6. A Motion Hearing was held at 3:00 PM and lasted until
approximately 4:30 PM
=== 3 ===
MILOSEVIC "TRIAL" SYNOPSIS FOR JUNE 04 2003
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - June 4, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
It seems to me that Mr. “C-47” is a secret witness simply because he
is not who and what he professes to be. He is one of many false
witnesses who have testified against Milosevic. As I said yesterday,
this secret witness claimed to be a member of the Serbian Radical
Party (SRS) and a Chetnik volunteer.
The first thing that Slobodan Milosevic did in the cross-examination
was set the record straight regarding the treatment of Croats and
Hungarians by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). This “C-47” person
tried to say that the SPS was collaborating with the SRS to intimidate
Croats and Hungarians in Vojovodina. Milosevic explained that this was
nonsense because the SPS had hundreds of Croat and Hungarian members
in Vojovodina and that the SPS chairperson in Vojovodina was a
Hungarian woman. It is quite illogical that the SPS would want to
threaten its own members.
For a member of the SRS this “C-47” seemed to know remarkably little
about the party. For example this so-called “C-47” claimed that he had
joined the SRS in 1990, and that he had even spoken with Vojislav
Seselj in the autumn of 1990 about matters pertaining to the party on
an occasion when Mr. Seselj came to his village.
As Slobodan Milosevic pointed out there are 2 problems here. The first
problem is that the SRS was not founded until 1991, and so there was
no Serbian Radical Party for the witness to join in 1990. The second
problem is that Vojislav Seselj was in jail when this secret witness
claims to have talked to him about the still nonexistent SRS.
When President Milosevic confronted the witness on these points this
secret witness asked to go into closed session.
The next point is that the witness spoke about the SRS presidency in
Vojovodina. President Milosevic pointed out that the problem here was
that there is no SRS presidency in Vojovodina, because (unlike the
SPS) the SRS opposes the existence of provinces and favors one unified
Serbia with no provinces. Therefore, the SRS has only one presidency
for all of Serbia. So it is impossible for this witness to have had
anything to do with the SRS Presidency in Vojovodina because that is
something that doesn’t exist.
Another false claim from this secret witness was that the SUP
controlled the SRS. The witness arrived at this conclusion, because he
said that certain members of the SUP were members of the SRS.
Milosevic pointed out that a problem here was that all of the people
whom this secret witness had enumerated in the SUP were not members of
the SRS at all. Another problem is that it doesn’t matter what the
political orientation that some members of the SUP had was. Just
because one holds a position and at the same time has a political
leaning doesn’t mean that one is using their position to control their
political party. That is an absurdity. Upon being confronted with this
information the secret witness asked to go into closed session again.
Another falsehood was when the witness claimed that he had seen
Vojislav Seselj at a rally, on September 13, 1991, in which 5,000
people took part, where Mr. Seselj was allegedly threatening to “gouge
out the eyes of Croats with rusty spoons.”
Milosevic began to explain that Seselj had never said this. Milosevic
was explaining that this so-called “quote from Seselj” came from a
parody done on a Minimax comedy TV show -- at that point for some
unknown reason the Tribunal abruptly cut off the audio/video feed.
As far as the Chetniks were concerned “C-47” said that one of their
aims was to overthrow Milosevic. It is interesting to note here that
many witnesses have testified at Milosevic’s trial about crimes
committed by so-called "Chetniks." Does it seem logical that Slobodan
Milosevic would be in command of this group whose stated purpose was to
overthrow him?
In fact, as far as the command of volunteers is concerned it was all
done by the local commanders in the combat theatre. If for example,
the Army of Republika Srpska, or the Army of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina, or if some units of the TO needed help; they would call on
these groups of volunteers, and these volunteers would go to the
combat theatre, where they would receive their weapons, and their
orders from the local commanders in the field.
Whatever some volunteer unit did or didn’t do has absolutely nothing
at all to do with Slobodan Milosevic. He had nothing to do with any of
that – he didn’t issue any orders, and he didn’t issue any weapons.
Those volunteers went to the combat front on their own free will, and
helped the local Serb units in the field.
Even this secret witness testified when he left the theatre of combat
that him and all of the volunteers were searched at the border by the
Serbian authorities of Bosnia and Croatia to ensure that they weren’t
keeping any of the weapons that they had been given.
A number of manipulations were perpetrated by the Tribunal today. The
use of closed sessions was abused. The majority of the
cross-examination took place in closed session in spite of the
objections made by President Milosevic.
Because President Milosevic is innocent, and therefore has nothing to
hide, he wants this so-called “trial” to be held out in the open for
the public to see. The Tribunal, on the other hand knows full well
that this is a show trial, and therefore it wants to hold the “trial”
in secret.
The prosecutor changed the order of witnesses around again today,
which makes it difficult for Milosevic to prepare for
cross-examinations. Then the prosecutor requested that the hearing for
tomorrow be extended. The problem here is that President Milosevic can
only meet with his associates from 3 PM until 4:45 PM after the
hearings, and as it stands now even with the hearings adjourning at
1:45 PM he still can’t always get to the prison by 3 PM. His
associates do his research for him and when his access to them is
limited his defense is hampered.
---
Sequence of events for 4 June 2003:
1. The Prosecutor, MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF - Concluded the examination in
chief of the secret witness “C-47”
2. President, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC - Cross-examined the secret witness
“C-47” NOTE: “C-47’s” cross-examination is not yet complete.
=== 4 ===
MILOSEVIC TRIAL SYNOPSIS FOR JUNE 05 2003
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - June 5, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
The secret witness “B-24” claimed to have been a member of the crisis
staff in the Serb Municipality of Zvornik from the inception of the
crisis staff until 12 April 1992, while serving in the crisis staff
“B-24” says that he was the commander of the police station. “B-24”
also claimed that he was a member of the SDS, and president of the
local government in Zvornik (i.e. he was the Mayor) from February 1993
until September 1993.
"B-24" provided some useful information, but it was also apparent that
he was testifying under threat.
We will start with the useful information that Mr. “B-24” provided.
First and foremost, under cross-examination from President Milosevic,
“B-24” explained the sequence of events that lead up to the Serbian
counterinsurgency operation that took place on 8 April 1992 in Zvornik.
“B-24” explained that the Muslims began to form armed paramilitary
formations of the so-called “Patriotic League” in 1991 before the
outbreak of any hostilities in Bosnia. He said that the Muslims had
substantial man power, and that they were well armed.
“B-24” explained how the Muslim paramilitaries would recruit
criminals, arm the criminals, and then make the criminals into the
police, and that they did this with a view to intimidating the Serbs.
“B-24” explained how the Serb population fled from Zvornik and how the
counterinsurgency operation of 8 April 1992 enabled them to return,
along with some 15,000 Serb refugees who had fled from central Bosnia.
“B-24” explained that the Muslim paramilitaries seized control of
Zvornik on 5 April 1992.
“B-24” explained that on 6 April 1992 five soldiers of the Yugoslav
People’s Army (JNA) were massacred in Zvornik by the Muslim armed
extremists. 6 April 1992 was the 2nd day of Muslim control over
Zvornik. 6 April 1992 was also the day that Bosnia was recognized as
an independent state, and in addition to that 6 April is the
anniversary of Hitler’s first attacks on Yugoslavia.
On 8 April 1992 the Territorial Defense (T.O.) of the Serb
Municipality of Zvornik, along with, various volunteers, and Arkan’s
Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG) launched a counterinsurgency operation
and took control of Zvornik away from the Muslim paramilitaries.
“B-24” explained that no JNA personnel and no government personnel
from Serbia took part in the counterinsurgency operation.
“B-24” explained that the Serbian authorities in Zvornik did all they
could to protect the Muslim civilian population of Zvornik, but as the
war raged on they couldn’t maintain control over the municipality, and
illegal paramilitaries, criminals out to exploit the situation, and
civilians angry at the whole situation made it so there was virtually
no government in Zvornik from roughly May to June of 1992. And that in
this chaotic situation Muslims were victimized, their mosques were
destroyed, and they fled.
Contrast this with the situation in just across the Drina River in
Mali Zvornik (in Serbia). As President Milosevic pointed out, passions
were high there too, but the authorities of Serbia managed to keep
order and nobody harmed that town’s 20% Muslim population, or laid a
finger on their Mosque, which was being guarded around the clock by
the MUP of Serbia.
It was also noted by Milosevic, and confirmed by “B-24” that members
of an illegal paramilitary formation that victimized Muslims at the
Chelopek Cultural Center were arrested and prosecuted by the
Government of Serbia on the basis of information provided by the
authorities of the Republika Srpska.
In spite of these useful things that “B-24” explained it was apparent
that he was at the Tribunal under threat of an indictment against
himself.
As I stated above “B-24” was a member of the crisis staff and served
as the commander of the police station in the Serb Municipality of
Zvornik. He held this position during the counterinsurgency operation.
“B-24’s” story about how the counterinsurgency operation came about is
a little odd. “B-24” claimed that Arkan and 24 of his men beat-up the
members of the Zvornik crisis staff and forced the T.O., which
numbered over 500, to launch the operation against their will. So are
we are to believe that Arkan and 24 members of the SDG were able to
force the 500 member T.O. to do something that it didn’t want to do?
“B-24” systematically avoided taking any responsibility even though he
was in a command position. Instead he blamed Arkan, in an effort to
remove command responsibility from himself.
“B-24’s” story doesn’t make sense here, because he told Milosevic in
the cross-examination that he was the one who personally went and got
Arkan and his men, brought them back, and arranged for their
accommodations. So it looks as if the plan was already made when Arkan
was brought in.
“B-24” tried to link Arkan to Milosevic by saying that he saw Arkan
getting out of a vehicle that had a license plate that indicated that
it belonged to the federal SUP, and that he had acquired Arkan’s
services on the advice of * a friend of his * who just happened to be
a member of the Serbian MUP.
The part about Arkan using the federal SUP’s vehicle is as much of a
lie as the part about Arkan and his 24 men beating-up the whole crisis
staff and forcing the 500 man T.O. to launch an operation against
their will. Arkan had his own vehicles, why on Earth would he use the
vehicle of the federal SUP? It doesn’t make sense.
I believe that “B-24” said this stuff about Arkan because the Tribunal
made a deal with him. I think that they sat “B-24” down and said,
“Testify against Milosevic or else we will slap a war crimes
indictment on you.”
The last question Mr. Groome asked “B-24” in his examination in chief
was: “Are you getting anything in exchange for your testimony?” To
which B-24 said, “No.” The real question is what B-24 was * not *
getting in exchange for his testimony? Was he * not * getting indicted
for war crimes perhaps?
---
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR 5 JUNE 2003:
1. Prosecutor Mr. Groome finished the examination in chief of the
secret witness testifying under the pseudonym “B-24”
2. Slobodan Milosevic cross-examined the secret witness testifying
under the pseudonym “B-24”
3. The Amicus Curiae Mr. Kay cross-examined the secret witness
testifying under the pseudonym “B-24”
4. The secret witness testifying under the pseudonym “B-1098” was
recalled and gave secret testimony in a closed session.
===
There were no proceedings scheduled between June 6 and June 9.
Proceedings resumed on June 10.
=== 5 ===
SYNOPSIS FOR THE MILOSEVIC “TRIAL” JUNE 10 2003
www.slobodan-milosevic.org – June 10, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
After a four day weekend the so-called “trial” of Slobodan Milosevic
resumed at The Hague Tribunal. President Milosevic finished the
cross-examination of the secret witness testifying under the pseudonym
of “C-47.” Then the prosecution called another secret witness who
testified under the pseudonym of “C-17.”
“C-47” continued to make an ass of himself. It is no wonder that he is
a secret witness. If I was saying the things that he was saying I’d be
embarrassed to show my face too.
“C-47” explained that nobody ordered the Chetnik volunteers to kill
and loot, but that they allegedly did simply because they didn’t have
anything better to do. “C-47” went on to say that his unit didn’t do
such things, but that he saw others doing it.
President Milosevic asked “C-47” if he ever reported any of the crimes
that he says the Chetniks were committing, and “C-47” replied that he
didn’t report anything to anybody.
After “C-47” finished, the prosecutor called another secret witness.
They call this one “C-17.” “C-17” testified about events around
Mostar. In particular “C-17” was talking about a camp that was being
used as a base for Chetnik volunteer units and the Krajina Red Berets.
The prosecutor kept on referring to a volunteer unit from the SAO
Krajina, known as the Krajina Red Berets as simply the “Red Berets.”
It is obvious that the prosecutor was attempting to confuse people
into thinking that the Serbian JSO (also known as the Red Berets) was
at this camp in Mostar.
The commander of the Krajina Red Berets, one Dragan Vasiljkovic, has
already come to the Hague Tribunal and testified that they were not
under the command of Slobodan Milosevic, and that the Serbian JSO had
nothing to with the Krajina Red Berets – these two totally separate
units just had the same name that’s all.
“C-17’s” testimony consisted of what the Krajina Red Berets and the
Chetniks, based at this camp, allegedly did around Mostar.
Seeing as how “C-47” testified that the Chetniks wanted to overthrow
Milosevic, and seeing as how the commander of the Krajina Red Berets
has already denied that they were under Milosevic’s command; I fail to
see what either one of these witnesses has to do with Milosevic.
The Tribunal recently gave the prosecution an additional 100 days to
present its case against Milosevic, because the original deadline for
them to finish their case had expired. Seeing such worthless witnesses
makes me wonder what the point of giving them more time was.
The only thing that the prosecution has proven beyond any doubt is
that they don’t have a case.
After the indictment against him was read-out at the beginning of the
“trial” President Milosevic said that it was written at the
intellectual level of a “retarded seven-year-old child.” After seeing
the prosecution, for nearly 2 years now, trying to prove this false
indictment, I’m afraid that I have to disagree with President
Milosevic. I think that a retarded seven-year-old could have done
better than the prosecution.
---
Sequence of Events for June 10, 2003
1. Judge Kwon was late because he got stuck in traffic.
2. Slobodan Milosevic concluded the cross-examination of the secret
witness testifying under the pseudonym “C-47.”
3. The prosecutor, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff examined the secret witness
testifying under the pseudonym “C-17.”
=== 6 ===
SYNOPSIS OF THE MILOSEVIC “TRIAL” FOR 11 JUNE 2003
www.slobodan-milosevic.org – June 11, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Today at the Hague Tribunal the secret witness testifying under the
pseudonym of “C-17” concluded his testimony.
During the conclusion of his examination-in-chief this so-called
“C-17” told Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff about an incident where a Canadian
volunteer took members of UNPROFOR hostage, and attempted to use them
as human shields during the NATO bombing.
The secret witness, together with that woman from the other side,
proceeded to present that shameful taking of hostages as some sort of
act organized by Slobodan Milosevic’s envoy, Jovica Stanisic. They
explained that Jovica Stanisic came to Bosnia and wanted to take over
the hostages, but they didn’t explain why.
In the cross-examination Slobodan Milosevic cleared this whole thing
up. It was explained that the Government of Serbia had actually
negotiated the release of the hostages, and that Jovica Stanisic was
sent to Bosnia by President Milosevic in order to take over the
hostages so that they could be brought back to Serbia and set free.
This typical for that so-called “prosecution.” They took a
humanitarian act where the Government of Serbia secured the release of
hostages, and then tried to make it look like evidence of some sort of
crime.
This secret witness gave a statement to the tribunal consisting almost
exclusively of things that he says he heard from other people. A
typical example was when he said that the Government of Serbia was
providing weapons to the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS).
The witness said that he saw civilian trucks from Serbia and that
somebody told him that the trucks contained weapons. “C-17” never
actually saw the weapons, he only heard about them from other people.
There was so much hearsay in “C-17’s” statement that President
Milosevic came right out and asked him what the point of his so-called
“evidence” was. “C-17” explained that he couldn’t answer that question
because didn’t work for the tribunal, and that he was only testifying
because they asked him to. In other words, this secret witness was so
useless that he didn’t even know what the point of his own testimony
was.
This witness was so ill-informed that it was pathetic. Yesterday I
accused the prosecution of trying to manipulate public perception by
calling the Krajina Red Berets, simply the “Red Berets.” I thought
that they were trying to create a misleading perception that the
Serbian JSO was involved in Bosnia.
Apparently, the witness really was talking about the Serbian JSO. The
problem here, as President Milosevic pointed out, is that the Serbian
JSO didn’t even exist during the time that the witness was talking
about, so the witness couldn’t have seen the Serbian JSO in Mostar or
anywhere else, because they didn’t exist.
More evidence that this secret witness was ill-informed came when he
was speaking about the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) being in Mostar as
late as the middle of June 1992.
As President Milosevic pointed out, the JNA didn’t exist in Bosnia
after May 19, 1992. The JNA was ordered to withdraw from Bosnia,
however Bosnian-Serb JNA members remained on their homeland, and the
JNA equipment which they had in their possession remained in Bosnia
with them and that is how the VRS was formed. So it is obvious that
“C-17” was either lying or seeing things that weren’t there when he
says that he saw the JNA in the middle of June. Either way whether he
was hallucinating or lying; the repeated references that this secret
witness made to the JNA being in Mostar in June of 1992 calls his
credibility into question.
All in all this was just another worthless witness in this shameful
political circus that they call a “trial.”
---
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR THE MILOSEVIC “TRIAL” FOR 11 JUNE 2003
1. The Prosecutor, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff concluded the examination in
chief of the secret witness testifying under the pseudonym of “C-17.”
2. President Slobodan Milosevic cross-examined the secret witness
testifying under the pseudonym of “C-17”
3. The Amicus Curiae, Mr. Tapuskovic cross-examined the secret
witness testifying under the pseudonym of “C-17”
4. The Prosecutor, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff re-examined the secret witness
testifying under the pseudonym of “C-17”
=== 7 ===
SYNOPSIS OF THE MILOSEVIC TRIAL JUNE 12 - 16
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - June 16, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
The prosecution called Osman Selak. Selak tried to say that the VJ
(FRY Army) was in direct command over the VRS (Army of Republika
Srpska).
During cross-examination, President Milosevic asked Mr. Selak if he
could cite any order that the VJ ever issued to the VRS. Selak
couldn't produce any orders or examples or anything like that, but he
did have a diagram that he drew where he drew a line between a box
marked "VJ" and another box marked "VRS." I guess that this line drawn
between the 2 boxes is what passes for "evidence" at the Hague
Tribunal.
To top off the absurdity of this whole thing, Mr. Selak hates Serbs.
Mr. Kay was talking about the history of the JNA, and he mentioned the
Second World War. Mr. Selak couldn't restrain himself he had to take a
shot at the Serbs and so he lied and said that the Chetniks supported
the Nazis.
Serb Chetniks saved the lives of more than 500 U.S. Airmen during the
2nd world war. Those Americans were saved from the Nazis by the
Chetniks. Draza Mihailovich is a hero in the fight against fascism and
this witness tried to call those honorable men Nazis! As an American I
am deeply offended by that remark.
The prosecutor must be scraping the bottom of the barrel, because
after calling the racist Selak to testify, they resorted to calling
Dr. Budimir Babovic, a political scientist from Montenegro, to testify
about the Serbian police.
This guy's claim to fame was that he wrote a book, which was paid for
by the Soros Foundation. In the book he talks about how Milosevic
"abused the police." He gets all of his information in his book from
"the international and domestic media" and through his own "personal
analysis of the laws and constitution of Serbia," even though he isn't
a lawyer or anything like that. He's just, as Mr. Kwon put it, "a
layman."
Dr. Babovic had no direct knowledge of anything. The only thing that
the so-called "expert witness" managed to prove was his own ignorance
of the Serbian Constitution and the Serbian penal code. President
Milosevic would ask the so-called "expert" questions about the law and
this dummy didn't have a clue what he was talking about. If it wasn't
so funny to watch it would be sad.
Following Babovic was "B-1047." Allegedly, Arkan's men unsuccessfully
tried to execute "B-1047."
After the alleged attempted execution, "B-1047" made his way to a VRS
base and the VRS arranged for him to be transported to a hospital in
Banja Luka for medical treatment. It is important to note that Banja
Luka was always held by the Serbs.
"B-1047" is an invalid because of his wounds, and he tells a very
harrowing story, but he has nothing to do with Milosevic. I would
really like to see the prosecution explain why he should be brought in
to testify against Milosevic.
What does "B-1047's" plight prove against Milosevic? They aren't
saying that Milosevic ordered that "B-1047" should be shot, and so I
really don't see what the point here is.
This isn't unique. Witnesses who aren't relevant to anything Milosevic
is accused of testify against him all the time. All I can see is that
the prosecution is wasting time.
The prosecution doesn't need extra time for presenting their case.
They don't have a case. The more they try to prove their false
indictment the dumber it makes them look.
Anyway, tomorrow should be interesting. The Former Yugoslav President,
Zoran Lilic will be testifying.
---
ORDER OF WITNESSES
1. Former JNA colonel / Logistics Base Commander, Osman Selak
2. Political scientist from Montenegro, Dr. Budimir Babovic
3. A secret witness testifying under the pseudonym of "B-1047"
All witnesses were examined by the Prosecution, cross-examined by
President Milosevic, cross-examined by the Amicus Curiae, and finally
re-examined by the Prosecution.
From: http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/
1. ZORAN LILIC TESTIFIES AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg061903.htm
2. MICHAEL WILLIAMS TESTIFIES AT MILOSEVIC "TRIAL"
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg062403.htm
3. SPS HOLDS VIDOVDAN DEMONSTRATION AT REPUBLIC SQUARE IN BELGRADE, 28
June 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/sps/news/sps062803.htm
4. BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF HAGUE WITNESSES: 30 JUNE - 11 JULY 2003
5. THE CIRCUS CONTINUES AT THE HAGUE, July 11, 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg071103.htm
=== 1 ===
ZORAN LILIC TESTIFIES AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL
www.slobodan-milosevic.org – June 19, 2003
Written By: Andy Wilcoxson
On Tuesday, June 17, 2003 Zoran Lilic began to give his testimony at
the so-called “trial” of Slobodan Milosevic.
Zoran Lilic has held the highest offices in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Mr.
Lilic was the President of the Serbian National Assembly, the
President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Deputy Prime
Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The testimony of Zoran Lilic is certainly the most important testimony
that the Milosevic “trial” has seen.
Two things were apparent from watching Lilic. The first obvious fact
is that Slobodan Milosevic is not a war criminal. The 2 nd obvious
fact, contrary to media reports, is that Mr. Lilic was not and is not
“in the hip pocket” of President Milosevic.
Indeed, Mr. Lilic was critical of Milosevic on some matters. First of
all, Lilic believed that Milosevic, as the SPS President, allowed the
JUL to have too much influence during the time that the SPS-JUL-ND
coalition was formed.
Lilic was also critical of the Kumanovo Agreement. Mr. Lilic favored a
different plan that had been put forward by Helmut Kohl.
It is therefore incorrect that the media should portray Mr. Lilic as
“Milosevic’s puppet.” Zoran Lilic is his own man, with his own
opinions, which as we see above do not always coincide Slobodan
Milosevic’s views.
When it comes to the subject of war crimes it was apparent that the
prosecution had made a mistake in bringing Lilic to testify. Lilic
proved to be a much better witness for the defense than for the
prosecution.
From the outset of his examination-in-chief it could be seen that
Preident Lilic’s statements were not what the prosecutor was looking
for. For example, Mr. Nice was trying to get Lilic to explain the
phrase “all Serbs in one state.” Mr. Nice obviously wanted Lilic to
say that this referred to some “greater Serbia plan,” instead Lilic
explained that the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
allowed all Serbs to live in one state and that the statement, “all
Serbs in one state” meant that the SFRY should be preserved at all
costs.
Mr. Nice also unsuccessfully attempted to get Lilic to say that
Milosevic “controlled” the leadership and the military forces of the
SAO Krajina and Republika Srpska. Lilic explained that Milosevic did
not control anybody over there, and when he did try to exercise
influence over them it was always to try and get them to accept peace
agreements.
At this point, in spite of efforts by Mr. Nice to change the topic,
Lilic went into the events in Srebrenica. Lilic explained that nobody
from the authorities of either Serbia or the FRY could have had
anything to do with what happened there.
Lilic explained that Milosevic’s reaction to Srebrenica was that of
shock and extreme anger when he heard what had happened there. Lilic
said that it was obvious that there was no possibility that Milosevic
could have had anything at all to do with Srebrenica, or any other
wartime event in Bosnia and Croatia.
On the subject of Srebrenica, it should be noted that it is the
“sweetest plum” in the prosecution’s false indictment. Srebrenica is
where the genocide charge emanates from.
When Milosevic cross-examined Lilic on the subject of Srebrenica, Lilic
further explained that when the FRY authorities inquired about
Srebrenica the Republika Srpska leadership was just as surprised as
anybody to hear about what had happened there. Lilic explained that
this meant that individual criminals, and not any government controlled
forces, had perpetrated the crimes that occurred in Srebrenica. Not
only does this testimony jive with the claims that Milosevic made in
his opening statement, but it also jives with the report of the Dutch
Government.
When Milosevic opened the cross-examination he began by asking Lilic
about Kosovo. Zoran Lilic is probably the best suited person to talk
about Kosovo and the position of the FRY government there. As the
Deputy Prime Minister of the time Lilic took numerous fact finding
missions to Kosovo. As a high official in the Government of Yugoslavia
Mr. Lilic was privy to all manner of intelligence reports.
During cross-examination Lilic explained that the Yugoslav and Serbian
authorities took exceptional care to protect Kosovo’s civilian
population. In fact so much care was taken that the Albanian
terrorists knew that by mingling themselves with civilians that they
would be able to flee from the authorities without being touched,
because the authorities were under orders never to fire on the
terrorists if doing so would endanger civilians.
Mr. Lilic explained Slobodan Milosevic’s position was that all
citizens and ethnic groups should be equal. Lilic stated that it was
President Milosevic’s firm conviction that nobody in Yugoslavia should
live as a second class citizen because of their ethnicity.
Mr. Lilic went on to explain that the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities
always differentiated between Albanian terrorists, and regular
Albanian civilians. He explained that orders were issued that human
rights need to be respected, and that all soldiers and police were
given copies of the Geneva Conventions to ensure that this happened.
Mr. Lilic explained that the V.J. and MUP protected Albanian civilians
precisely from the Albanian terrorists who were seeking to break
Kosovo away from Serbia. Lilic explained how both Albanians, and
non-Albanians were under threat from the KLA terrorists. Lilic stated
that normal Albanian civilians who wished to live as peaceful law
abiding citizens of Yugoslavia were under the greatest danger from the
KLA terrorists.
Lilic dismissed as an absurdity that Serbia or Yugoslavia could have
had any plan to expel Albanians from Kosovo. Lilic explained that the
Serb and Yugoslav authorities had a great desire, and made great
efforts to try to engage the Kosovo Albanians so that a peaceful
political solution could be found.
Being Yugoslavia’s Deputy Prime Minister at the time Mr. Lilic had
access to all manner of intelligence information regarding the
Albanian terrorists that were operating in Kosovo at the time.
On the basis of the intelligence information that he had received as
the Deputy Prime Minster, Mr. Lilic explained that the United States,
and in particular the American ambassador Hill, prepared the KLA
terrorists for their “spring offensive” and that this was done with a
view to provoke a conflict that would create a pretext for the illegal
NATO aggression and the eventual occupation of Kosovo and Metohija.
Lilic went on to explain how the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement had
been abused. Lilic explained how the Kosovo Verification Mission of
the OSCE was being used as a cover to further arm the Albanian
terrorists. He explained that during that time the Albanian terrorists
had received East German weapons, and other high-tech weaponry that
could only come to them with the cooperation of foreign governments.
Lilic began to explain about how the KLA would force Albanians to flee
from Kosovo to create the false illusion that Albanians were being
expelled by Serbs, but at this point the so-called “Judge” May didn’t
want to hear anymore.
This same “Judge,” who is so deeply interested in hearing all about
what some local yokel says he heard second hand, from God only knows
who, off in some village in Bosnia, refused to hear what a high
government official knew from the intelligence documents that he was
privy to. The so-called “Judge” ruled the information as irrelevant
since the Deputy PM didn’t go out into the battlefield and gather the
information personally.
This so-called “Judge” must be smoking some good crack to be able to
say something as stupid as that. How could any government function if
the highest officials always have to gather the intelligence in
person? Does George W. Bush know that Osama bin Laden blew up the
World Trade Center because he was personally hiding in the cave in
Afghanistan listening to bin Laden make the plans? Of course not, but
he has the relevant intelligence information, and so he is perfectly
competent to say that bin Laden did it.
At any rate, after Kosovo was discussed, Milosevic began to ask Lilic
about Bosnia and Croatia. Mr. Lilic explained in no uncertain terms
that neither Serbia, nor the FRY, nor any official from Serbia or the
FRY had any command or control over the Bosnian Serbs or the Krajina
Serbs, and Lilic in view of the positions he held, is in a better
position than anybody to know that.
Mr. Lilic proceeded to explain how the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia
evolved and the manner in which the governments of Serbia and the FRY
were involved.
First of all Lilic, explained that all of the efforts of Serbia and
the FRY were directed towards humanitarian assistance and negotiating
an end to the armed conflicts.
Lilic explained that in Croatia the Serbian population was in jeopardy
from the Croatian government, and that the Krajina Serbs did not
launch aggression on Croatia, but simply defended their own land that
they had been living on for centuries.
Lilic explained how Serbia, the FRY, and Milosevic in particular
worked tirelessly to achieve the Vance Plan, and that all of
Milosevic’s efforts in respect to the Krajina, and the war in Croatia
were directed exclusively towards achieving peace.
As for the civil war in Bosnia, Lilic explained in no ambiguous terms
that neither Serbia nor the FRY had anything to do with that, and that
it was in fact a civil war in Bosnia and, not some sort of aggression
by Serbia or Yugoslavia.
Lilic explained that Serbia, even under sanctions, extended
humanitarian assistance to the people in Bosnia and to all of the
refugees who came to Serbia, irrespective of their ethnicity.
In fact, Serbia even allowed Muslim soldiers from the Army of B-H to
come to Serbia as refugees as long as they didn’t bring their weapons.
In this case both the R.S. and the Muslim authorities wanted these
soldiers handed over to them, but Milosevic steadfastly refused their
demands, and insisted that these soldiers be allowed to control their
own fate.
Lilic explained that the war in Bosnia broke out when independence was
declared on the basis of and illegal and unconstitutional referendum.
Lilic said that the first armed attacks of the Bosnian war came from
Muslim extremists who were attacking the Serb population in Bosnia.
Lilic explained how prior to the all out warfare that tore through
Bosnia that a peace plan had been reached. He told about how the
Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims all negotiated and signed a peace
agreement in Lisbon called the Cutilero Plan. Lilic explained that
after the agreement was signed that the Muslim President, Alija
Izetbegovic reneged on the agreement, withdrew his signature, and the
war began in earnest.
Lilic explained that after the war began the Muslim side began to
bring in Mujahideens and Islamic fundamentalists from the Middle East
to fight against the Serbs.
During the examination in chief, Fikret Abdic was mentioned, because
he had traveled to Belgrade and met with President Milosevic. The
prosecution had tried to present this like some sort of secret meeting
even though it was reported quite openly in the Media, and Lilic
confirmed in the cross-examination that this meeting was no secret.
For those of you who don’t know who Fikret Abdic is I would encourage
you to research him. Fikret Abdic was the winner of the 1990 elections
in Bosnia, but unfortunately Alija Izetbegovic (who lost the
elections) managed to take over power from him.
Fikret Abdic is a Muslim of the Croatian ethnicity. He has dual
Croat/Bosnian citizenship. Unlike Alija Izetbegovic, Mr. Abdic got
along splendidly with the Serbs, and for a time with the Croats until
they allied with Izetbegovic.
Fikret Abdic and his Muslim followers in western Bosnia declared
independence from Bosnia, signed peace agreements with the Serbs and
Croats, and were able to escape the war, until Alija Izetbegovic sent
in the 5 th Corps of the Army of B-H to attack the Muslim population
there, killing them, looting their homes, and forcing the survivors to
flee to the Krajina where they lived with the Serbs until the Croats
committed genocide with Operation Storm and Operation Flash eliminating
nearly all of the Serb population from the Krajina.
Lilic confirmed Milosevic’s claim that Serbia and the FRY’s policy
towards Bosnia was exclusively a policy of peace aimed at ending the
bloodshed.
Lilic explained that nobody worked harder to bring peace to Bosnia
than Slobodan Milosevic. The Government of Serbia, the Government of
the FRY, and Slobodan Milosevic personally endorsed the Vance-Owen
Plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, the Contact Group Plan, the Action
Plan of the European Union, and the Dayton Accords.
Lilic testified about how hard Milosevic worked to negotiate the
Vance-Owen plan, and how hard Milosevic tried to convince the
Republika Srpska Assembly to accept the plan. Slobodan Milosevic
addressed the R.S. Assembly on 2 occasions to try to convince them to
accept the plan.
When the R.S. assembly refused to adopt the Vance-Owen Plan Milosevic
was furious. President Milosevic insisted that the Serbia/FRY
delegation leave immediately, even though it was a great risk to his
own personal safety since it was late at night, and a Muslim attack
was feared.
It was precisely the refusal of the R.S. to adopt the Vance-Owen plan
that strained relations between Belgrade and Pale, and that lead to
the decision of Serbia and the FRY to blockade the Drina River.
Lilic explained how, at Dayton, Slobodan Milosevic saved the Republika
Srpska from certain destruction. At the time NATO air strikes were
rapidly diminishing the R.S. territory and a failure to reach an
agreement at that point would have definitely meant the end of the
Republika Srpska.
Through the efforts of Slobodan Milosevic at Dayton the Republika
Srpska was recognized, and territory that had been lost over the
course of the NATO air strikes was even returned to Republika Srpska.
As the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Zoran Lilic
served on the Supreme Defense Council together with Slobodan Milosevic
(while Milosevic was the President of Serbia). Therefore, Mr. Lilic is
in a unique position to be able to see how decisions were taken.
The prosecution has tried to allege that Slobodan Milosevic behaved
like some sort of dictator in the Supreme Defense Council. But the
testimony of Lilic proves otherwise. Lilic testified that the
decisions of the SDC were reached by consensus and that Milosevic
didn’t have any more power than any of the other members of the SDC.
The prosecution also alleges that the Serbia and FRY authorities
formed and supported paramilitaries and sent them to Bosnia and
Croatia, and that Milosevic is responsible for this. Lilic’s testimony
again proves otherwise. Lilic stated, and he produced the documents to
prove it that the SDC (which Milosevic served on) took a decision that
paramilitaries should be disarmed and abolished.
Lilic explained that some opposition parties were forming units, but
that the SPS never had any sort of units, nor did the SPS engage in
any sort of cooperation with the SDS. Lilic not only being the former
head of state, but also being a former member of the SPS himself,
would certainly be in a position to know about this.
Slobodan Milosevic asked Lilic point-blank if he knew of any order or
any de-facto policy emanating from the Government of Serbia or
Yugoslavia, or any officials of those governments that the Army or
Police personnel should commit any crimes against anybody. Lilic said
that there was absolutely not any such policy, and that the Army and
the police were under the strictest orders to combat crime regardless
of who the perpetrator was, even if the perpetrator was a soldier or a
police officer.
President Lilic’s testimony is the most important testimony that this
farce of a “trial” has seen. Historians will be able to read his
testimony and see quite clearly that Slobodan Milosevic is innocent.
In spite of the best efforts of this illegal tribunal, history will
never be able to successfully record the lie that Slobodan Milosevic is
a war criminal.
Lilic’s testimony is not yet complete. He will return at a later date
to complete his cross-examination, be cross-examined by the Amicus,
and be re-examined by the prosecution. No hearing is scheduled on
Friday. The next hearing will be on Monday, but other witnesses have
been scheduled.
---
Sequence of Events:
1. JUNE 17, 2003 – Lilic is examined by the Prosecutor, Mr. Nice.
2. JUNE 18, 2003 – Mr. Nice concludes his examination of Lilic.
3. JUNE 18, 2003 – Slobodan Milosevic begins his cross-examination
of Lilic.
4. JUNE 19, 2003 – Slobodan Milosevic continues his
cross-examination of Lilic.
=== 2 ===
MICHAEL WILLIAMS TESTIFIES AT MILOSEVIC "TRIAL"
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - June 24, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Michael Williams, the former advisor and spokesman of the former chief
of the UN Mission to Bosnia Jasusi Akasi, testified at the so-called
"trial" of Slobodan Milosevic on Tuesday.
The main point of Mr. Williams's testimony seemed to be to bad mouth
the VRS and the Bosnian-Serb leadership. None of that has anything to
do with Milosevic, but this is the Hague Tribunal, and propaganda is
the main order of the day.
Mr. Williams's "evidence" against Milosevic was practically
non-existent. Williams doubted the veracity of the blockade that
Yugoslavia placed on the Republika Srpska, over their refusal to accept
various peace plans, but he didn't have any evidence that the Yugoslav
side was violating the blockade. All he had was his suspicions.
Williams did however confirm that Milosevic's policy from the
beginning was that the war in Bosnia should be stopped. He also
confirmed that Milosevic endorsed various peace plans aimed at ending
the war.
In other news, much has been made in the media recently over a
document produced by the prosecution last week which purports to
"link" Milosevic to the alleged events at Srebrenica.
The document in question is allegedly an order from a Bosnian-Serb
police commander where the MUP of Serbia mentioned as participating in
counter-insurgency operations in Srebrenica.
The document has some major problems. The problems indicate that the
document is quite probably a forgery:
1. The document is typewritten, but no Serbian type characters appear
in the typewritten text.
2. The document is typed on a blank piece of paper. It is not typed on
official letterhead.
3. The document isn't signed.
4. The document isn't stamped with the seal of the relevant government
organ.
5. The document contains typographical errors.
6. The words "very urgent" are typed in the English language on the
top of this alleged "Serbian document."
CLICK HERE TO SEE THE SCANNED IMAGE OF THE DOCUMENT:
http://www.iwpr.net/images/tribunal/tri_317_1_rs_order_ser.gif
From looking at the document it is quite obvious that anybody with
access to a typewriter and a blank piece of paper could have produced
it.
=== 3 ===
SPS HOLDS VIDOVDAN DEMONSTRATION AT REPUBLIC SQUARE IN BELGRADE
28 June 2003
On June 28, 2003 the Socialist Party of Serbia circulated a petition
around Serbia calling for the abolition of the Hague Tribunal, and an
end to the selling out of the country to Western capitalists.
Over the period of only a couple of hours the SPS managed to gather
more than 3,000 signatures at their desk at Republic Square in
Belgrade, and the SPS gathered more than 60,000 signatures for the
whole of Serbia.
The police in "democratic" Serbia were unhappy that the flag of the
SPS was displayed publicly and so they "invited" the organizer of the
demonstration to come to the police station with them.
Below are photos of the police, the demonstrators, and the citizens
queuing to sign the petition at Republic Square.
(see:
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/sps/news/sps062803.htm )
=== 4 ===
BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF HAGUE WITNESSES: 30 JUNE - 11 JULY 2003
Written by: Vera Martinovic - July 14, 2003
Here's a brief summary of the last 12 witnesses, 5 of which were known
by numbers instead of names, with blurred faces and distorted voices,
and 1 not even that (he was nameless and numberless, and it was simply
announced that his whole testimony would be given in a private
session).
B-1244, a Bosnian Serb civil official during the war, first confirmed
that 30 Frenki Simatovic's men [Commander of the Serbian Special
Police unit] participated in the military takeover of his town (being
asked about it by the Prosecutor Groome in a highly suggestive and
confusing manner]. Then, when Milosevic asked about these men in
detail, he clarified that they were in fact members of the Serbian
Radical Party who arrived in the municipality as volunteers with no
link to Simatovic or to the State Security Department of the Police of
Serbia whatsoever.
C-0006 seemed totally unreliable, claiming to be a Croat who was first
arrested by the local Serbs, and then forced to become a member of the
Serb Territorial Defence in Vukovar. As a shanghaied soldier, he was
somehow at liberty to be miraculously present at all the key moments
and places during these two critical days, seeing all of the important
players in action at least three times a day, listening to their
conversations, coming and going not once but twice to Ovcara Farm,
doing nothing, just puttering about.
He even claimed to have seen Major Sljivancanin in person at Ovcara.
Such a bold thing has never claimed by anybody so far. He even said
hello to the Major, but the latter failed to reply. To boot, he gave
his testimony in English. Yet, with all his alleged hovering presence
(like a Victorian novelist, he was even able to read minds of his
characters), his testimony boiled to already well-known general things
that could be told by anybody watching TV at that time.
Witness "X", testifying in a private session, probably gave crucial
relevant evidence based on his personal gut feeling about how
"Milosevic was a thief who was too much in love with his overweight
wife."
Vlado Vukovic, a former Croatian policeman who fought against the JNA
[Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija = Yugoslav National Army] in Krajina,
became POW and was exchanged later on, claimed that the JNA was in
fact attacking this defenseless Croatian village with no reason at all.
I repeat, he was captured while attacking a JNA facility near the said
village, together with the rest of Croatian policemen and irregulars.
C-1230 testified that how he was the only one who survived an alleged
execution by JNA soldiers in Krajina. The problem is that in his
previous 3 written statements given to the OTP he never mentioned JNA
soldiers, only some local Serb irregulars. Perhaps his memory got
better after several years.
Andreas Riedlemayer, a Harvard expert on Islamic architecture, was
again commissioned by the OTP (after his testimony about Kosovo) to
talk about the destruction of not only the Islamic, but also the
Catholic monuments in Bosnia (as an expert on the Islamic architecture,
of course, and not on destruction nor on Catholicism).
Riedlemayer was not tasked with researching the destruction of the
Catholic monuments destroyed by the Muslims, nor the destruction of
the Muslim monuments destroyed by the Catholics - only the destruction
of the Muslim and Catholic monuments destroyed by the Serbs.
While not being an expert on arms and explosives (by his own
admission), Mr. Riedlemayer somehow managed to know how, and under
what circumstances, all of those monuments were destroyed. Although he
had never bothered to investigate the destruction of Serb monuments,
he somehow knew their destruction was not substantial.
Riedelmayer, was even bold enough to claim that the fact he wrote a
letter to Clinton demanding the UN arms embargo against Bosnian
Muslims should cease to be respected by the US, did not affect his
professional objectivity in the least.
Zoran Lilic, former Yugoslav President, was summoned again, one month
after his previous appearance, to testify about some important
documents recently received by the OTP from the Yugoslav authorities,
namely the transcripts of the meetings of the Supreme Defence Council,
as well as some intercepted highly confidential phone calls.
It turned out to be an anticlimactic, the Council transcripts merely
demonstrated that Milosevic had even less influence, let alone direct
authority over Bosnian Serbs, who opposed him bitterly at every
meeting.
The intercepts (most probably made by the Croatian Security Services)
were useless due to the poor technical quality, so their written
transcripts had been used instead. Nevertheless, they were completely
uninteresting, except one: a phone call between Lilic and General
Perisic (the YU Army Chief of Staff), where Lilic said it had been
agreed that a written guarantee would be provided to General Mladic to
assure him he will not be delivered to the ICTY, in exchange for the
return of two captured French pilots [downed by the Bosnian Serbs
while their Mirage fighter participated in the NATO bombing of the
Serb positions near Pale].
The juicy detail was when Lilic said to Perisic he should explain to
Mladic when negotiating the release of the pilots that both French
President Jacques Chirac and Milosevic had agreed to give that same
guarantee [in order not to spoil the upcoming signing of the Dayton
Accords in Paris].
Another interesting intercept (or, alleged intercept, since there was
no tape at all, just the transcript) was the one in which Milosevic's
wife spoke to the Chef de Cabinet of Karadzic about those French
pilots. The alleged conversation contains no damning details at all, it
could only give a general impression of Milosevic's wife being
influential and meddling into her husband's business. The problem was
that in this transcript Mrs. Markovic called her interlocutor "Rajko"
and referred to her husband as "President Milosevic".
Milosevic claimed his wife never knew any of these people, let alone
on a first-name basis, and expressed surprise that she should refer to
him as "President Milosevic", after spending her whole life with him.
He expressed his concern that the evidence might be forged. He said he
would love to hear the tape of this conversation be played in the
courtroom. It turned out that Mr. Nice couldn't produce any tape, and
so he withdrew this particular piece of "evidence".
Edin Pasic, former translator for Arabic and Turkish in the
ex-Yugoslav federal bodies and the current Ambassador of Bosnia &
Herzegovina to Kuwait, stated that, while passing the corridors of the
Presidential palace on his way to his task of interpreting the
telephone conversation between Muammar el Gaddafi of Libya and the
Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic in 1992. He saw men in mudded
uniforms who were talking of the killings and throat-cutting they had
done in Bosnia. He must've passing those clean corridors real slow to
be able to hear all the colorful details by those mudded fighters.
Pasic said that the Belgrade mosque on Knez Mihailova street, which he
said he attended regularly, was attacked by a hand grenade. When
Milosevic pointed out that the mosque (repaired and guarded by the
police after that) was not on that street, and when Tapuskovic showed
some interest in how come a Communist like Mr Pasic was attending a
mosque at all, Mr Pasic explained that the mosque must've been
somewhere in the general vicinity of the park (the man had lived in
Belgrade for 16 years, mind you), and that he was not a Communist, but
merely a member of the League of Communists.
Pasic expressed his disdain for the Belgrade Mufti [the head of the
Muslim community], who was regularly seeing Milosevic, or, as the
witness put it "flirted with Milosevic".
Pasic claimed that the Muslims in Belgrade lived under terror, feeling
as if they were wearing "yellow arm-bands" (used by Nazis to identify
Jews), and that the ethnic cleansing had in fact started from
Belgrade. To strengthen such a claim he used his own "horrifying
experience:" President Cosic allegedly offered him to be his adviser
for Islamic countries, but he proudly refused, not wanting to become a
puppet to Milosevic, which Cosic already was (the hapless Cosic
allegedly admitted as much in desperate whispers to his
interpreter/wannabe adviser, who fell down on his knees, begging Cosic
to protect the Bosnian Muslims).
After that, Pasic felt as if he had been followed and his apartment
entered. The terror was such that full 4 years later Pasic calmly left
with his whole family to Hungary, and thence to Egypt, regularly using
his passport to do so. Milosevic didn't appreciate the kneeling
melodrama in the Presidential cabinet and reminded the witness that
Cosic was alive and could testify that nothing similar had happened
and voiced his disgust that such a story came from the witness in the
worst of taste.
May said the bad taste is unimportant, only the sterling quality of
the evidence this witness is providing. Mr Pasic had to say something
damning about the Colonel Sljivancanin, too: apparently, during an
official reception, the Colonel's face literally "lit up when Milosevic
entered the room."
Safet Avdic, a Muslim from Foca who had been a POW in a Bosnian Serb
detention facility and who was subsequently exchanged, described his
prison days, complaining that he has lost a lot of weight there. Oddly
enough, he has never been maltreated, but he heard that some other POWs
had.
Jusuf Taranin, was another Muslim from the same municipality, who
described how 7 Muslims were killed by a bunch of irregulars in a
warehouse that used to belong to the JNA (that must've been the reason
the Prosecution summoned this particular witness - the JNA had been
somehow mentioned in his testimony). He also stated that 10 days
before the clashes began, the JNA came and distributed guns to local
Serbs. When Milosevic asked whether this could have been local
Territorial Defence guys who came and distributed guns, the reliable
witness said: "I don't know, could be."
B-1120 was in the same detention facility in Foca as Safet Avdic, and
he also claimed that the local Muslims were unarmed when attacked by
the vicious Serbs, and that they never fired at all towards the Serb
positions. He had trouble answering how come the battle for Foca lasted
for full 8 days, then.
C-1171 was a member of the ZNG [Zbor Narodne Garde = Croatian National
Guard Corps] in Vukovar, who saw the end was near and with hundreds of
other zenge came to Vukovar Hospital, pretending to be wounded or a
staff member, to be able to come out of the town in a humanitarian
convoy. Along with the others, he was arrested and taken to the Ovcara
Farm. He managed to jump out of the truck, but was caught again.
Strangely enough, he was not executed as could have been expected from
the Serbs on a killing spree, but was shipped to the Belgrade Military
Prison, where he had not been maltreated and where it was established
he was a suspect war criminal (a member of the ZNG explosives unit,
who demolished private Serb property in Vukovar, killing civilians).
C-1171 was subsequently exchanged. His damning testimony re the Ovcara
case was that he, unlike the omnipresent earlier witness C-0006, never
saw Colonel Sljivancanin at the Ovcara Farm at all. He did see some
uniformed men there who had parts of the JNA uniforms on plus fur hats
and various insignia, so sometimes he referred to them as the JNA
soldiers and sometimes as the local irregulars.
When directly asked by Milosevic whether he could confirm these people
were the JNA soldiers, the witness said he didn't know and playfully
added that Milosevic should answer that instead. Witty, but not
evidence. There was an interesting moment when Milosevic produced and
tendered into evidence the original Vukovar Hospital register [taken
away by the JNA after they took over the Hospital], showing that only
45 wounded persons in all (both civilians and military) had been
admitted during the fiercest final battle between 2 and 18 November
1991, a far cry from that horrifying picture that the Hospital
Director Dr Bosanac had painted of overcrowded facility with hundreds
and hundreds of wounded.
The problem with this legal procedure is that it needs some relevant
and hard evidence to build up the case against the defendant. So far,
it was as described above, or even worse. May I suggest to May & Co.
to explain their final sentence by the damning testimony of that
secret witness "X"?
Vera Martinovic is an independent writer based in Belgrade Yugoslavia.
Article Posted For Fair Use Only
=== 5 ===
THE CIRCUS CONTINUES AT THE HAGUE
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - July 11, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
After over 10 days of not watching I found that the so-called "trial"
at the Hague to be as much of a joke as ever.
Today there were 2 secret witnesses who testified, B-1120 and C-1171.
B-1120 was a 92-bis witness for Foca, and his testimony was downright
comical.
B-1120 was a member of the main board of the SDA in Foca virtually
since the inception of the party in 1990.
B-1120 initially claimed that Muslims in Foca armed themselves and
formed armed night patrols before the war began. However, as is often
the case at this so-called "trial," he changed this story 5 minutes
later and claimed that the Muslims had no weapons.
B-1120 explained the deaths of 1,100 Serbs and the burning of Serb
houses and the mass-exodus of Serbs from Foca to Montenegro was all
done by the Serbs themselves!
According to B-1120 the Serbs were killing themselves, expelling
themselves, and burning down their own houses. Only at the Hague
Tribunal could a cock and bull story like that make sense.
The next witness to testify was another secret witness called C-1171.
C-1171 was a member of the ZNG in Vukovar.
Apparently, C-1171 is some sort of war criminal himself, but the
details of his crimes were dealt with in closed session.
At any rate C-1171's testimony had nothing to do with Milosevic. The
only thing that could possibly be connected to Milosevic was the time
that C-1171 spent in the JNA's military prison in Belgrade, and C-1171
testified that nobody mistreated him there.
Between those 2 secret witnesses the so-called "trial chamber" dealt
with the testimony of 6 other secret witnesses who gave mostly secret
evidence in other "trials".
So what we have here is secret witnesses testifying about
God-knows-what with no opportunity for President Milosevic to ask
these secret witnesses about their secret evidence.
This circus in The Hague puts Barnum and Bailey to shame.
1. ZORAN LILIC TESTIFIES AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg061903.htm
2. MICHAEL WILLIAMS TESTIFIES AT MILOSEVIC "TRIAL"
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg062403.htm
3. SPS HOLDS VIDOVDAN DEMONSTRATION AT REPUBLIC SQUARE IN BELGRADE, 28
June 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/sps/news/sps062803.htm
4. BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF HAGUE WITNESSES: 30 JUNE - 11 JULY 2003
5. THE CIRCUS CONTINUES AT THE HAGUE, July 11, 2003
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg071103.htm
=== 1 ===
ZORAN LILIC TESTIFIES AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL
www.slobodan-milosevic.org – June 19, 2003
Written By: Andy Wilcoxson
On Tuesday, June 17, 2003 Zoran Lilic began to give his testimony at
the so-called “trial” of Slobodan Milosevic.
Zoran Lilic has held the highest offices in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Mr.
Lilic was the President of the Serbian National Assembly, the
President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Deputy Prime
Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The testimony of Zoran Lilic is certainly the most important testimony
that the Milosevic “trial” has seen.
Two things were apparent from watching Lilic. The first obvious fact
is that Slobodan Milosevic is not a war criminal. The 2 nd obvious
fact, contrary to media reports, is that Mr. Lilic was not and is not
“in the hip pocket” of President Milosevic.
Indeed, Mr. Lilic was critical of Milosevic on some matters. First of
all, Lilic believed that Milosevic, as the SPS President, allowed the
JUL to have too much influence during the time that the SPS-JUL-ND
coalition was formed.
Lilic was also critical of the Kumanovo Agreement. Mr. Lilic favored a
different plan that had been put forward by Helmut Kohl.
It is therefore incorrect that the media should portray Mr. Lilic as
“Milosevic’s puppet.” Zoran Lilic is his own man, with his own
opinions, which as we see above do not always coincide Slobodan
Milosevic’s views.
When it comes to the subject of war crimes it was apparent that the
prosecution had made a mistake in bringing Lilic to testify. Lilic
proved to be a much better witness for the defense than for the
prosecution.
From the outset of his examination-in-chief it could be seen that
Preident Lilic’s statements were not what the prosecutor was looking
for. For example, Mr. Nice was trying to get Lilic to explain the
phrase “all Serbs in one state.” Mr. Nice obviously wanted Lilic to
say that this referred to some “greater Serbia plan,” instead Lilic
explained that the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
allowed all Serbs to live in one state and that the statement, “all
Serbs in one state” meant that the SFRY should be preserved at all
costs.
Mr. Nice also unsuccessfully attempted to get Lilic to say that
Milosevic “controlled” the leadership and the military forces of the
SAO Krajina and Republika Srpska. Lilic explained that Milosevic did
not control anybody over there, and when he did try to exercise
influence over them it was always to try and get them to accept peace
agreements.
At this point, in spite of efforts by Mr. Nice to change the topic,
Lilic went into the events in Srebrenica. Lilic explained that nobody
from the authorities of either Serbia or the FRY could have had
anything to do with what happened there.
Lilic explained that Milosevic’s reaction to Srebrenica was that of
shock and extreme anger when he heard what had happened there. Lilic
said that it was obvious that there was no possibility that Milosevic
could have had anything at all to do with Srebrenica, or any other
wartime event in Bosnia and Croatia.
On the subject of Srebrenica, it should be noted that it is the
“sweetest plum” in the prosecution’s false indictment. Srebrenica is
where the genocide charge emanates from.
When Milosevic cross-examined Lilic on the subject of Srebrenica, Lilic
further explained that when the FRY authorities inquired about
Srebrenica the Republika Srpska leadership was just as surprised as
anybody to hear about what had happened there. Lilic explained that
this meant that individual criminals, and not any government controlled
forces, had perpetrated the crimes that occurred in Srebrenica. Not
only does this testimony jive with the claims that Milosevic made in
his opening statement, but it also jives with the report of the Dutch
Government.
When Milosevic opened the cross-examination he began by asking Lilic
about Kosovo. Zoran Lilic is probably the best suited person to talk
about Kosovo and the position of the FRY government there. As the
Deputy Prime Minister of the time Lilic took numerous fact finding
missions to Kosovo. As a high official in the Government of Yugoslavia
Mr. Lilic was privy to all manner of intelligence reports.
During cross-examination Lilic explained that the Yugoslav and Serbian
authorities took exceptional care to protect Kosovo’s civilian
population. In fact so much care was taken that the Albanian
terrorists knew that by mingling themselves with civilians that they
would be able to flee from the authorities without being touched,
because the authorities were under orders never to fire on the
terrorists if doing so would endanger civilians.
Mr. Lilic explained Slobodan Milosevic’s position was that all
citizens and ethnic groups should be equal. Lilic stated that it was
President Milosevic’s firm conviction that nobody in Yugoslavia should
live as a second class citizen because of their ethnicity.
Mr. Lilic went on to explain that the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities
always differentiated between Albanian terrorists, and regular
Albanian civilians. He explained that orders were issued that human
rights need to be respected, and that all soldiers and police were
given copies of the Geneva Conventions to ensure that this happened.
Mr. Lilic explained that the V.J. and MUP protected Albanian civilians
precisely from the Albanian terrorists who were seeking to break
Kosovo away from Serbia. Lilic explained how both Albanians, and
non-Albanians were under threat from the KLA terrorists. Lilic stated
that normal Albanian civilians who wished to live as peaceful law
abiding citizens of Yugoslavia were under the greatest danger from the
KLA terrorists.
Lilic dismissed as an absurdity that Serbia or Yugoslavia could have
had any plan to expel Albanians from Kosovo. Lilic explained that the
Serb and Yugoslav authorities had a great desire, and made great
efforts to try to engage the Kosovo Albanians so that a peaceful
political solution could be found.
Being Yugoslavia’s Deputy Prime Minister at the time Mr. Lilic had
access to all manner of intelligence information regarding the
Albanian terrorists that were operating in Kosovo at the time.
On the basis of the intelligence information that he had received as
the Deputy Prime Minster, Mr. Lilic explained that the United States,
and in particular the American ambassador Hill, prepared the KLA
terrorists for their “spring offensive” and that this was done with a
view to provoke a conflict that would create a pretext for the illegal
NATO aggression and the eventual occupation of Kosovo and Metohija.
Lilic went on to explain how the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement had
been abused. Lilic explained how the Kosovo Verification Mission of
the OSCE was being used as a cover to further arm the Albanian
terrorists. He explained that during that time the Albanian terrorists
had received East German weapons, and other high-tech weaponry that
could only come to them with the cooperation of foreign governments.
Lilic began to explain about how the KLA would force Albanians to flee
from Kosovo to create the false illusion that Albanians were being
expelled by Serbs, but at this point the so-called “Judge” May didn’t
want to hear anymore.
This same “Judge,” who is so deeply interested in hearing all about
what some local yokel says he heard second hand, from God only knows
who, off in some village in Bosnia, refused to hear what a high
government official knew from the intelligence documents that he was
privy to. The so-called “Judge” ruled the information as irrelevant
since the Deputy PM didn’t go out into the battlefield and gather the
information personally.
This so-called “Judge” must be smoking some good crack to be able to
say something as stupid as that. How could any government function if
the highest officials always have to gather the intelligence in
person? Does George W. Bush know that Osama bin Laden blew up the
World Trade Center because he was personally hiding in the cave in
Afghanistan listening to bin Laden make the plans? Of course not, but
he has the relevant intelligence information, and so he is perfectly
competent to say that bin Laden did it.
At any rate, after Kosovo was discussed, Milosevic began to ask Lilic
about Bosnia and Croatia. Mr. Lilic explained in no uncertain terms
that neither Serbia, nor the FRY, nor any official from Serbia or the
FRY had any command or control over the Bosnian Serbs or the Krajina
Serbs, and Lilic in view of the positions he held, is in a better
position than anybody to know that.
Mr. Lilic proceeded to explain how the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia
evolved and the manner in which the governments of Serbia and the FRY
were involved.
First of all Lilic, explained that all of the efforts of Serbia and
the FRY were directed towards humanitarian assistance and negotiating
an end to the armed conflicts.
Lilic explained that in Croatia the Serbian population was in jeopardy
from the Croatian government, and that the Krajina Serbs did not
launch aggression on Croatia, but simply defended their own land that
they had been living on for centuries.
Lilic explained how Serbia, the FRY, and Milosevic in particular
worked tirelessly to achieve the Vance Plan, and that all of
Milosevic’s efforts in respect to the Krajina, and the war in Croatia
were directed exclusively towards achieving peace.
As for the civil war in Bosnia, Lilic explained in no ambiguous terms
that neither Serbia nor the FRY had anything to do with that, and that
it was in fact a civil war in Bosnia and, not some sort of aggression
by Serbia or Yugoslavia.
Lilic explained that Serbia, even under sanctions, extended
humanitarian assistance to the people in Bosnia and to all of the
refugees who came to Serbia, irrespective of their ethnicity.
In fact, Serbia even allowed Muslim soldiers from the Army of B-H to
come to Serbia as refugees as long as they didn’t bring their weapons.
In this case both the R.S. and the Muslim authorities wanted these
soldiers handed over to them, but Milosevic steadfastly refused their
demands, and insisted that these soldiers be allowed to control their
own fate.
Lilic explained that the war in Bosnia broke out when independence was
declared on the basis of and illegal and unconstitutional referendum.
Lilic said that the first armed attacks of the Bosnian war came from
Muslim extremists who were attacking the Serb population in Bosnia.
Lilic explained how prior to the all out warfare that tore through
Bosnia that a peace plan had been reached. He told about how the
Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims all negotiated and signed a peace
agreement in Lisbon called the Cutilero Plan. Lilic explained that
after the agreement was signed that the Muslim President, Alija
Izetbegovic reneged on the agreement, withdrew his signature, and the
war began in earnest.
Lilic explained that after the war began the Muslim side began to
bring in Mujahideens and Islamic fundamentalists from the Middle East
to fight against the Serbs.
During the examination in chief, Fikret Abdic was mentioned, because
he had traveled to Belgrade and met with President Milosevic. The
prosecution had tried to present this like some sort of secret meeting
even though it was reported quite openly in the Media, and Lilic
confirmed in the cross-examination that this meeting was no secret.
For those of you who don’t know who Fikret Abdic is I would encourage
you to research him. Fikret Abdic was the winner of the 1990 elections
in Bosnia, but unfortunately Alija Izetbegovic (who lost the
elections) managed to take over power from him.
Fikret Abdic is a Muslim of the Croatian ethnicity. He has dual
Croat/Bosnian citizenship. Unlike Alija Izetbegovic, Mr. Abdic got
along splendidly with the Serbs, and for a time with the Croats until
they allied with Izetbegovic.
Fikret Abdic and his Muslim followers in western Bosnia declared
independence from Bosnia, signed peace agreements with the Serbs and
Croats, and were able to escape the war, until Alija Izetbegovic sent
in the 5 th Corps of the Army of B-H to attack the Muslim population
there, killing them, looting their homes, and forcing the survivors to
flee to the Krajina where they lived with the Serbs until the Croats
committed genocide with Operation Storm and Operation Flash eliminating
nearly all of the Serb population from the Krajina.
Lilic confirmed Milosevic’s claim that Serbia and the FRY’s policy
towards Bosnia was exclusively a policy of peace aimed at ending the
bloodshed.
Lilic explained that nobody worked harder to bring peace to Bosnia
than Slobodan Milosevic. The Government of Serbia, the Government of
the FRY, and Slobodan Milosevic personally endorsed the Vance-Owen
Plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, the Contact Group Plan, the Action
Plan of the European Union, and the Dayton Accords.
Lilic testified about how hard Milosevic worked to negotiate the
Vance-Owen plan, and how hard Milosevic tried to convince the
Republika Srpska Assembly to accept the plan. Slobodan Milosevic
addressed the R.S. Assembly on 2 occasions to try to convince them to
accept the plan.
When the R.S. assembly refused to adopt the Vance-Owen Plan Milosevic
was furious. President Milosevic insisted that the Serbia/FRY
delegation leave immediately, even though it was a great risk to his
own personal safety since it was late at night, and a Muslim attack
was feared.
It was precisely the refusal of the R.S. to adopt the Vance-Owen plan
that strained relations between Belgrade and Pale, and that lead to
the decision of Serbia and the FRY to blockade the Drina River.
Lilic explained how, at Dayton, Slobodan Milosevic saved the Republika
Srpska from certain destruction. At the time NATO air strikes were
rapidly diminishing the R.S. territory and a failure to reach an
agreement at that point would have definitely meant the end of the
Republika Srpska.
Through the efforts of Slobodan Milosevic at Dayton the Republika
Srpska was recognized, and territory that had been lost over the
course of the NATO air strikes was even returned to Republika Srpska.
As the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Zoran Lilic
served on the Supreme Defense Council together with Slobodan Milosevic
(while Milosevic was the President of Serbia). Therefore, Mr. Lilic is
in a unique position to be able to see how decisions were taken.
The prosecution has tried to allege that Slobodan Milosevic behaved
like some sort of dictator in the Supreme Defense Council. But the
testimony of Lilic proves otherwise. Lilic testified that the
decisions of the SDC were reached by consensus and that Milosevic
didn’t have any more power than any of the other members of the SDC.
The prosecution also alleges that the Serbia and FRY authorities
formed and supported paramilitaries and sent them to Bosnia and
Croatia, and that Milosevic is responsible for this. Lilic’s testimony
again proves otherwise. Lilic stated, and he produced the documents to
prove it that the SDC (which Milosevic served on) took a decision that
paramilitaries should be disarmed and abolished.
Lilic explained that some opposition parties were forming units, but
that the SPS never had any sort of units, nor did the SPS engage in
any sort of cooperation with the SDS. Lilic not only being the former
head of state, but also being a former member of the SPS himself,
would certainly be in a position to know about this.
Slobodan Milosevic asked Lilic point-blank if he knew of any order or
any de-facto policy emanating from the Government of Serbia or
Yugoslavia, or any officials of those governments that the Army or
Police personnel should commit any crimes against anybody. Lilic said
that there was absolutely not any such policy, and that the Army and
the police were under the strictest orders to combat crime regardless
of who the perpetrator was, even if the perpetrator was a soldier or a
police officer.
President Lilic’s testimony is the most important testimony that this
farce of a “trial” has seen. Historians will be able to read his
testimony and see quite clearly that Slobodan Milosevic is innocent.
In spite of the best efforts of this illegal tribunal, history will
never be able to successfully record the lie that Slobodan Milosevic is
a war criminal.
Lilic’s testimony is not yet complete. He will return at a later date
to complete his cross-examination, be cross-examined by the Amicus,
and be re-examined by the prosecution. No hearing is scheduled on
Friday. The next hearing will be on Monday, but other witnesses have
been scheduled.
---
Sequence of Events:
1. JUNE 17, 2003 – Lilic is examined by the Prosecutor, Mr. Nice.
2. JUNE 18, 2003 – Mr. Nice concludes his examination of Lilic.
3. JUNE 18, 2003 – Slobodan Milosevic begins his cross-examination
of Lilic.
4. JUNE 19, 2003 – Slobodan Milosevic continues his
cross-examination of Lilic.
=== 2 ===
MICHAEL WILLIAMS TESTIFIES AT MILOSEVIC "TRIAL"
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - June 24, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Michael Williams, the former advisor and spokesman of the former chief
of the UN Mission to Bosnia Jasusi Akasi, testified at the so-called
"trial" of Slobodan Milosevic on Tuesday.
The main point of Mr. Williams's testimony seemed to be to bad mouth
the VRS and the Bosnian-Serb leadership. None of that has anything to
do with Milosevic, but this is the Hague Tribunal, and propaganda is
the main order of the day.
Mr. Williams's "evidence" against Milosevic was practically
non-existent. Williams doubted the veracity of the blockade that
Yugoslavia placed on the Republika Srpska, over their refusal to accept
various peace plans, but he didn't have any evidence that the Yugoslav
side was violating the blockade. All he had was his suspicions.
Williams did however confirm that Milosevic's policy from the
beginning was that the war in Bosnia should be stopped. He also
confirmed that Milosevic endorsed various peace plans aimed at ending
the war.
In other news, much has been made in the media recently over a
document produced by the prosecution last week which purports to
"link" Milosevic to the alleged events at Srebrenica.
The document in question is allegedly an order from a Bosnian-Serb
police commander where the MUP of Serbia mentioned as participating in
counter-insurgency operations in Srebrenica.
The document has some major problems. The problems indicate that the
document is quite probably a forgery:
1. The document is typewritten, but no Serbian type characters appear
in the typewritten text.
2. The document is typed on a blank piece of paper. It is not typed on
official letterhead.
3. The document isn't signed.
4. The document isn't stamped with the seal of the relevant government
organ.
5. The document contains typographical errors.
6. The words "very urgent" are typed in the English language on the
top of this alleged "Serbian document."
CLICK HERE TO SEE THE SCANNED IMAGE OF THE DOCUMENT:
http://www.iwpr.net/images/tribunal/tri_317_1_rs_order_ser.gif
From looking at the document it is quite obvious that anybody with
access to a typewriter and a blank piece of paper could have produced
it.
=== 3 ===
SPS HOLDS VIDOVDAN DEMONSTRATION AT REPUBLIC SQUARE IN BELGRADE
28 June 2003
On June 28, 2003 the Socialist Party of Serbia circulated a petition
around Serbia calling for the abolition of the Hague Tribunal, and an
end to the selling out of the country to Western capitalists.
Over the period of only a couple of hours the SPS managed to gather
more than 3,000 signatures at their desk at Republic Square in
Belgrade, and the SPS gathered more than 60,000 signatures for the
whole of Serbia.
The police in "democratic" Serbia were unhappy that the flag of the
SPS was displayed publicly and so they "invited" the organizer of the
demonstration to come to the police station with them.
Below are photos of the police, the demonstrators, and the citizens
queuing to sign the petition at Republic Square.
(see:
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/sps/news/sps062803.htm )
=== 4 ===
BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF HAGUE WITNESSES: 30 JUNE - 11 JULY 2003
Written by: Vera Martinovic - July 14, 2003
Here's a brief summary of the last 12 witnesses, 5 of which were known
by numbers instead of names, with blurred faces and distorted voices,
and 1 not even that (he was nameless and numberless, and it was simply
announced that his whole testimony would be given in a private
session).
B-1244, a Bosnian Serb civil official during the war, first confirmed
that 30 Frenki Simatovic's men [Commander of the Serbian Special
Police unit] participated in the military takeover of his town (being
asked about it by the Prosecutor Groome in a highly suggestive and
confusing manner]. Then, when Milosevic asked about these men in
detail, he clarified that they were in fact members of the Serbian
Radical Party who arrived in the municipality as volunteers with no
link to Simatovic or to the State Security Department of the Police of
Serbia whatsoever.
C-0006 seemed totally unreliable, claiming to be a Croat who was first
arrested by the local Serbs, and then forced to become a member of the
Serb Territorial Defence in Vukovar. As a shanghaied soldier, he was
somehow at liberty to be miraculously present at all the key moments
and places during these two critical days, seeing all of the important
players in action at least three times a day, listening to their
conversations, coming and going not once but twice to Ovcara Farm,
doing nothing, just puttering about.
He even claimed to have seen Major Sljivancanin in person at Ovcara.
Such a bold thing has never claimed by anybody so far. He even said
hello to the Major, but the latter failed to reply. To boot, he gave
his testimony in English. Yet, with all his alleged hovering presence
(like a Victorian novelist, he was even able to read minds of his
characters), his testimony boiled to already well-known general things
that could be told by anybody watching TV at that time.
Witness "X", testifying in a private session, probably gave crucial
relevant evidence based on his personal gut feeling about how
"Milosevic was a thief who was too much in love with his overweight
wife."
Vlado Vukovic, a former Croatian policeman who fought against the JNA
[Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija = Yugoslav National Army] in Krajina,
became POW and was exchanged later on, claimed that the JNA was in
fact attacking this defenseless Croatian village with no reason at all.
I repeat, he was captured while attacking a JNA facility near the said
village, together with the rest of Croatian policemen and irregulars.
C-1230 testified that how he was the only one who survived an alleged
execution by JNA soldiers in Krajina. The problem is that in his
previous 3 written statements given to the OTP he never mentioned JNA
soldiers, only some local Serb irregulars. Perhaps his memory got
better after several years.
Andreas Riedlemayer, a Harvard expert on Islamic architecture, was
again commissioned by the OTP (after his testimony about Kosovo) to
talk about the destruction of not only the Islamic, but also the
Catholic monuments in Bosnia (as an expert on the Islamic architecture,
of course, and not on destruction nor on Catholicism).
Riedlemayer was not tasked with researching the destruction of the
Catholic monuments destroyed by the Muslims, nor the destruction of
the Muslim monuments destroyed by the Catholics - only the destruction
of the Muslim and Catholic monuments destroyed by the Serbs.
While not being an expert on arms and explosives (by his own
admission), Mr. Riedlemayer somehow managed to know how, and under
what circumstances, all of those monuments were destroyed. Although he
had never bothered to investigate the destruction of Serb monuments,
he somehow knew their destruction was not substantial.
Riedelmayer, was even bold enough to claim that the fact he wrote a
letter to Clinton demanding the UN arms embargo against Bosnian
Muslims should cease to be respected by the US, did not affect his
professional objectivity in the least.
Zoran Lilic, former Yugoslav President, was summoned again, one month
after his previous appearance, to testify about some important
documents recently received by the OTP from the Yugoslav authorities,
namely the transcripts of the meetings of the Supreme Defence Council,
as well as some intercepted highly confidential phone calls.
It turned out to be an anticlimactic, the Council transcripts merely
demonstrated that Milosevic had even less influence, let alone direct
authority over Bosnian Serbs, who opposed him bitterly at every
meeting.
The intercepts (most probably made by the Croatian Security Services)
were useless due to the poor technical quality, so their written
transcripts had been used instead. Nevertheless, they were completely
uninteresting, except one: a phone call between Lilic and General
Perisic (the YU Army Chief of Staff), where Lilic said it had been
agreed that a written guarantee would be provided to General Mladic to
assure him he will not be delivered to the ICTY, in exchange for the
return of two captured French pilots [downed by the Bosnian Serbs
while their Mirage fighter participated in the NATO bombing of the
Serb positions near Pale].
The juicy detail was when Lilic said to Perisic he should explain to
Mladic when negotiating the release of the pilots that both French
President Jacques Chirac and Milosevic had agreed to give that same
guarantee [in order not to spoil the upcoming signing of the Dayton
Accords in Paris].
Another interesting intercept (or, alleged intercept, since there was
no tape at all, just the transcript) was the one in which Milosevic's
wife spoke to the Chef de Cabinet of Karadzic about those French
pilots. The alleged conversation contains no damning details at all, it
could only give a general impression of Milosevic's wife being
influential and meddling into her husband's business. The problem was
that in this transcript Mrs. Markovic called her interlocutor "Rajko"
and referred to her husband as "President Milosevic".
Milosevic claimed his wife never knew any of these people, let alone
on a first-name basis, and expressed surprise that she should refer to
him as "President Milosevic", after spending her whole life with him.
He expressed his concern that the evidence might be forged. He said he
would love to hear the tape of this conversation be played in the
courtroom. It turned out that Mr. Nice couldn't produce any tape, and
so he withdrew this particular piece of "evidence".
Edin Pasic, former translator for Arabic and Turkish in the
ex-Yugoslav federal bodies and the current Ambassador of Bosnia &
Herzegovina to Kuwait, stated that, while passing the corridors of the
Presidential palace on his way to his task of interpreting the
telephone conversation between Muammar el Gaddafi of Libya and the
Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic in 1992. He saw men in mudded
uniforms who were talking of the killings and throat-cutting they had
done in Bosnia. He must've passing those clean corridors real slow to
be able to hear all the colorful details by those mudded fighters.
Pasic said that the Belgrade mosque on Knez Mihailova street, which he
said he attended regularly, was attacked by a hand grenade. When
Milosevic pointed out that the mosque (repaired and guarded by the
police after that) was not on that street, and when Tapuskovic showed
some interest in how come a Communist like Mr Pasic was attending a
mosque at all, Mr Pasic explained that the mosque must've been
somewhere in the general vicinity of the park (the man had lived in
Belgrade for 16 years, mind you), and that he was not a Communist, but
merely a member of the League of Communists.
Pasic expressed his disdain for the Belgrade Mufti [the head of the
Muslim community], who was regularly seeing Milosevic, or, as the
witness put it "flirted with Milosevic".
Pasic claimed that the Muslims in Belgrade lived under terror, feeling
as if they were wearing "yellow arm-bands" (used by Nazis to identify
Jews), and that the ethnic cleansing had in fact started from
Belgrade. To strengthen such a claim he used his own "horrifying
experience:" President Cosic allegedly offered him to be his adviser
for Islamic countries, but he proudly refused, not wanting to become a
puppet to Milosevic, which Cosic already was (the hapless Cosic
allegedly admitted as much in desperate whispers to his
interpreter/wannabe adviser, who fell down on his knees, begging Cosic
to protect the Bosnian Muslims).
After that, Pasic felt as if he had been followed and his apartment
entered. The terror was such that full 4 years later Pasic calmly left
with his whole family to Hungary, and thence to Egypt, regularly using
his passport to do so. Milosevic didn't appreciate the kneeling
melodrama in the Presidential cabinet and reminded the witness that
Cosic was alive and could testify that nothing similar had happened
and voiced his disgust that such a story came from the witness in the
worst of taste.
May said the bad taste is unimportant, only the sterling quality of
the evidence this witness is providing. Mr Pasic had to say something
damning about the Colonel Sljivancanin, too: apparently, during an
official reception, the Colonel's face literally "lit up when Milosevic
entered the room."
Safet Avdic, a Muslim from Foca who had been a POW in a Bosnian Serb
detention facility and who was subsequently exchanged, described his
prison days, complaining that he has lost a lot of weight there. Oddly
enough, he has never been maltreated, but he heard that some other POWs
had.
Jusuf Taranin, was another Muslim from the same municipality, who
described how 7 Muslims were killed by a bunch of irregulars in a
warehouse that used to belong to the JNA (that must've been the reason
the Prosecution summoned this particular witness - the JNA had been
somehow mentioned in his testimony). He also stated that 10 days
before the clashes began, the JNA came and distributed guns to local
Serbs. When Milosevic asked whether this could have been local
Territorial Defence guys who came and distributed guns, the reliable
witness said: "I don't know, could be."
B-1120 was in the same detention facility in Foca as Safet Avdic, and
he also claimed that the local Muslims were unarmed when attacked by
the vicious Serbs, and that they never fired at all towards the Serb
positions. He had trouble answering how come the battle for Foca lasted
for full 8 days, then.
C-1171 was a member of the ZNG [Zbor Narodne Garde = Croatian National
Guard Corps] in Vukovar, who saw the end was near and with hundreds of
other zenge came to Vukovar Hospital, pretending to be wounded or a
staff member, to be able to come out of the town in a humanitarian
convoy. Along with the others, he was arrested and taken to the Ovcara
Farm. He managed to jump out of the truck, but was caught again.
Strangely enough, he was not executed as could have been expected from
the Serbs on a killing spree, but was shipped to the Belgrade Military
Prison, where he had not been maltreated and where it was established
he was a suspect war criminal (a member of the ZNG explosives unit,
who demolished private Serb property in Vukovar, killing civilians).
C-1171 was subsequently exchanged. His damning testimony re the Ovcara
case was that he, unlike the omnipresent earlier witness C-0006, never
saw Colonel Sljivancanin at the Ovcara Farm at all. He did see some
uniformed men there who had parts of the JNA uniforms on plus fur hats
and various insignia, so sometimes he referred to them as the JNA
soldiers and sometimes as the local irregulars.
When directly asked by Milosevic whether he could confirm these people
were the JNA soldiers, the witness said he didn't know and playfully
added that Milosevic should answer that instead. Witty, but not
evidence. There was an interesting moment when Milosevic produced and
tendered into evidence the original Vukovar Hospital register [taken
away by the JNA after they took over the Hospital], showing that only
45 wounded persons in all (both civilians and military) had been
admitted during the fiercest final battle between 2 and 18 November
1991, a far cry from that horrifying picture that the Hospital
Director Dr Bosanac had painted of overcrowded facility with hundreds
and hundreds of wounded.
The problem with this legal procedure is that it needs some relevant
and hard evidence to build up the case against the defendant. So far,
it was as described above, or even worse. May I suggest to May & Co.
to explain their final sentence by the damning testimony of that
secret witness "X"?
Vera Martinovic is an independent writer based in Belgrade Yugoslavia.
Article Posted For Fair Use Only
=== 5 ===
THE CIRCUS CONTINUES AT THE HAGUE
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - July 11, 2003
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
After over 10 days of not watching I found that the so-called "trial"
at the Hague to be as much of a joke as ever.
Today there were 2 secret witnesses who testified, B-1120 and C-1171.
B-1120 was a 92-bis witness for Foca, and his testimony was downright
comical.
B-1120 was a member of the main board of the SDA in Foca virtually
since the inception of the party in 1990.
B-1120 initially claimed that Muslims in Foca armed themselves and
formed armed night patrols before the war began. However, as is often
the case at this so-called "trial," he changed this story 5 minutes
later and claimed that the Muslims had no weapons.
B-1120 explained the deaths of 1,100 Serbs and the burning of Serb
houses and the mass-exodus of Serbs from Foca to Montenegro was all
done by the Serbs themselves!
According to B-1120 the Serbs were killing themselves, expelling
themselves, and burning down their own houses. Only at the Hague
Tribunal could a cock and bull story like that make sense.
The next witness to testify was another secret witness called C-1171.
C-1171 was a member of the ZNG in Vukovar.
Apparently, C-1171 is some sort of war criminal himself, but the
details of his crimes were dealt with in closed session.
At any rate C-1171's testimony had nothing to do with Milosevic. The
only thing that could possibly be connected to Milosevic was the time
that C-1171 spent in the JNA's military prison in Belgrade, and C-1171
testified that nobody mistreated him there.
Between those 2 secret witnesses the so-called "trial chamber" dealt
with the testimony of 6 other secret witnesses who gave mostly secret
evidence in other "trials".
So what we have here is secret witnesses testifying about
God-knows-what with no opportunity for President Milosevic to ask
these secret witnesses about their secret evidence.
This circus in The Hague puts Barnum and Bailey to shame.
Tre modelli a confronto
Breve relazione sulle forme storiche
della regolazione socialista dell’economia
di Gianmarco Pisa, Federazione Prc Napoli
(ringraziamo l'autore per avere messo il testo a disposizione)
1. Sull’economia socialista di piano
All’interno di un sistema socialista a direzione pianificata centrale,
il piano si pone innanzitutto come “metodo”, criterio generale di
determinazione politica delle linee generali della produzione,
orientato all'individuazione delle produzioni strategiche, mediante un
sistema di controllo e direzione, che si articola in due momenti: il
primo quello della definizione politica degli obiettivi generali della
produzione, il secondo quello della partecipazione all'elaborazione del
piano da parte dei singoli responsabili della produzione.
Il piano punta alla determinazione degli obiettivi generali della
crescita economica, della produzione settoriale, e degli assetti
strategici della produzione, secondo una definizione contenuta nel
piano (tipicamente quinquennale, più raramente settennale) definito
appunto ‘prospettico’, in quanto finalizzato a stabilire l'obiettivo
generale di produzione di medio-periodo; e definisce le ricadute
effettive del piano prospettico, che diventa operativo nella forma
di‘piano annuale’ (con i suoi articolati trimestrali o semestrali),
atto a fornire le linee guida delle operazioni economiche da compiere,
le direttive della produzione, le forme dell'interazione tra i vari
comparti produttivi. Qui si inserisce un terzo tipo di piano, che va
sotto il nome di ‘piano degli investimenti’, che fissa gli orientamenti
rispetto alla destinazione degli investimenti produttivi, in ordine
alla quota di pil da destinare all'investimento generale, alla quota di
capitale preventivato da destinare tra i vari settori produttivi, e
infine alla quota di investimento all'interno di ciascun settore. Il
primo orientamento spetta alla dirigenza politica e attiene
strettamente agli obiettivi fissati nel piano prospettico, il secondo
viene preso dai ministeri ed uffici preposti (l'Ufficio Centrale della
Pianificazione stabilisce le coordinate generali del piano e attraverso
i suoi dipartimenti, uffici e ministeri economici le ricadute
particolari) sulla base delle indicazioni emergenti dai dati raccolti
dalla base aziendale, mentre il terzo consta delle decisioni operative
sulla base di un calcolo generale del tasso di interesse e dei tempi di
ammortamento, in un quadro complessivo di gestione a più livelli
dell’intero sistema produttivo.
In questo panorama generale emerge il problema storico dell’economia
sovietica, quello del mantenimento di una forma di mercato ‘socialista’
sotto forma di mantenimento della forma monetaria dello scambio, dovuto
alla permanenza della contraddizione città-campagna e,
conseguentemente, del problema degli approvvigionamenti. Questo
problema determinò la consapevolezza della inopportunità di spingere la
lotta di classe nelle campagne fino alle sue estreme conseguenze
cosicché la collettivizzazione delle campagne non fu resa integrale, ed
accanto al sistema dei sovchoz (le aziende agricole statali, in cui i
contadini lavoravano alle dirette dipendenze dello Stato su una terra
integralmente statalizzata), si affermò quello della cooperazione
contadina nei kolchoz (aziende cooperative non statali, in cui i
contadini cooperatori lavoravano direttamente la terra collettivizzata
con strumenti di produzione di proprietà dello Stato al quale dovevano
poi vendere i loro prodotti).
Il sistema sovietico corrisponde, quindi, alla formulazione socialista
di un sistema economico mediato tra forme statali e cooperative, il che
non traduce in effetti il programma di socializzazione integrale dei
mezzi di produzione (anche in virtù del limite della statalizzazione),
ma risponde alla campagna antikulaki e di conseguenza alla necessità di
assicurare all'egemonia operaia una base salda di collaborazione con il
mondo delle campagne e le fonti di approvvigionamento. Rimaneva
pertanto, di conseguenza, all'interno della pianificazione sovietica,
la validità della legge del valore e la formalizzazione del valore nei
prezzi dei beni, sulla base del lavoro astratto oggettivato contenuto
in essi.
Tale contraddizione all'interno del sistema generale dell'economia di
piano non valse comunque ad inficiare l'impianto generale, appunto per
il carattere non autoregolativo della forma monetaria dello scambio
introdotto nell'Unione e nel sistema delle relazioni tra macrostrutture
distinte (agricoltura, industria, servizi). Se è vero che i prodotti si
scambiano su base mercantile, è anche vero che i prezzi che esprimono
il rapporto di valore all'interno di quella forma di scambio non
esprimono alcun valore aggiunto al bene-merce, come accade nelle
economie capitalistiche, ma semplicemente il valore in sé del
bene-merce sulla base del lavoro sociale oggettivato in esso contenuto
sotto forma di costi diretti della produzione, senza alcuna eccedenza
di valore diversamente capitalizzabile (per esempio sotto forma di
acquisto della forza-lavoro o dei mezzi della produzione, forma
dell’accumulazione capitalistica).
Dal punto di vista strutturale, si può dire che nel sistema economico
sovietico la pianificazione si pone come criterio generale di
regolazione dell’applicazione della legge del valore, in virtù del
quale quest'ultima, pur permanendo come dato all'interno del sistema
della produzione, non assume valore condizionante, nel senso che non
assume alcuna funzione generale di regolazione sociale. Ciò è
dimostrato dalla sostanziale scomparsa delle forme tipicamente
capitalistiche dello “scambio ineguale”, sia nel senso dell'allocazione
sulmercato della forza-lavoro, dal momento che nell'economia sovietica
questa allocazione non esisteva (in quanto il lavoratore non vendeva
privatamente la sua forza-lavoro al capitalista, ma la massa
complessiva di forza-lavoro era allocata nei vari comparti della
produzione sulla base della decisione politica), sia nel senso della
compravendita dei prodotti-merci (in quanto il sistema dello scambio si
fondava non sulla compravendita finalizzata al profitto mediante
accumulazione di quote di valore eccedentarie contenute nel prezzo,
bensì sulla compravendita regolata in sede politica, finalizzata
all'approvvigionamento reciproco mediante una forma monetaria sancita
dal prezzo imposto, uguale ai costi diretti della produzione, sulla
base di una valutazione politica generale orientata all'annullamento
della quota-capitale). .
Ne derivano due conseguenze: la forza-lavoro come valore-lavoro non ha
carattere salariale, dal momento che essa si esprime mediante
aggregazioni salariali su tutti i comparti della vita sociale (l’intero
sistema dei servizi sociali nella struttura sovietica è gratuito) e
come lavoro-vivo non entra all'interno delle quote di capitale
accumulabile dal momento che non esiste proprietà privata dei mezzi di
produzione. Inoltre, l'assenza di unaproprietà privata degli strumenti
della produzione e il sistema della regolazione generale dei prezzi
impedisce la formazione di qualunque profitto aggiuntivo a quello che è
considerato “profitto minimo” (quantità di valore arbitrariamente
fissata in sede politica nell'ambito del computo dei prezzi come
determinazione del valore contenuto nel bene-merce sulla base del
lavoro socialmente necessario), e il sistema stesso della proprietà
statale dei mezzi di produzione fa sì che tutte le quotazioni in conto
capitale (quota del profitto minimo, quote di ammortamento del capitale
fisso, quota generale delle imposte) pertengano al controllo e alla
disponibilità dello Stato e rifluiscano (in quote politicamente
determinate) al sistema delle aziende solo sotto forma di
quote-capitale non capitalizzabili ma investibili unicamente nella
produzione.
La conseguenza del sistema è quella di agire direttamente su tutti i
versanti della composizione sociale del meccanismo della riproduzione,
cioè a dire sui rapporti sociali di produzione: su quello della
forza-lavoro, in quanto ne garantisce la riproducibilità in forme non
capitalistiche, e su quello dei dirigenti delle aziende in quanto
impedisce la maturazione di un plusprofitto e quindi la accumulazione
di capitale. Ciò garantisce il sistema dalla riproduzione della prassi
dell’accumulazione, ma al tempo stesso lo espone al limite della
determinazione simultanea di tutti i singoli fattori della produzione,
compito sostanzialmente inespletabile dal pianificatore in maniera
compiuta, specie se si considerano i limiti della tecnologia sovietica
del software e del calcolo automatico, necessari per questo genere di
operazioni di computo a molteplici livelli.
2. Sull’economia socialista di mercato
La Cina, nella III sessione plenaria dell'XI congresso del Pcc del
1978, ha compiuto una svolta storica, ridislocando il concetto di lotta
di classe, intesa non più come punto centrale del programma del
partito, sostituendolo con quello di “costruzione economica”. Di
conseguenza, la distinzione marxista tra forze produttive e rapporti
sociali di produzione, sebbene rimanga rilevante, viene rivista in
termini diversi da quelli tradizionali, il mercato viene utilizzato
come elemento di dinamizzazione per le forze produttive socialiste e la
nuova condizione del ‘socialismo di mercato’ è finalizzata alla
innovazione economica. Attualmente il sistema produttivo cinese è
ripartito in modo equanime tra il settore pubblico, quello cooperativo
e quello privato, con una leggera preponderanza del primo e all’interno
di un orientamento generale fissato dal piano generale della produzione
sotto la direzione politica del partito. Il risultato di questa
evoluzione si misura nei tassi di crescita dell'economia cinese (10%
circa annuo in tutti gli anni Novanta), un tasso di crescita che
consentirà nel giro di un decennio alla Cina di superare il prodotto
interno lordo Usa. Non stupisce quindi il grado dell’integrazione
dell’economia cinese con la maggiore economia mondiale, quella Usa:
tale integrazione economica si spiega anche con i dati degli scambi: la
Cina esporta 32.4 b$ negli Usa (35% export cinese) e importa 8.8 b$
dagli Usa (2% export statunitense, dati 1999). La Cina rappresenta la
fonte del 7.5% dell'import statunitense, mentre viene dagli Usa il 5%
dell'import Cinese. Si ritiene valutabile in 200.000 posti di lavoro
negli Usa il costo sociale di un taglio dei rapporti con la Cina.
Il XXI secolo si apre per la Cina all'insegna della necessità di
mantenere una propria egemonia strategica nella regione e un proprio
primato rispetto alle economia delle altre ‘tigri asiatiche’, in modo
da confermarle lo status di potenza regionale - e nel medio periodo non
solo regionale - che attualmente le compete, nonostante il
rallentamento dell'ultimo biennio, che comunque non le ha impedito di
mantenere la media di incremento del proprio pil su valori stabilmente
ancorati attorno all'8% annuo in media, e di registrare nel 1999 un
aumento su base annua del valore degli scambi borsistici pari al 50%
superando la media giornaliera dei 13 mld di yuan, un valore di
crescita assolutamente strabiliante. La forza dell'economia cinese si
basa su due pilastri: il sistema misto integrato che caratterizza la
struttura economica, nel quadro del modello socialista di mercato, e le
‘regioni economiche speciali’, con la funzione dinamizzante
dell’economia di mercato a spingere la crescita e il sistema regolativo
centrale, guidato dall’impresa pubblica e dalla forte spinta agli
investimenti, attualmente concentrati nelle regioni dell’interno, ad
assicurare il controllo governativo e a fare da calmiere nei periodi di
recessione. Ciò significa che il modello cinese misto, controllato
dallo Stato ma aperto al libero mercato e in grado di cogliere ogni
occasione di crescita, è percepito come una garanzia di mantenimento di
un tasso di crescita costantemente superiore a quello della stragrande
maggioranza degli altri paesi del mondo, tanto è vero che la bilancia
commerciale ha fatto segnare per il 1999 un surplus di 30 mld di
dollari, con riserve straniere che ammontano a quasi 150 mld di
dollari, parzialmente convertiti in euro.
Dopo aver viaggiato agli inizi degli anni Novanta su punte massime
addirittura superiori al 14% nei casi record, attualmente il pil
viaggia intorno a valori più regolari e stabili del 7-8% annuo, con un
tasso di crescita delle esportazioni introno al 6-8%, arrivando a circa
200 mld $ nell'insieme nel 2000. Se a ciò si aggiunge che il volume
degli scambi negli ultimi 25 anni è passato da 20 a 450 mld $, cioè si
è moltiplicato di ben 25 volte (quello americano di appena 8.5 volte)
si può affermare che la Cina è destinata a giocare un ruolo chiave
nell'economia mondiale già a partire da questa generazione. Questo,
però, non significa per la Cina la soluzione di tutti i problemi, anzi:
la crescita della domanda interna, che pure viaggia a ritmi assai
sostenuti, tra il 6 e l'8% annuo, non è in grado da sola di fare da
traino ad una ripresa così vigorosa dell'economia. In particolare, il
sistema bancario è in difficoltà: tra sofferenze (3%) e crediti
dichiarati inesigibili (9%) i problemi finanziari delle banche hanno
raggiunto una dimensione tale che si è reso necessario l'intervento
della banca centrale per garantire la tenuta dell'intero sistema. La
prevista riconversione di una parte delle aree destinate alla
coltivazione del cotone, del riso e dello zucchero, con l'obiettivo di
migliorarne la qualità, aumentarne le quotazioni sul mercato, favorire
una maggiore diversificazione della produzione agricola, incoraggiando
anche colture più remunerative, ha ricevuto un forte impulso, ma
procede ancora lentamente, rivelandosi ancora una volta l’agricoltura
l'anello debole della catena produttiva cinese - come del resto è
sempre stato storicamente per tutti i sistemi a guida
grande-industriale. Una peculiarità del sistema cinese del socialismo
di mercato è la non armonicità del sistema creditizio: il 75% del pil
proviene dai settori privati, che però hanno accesso soltanto al 35%
dell'ammontare dei crediti bancari, laddove il restante 25% della quota
pil dovuta al settore pubblico è finanziato ancora per il 65% dal
credito bancario. E’ una caratteristica significativa, perché rende
ragione della centralità pubblica della direzione del meccanismo della
riproduzione economica in Cina. E’ noto che l'economia cinese del
resto, prova a evolvere sul duplice binario del mercato e della
direzione socialista dell’economia, puntando da una parte a chiudere le
imprese di Stato improduttive e dall'altra a mantenere in piedi e
cercare anzi di potenziare quelle redditizie, secondo un progetto di
integrazione competitiva tra le due economie, che potrebbe
rappresentare una sintesi originale delle esperienze storiche
precedenti ed anche un modo di tenere insieme l'esigenza di una
maggiore competitività sui mercati finanziari mondiali e quella di
garantire un livello di protezione sociale, adeguato agli standard
socialisti, alla luce di un’esigenza resa impellente dalla complessità
della struttura sociale interna della Cina.
In questo quadro è da interpretarsi il progetto degli investimenti per
infrastrutture strategiche messo in cantiere dal governo cinese per
l'ammodernamento di tutto il sistema-paese in un arco di tempo
decennale a partire dal 1999, nonché altri provvedimenti significativi:
l'entrata in vigore della nuova legge che elimina il monopolio statale
sui movimenti del mercato del lavoro (assunzioni e licenziamenti),
affidandoli anche a enti parastatali o privati sotto controllo
pubblico, ed il lancio del software “red flag linus” per
l'informatizzazione dell'apparato amministrativo. La vera forza
dell'ammodernamento della Cina è probabilmente il settore delle
comunicazioni: in questo ambito si inseriscono il piano di
razionalizzazione delle 27 compagnie aeree del paese, che hanno
determinato nel 1999 un volume d'affari di 1mld $ di profitti per 65
mln di passeggeri, attorno ai tre poli dell'Air China su Pechino, la
China Eastern su Shanghai, e la China Southern a Guangdong; il piano
commerciale di interscambio con l'Ue (la Cina con il10% del volume
totale è già oggi il terzo fornitore del nostro paese dopo Francia e
Germania e punta ad una vera e propria egemonia dei mercati mondiali,
grazie soprattutto alla competitività dei suoi prodotti, in virtù del
basso costo del lavoro); il piano Internet (su cui il governo cinese
esercita un rigoroso controllo ma che ha già aperto a decine di mln di
abbonati); ed infine, la conquista più recente, l'ingresso ufficiale
della Cina nel Wto del 2002. L'ingresso formale della Cina nel Wto è
stato assicurato a Ginevra il 17/9/2001, e ufficializzato durante il
Wto round in Quatar: l'ingresso ripropone la questione della
competitività del sistema cinese, ma anche il suo ruolo di regolatore
degli scambi nell’area Asean (di cui diede prova già al tempo della
crisi del Sudest asiatico, recuperata proprio grazie alla politica
valutaria decisa dal governo cinese e alla non svalutazione della sua
moneta). Del resto la Cina punta a essere competitiva per determinati
comparti produttivi e a battere la concorrenzadi altri paesi in via di
sviluppo e che figurano tra i 146 membri del Wto. In particolare, il
documento sottoscritto a Ginevra, che è la piattaforma dell'ingresso
della Cina, contiene un capitolo, che è la grande vittoria politica di
Pechino, in cui, a dispetto del fatto che a partire dal 2010 il pil
della Cina raggiungerà quello americano, è stato stabilito che sino al
2008 i cinesi pagheranno per ben 1600 prodotti dazi inferiori all'1%,
in virtù dello status di “nazione povera” ad essa concesso, il che le
ha già provocato l'accusa di fare una politica di vero e proprio
dumping sociale.
3. Sull’autogestione
Il sistema dell’autogestione corrisponde alla formazione economica
adottata in Jugoslavia a partire dal 1950, anno in cui, a seguito dei
limiti del sistema di pianificazione centrale adottato precedentemente
(bassa accumulazione causata dalla mancata decentralizzazione
produttiva, scarsa diversificazione qualitativa dei prodotti, carente
formazione di quadri nelle diverse specializzazioni
tecnico-produttive), è stata assunta le decisione di passare alla forma
dell’autogestione. Questa si basa sulla struttura del consiglio
operaio, che è un organismo sociale, formalmente non collocato sotto il
controllo del partito, incaricato della direzione della produzione e
delle relazioni industriali. Il modello ha consentito, attraverso il
controllo diretto della produzione e la riduzione degli addetti
dell’apparato, una maggiore aderenza al mercato, la regolazione della
produzione sulla base della legge della domanda e dell’offerta (con
conseguente diversificazione produttiva), ma anche, d’altra parte, una
certa sperequazione tra le diverse imprese, quanto alla
compartecipazione del reddito complessivo prodotto, e tra le diverse
regioni della Federazione, dovuta aldiverso ritmo di sviluppo e alla
non omogenea industrializzazione del Paese. Non a caso a seguito
dell’adozione dell’autogestione, che ha finito con il migliorare la
produzione, ma anche con l’accrescere simili disparità, si è imposta
una modalità nuova di intervento dello Stato centrale, che regola la
compartecipazione al reddito agendo soprattutto mediante la leva degli
investimenti e attraverso l’imposizione di barriere doganali volte a
difendere la produzione industriale.
Lo Stato acquisisce all’interno del sistema la funzione di orientamento
e riequilibrio attraverso la leva dei fondi di investimento, che
mediamente raccolgono circa il 50% dei profitti della Federazione;
viceversa, il Partito non detiene un ruolo centrale, se non quello
della definizione ideologica della funzione della autogestione e
dell’autogoverno e, conseguentemente, quello della regolazione sociale
del consenso, attraverso gli organismi sociali di massa. In altre
parole, il partito agisce tra le masse attraverso i suoi quadri che
sostengono le posizioni generali negli organismi, ma senza esercita una
direzione politica impositiva all’interno dei consigli: non a caso,
esso possiede un funzionariato piuttosto ridotto e ha un funzionamento
interno decisamente snello, specialmente se comparato con gli organismi
dei partiti al potere nelle altre democrazie popolari. Il partito, ha,
invece, un ruolo cruciale al di fuori dei luoghi della produzione, dove
funge da organizzatore sociale, attraverso le assemblee, nei suoi vari
gradi, e svolge questo ruolo di concerto con i consigli dei produttori,
pur esercitando in questo caso una funzione dirigente più esplicita:
formalmente, comunque, le assemblee di partito e i consigli dei
produttori hanno diritti uguali per i problemi di rispettiva competenza
e possono tenere sedute comuni per problemi comuni.
All’interno del quadro economico generale, tutte le attività produttive
sono autogestite e le forze produttive fondamentali, di proprietà
sociale, sono controllate dai consigli dei lavoratori, eccezion fatta
per la terra (di proprietà statale) e per alcuni settori
dell’artigianato (che hanno una regolazione diversa e privatistica). Il
consiglio operaio è una struttura assembleare elettiva (è eletto dalle
maestranze): i suoi membri non sono remunerati e tutti i membri devono
essere attivi all’interno della produzione. Pur essendo una struttura
sostanzialmente leggera, e comunque poco burocratizzata, in ragione
della gran mole di ambiti sui quali interviene (sostanzialmente, tutte
le questioni del lavoro, della produzione e delle relazioni
industriali), esso si struttura in commissioni interne, di cui possono
far parte anche operai non membri del consiglio (democrazia interna).
Il consiglio operaio detiene il potere formale ed effettivo nella
produzione e le sue decisioni, oltre ad essere vincolanti, non possono
essere annullate se non dal consiglio medesimo. Il reddito netto delle
aziende viene diviso in base ad una legge apposita (definita ‘legge dei
salari’) e ripartito nei diversi fondi di investimento per la quota
destinata allo Stato; il salario viene invece garantito dall’unità
produttiva per l’80% e per il restante 20% compartecipato dallo Stato,
che detiene il controllo di un fondo, da cui si estrae una quota
eccedentaria corrisposta al lavoratore in premio (qualcosa di simile,
per intenderci, alla nostra 13a). Il reddito nel sistema jugoslavoè
diviso tra salari per i lavoratori, quota destinata alla comune, quota
destinata all’accumulazione o al consumo (questa è una voce variabile,
a seconda della decisione del consiglio di fabbrica). Il sindacato
svolge una funzione importante: partecipa alla fissazione dei salari,
si occupa della previdenza, gestisce le funzioni ricreative e,
parzialmente, associative.
Il vantaggio principale dell’autogestione è indubbiamente connesso con
la possibilità di associare direttamente alla direzione del sistema
produttivo la classe operaia: da questo punto di vista, in effetti, vi
è una divisione delle mansioni di responsabilità, dal momento che,
all’interno della fabbrica, la responsabilità tecnica e legale è del
direttore, ma la responsabilità generale di direzione ed organizzazione
della produzione è del consiglio di fabbrica; il suo svantaggio
probabilmente è quello di non garantire necessariamente uno sviluppo
armonico della produzione e di non poter impedire un ruolo socialmente
regolativo della legge del valore e della funzione di mercato
(permanenza della validità della legge della domanda e dell’offerta).
Non a caso, lo Stato, anche in regime di autogestione, interviene con
diversi mezzi per riequilibrare gli scompensi: non solo gli
investimenti, ma anche, ad esempio, gli incentivi materiali, il
controllo del commercio estero della valuta, la predisposizione di
fondi speciali di sostegno per le regioni arretrate.
Pur garantendo uno sviluppo dell’economia in senso socialista, grazie
soprattutto alla funzione dello Stato, il sistema economico resta
duale, e può essere definito come un sistema a economia pianificata di
mercato. In questo sistema un ruolo centrale rivestono le cooperative,
il cui sviluppo è stato storicamente condizionato dallo sviluppo della
meccanica e dell’industrializzazione del paese (macchine e
fertilizzanti) e la cui funzione è quella dell’organizzazione della
produzione contadina sulla base di un modello
solidaristico-collettivistico (vicino a quello del kolchoz sovietico);
il sistema delle cooperative costituisce, in effetti, nel sistema
economico jugoslavo, la funzione di controllo dell’intero lavoro dei
contadini, non esistendo un sistema di aziende agricole di Stato
sufficientemente esteso.
L’assenza di direzione politica effettiva del partito all’interno dei
luoghi della produzione fa sì che si registri una singolare
non-omogeneità politica tra i lavoratori medesimi rispetto alle grandi
questioni teorico-politiche ed ideologiche: erano, ad esempio, diffuse
tra i lavoratori jugoslavi, posizioni che sostenevano che
l’autogestione consentisse una trasformazione delle basi materiali del
sistema capitalistico, rendendolo,di conseguenza, accettabile, oppure
che ritenevano non vi fosse una frontiera geografica ed economica tra i
Paesi del blocco socialista e quelli capitalisti, segno, questo,
probabilmente, della notevole apertura al mercato internazionale da
parte della Jugoslavia, in rapporto agli altri Paesi del blocco
socialista, e della sua mancata adesione al Comecon.
Si registrano, inoltre, interventi attivi, sebbene sporadici, dello
Stato all’interno del sistema di fabbrica per fermare il
corporativismo, altra minaccia al sistema dell’autogestione; in ogni
caso, anche in circostanze di questo genere, non è il partito che
interviene. Del resto i meccanismi del controllo, nella realtà
produttiva jugoslava, risultano essere decisamente ridotti,
riguardando, in prevalenza, controlli di legittimità e di rispetto
della legge, anche in virtù della sostanziale assenza di conflitti
interni al sistema delle relazioni di fabbrica. Lo stesso apparato
ispettivo della Federazione, nonché le commissioni di controllo del
partito sono relativamente modeste e impegnate in circostanze
specifiche generalmente non concernenti conflitti di lavoro; da questo
punto di vista si può dire che il risultato più importante conseguito
dal modello dell’autogestione è proprio quello di aver coniugato in
maniera più efficace di altri sistemi storicamente sviluppati le
esigenze della produzione con quelli di un’effettiva democrazia
socialista in generale, e, in particolare, sui luoghi di lavoro.
Breve relazione sulle forme storiche
della regolazione socialista dell’economia
di Gianmarco Pisa, Federazione Prc Napoli
(ringraziamo l'autore per avere messo il testo a disposizione)
1. Sull’economia socialista di piano
All’interno di un sistema socialista a direzione pianificata centrale,
il piano si pone innanzitutto come “metodo”, criterio generale di
determinazione politica delle linee generali della produzione,
orientato all'individuazione delle produzioni strategiche, mediante un
sistema di controllo e direzione, che si articola in due momenti: il
primo quello della definizione politica degli obiettivi generali della
produzione, il secondo quello della partecipazione all'elaborazione del
piano da parte dei singoli responsabili della produzione.
Il piano punta alla determinazione degli obiettivi generali della
crescita economica, della produzione settoriale, e degli assetti
strategici della produzione, secondo una definizione contenuta nel
piano (tipicamente quinquennale, più raramente settennale) definito
appunto ‘prospettico’, in quanto finalizzato a stabilire l'obiettivo
generale di produzione di medio-periodo; e definisce le ricadute
effettive del piano prospettico, che diventa operativo nella forma
di‘piano annuale’ (con i suoi articolati trimestrali o semestrali),
atto a fornire le linee guida delle operazioni economiche da compiere,
le direttive della produzione, le forme dell'interazione tra i vari
comparti produttivi. Qui si inserisce un terzo tipo di piano, che va
sotto il nome di ‘piano degli investimenti’, che fissa gli orientamenti
rispetto alla destinazione degli investimenti produttivi, in ordine
alla quota di pil da destinare all'investimento generale, alla quota di
capitale preventivato da destinare tra i vari settori produttivi, e
infine alla quota di investimento all'interno di ciascun settore. Il
primo orientamento spetta alla dirigenza politica e attiene
strettamente agli obiettivi fissati nel piano prospettico, il secondo
viene preso dai ministeri ed uffici preposti (l'Ufficio Centrale della
Pianificazione stabilisce le coordinate generali del piano e attraverso
i suoi dipartimenti, uffici e ministeri economici le ricadute
particolari) sulla base delle indicazioni emergenti dai dati raccolti
dalla base aziendale, mentre il terzo consta delle decisioni operative
sulla base di un calcolo generale del tasso di interesse e dei tempi di
ammortamento, in un quadro complessivo di gestione a più livelli
dell’intero sistema produttivo.
In questo panorama generale emerge il problema storico dell’economia
sovietica, quello del mantenimento di una forma di mercato ‘socialista’
sotto forma di mantenimento della forma monetaria dello scambio, dovuto
alla permanenza della contraddizione città-campagna e,
conseguentemente, del problema degli approvvigionamenti. Questo
problema determinò la consapevolezza della inopportunità di spingere la
lotta di classe nelle campagne fino alle sue estreme conseguenze
cosicché la collettivizzazione delle campagne non fu resa integrale, ed
accanto al sistema dei sovchoz (le aziende agricole statali, in cui i
contadini lavoravano alle dirette dipendenze dello Stato su una terra
integralmente statalizzata), si affermò quello della cooperazione
contadina nei kolchoz (aziende cooperative non statali, in cui i
contadini cooperatori lavoravano direttamente la terra collettivizzata
con strumenti di produzione di proprietà dello Stato al quale dovevano
poi vendere i loro prodotti).
Il sistema sovietico corrisponde, quindi, alla formulazione socialista
di un sistema economico mediato tra forme statali e cooperative, il che
non traduce in effetti il programma di socializzazione integrale dei
mezzi di produzione (anche in virtù del limite della statalizzazione),
ma risponde alla campagna antikulaki e di conseguenza alla necessità di
assicurare all'egemonia operaia una base salda di collaborazione con il
mondo delle campagne e le fonti di approvvigionamento. Rimaneva
pertanto, di conseguenza, all'interno della pianificazione sovietica,
la validità della legge del valore e la formalizzazione del valore nei
prezzi dei beni, sulla base del lavoro astratto oggettivato contenuto
in essi.
Tale contraddizione all'interno del sistema generale dell'economia di
piano non valse comunque ad inficiare l'impianto generale, appunto per
il carattere non autoregolativo della forma monetaria dello scambio
introdotto nell'Unione e nel sistema delle relazioni tra macrostrutture
distinte (agricoltura, industria, servizi). Se è vero che i prodotti si
scambiano su base mercantile, è anche vero che i prezzi che esprimono
il rapporto di valore all'interno di quella forma di scambio non
esprimono alcun valore aggiunto al bene-merce, come accade nelle
economie capitalistiche, ma semplicemente il valore in sé del
bene-merce sulla base del lavoro sociale oggettivato in esso contenuto
sotto forma di costi diretti della produzione, senza alcuna eccedenza
di valore diversamente capitalizzabile (per esempio sotto forma di
acquisto della forza-lavoro o dei mezzi della produzione, forma
dell’accumulazione capitalistica).
Dal punto di vista strutturale, si può dire che nel sistema economico
sovietico la pianificazione si pone come criterio generale di
regolazione dell’applicazione della legge del valore, in virtù del
quale quest'ultima, pur permanendo come dato all'interno del sistema
della produzione, non assume valore condizionante, nel senso che non
assume alcuna funzione generale di regolazione sociale. Ciò è
dimostrato dalla sostanziale scomparsa delle forme tipicamente
capitalistiche dello “scambio ineguale”, sia nel senso dell'allocazione
sulmercato della forza-lavoro, dal momento che nell'economia sovietica
questa allocazione non esisteva (in quanto il lavoratore non vendeva
privatamente la sua forza-lavoro al capitalista, ma la massa
complessiva di forza-lavoro era allocata nei vari comparti della
produzione sulla base della decisione politica), sia nel senso della
compravendita dei prodotti-merci (in quanto il sistema dello scambio si
fondava non sulla compravendita finalizzata al profitto mediante
accumulazione di quote di valore eccedentarie contenute nel prezzo,
bensì sulla compravendita regolata in sede politica, finalizzata
all'approvvigionamento reciproco mediante una forma monetaria sancita
dal prezzo imposto, uguale ai costi diretti della produzione, sulla
base di una valutazione politica generale orientata all'annullamento
della quota-capitale). .
Ne derivano due conseguenze: la forza-lavoro come valore-lavoro non ha
carattere salariale, dal momento che essa si esprime mediante
aggregazioni salariali su tutti i comparti della vita sociale (l’intero
sistema dei servizi sociali nella struttura sovietica è gratuito) e
come lavoro-vivo non entra all'interno delle quote di capitale
accumulabile dal momento che non esiste proprietà privata dei mezzi di
produzione. Inoltre, l'assenza di unaproprietà privata degli strumenti
della produzione e il sistema della regolazione generale dei prezzi
impedisce la formazione di qualunque profitto aggiuntivo a quello che è
considerato “profitto minimo” (quantità di valore arbitrariamente
fissata in sede politica nell'ambito del computo dei prezzi come
determinazione del valore contenuto nel bene-merce sulla base del
lavoro socialmente necessario), e il sistema stesso della proprietà
statale dei mezzi di produzione fa sì che tutte le quotazioni in conto
capitale (quota del profitto minimo, quote di ammortamento del capitale
fisso, quota generale delle imposte) pertengano al controllo e alla
disponibilità dello Stato e rifluiscano (in quote politicamente
determinate) al sistema delle aziende solo sotto forma di
quote-capitale non capitalizzabili ma investibili unicamente nella
produzione.
La conseguenza del sistema è quella di agire direttamente su tutti i
versanti della composizione sociale del meccanismo della riproduzione,
cioè a dire sui rapporti sociali di produzione: su quello della
forza-lavoro, in quanto ne garantisce la riproducibilità in forme non
capitalistiche, e su quello dei dirigenti delle aziende in quanto
impedisce la maturazione di un plusprofitto e quindi la accumulazione
di capitale. Ciò garantisce il sistema dalla riproduzione della prassi
dell’accumulazione, ma al tempo stesso lo espone al limite della
determinazione simultanea di tutti i singoli fattori della produzione,
compito sostanzialmente inespletabile dal pianificatore in maniera
compiuta, specie se si considerano i limiti della tecnologia sovietica
del software e del calcolo automatico, necessari per questo genere di
operazioni di computo a molteplici livelli.
2. Sull’economia socialista di mercato
La Cina, nella III sessione plenaria dell'XI congresso del Pcc del
1978, ha compiuto una svolta storica, ridislocando il concetto di lotta
di classe, intesa non più come punto centrale del programma del
partito, sostituendolo con quello di “costruzione economica”. Di
conseguenza, la distinzione marxista tra forze produttive e rapporti
sociali di produzione, sebbene rimanga rilevante, viene rivista in
termini diversi da quelli tradizionali, il mercato viene utilizzato
come elemento di dinamizzazione per le forze produttive socialiste e la
nuova condizione del ‘socialismo di mercato’ è finalizzata alla
innovazione economica. Attualmente il sistema produttivo cinese è
ripartito in modo equanime tra il settore pubblico, quello cooperativo
e quello privato, con una leggera preponderanza del primo e all’interno
di un orientamento generale fissato dal piano generale della produzione
sotto la direzione politica del partito. Il risultato di questa
evoluzione si misura nei tassi di crescita dell'economia cinese (10%
circa annuo in tutti gli anni Novanta), un tasso di crescita che
consentirà nel giro di un decennio alla Cina di superare il prodotto
interno lordo Usa. Non stupisce quindi il grado dell’integrazione
dell’economia cinese con la maggiore economia mondiale, quella Usa:
tale integrazione economica si spiega anche con i dati degli scambi: la
Cina esporta 32.4 b$ negli Usa (35% export cinese) e importa 8.8 b$
dagli Usa (2% export statunitense, dati 1999). La Cina rappresenta la
fonte del 7.5% dell'import statunitense, mentre viene dagli Usa il 5%
dell'import Cinese. Si ritiene valutabile in 200.000 posti di lavoro
negli Usa il costo sociale di un taglio dei rapporti con la Cina.
Il XXI secolo si apre per la Cina all'insegna della necessità di
mantenere una propria egemonia strategica nella regione e un proprio
primato rispetto alle economia delle altre ‘tigri asiatiche’, in modo
da confermarle lo status di potenza regionale - e nel medio periodo non
solo regionale - che attualmente le compete, nonostante il
rallentamento dell'ultimo biennio, che comunque non le ha impedito di
mantenere la media di incremento del proprio pil su valori stabilmente
ancorati attorno all'8% annuo in media, e di registrare nel 1999 un
aumento su base annua del valore degli scambi borsistici pari al 50%
superando la media giornaliera dei 13 mld di yuan, un valore di
crescita assolutamente strabiliante. La forza dell'economia cinese si
basa su due pilastri: il sistema misto integrato che caratterizza la
struttura economica, nel quadro del modello socialista di mercato, e le
‘regioni economiche speciali’, con la funzione dinamizzante
dell’economia di mercato a spingere la crescita e il sistema regolativo
centrale, guidato dall’impresa pubblica e dalla forte spinta agli
investimenti, attualmente concentrati nelle regioni dell’interno, ad
assicurare il controllo governativo e a fare da calmiere nei periodi di
recessione. Ciò significa che il modello cinese misto, controllato
dallo Stato ma aperto al libero mercato e in grado di cogliere ogni
occasione di crescita, è percepito come una garanzia di mantenimento di
un tasso di crescita costantemente superiore a quello della stragrande
maggioranza degli altri paesi del mondo, tanto è vero che la bilancia
commerciale ha fatto segnare per il 1999 un surplus di 30 mld di
dollari, con riserve straniere che ammontano a quasi 150 mld di
dollari, parzialmente convertiti in euro.
Dopo aver viaggiato agli inizi degli anni Novanta su punte massime
addirittura superiori al 14% nei casi record, attualmente il pil
viaggia intorno a valori più regolari e stabili del 7-8% annuo, con un
tasso di crescita delle esportazioni introno al 6-8%, arrivando a circa
200 mld $ nell'insieme nel 2000. Se a ciò si aggiunge che il volume
degli scambi negli ultimi 25 anni è passato da 20 a 450 mld $, cioè si
è moltiplicato di ben 25 volte (quello americano di appena 8.5 volte)
si può affermare che la Cina è destinata a giocare un ruolo chiave
nell'economia mondiale già a partire da questa generazione. Questo,
però, non significa per la Cina la soluzione di tutti i problemi, anzi:
la crescita della domanda interna, che pure viaggia a ritmi assai
sostenuti, tra il 6 e l'8% annuo, non è in grado da sola di fare da
traino ad una ripresa così vigorosa dell'economia. In particolare, il
sistema bancario è in difficoltà: tra sofferenze (3%) e crediti
dichiarati inesigibili (9%) i problemi finanziari delle banche hanno
raggiunto una dimensione tale che si è reso necessario l'intervento
della banca centrale per garantire la tenuta dell'intero sistema. La
prevista riconversione di una parte delle aree destinate alla
coltivazione del cotone, del riso e dello zucchero, con l'obiettivo di
migliorarne la qualità, aumentarne le quotazioni sul mercato, favorire
una maggiore diversificazione della produzione agricola, incoraggiando
anche colture più remunerative, ha ricevuto un forte impulso, ma
procede ancora lentamente, rivelandosi ancora una volta l’agricoltura
l'anello debole della catena produttiva cinese - come del resto è
sempre stato storicamente per tutti i sistemi a guida
grande-industriale. Una peculiarità del sistema cinese del socialismo
di mercato è la non armonicità del sistema creditizio: il 75% del pil
proviene dai settori privati, che però hanno accesso soltanto al 35%
dell'ammontare dei crediti bancari, laddove il restante 25% della quota
pil dovuta al settore pubblico è finanziato ancora per il 65% dal
credito bancario. E’ una caratteristica significativa, perché rende
ragione della centralità pubblica della direzione del meccanismo della
riproduzione economica in Cina. E’ noto che l'economia cinese del
resto, prova a evolvere sul duplice binario del mercato e della
direzione socialista dell’economia, puntando da una parte a chiudere le
imprese di Stato improduttive e dall'altra a mantenere in piedi e
cercare anzi di potenziare quelle redditizie, secondo un progetto di
integrazione competitiva tra le due economie, che potrebbe
rappresentare una sintesi originale delle esperienze storiche
precedenti ed anche un modo di tenere insieme l'esigenza di una
maggiore competitività sui mercati finanziari mondiali e quella di
garantire un livello di protezione sociale, adeguato agli standard
socialisti, alla luce di un’esigenza resa impellente dalla complessità
della struttura sociale interna della Cina.
In questo quadro è da interpretarsi il progetto degli investimenti per
infrastrutture strategiche messo in cantiere dal governo cinese per
l'ammodernamento di tutto il sistema-paese in un arco di tempo
decennale a partire dal 1999, nonché altri provvedimenti significativi:
l'entrata in vigore della nuova legge che elimina il monopolio statale
sui movimenti del mercato del lavoro (assunzioni e licenziamenti),
affidandoli anche a enti parastatali o privati sotto controllo
pubblico, ed il lancio del software “red flag linus” per
l'informatizzazione dell'apparato amministrativo. La vera forza
dell'ammodernamento della Cina è probabilmente il settore delle
comunicazioni: in questo ambito si inseriscono il piano di
razionalizzazione delle 27 compagnie aeree del paese, che hanno
determinato nel 1999 un volume d'affari di 1mld $ di profitti per 65
mln di passeggeri, attorno ai tre poli dell'Air China su Pechino, la
China Eastern su Shanghai, e la China Southern a Guangdong; il piano
commerciale di interscambio con l'Ue (la Cina con il10% del volume
totale è già oggi il terzo fornitore del nostro paese dopo Francia e
Germania e punta ad una vera e propria egemonia dei mercati mondiali,
grazie soprattutto alla competitività dei suoi prodotti, in virtù del
basso costo del lavoro); il piano Internet (su cui il governo cinese
esercita un rigoroso controllo ma che ha già aperto a decine di mln di
abbonati); ed infine, la conquista più recente, l'ingresso ufficiale
della Cina nel Wto del 2002. L'ingresso formale della Cina nel Wto è
stato assicurato a Ginevra il 17/9/2001, e ufficializzato durante il
Wto round in Quatar: l'ingresso ripropone la questione della
competitività del sistema cinese, ma anche il suo ruolo di regolatore
degli scambi nell’area Asean (di cui diede prova già al tempo della
crisi del Sudest asiatico, recuperata proprio grazie alla politica
valutaria decisa dal governo cinese e alla non svalutazione della sua
moneta). Del resto la Cina punta a essere competitiva per determinati
comparti produttivi e a battere la concorrenzadi altri paesi in via di
sviluppo e che figurano tra i 146 membri del Wto. In particolare, il
documento sottoscritto a Ginevra, che è la piattaforma dell'ingresso
della Cina, contiene un capitolo, che è la grande vittoria politica di
Pechino, in cui, a dispetto del fatto che a partire dal 2010 il pil
della Cina raggiungerà quello americano, è stato stabilito che sino al
2008 i cinesi pagheranno per ben 1600 prodotti dazi inferiori all'1%,
in virtù dello status di “nazione povera” ad essa concesso, il che le
ha già provocato l'accusa di fare una politica di vero e proprio
dumping sociale.
3. Sull’autogestione
Il sistema dell’autogestione corrisponde alla formazione economica
adottata in Jugoslavia a partire dal 1950, anno in cui, a seguito dei
limiti del sistema di pianificazione centrale adottato precedentemente
(bassa accumulazione causata dalla mancata decentralizzazione
produttiva, scarsa diversificazione qualitativa dei prodotti, carente
formazione di quadri nelle diverse specializzazioni
tecnico-produttive), è stata assunta le decisione di passare alla forma
dell’autogestione. Questa si basa sulla struttura del consiglio
operaio, che è un organismo sociale, formalmente non collocato sotto il
controllo del partito, incaricato della direzione della produzione e
delle relazioni industriali. Il modello ha consentito, attraverso il
controllo diretto della produzione e la riduzione degli addetti
dell’apparato, una maggiore aderenza al mercato, la regolazione della
produzione sulla base della legge della domanda e dell’offerta (con
conseguente diversificazione produttiva), ma anche, d’altra parte, una
certa sperequazione tra le diverse imprese, quanto alla
compartecipazione del reddito complessivo prodotto, e tra le diverse
regioni della Federazione, dovuta aldiverso ritmo di sviluppo e alla
non omogenea industrializzazione del Paese. Non a caso a seguito
dell’adozione dell’autogestione, che ha finito con il migliorare la
produzione, ma anche con l’accrescere simili disparità, si è imposta
una modalità nuova di intervento dello Stato centrale, che regola la
compartecipazione al reddito agendo soprattutto mediante la leva degli
investimenti e attraverso l’imposizione di barriere doganali volte a
difendere la produzione industriale.
Lo Stato acquisisce all’interno del sistema la funzione di orientamento
e riequilibrio attraverso la leva dei fondi di investimento, che
mediamente raccolgono circa il 50% dei profitti della Federazione;
viceversa, il Partito non detiene un ruolo centrale, se non quello
della definizione ideologica della funzione della autogestione e
dell’autogoverno e, conseguentemente, quello della regolazione sociale
del consenso, attraverso gli organismi sociali di massa. In altre
parole, il partito agisce tra le masse attraverso i suoi quadri che
sostengono le posizioni generali negli organismi, ma senza esercita una
direzione politica impositiva all’interno dei consigli: non a caso,
esso possiede un funzionariato piuttosto ridotto e ha un funzionamento
interno decisamente snello, specialmente se comparato con gli organismi
dei partiti al potere nelle altre democrazie popolari. Il partito, ha,
invece, un ruolo cruciale al di fuori dei luoghi della produzione, dove
funge da organizzatore sociale, attraverso le assemblee, nei suoi vari
gradi, e svolge questo ruolo di concerto con i consigli dei produttori,
pur esercitando in questo caso una funzione dirigente più esplicita:
formalmente, comunque, le assemblee di partito e i consigli dei
produttori hanno diritti uguali per i problemi di rispettiva competenza
e possono tenere sedute comuni per problemi comuni.
All’interno del quadro economico generale, tutte le attività produttive
sono autogestite e le forze produttive fondamentali, di proprietà
sociale, sono controllate dai consigli dei lavoratori, eccezion fatta
per la terra (di proprietà statale) e per alcuni settori
dell’artigianato (che hanno una regolazione diversa e privatistica). Il
consiglio operaio è una struttura assembleare elettiva (è eletto dalle
maestranze): i suoi membri non sono remunerati e tutti i membri devono
essere attivi all’interno della produzione. Pur essendo una struttura
sostanzialmente leggera, e comunque poco burocratizzata, in ragione
della gran mole di ambiti sui quali interviene (sostanzialmente, tutte
le questioni del lavoro, della produzione e delle relazioni
industriali), esso si struttura in commissioni interne, di cui possono
far parte anche operai non membri del consiglio (democrazia interna).
Il consiglio operaio detiene il potere formale ed effettivo nella
produzione e le sue decisioni, oltre ad essere vincolanti, non possono
essere annullate se non dal consiglio medesimo. Il reddito netto delle
aziende viene diviso in base ad una legge apposita (definita ‘legge dei
salari’) e ripartito nei diversi fondi di investimento per la quota
destinata allo Stato; il salario viene invece garantito dall’unità
produttiva per l’80% e per il restante 20% compartecipato dallo Stato,
che detiene il controllo di un fondo, da cui si estrae una quota
eccedentaria corrisposta al lavoratore in premio (qualcosa di simile,
per intenderci, alla nostra 13a). Il reddito nel sistema jugoslavoè
diviso tra salari per i lavoratori, quota destinata alla comune, quota
destinata all’accumulazione o al consumo (questa è una voce variabile,
a seconda della decisione del consiglio di fabbrica). Il sindacato
svolge una funzione importante: partecipa alla fissazione dei salari,
si occupa della previdenza, gestisce le funzioni ricreative e,
parzialmente, associative.
Il vantaggio principale dell’autogestione è indubbiamente connesso con
la possibilità di associare direttamente alla direzione del sistema
produttivo la classe operaia: da questo punto di vista, in effetti, vi
è una divisione delle mansioni di responsabilità, dal momento che,
all’interno della fabbrica, la responsabilità tecnica e legale è del
direttore, ma la responsabilità generale di direzione ed organizzazione
della produzione è del consiglio di fabbrica; il suo svantaggio
probabilmente è quello di non garantire necessariamente uno sviluppo
armonico della produzione e di non poter impedire un ruolo socialmente
regolativo della legge del valore e della funzione di mercato
(permanenza della validità della legge della domanda e dell’offerta).
Non a caso, lo Stato, anche in regime di autogestione, interviene con
diversi mezzi per riequilibrare gli scompensi: non solo gli
investimenti, ma anche, ad esempio, gli incentivi materiali, il
controllo del commercio estero della valuta, la predisposizione di
fondi speciali di sostegno per le regioni arretrate.
Pur garantendo uno sviluppo dell’economia in senso socialista, grazie
soprattutto alla funzione dello Stato, il sistema economico resta
duale, e può essere definito come un sistema a economia pianificata di
mercato. In questo sistema un ruolo centrale rivestono le cooperative,
il cui sviluppo è stato storicamente condizionato dallo sviluppo della
meccanica e dell’industrializzazione del paese (macchine e
fertilizzanti) e la cui funzione è quella dell’organizzazione della
produzione contadina sulla base di un modello
solidaristico-collettivistico (vicino a quello del kolchoz sovietico);
il sistema delle cooperative costituisce, in effetti, nel sistema
economico jugoslavo, la funzione di controllo dell’intero lavoro dei
contadini, non esistendo un sistema di aziende agricole di Stato
sufficientemente esteso.
L’assenza di direzione politica effettiva del partito all’interno dei
luoghi della produzione fa sì che si registri una singolare
non-omogeneità politica tra i lavoratori medesimi rispetto alle grandi
questioni teorico-politiche ed ideologiche: erano, ad esempio, diffuse
tra i lavoratori jugoslavi, posizioni che sostenevano che
l’autogestione consentisse una trasformazione delle basi materiali del
sistema capitalistico, rendendolo,di conseguenza, accettabile, oppure
che ritenevano non vi fosse una frontiera geografica ed economica tra i
Paesi del blocco socialista e quelli capitalisti, segno, questo,
probabilmente, della notevole apertura al mercato internazionale da
parte della Jugoslavia, in rapporto agli altri Paesi del blocco
socialista, e della sua mancata adesione al Comecon.
Si registrano, inoltre, interventi attivi, sebbene sporadici, dello
Stato all’interno del sistema di fabbrica per fermare il
corporativismo, altra minaccia al sistema dell’autogestione; in ogni
caso, anche in circostanze di questo genere, non è il partito che
interviene. Del resto i meccanismi del controllo, nella realtà
produttiva jugoslava, risultano essere decisamente ridotti,
riguardando, in prevalenza, controlli di legittimità e di rispetto
della legge, anche in virtù della sostanziale assenza di conflitti
interni al sistema delle relazioni di fabbrica. Lo stesso apparato
ispettivo della Federazione, nonché le commissioni di controllo del
partito sono relativamente modeste e impegnate in circostanze
specifiche generalmente non concernenti conflitti di lavoro; da questo
punto di vista si può dire che il risultato più importante conseguito
dal modello dell’autogestione è proprio quello di aver coniugato in
maniera più efficace di altri sistemi storicamente sviluppati le
esigenze della produzione con quelli di un’effettiva democrazia
socialista in generale, e, in particolare, sui luoghi di lavoro.
http://www.srp.hr/
---
Novi list 25.05.2003.
RAZGOVOR: DR. STIPE ŠUVAR, PREDSJEDNIK SRP-a I AUTOR KNJIGE »HRVATSKI
KARUSEL«
Hrvatska je na ringišpilu koji neće tako skoro stati
S čela skupine od 28 tranzicijskih zemalja Hrvatska je došla na
začelje. Pa, sada smatramo uspjehom ako nas Europa tretira da smo
jednako zreli za EU kao Rumunjska i Bugarska
Razgovarao Neven ŠANTIĆ
Sredinom lipnja dr. Stipe Šuvar, sveučilišni profesor, predsjednik
Spcijalističke radničke partije (SRP) te vlasnik i urednik časopisa
»Hrvatska ljevica«, objavit će, nakon pauze od 14 godina, svoju 20.
knjigu. Na više od 500 stranica sakupio je svoje tekstove pisane u
posljednjih 13 godina, naslovivši knjigu »Hrvatski karusel« (prilozi
političkoj sociologiji hrvatskog društva).
Bez obzira na to što su tekstovi u knjizi dosad već objavljeni u
novinama, časopisima, znanstvenim, stručnim i političkim
skupovima, očekujete li i da ovako skupljeni nekoga ponukaju na
razmišljanje a ponekog i na polemiku s Vama?
– Ovi tekstovi neće ponukati na razmišljanje one koji su ih i dosad
imali priliku čitati, a ti se uglavnom slažu sa mnom. Nisam siguran da
će ih čitati oni drugi koji misle različito od mene, ali knjigu
i dajem na uvid široj javnosti da bi ih eventualno zaintrigirao i
polemizirao s njima. Kroz cijeli život nisam bježao od polemike,
štoviše volim je. Inače, kroz posljednjih petnaest godina ispisao sam
mnogo toga i ako bude vremena i mogućnosti pojavit će se još dvije moje
knjige. Jedna bi se zvala »Historija tragikomika«, a druga »Pogledi o
tranziciji i globalizaciji«.
Zašto baš »Hrvatski karusel«?
– Karusel je internacionalna riječ koja znači vrtuljak, ringišpil. Htio
sam poručiti da je Hrvatska cijelo to vrijeme od 1990. godine, od kada
se kao država osamostalila, na vrtuljku i da to stanje neće u dogledno
vrijeme prestati.
»Kolonije od Triglava do Vardara«
Samo letimičan pogled na jedanaest poglavlja i naslove tekstove
izazivaju dojam katastrofičnosti. Smatrate li sebe katastrofičarem?
– Ako sam katastrofičar onda bih sam sebi tepao da sam katastrofičar
sui generis. U Hrvatskoj je malo ljudi koji danas nisu
katastrofičari. Uzmite hadezeovce i sve te stranke koje su se iščilile
iz HDZ-a kada se on danas raspada kao svenarodni pokret. Vidite da
svaki dan kada zinu oglašavaju se kao katastrofičari. Kažu da je
postojeća vlast dovela Hrvatsku u katastrofu i da jedini izlaz njihov
povratak na vlast. Ako pak gledate ove koji su sada na vlasti, oni su
isto katastrofičari. Kažu da je stanje bilo katastrofalno i da oni sada
kola izvlače iz blata, pa traže još vremena da bude bolje. Ja sam
katastrofičar u tom smislu što na stvari gledam tako da se s Hrvatskom
dogodilo to što se dogodilo i da u nečemu dijeli sudbinu svih 28
tranzicijskih zemalja, s tim što je ona kroz ovo vrijeme s čela,
ekonomski i civilizacijski, zemalja te skupine došla na začelje. Pa,
sada smatramo uspjehom ako nas Europa tretira da smo jednako zreli za
EU kao Rumunjska i Bugarska, koje su 1990. godine bile daleko iza
Hrvatske.
Pa i to je nešto.
– Hrvatska je sada mala, periferna europska zemlja koja nikome nije
zanimljiva, ali će je EU uzeti u svoje okrilje jer mora uzeti
cijeli jugoistok Europe. Uzet će nas možda ipak zajedno sa Srbijom,
BiH, Makedonijom i Albanijom, onako uđuture, a ako nas uzmu četiri ili
dvije godine ranije opet je to ista sudbina. Katastrofičar sam u tom
smislu kako sagledavam stvari ne samo u odnosu na Hrvatsku nego na
cijeli ovaj prostor koji je bio u granicama bivše Jugoslavije. Zato i
zadnje poglavlje knjige nosi naslov »Kolonije od Triglava do
Vardara«
Ne do Đevđelije?
– To je bio prvi naslov koji ću vjerojatno promijeniti, iako bi
efektniji naslov bio »Od Triglava do Đevđelije, kolonija do kolonije«.
Dakle, Hrvatsku promatram u jednom geostrateškom okruženju, a
to mora činiti svaki ozbiljan analitičar.
Nema planova razvoja
Je li moglo biti drukčije?
– Svakako da je moglo. Uzmite samo usporedbu Slovenije i Hrvatske. U
Sloveniji se štošta ispod žita događa što je također onespokojavajuće.
Podsjećam samo na bezobzirno brisanje »južnjaka« iz popisa postojećih
građana. Ali Slovenija je iskoristila priliku raspada Jugoslavije i
izlaska iz nje na puno pametniji i racionalniji način. Ona je početkom
devedesetih bila 30 posto razvijenija od Hrvatske, a sada je sto posto.
Nije bezobzirno rasprodavala svoju društvenu imovinu, sačuvala je mnoga
socijalna i radna prava, standard njenih građana je mnogo veći.
Vrijedi li i sredinom 2003. godine ona Vaša pozanta izreka da je
račanizam nastavak tuđmanizma?
– Vaša kolegica Jelena Lovrić, s čijim se kolumnama uglavnom slažem,
upozorava na bit Račanove politike i njegove stranke. U jednoj
od posljednjih kolumni napisala je da nema nijedne stranke koja
zagovara interese rada, a da i Račanova stranka zagovara interese
kapitala. Postoji, međutim, stranka kojoj sam ja na čelu, SRP, koja
zagovara interese rada samo što je nema u Saboru. Niti je mogla ući u
Sabor jer se 2000. godine za nju gotovo nije ni znalo. A svi su tada
išli na izbore samo s željom da HDZ siđe s vlasti i glasali za
koaliciju Račan-Budiša. No, SDP nije više, to ljudi trebaju shvatiti,
stranka socijaldemokracije. Socijaldemokracija je na strani
rada, a kroz ove tri i pol godine mandata koalicije u kojoj je SDP
najutjecajniji pokazalo se da ta stranka nije na strani rada.
I birači sazrijevaju
Gdje je onda uopće izlaz iz situacije u kojoj jesmo?
– Moramo imati koncept razvoja, a sve smo to razradili u programu
SRP-a, u kojem moramo polaziti od svojih komparativnih resursa,
od obrazovne razine svog stanovništva, od prirodne radišnosti,
nadarenosti i sposobnosti, da i ja kažem to patetično, hrvatskog
čovjeka bez obzira na etničku pripadnost, od optimalnog uklapanja u
najbliže regionalno, europsko i svjetsko tržište. Sada toga nema. Nitko
ne radi na planovima razvoja, mi smo jedina država u Europi koja nema
resor planiranja.
Tvrdite, dakle, da Vaša stranka nudi izlaz, ali što to vrijedi kada
vas birači ne prepoznaju?
– Naša stranka koja je pod staklenim zvonom, prešućuju nas,
nemamo novca, logistike, ima više pristaša i dobit će na
izborima više glasova nego Liberalna stranka, čak više nego IDS i mnoge
stranke koje su sada u parlamentu. Ali, nas neće u koaliciju, kao što
ni mi nećemo s nekima. Realnost je da imamo dvije stranke, SDP i HDZ,
koje se hrvu za vlast i treću između njih, HSS, koja će se prodati
onome od koga više dobije. HSS je sada dobro jer ima 10 posto birača i
bar 40 posto vlasti u Hrvatskoj. No, da se vratim SRP-u, da u Hrvatskoj
ljudi ne rezoniraju po sistemu »vi ste mali i nemoćni, ne
prihvaća vas šira javnost, ako damo vama glas onda je to izgubljen glas
pa je bolje dati glas SDP-u«, mi bismo mirne duše mogli reći da bi
dobili desetak posto glasova, iako sam i sada optimist i smatram da
ćemo ući u parlament. A kada bi ušli u Sabor sve bi bilo drukčije. Ali
promijenit će se i to, SRP neće uvijek biti na margini. Ne moram ja to
dočekati. Za pet, šest godina u Hrvatskoj će biti drukčiji tokovi,
treba puno očekivati od političkog osvješćivanja mlađeg naraštaja koji
sada glumi apolitičnost, prilike će nas sve zajedno prisiliti na neke
rezove i preokrete. I birači polako ali sigurno sazrijevaju.
Novi list 17.07.2003.
---
BOGOMIL KARLAVARIS, KASTAV: TEKSTOVI ROBERTA FRANKA UZ DAN
ANTIFAŠISTIČKE BORBE
Treba objediniti sve pokrete koji vode k slobodi i demokraciji
Zanemarena je važna činjenica da u Rijeci djeluju još najmanje
dvije antifašističke grupacije i to – mladi socijalisti SRP-a i
mladi SDP-a. Njihova antifašistička ishodišta sigurno nisu
potpuno neovisna o idealima NOB-a
Osjećam potrebu da svoje reagiranje otpočnem priznanjem »Novom
listu« što je i ove godine obilježio 22. lipnja, Dan
antifašističke borbe. Isto tako pohvalu zaslužuje Robert Frank
koji je nastojao otkriti neke manje poznate pojave o novom
antifašizmu. On naglašava, što ističe i u naslovu svoga teksta,
da novi antifašizam ne koketira ni s Titom ni s NOB-om. Motivi
antifašizma zaista mogu biti različiti, ali suština ostaje
uvijek ista borba protiv autoritarizma, ideološke
jednostranosti, ugrožavanja ljudskih sloboda, uskih interesa nacionalne
buržoazije, itd. Upravo zbog mogućih dilema, uprkos izrečenoj
pohvali, smatram da treba reagirati na spomenuti tekst i malo
šire procjenjivati pojave.
U svom tekstu Robert Frank navodi nekoliko grupa
mladih antifašista (RAF – riječki antifašistički front, AFF –
antifašistički front, AFA – antifašističke akcija, RAI – riječki
anarhisti te grupe trockista), a njihova ishodišta vidi u pokretu
pankera i antiglobalista, koji imaju sve veći utjecaj na mlade u
Hrvatskoj. Iz teksta se vidi da su ove grupe još malobrojne i
daleko ispod snaga neofašističkih grupacija, koje uglavnom
djeluju javno noseći ustaška znamenja, kukasti križ i sliku
Ante Pavelića. Iako vjerujem da utjecaj NOB-a nije presudan,
treba imati u vidu da antiglobalizam, kao otpor dominaciji
interesa krupnog kapitala, u suštini ima sličnu reakciju kao
nekada antifašizam u vrijeme postojanja nasilja i rata fašističkih
država ili, u današnje vrijeme, nasilja i agresivnosti neofašizma.
Bliskost fašističkih metoda i današnjih centara moći u interesu
male grupacije ljudi otkrio je i prošlogodišnji razgovor o
fašizmu i antifašizmu u »Novom listu« eminentnih stručnjaka.
Sličan otpor oblicima moći dvaju blokova pružao je svojedobno i
Tito osnivanjem pokreta nesvrstanih. Otuda je prividna
neovisnost današnjih mladih antifašista od Tita i NOB-a.
Međutim, u zaključku Roberta Franka o neovisnosti
novih antifašista, zanemarena je važna činjenica da u Rijeci djeluju
još najmanje dvije antifašističke grupacije i to – mladi
socijalisti SRP-a i mladi SDP-a. Njihova antifašistička ishodišta
sigurno nisu potpuno neovisna o idealima NOB-a, iako je danas postao
aktualniji otpor fašizma s pozicija novih shvaćanja o
demokratskom socijalizmu. Kao i zreli građani i mladi osjećaju
svu izopačenost ne samo neofašizma, već i manjkavost današnjih
normi građanske i parlamentarne demokracije. To neminovno vodi
do traženja modela novog, boljeg svijeta, a on se može naći
samo u potpunom oslobađanju čovjeka od ovisnosti, dakle u
ljudskoj slobodi, njegovom utjecaju na sve tokove života u
punoj demokratskoj proceduri.
Demokracija se, dakle, može samo širiti na nova
područja života od sadašnjeg političkog, preko ekonomskog do društvenog
područja. Tome se uzaludno suprotstavljaju fašisti. I u tome je
i suština borbe antifašista, koji će slabljenjem fašizma,
izgubiti veće društvene značenje, nažalost, danas još moraju
imati. Vjerujem u objedinjavanje svih pokreta koji vode slobodi
i demokraciji, reagira Bogomil Karlavaris, Kastav.
---
Novi list 25.05.2003.
RAZGOVOR: DR. STIPE ŠUVAR, PREDSJEDNIK SRP-a I AUTOR KNJIGE »HRVATSKI
KARUSEL«
Hrvatska je na ringišpilu koji neće tako skoro stati
S čela skupine od 28 tranzicijskih zemalja Hrvatska je došla na
začelje. Pa, sada smatramo uspjehom ako nas Europa tretira da smo
jednako zreli za EU kao Rumunjska i Bugarska
Razgovarao Neven ŠANTIĆ
Sredinom lipnja dr. Stipe Šuvar, sveučilišni profesor, predsjednik
Spcijalističke radničke partije (SRP) te vlasnik i urednik časopisa
»Hrvatska ljevica«, objavit će, nakon pauze od 14 godina, svoju 20.
knjigu. Na više od 500 stranica sakupio je svoje tekstove pisane u
posljednjih 13 godina, naslovivši knjigu »Hrvatski karusel« (prilozi
političkoj sociologiji hrvatskog društva).
Bez obzira na to što su tekstovi u knjizi dosad već objavljeni u
novinama, časopisima, znanstvenim, stručnim i političkim
skupovima, očekujete li i da ovako skupljeni nekoga ponukaju na
razmišljanje a ponekog i na polemiku s Vama?
– Ovi tekstovi neće ponukati na razmišljanje one koji su ih i dosad
imali priliku čitati, a ti se uglavnom slažu sa mnom. Nisam siguran da
će ih čitati oni drugi koji misle različito od mene, ali knjigu
i dajem na uvid široj javnosti da bi ih eventualno zaintrigirao i
polemizirao s njima. Kroz cijeli život nisam bježao od polemike,
štoviše volim je. Inače, kroz posljednjih petnaest godina ispisao sam
mnogo toga i ako bude vremena i mogućnosti pojavit će se još dvije moje
knjige. Jedna bi se zvala »Historija tragikomika«, a druga »Pogledi o
tranziciji i globalizaciji«.
Zašto baš »Hrvatski karusel«?
– Karusel je internacionalna riječ koja znači vrtuljak, ringišpil. Htio
sam poručiti da je Hrvatska cijelo to vrijeme od 1990. godine, od kada
se kao država osamostalila, na vrtuljku i da to stanje neće u dogledno
vrijeme prestati.
»Kolonije od Triglava do Vardara«
Samo letimičan pogled na jedanaest poglavlja i naslove tekstove
izazivaju dojam katastrofičnosti. Smatrate li sebe katastrofičarem?
– Ako sam katastrofičar onda bih sam sebi tepao da sam katastrofičar
sui generis. U Hrvatskoj je malo ljudi koji danas nisu
katastrofičari. Uzmite hadezeovce i sve te stranke koje su se iščilile
iz HDZ-a kada se on danas raspada kao svenarodni pokret. Vidite da
svaki dan kada zinu oglašavaju se kao katastrofičari. Kažu da je
postojeća vlast dovela Hrvatsku u katastrofu i da jedini izlaz njihov
povratak na vlast. Ako pak gledate ove koji su sada na vlasti, oni su
isto katastrofičari. Kažu da je stanje bilo katastrofalno i da oni sada
kola izvlače iz blata, pa traže još vremena da bude bolje. Ja sam
katastrofičar u tom smislu što na stvari gledam tako da se s Hrvatskom
dogodilo to što se dogodilo i da u nečemu dijeli sudbinu svih 28
tranzicijskih zemalja, s tim što je ona kroz ovo vrijeme s čela,
ekonomski i civilizacijski, zemalja te skupine došla na začelje. Pa,
sada smatramo uspjehom ako nas Europa tretira da smo jednako zreli za
EU kao Rumunjska i Bugarska, koje su 1990. godine bile daleko iza
Hrvatske.
Pa i to je nešto.
– Hrvatska je sada mala, periferna europska zemlja koja nikome nije
zanimljiva, ali će je EU uzeti u svoje okrilje jer mora uzeti
cijeli jugoistok Europe. Uzet će nas možda ipak zajedno sa Srbijom,
BiH, Makedonijom i Albanijom, onako uđuture, a ako nas uzmu četiri ili
dvije godine ranije opet je to ista sudbina. Katastrofičar sam u tom
smislu kako sagledavam stvari ne samo u odnosu na Hrvatsku nego na
cijeli ovaj prostor koji je bio u granicama bivše Jugoslavije. Zato i
zadnje poglavlje knjige nosi naslov »Kolonije od Triglava do
Vardara«
Ne do Đevđelije?
– To je bio prvi naslov koji ću vjerojatno promijeniti, iako bi
efektniji naslov bio »Od Triglava do Đevđelije, kolonija do kolonije«.
Dakle, Hrvatsku promatram u jednom geostrateškom okruženju, a
to mora činiti svaki ozbiljan analitičar.
Nema planova razvoja
Je li moglo biti drukčije?
– Svakako da je moglo. Uzmite samo usporedbu Slovenije i Hrvatske. U
Sloveniji se štošta ispod žita događa što je također onespokojavajuće.
Podsjećam samo na bezobzirno brisanje »južnjaka« iz popisa postojećih
građana. Ali Slovenija je iskoristila priliku raspada Jugoslavije i
izlaska iz nje na puno pametniji i racionalniji način. Ona je početkom
devedesetih bila 30 posto razvijenija od Hrvatske, a sada je sto posto.
Nije bezobzirno rasprodavala svoju društvenu imovinu, sačuvala je mnoga
socijalna i radna prava, standard njenih građana je mnogo veći.
Vrijedi li i sredinom 2003. godine ona Vaša pozanta izreka da je
račanizam nastavak tuđmanizma?
– Vaša kolegica Jelena Lovrić, s čijim se kolumnama uglavnom slažem,
upozorava na bit Račanove politike i njegove stranke. U jednoj
od posljednjih kolumni napisala je da nema nijedne stranke koja
zagovara interese rada, a da i Račanova stranka zagovara interese
kapitala. Postoji, međutim, stranka kojoj sam ja na čelu, SRP, koja
zagovara interese rada samo što je nema u Saboru. Niti je mogla ući u
Sabor jer se 2000. godine za nju gotovo nije ni znalo. A svi su tada
išli na izbore samo s željom da HDZ siđe s vlasti i glasali za
koaliciju Račan-Budiša. No, SDP nije više, to ljudi trebaju shvatiti,
stranka socijaldemokracije. Socijaldemokracija je na strani
rada, a kroz ove tri i pol godine mandata koalicije u kojoj je SDP
najutjecajniji pokazalo se da ta stranka nije na strani rada.
I birači sazrijevaju
Gdje je onda uopće izlaz iz situacije u kojoj jesmo?
– Moramo imati koncept razvoja, a sve smo to razradili u programu
SRP-a, u kojem moramo polaziti od svojih komparativnih resursa,
od obrazovne razine svog stanovništva, od prirodne radišnosti,
nadarenosti i sposobnosti, da i ja kažem to patetično, hrvatskog
čovjeka bez obzira na etničku pripadnost, od optimalnog uklapanja u
najbliže regionalno, europsko i svjetsko tržište. Sada toga nema. Nitko
ne radi na planovima razvoja, mi smo jedina država u Europi koja nema
resor planiranja.
Tvrdite, dakle, da Vaša stranka nudi izlaz, ali što to vrijedi kada
vas birači ne prepoznaju?
– Naša stranka koja je pod staklenim zvonom, prešućuju nas,
nemamo novca, logistike, ima više pristaša i dobit će na
izborima više glasova nego Liberalna stranka, čak više nego IDS i mnoge
stranke koje su sada u parlamentu. Ali, nas neće u koaliciju, kao što
ni mi nećemo s nekima. Realnost je da imamo dvije stranke, SDP i HDZ,
koje se hrvu za vlast i treću između njih, HSS, koja će se prodati
onome od koga više dobije. HSS je sada dobro jer ima 10 posto birača i
bar 40 posto vlasti u Hrvatskoj. No, da se vratim SRP-u, da u Hrvatskoj
ljudi ne rezoniraju po sistemu »vi ste mali i nemoćni, ne
prihvaća vas šira javnost, ako damo vama glas onda je to izgubljen glas
pa je bolje dati glas SDP-u«, mi bismo mirne duše mogli reći da bi
dobili desetak posto glasova, iako sam i sada optimist i smatram da
ćemo ući u parlament. A kada bi ušli u Sabor sve bi bilo drukčije. Ali
promijenit će se i to, SRP neće uvijek biti na margini. Ne moram ja to
dočekati. Za pet, šest godina u Hrvatskoj će biti drukčiji tokovi,
treba puno očekivati od političkog osvješćivanja mlađeg naraštaja koji
sada glumi apolitičnost, prilike će nas sve zajedno prisiliti na neke
rezove i preokrete. I birači polako ali sigurno sazrijevaju.
Novi list 17.07.2003.
---
BOGOMIL KARLAVARIS, KASTAV: TEKSTOVI ROBERTA FRANKA UZ DAN
ANTIFAŠISTIČKE BORBE
Treba objediniti sve pokrete koji vode k slobodi i demokraciji
Zanemarena je važna činjenica da u Rijeci djeluju još najmanje
dvije antifašističke grupacije i to – mladi socijalisti SRP-a i
mladi SDP-a. Njihova antifašistička ishodišta sigurno nisu
potpuno neovisna o idealima NOB-a
Osjećam potrebu da svoje reagiranje otpočnem priznanjem »Novom
listu« što je i ove godine obilježio 22. lipnja, Dan
antifašističke borbe. Isto tako pohvalu zaslužuje Robert Frank
koji je nastojao otkriti neke manje poznate pojave o novom
antifašizmu. On naglašava, što ističe i u naslovu svoga teksta,
da novi antifašizam ne koketira ni s Titom ni s NOB-om. Motivi
antifašizma zaista mogu biti različiti, ali suština ostaje
uvijek ista borba protiv autoritarizma, ideološke
jednostranosti, ugrožavanja ljudskih sloboda, uskih interesa nacionalne
buržoazije, itd. Upravo zbog mogućih dilema, uprkos izrečenoj
pohvali, smatram da treba reagirati na spomenuti tekst i malo
šire procjenjivati pojave.
U svom tekstu Robert Frank navodi nekoliko grupa
mladih antifašista (RAF – riječki antifašistički front, AFF –
antifašistički front, AFA – antifašističke akcija, RAI – riječki
anarhisti te grupe trockista), a njihova ishodišta vidi u pokretu
pankera i antiglobalista, koji imaju sve veći utjecaj na mlade u
Hrvatskoj. Iz teksta se vidi da su ove grupe još malobrojne i
daleko ispod snaga neofašističkih grupacija, koje uglavnom
djeluju javno noseći ustaška znamenja, kukasti križ i sliku
Ante Pavelića. Iako vjerujem da utjecaj NOB-a nije presudan,
treba imati u vidu da antiglobalizam, kao otpor dominaciji
interesa krupnog kapitala, u suštini ima sličnu reakciju kao
nekada antifašizam u vrijeme postojanja nasilja i rata fašističkih
država ili, u današnje vrijeme, nasilja i agresivnosti neofašizma.
Bliskost fašističkih metoda i današnjih centara moći u interesu
male grupacije ljudi otkrio je i prošlogodišnji razgovor o
fašizmu i antifašizmu u »Novom listu« eminentnih stručnjaka.
Sličan otpor oblicima moći dvaju blokova pružao je svojedobno i
Tito osnivanjem pokreta nesvrstanih. Otuda je prividna
neovisnost današnjih mladih antifašista od Tita i NOB-a.
Međutim, u zaključku Roberta Franka o neovisnosti
novih antifašista, zanemarena je važna činjenica da u Rijeci djeluju
još najmanje dvije antifašističke grupacije i to – mladi
socijalisti SRP-a i mladi SDP-a. Njihova antifašistička ishodišta
sigurno nisu potpuno neovisna o idealima NOB-a, iako je danas postao
aktualniji otpor fašizma s pozicija novih shvaćanja o
demokratskom socijalizmu. Kao i zreli građani i mladi osjećaju
svu izopačenost ne samo neofašizma, već i manjkavost današnjih
normi građanske i parlamentarne demokracije. To neminovno vodi
do traženja modela novog, boljeg svijeta, a on se može naći
samo u potpunom oslobađanju čovjeka od ovisnosti, dakle u
ljudskoj slobodi, njegovom utjecaju na sve tokove života u
punoj demokratskoj proceduri.
Demokracija se, dakle, može samo širiti na nova
područja života od sadašnjeg političkog, preko ekonomskog do društvenog
područja. Tome se uzaludno suprotstavljaju fašisti. I u tome je
i suština borbe antifašista, koji će slabljenjem fašizma,
izgubiti veće društvene značenje, nažalost, danas još moraju
imati. Vjerujem u objedinjavanje svih pokreta koji vode slobodi
i demokraciji, reagira Bogomil Karlavaris, Kastav.
