Informazione
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Italian Interests and Policies
in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans
Lieutenant General Carlo Jean
Introductory Remarks
Italy and Central-Eastern Europe
History's Weight and Opportunities
Political and Security Interests
Economic Interests
Conclusions
Summary
Introductory Remarks
When speaking of national interests, it may be advisable to provide a
precise definition of the phrase. By its nature, its meaning is
ambiguous,
so that this expression used to be censored and banned from the Italian
public debate. However, the phrase "national interests" refers to a
crucial concept which, at least implicitly, lays at the very basis of
any
foreign policy goal.
Interests are not objective or deterministic, although they are defined
on
the basis of domestic and international influence and opportunities as
well as on strong and weak points both of a material character and
relating to the political and institutional systems. Opting for one
particular interest or policy means giving up other interests and
policies. Political, diplomatic, economic and military resources are
always limited. Therefore, an interest cannot merely be defined in
absolute terms. It must also be viewed in comparative terms. In defining
national interests and policies, the availability of adequate resources
to
implement them must be taken into consideration. An interest is such
only
if it can be achieved. If not, it is a mere wish or just empty talk.
Moreover, interests are influenced by the time factor. Short-term
interests usually differ and sometimes widely diverge from long-term
ones.
The present concurrence of radical geo-political, demographic, social
and
technological changes has dramatically accelerated the pace of domestic
and international developments. Therefore, global and long-term
forecasts
and projects have acquired a far more crucial significance than they
used
to have. Italian politics must widen its time horizon through adequate
institutional reforms, and the various Ministries involved in foreign
policy must improve their forecast, planning and inter-sectorial
cooperation capabilities. The planned institutional reforms - such as
the
proposed Foreign Ministry reform and the creation of a foreign policy
planning and coordination body at the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers - seem to indicate that the Italian situation in this respect
may rapidly improve.
This essay focuses on Central Europe and the Balkans only. However,
since,
as it was mentioned above, interests and policies have a global
character,
Italy's future prospects, vocations, limits and potential capabilities
are
shortly outlined in order to provide the wider context needed to fully
understand sectorial and regional evaluations. A brief account of past
Italian policies in the area is also provided, because historical
experience is bound to affect present perceptions in Italy, Central
Europe
and the Balkans. An evaluation of Italy's security and economic
interests
follows. Lastly, the potentials of the policies Italy can implement are
analysed, with special reference to the Central European Initiative,
which
Italy identified as a key component of its "Ostpolitik" at the Graz,
November 6-8 1996 meeting.
Italy and Central-Eastern Europe
A cursory glance at a geographical map conveys the impression that Italy
is a Mediterranean country or, at least, a Southern European country, an
appendix of Central Europe. Some even claim Italy's "insularity" and -
although not going so far as to propose a revival of the "mare nostrum"
concept - state that Italy's national identity can find its full
expression in the Mediterranean only. According to this approach, the
Balkans and Southern-Eastern Europe belong to the East rather than to
the
West or, at least, to a gray area between the two.
However, if physical geography and historical reminiscences of the Roman
Empire, the sea-faring Republics and the Middle Ages are put aside and
if
the present and possible future fluxes are taken into consideration -
that
is, if a geopolitical approach is adopted - the resulting evaluation is
quite different. Italy is a European rather than a Mediterranean, a
continental rather than a maritime country. Its weak and its strong
points
in the Mediterranean (merely in terms of foreign trade shares) clearly
indicate that it has a role in the South only because it belongs to the
North. The huge problems and conflicts in the Mediterranean are
incompatible with Italy's limited political, economic and military
resources. Italy can play a role in the area only by taking part in
common
initiatives within a EU and NATO framework. The Mediterranean is
extremely
important and even crucial for Italy, from the points of view of
non-military threats (e.g. migration waves), of its energy sources and
of
the economic prospects offers. However, Italy will be able to exploit
these opportunities to the full only when the cost of labour in Eastern
Europe will increase to the point that Italian companies will be induced
to transfer their labour-intensive productions southwards. In turn, such
a
development will be possible only if this latter area offers acceptable
stability conditions. If not, there will be no alternative but a
separation policy, i.e. a Bysantium-style grand policy rather than a
Roman-style grand policy based on cooperation and integration.
Whilst Central-Eastern Europe and, in the longer run, the Balkans, are
bound to become fully integrated in the Western system - since this
process is but a "return to Europe", as Milan Kundera defined it - the
South has much fewer integration prospects. Whilst the East wants to be
absorbed into the West, the South claims its own identity and cultural
specificity as distinct from and even in conflict with the West. Since
it
will never become a part of Europe, it cannot achieve as much importance
as Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Although Eastern Europe's problems are admittedly serious, the Middle
Eastern and North African ones are far worse. Since Italy's resources
are
limited, it has no choice but to take part in common initiatives within
Europe and NATO (Barcelona, MENA Economic Summit, CSCM, PFM, etc.). In
this respect, the main risk for Italy is being isolated or marginalized
in
the Mediterranean, although the present situation is quite different
from
that of the period when the slogan "let us cling to the Alps" was
popular.
Should Europe be dominated, in the future, by the so-called "Weimar
triangle" (France, Germany and Poland), with which Spain is apparently
developing increasingly close links, the consequences for Italy might be
much more disastrous than those of its exclusion from the Contact Group
for the former Yugoslavia - which may even have been a piece of luck,
because it has left a larger room for manoeuvre to Italy or, at least,
has
dissociated Italy from the meager results of the former.
On the other hand, in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, Italy
has
greater competitive advantages (for instance, as far as the volume of
foreign trade is concerned, it ranks second in the former area rather
than
fourth as in the Mediterranean). Since the end of the Cold War, Italy
has
rediscovered the geo-politics of pre-unitarian states and, especially,
their links to Central-Eastern Europe, Russia and Ukraine. The Adriatic
Sea is turning into a kind of internal lake connecting the Italian
Peninsula with the Balkans. Moreover, it is becoming the only route -
apart from the Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest axis - leading to
Central-Eastern Europe.
As was authoritatively stated, "the European circle remains our priority
and implies a twofold line of deepening the Union and widening it to the
East". The strategic priority in Italy's foreign policy lies in Central
Europe and in the Balkans. This objective must be transformed into a
real
"Italian Ostpolitik". Priorities must be global. Convergent - and
therefore compatible - policies must be defined in the various sectors.
Furthermore, Italy is a medium power. Therefore, it cannot confine
itself
to implementing a regional policy, as it may have done in the past. It
has
global interests, and it must pursue them by exploiting its potential,
which is undoubtedly greater in trade than in the political or military
sectors. Strengthening its relations with Eastern Europe may enable
Italy
to play a greater role in Europe, especially in view of EU's
enlargement.
In this respect, we do not share the frequently voiced opinion that the
"loss of a barycentre", that is, EU's and NATO's enlargement to Northern
Central Europe alone, must be regretted. We believe that this
enlargement
may be beneficial for Italy, provided that it succeeds in replacing the
ecumenist and Third-worldist aspirations marking its foreign policy
rethorics and a large part of the domestic political background, with a
comprehensive, consistent definition of Italy's interests and policies
towards Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and that adequate
efforts,
resours and political attention are devoted to their implementation.
These
interests don’t consist in the creation of a political sphere of
influence, but in the economic integration not only to expand the
Italian
economy, but most importantly to increase the stability in an area
strictly linked to the Italian security. For this reason Italy strongly
supports the rapid entering of Slovenia and Romania in the Atlantic
Alliance and in the European Union. The Central European Initiative is
an
instrument to support the implementation of this goal.
History's Weight and Opportunities
In the Risorgimento, Italy entertained very close relations with the
national movements in the Balkans, in Hungary and in Poland, as shown by
the number of volunteers from these countries who fought in the
Risorgimento wars and by the number of Italian volunteers who fought in
these countries' wars of independence. In the aftermath of World War I,
the Italian nationalist movement squandered this capital of friendly
relations.
Ironically, Italy's policy towards the former Yugoslavia has always
displayed a quality of contrariness: it was inflexible and aggressive
when
Yugoslavia was strong and enjoyed large international support, and it
was
hesitant and conciliatory when Yugoslavia was weak and isolated. In the
first post-war period, Italy backed Croat and Macedonian secessionism,
thus weakening Yugoslavia which, on the other hand, was a key element in
the balances developed in the Versailles and Trianon Treaties. It
supported Bulgaria and especially Hungary, that is, the countries which
wanted to change the status quo. It tried to compete with Germany's
penetration into the Danube and Balkan regions and backed Austria's
independence, thus helping to destabilize the European balances. As a
consequence, it became a vassal of Germany's and several of its
North-Eastern provinces were absorbed into the German Reich.
In the second post-war period, the situation improved considerably after
the territorial dispute with Yugoslavia was solved, especially with the
1975 Osimo Treaty. Relations with Belgrade were rapidly intensified, and
not only in the economic field. They also extended to politico-strategic
relations, since Yugoslavia had the role of a rampart between Italy and
the Warsaw Pact and helped maintaining stability in the Balkans, thus
increasing Italy's weight within NATO. Moreover, better relations with
Yugoslavia also brought about domestic benefits, since they made it
easier
to accept the defeat in the war and, especially, helped to create
cohesion
among the domestic political forces, and to ease clashes between the
majority and the opposition on Italy's international position.
Relations to Central-Eastern European countries, and especially Hungary
and Poland, were just as well-developed. Regarding Czechoslovakia,
relations were initially strained by a few negative episodes, such as
Radio Prague's aggressiveness against Italy and allegations that the
Czech
secret service was colluding with Italian terrorist groups. Relations
with
Bulgaria suffered a setback after the attempt on the Pope's life. On the
other hand, in the 1980's relations to Poland, which were already
intensive, were greatly boosted by the presence of a Polish Pope and by
the support provided by the Italian Catholic groups and Trade Unions to
the Solidarity movement. The latter undoubtedly played an important role
in undermining the Soviet Empire in Central-Eastern Europe, and in
determining its eventual collapse.
During the Cold War, Italy entertained fairly intensive relations to
Romania, which claimed to belong to Europe because of its Latin, rather
than Slav and Orthodox, heritage and pursued a policy of national
independence, didn’t participate to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and
cooperated with Yugoslavia reinforcing its non-aligned status. As a
whole,
during the whole Cold War period, Italy's relations with Central-Eastern
Europe tended to intensify in periods of detente with the Soviet Union.
However, ties remained close also in periods of high East-West tensions.
The current role of Italy's presence in Central-Eastern Europe as a
whole
and the favour it generally enjoys in the region stems from Italy's
"mini-Ostpolitik", launched in the 1950's by Fanfani and Gronchi, much
earlier than the great German "Ostpolitik" of the 1970's and 1980's.
Until
the collapse of the "wall", these two policies always converged and
displayed interesting factors of complementarity and synergy.
The various initiative which were adopted within this context - such as
the inter-regional agreements of Alpe Adria, marked by a strong
involvement of Bavaria, and the accords which led to the 1989 Budapest
declaration, which created the Quadrangular alliance (Italy, Austria,
Hungary and Yugoslavia) and shifted cooperation onto government level -
played an important role in weakening the Soviet external Empire and in
paving the way for more intensive and fruitful cooperation initiatives
after 1989, when Europe's geo-political division ended.
Discrepancies started with the end of the Cold War and the increasingly
tangible prospects of German re-unification, which gave rise, in Italy,
to
exaggerated fears that Germany would acquire a hegemonic role in the
whole
area, undermining Italy's position. This scenario gave rise to rather
incongruous reactions, such as the attempt to counterbalance the Weimar
axis, i.e. the "Paris-Berlin-Warsaw" axis, by creating a "Barcelona
(sic!)-Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Kiev" axis. In this respect, an
"influence zone" concept was revived, according to which Italy and
Germany
were supposed to compete in the whole Danube-Carpatians area. It was
also
suggested that Italy might exploit the temporary weakening of Germany's
external-projection capabilities during its re-unification process in
order to consolidate its own position in the area.
At the outset, Italy mobilized considerable financial means to pursue
this
policy. However, the concept rapidly lost credibility when the
initiative
was extended north of the Danube, to the Baltic Sea. As Luigi Vittorio
Ferraris humorously put it, Italy was planning to build a Mitteleuropa
without Germany, which equated "making an omelet without eggs".
Yugoslavia's collapse as well as Italy's political and institutional
crisis and plummeting budgets greatly reduced the momentum of the
initiative, although it progressively expanded to reach its present 16
member and observer states.
Basically, the end of the Cold War and German re-unification have
radically changed the situation. Apparently, Italy has not yet fully
realized that it is one of the main "victors" of the Cold War and that
its
overall geo-political situation has altered with respect to the past,
not
only because of the collapse of its domestic "wall", but also because of
the vast opportunities that have opened in Eastern Europe. By
concentrating too much on its domestic problems and on its political and
institutional crisis, and by devoting too few attention and resources to
its foreign policy in what is a crucial period of transition in
Central-Eastern Europe, it runs the risk of losing vital opportunities
and
of reducing its role in the Western integration and stabilization of the
area.
The geo-political concepts of vital space, exclusive influence zones and
territorial expansion have lost all meanings. International economic and
political relations are no longer marked by a vertical and hierarchical
structure. At present, geo-politics is dominated by flows, rather than
by
space, and is marked by network structures. Each country's ability to
safeguard its own interests mainly depends on its involvement in the
networks and on its capability to attract flows. International relations
are no longer zero-sum games, and are increasingly becoming positive-sum
games. Contacts and cooperation have acquired decisive importance as
against competition for dominance and power. The new situation offers
vast
opportunities for Italy to develop its relations in the region.
Therefore,
Italy has a great interest in promoting the region's stability, order
and
development.
The definition of national interests and foreign policy options - also
in
the sector of military policy, either at national or multinational
level,
especially in European and NATO contexts - must be aimed at fully
exploiting Italy's potential in Central-Eastern Europe and in the
Balkans.
In this region, there are excellent conditions to develop cooperation
with
Germany, which shares Italy's interest in the rapid normalization and
integration of the whole area into the great Western institutions, such
as
the European Union and NATO. Italy's and Germany's "Ostpolitik" policies
would be enhanced by complementarity, rather than by competition.
However,
cooperation with Germany in Central-Eastern Europe requires that Germany
is prepared to pursue this line, which, for the time being, cannot be
taken for granted, although now all countries are following in the area
common European, rather than competitive national approaches.
Political and Security Interests
The disappearance of the Soviet threat has dramatically changed the
concept of security. Security does no longer imply defending one's
national territory against aggression. It involves maintaining stability
in order to enable Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans to achieve
political and economic integration into the European regional system. If
politico-strategical stability were not achieved, their integration
would
be unfeasible, because high political risks would make private
investments
too expensive and because no stable economic cooperation would be
possible.
This basic interest, which Italy can pursue only by cooperating with the
other European countries which share the same objectives, is made even
more crucial by the fact that an outbreak of ethnic and identity-based
conflicts and the deriving destabilization of the whole Balkanic area
may
result in uncontrollable migration tides and in an intensification of
fundamentalism and terrorism which are bound to directly involve Italy.
Lastly, this development might result in strife within the alliances in
which Italy is a member and, domestically, in tensions between ethical
and
humanitarian claims and the need for a "Realpolitik" which keeps into
account Italy's national priorities and scant public resources.
The need to prevent conflicts which would be bound to involve Italy also
stems from the country's political and military weakness, although so
far
Italy has erred on the side of caution, taking tardy and limited
actions.
In particular, Italy's refusal to take part in the British-French Rapid
Reaction Force seems wholly unjustified.
These problems do not confine themselves to the Balkans - from Bosnia to
Kosovo and Macedonia - whose conflicts may destabilize the whole
Adriatic
region and extend to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. Other
potential
dangers are the presence of Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia
and
Vojvodina and, although to a lesser extent, the tensions between Greece
and Turkey and between Bulgaria and Turkey.
Intensive Italian engagement in the multilateral actions organized to
solve these problems - both peace-supporting operations and political,
economic and humanitarian initiatives - can help maintain Italy's
presence
in the whole region, promote Italy's role in Europe, improve its tainted
national image and, more practically, safeguard its national interests
in
the EU and in NATO.
In defining Italy's policy in the region, the key point to be considered
is the implementation of an order in former Yugoslavia which can be
maintained in the long run, after the withdrawal of Western forces from
Bosnia. At that date, the risk of conflicts breaking out in Kosovo,
which
implies even greater dangers for Italy, will increase. The problem,
however, reaches much further. It also involves NATO's and EU's eastward
enlargement as well as US-Russian relations and interests in the Balkans
and in Central-Eastern Europe as a whole. In this respect, short-term
interests often diverge from long-term ones, and sub-regional interests
often clash with regional or pan-European interests.
In the case of Bosnia, it is obvious that stability could have been
attained much more easily, in the short period, by partitioning Bosnia
between Serbia and Croatia or breaking it up into three ethnically
"pure"
states than by the Dayton solution of creating a multi-ethnic state
which
imposes coexistence on people who do not want to coexist. However, the
two
former options do not only clash with Western values and principles.
They
are also liable to fuel instability in the long period. A similar
discrepancy emerges as far as the debate on war criminals in Bosnia is
concerned. If NATO forces had been entrusted with the task of hunting
down
and arresting war criminals, attacks and retaliations would have
certainly
ensued, jeopardizing NATO's presence in Bosnia and, therefore, the
likelihood of putting a stop to the conflict. However, in the longer
period, only the arrest and the trial of war criminals by the Hague
Supreme High Court can be a decisive factor of stabilization. Should
local
courts submit war crinals to trial, their verdicts would be considered
biased and retaliatory and would trigger further reprisals or even
large-scale guerrilla and terrorist initiatives which have not yet taken
place in the former Yugoslavia.
It seems justified to accuse the international community of following an
inconsistent strategy, which is oriented to the long term
(multi-ethnical
Bosnia) on the one hand, and on the short period on the other (failed
arrest and trial of war criminals). However, it must be pointed out
that,
de facto, NATO has carefully avoided any decisive actions in issues
which
could help, at least theoretically, to create a really multi-ethnic
Bosnia, such as, for instance, the repatriation of refugees. In this
respect, doubts have emerged on whether implementing multiethnicity
really
is the truly objective of the international community.
Italy's action has been balanced. Its maintaining relations to Beograd
and
its refraining from the anti-Serb hysteria which marked many other
Western
states have been an advantage for the international community as a
whole.
Italy's line, far from deriving from Machiavellian considerations,
merely
stemmed from a pragmatic assessment that there were two options
available:
either imposing an international mandate on all the former Yugoslavia
for
an indefinite period of time, or seeking an agreement with all the
involved parties. Since the former option was wholly unrealistic, the
second was to be adopted. On the other hand, it must be highlighted that
many of the critics of the meetings between Italian Foreign Ministers
and
Serb President Slobodan Milosevic were the same people who greeted the
attack on Moscow's White House and the accession of Russia into the
Council of Europe! Should their motives be analysed, it might be
discovered that the "Idealpolitik" facade really concealed a
"Realpolitik".
Easing the international attitude towards the Serbs and promoting
Beograd's return into the European institutions, starting with OSCE and
the Central European Initiative, is not only in the Italian interest. It
can help ensuring long-term stability in the Balkans. The recent
anti-Milosevic demonstrations organized by students and workers in
Beograd, although unlikely to bring about a political change, are
helping
to improve the image of the Serb people, who used to be consistently
criminalized, in the eyes of the international public. This may provide
a
starting point to face Serbia's basic problems with realism - in the
style
launched by the American negotiator, Richard Holbrooke - and help it to
join Europe, to which it, too, belongs.
A plan which seems to completely fulfil the objective of stability in
the
Balkans is the so-called Euroslavia project. Its goal is not to impose
anything or to rebuild a new Yugoslavia, not even according to a smooth
confederation model. It aims at re-establishing economic relations among
the various Republics, promoting development in order to damp down the
conflict and preparing the whole area for association and, in the long
term, integration into the European Union. The direct or indirect
actions
which are being carried out by the Italian diplomacy to prevent a
conflict
in Kosovo should be comprised into this project, intensified and, if
possible, coordinated with similar US and EU initiatives.
Should the situation in Kosovo break down, a consequent mass migration
of
a few hundred thousand people might deteriorate the situation to
breaking
point throughout the Balkans. If the migrants flowed into Macedonia,
they
would destabilize the present situation there. If, on the other hand -
which is much more likely, since the Serbs would block all entries into
Macedonia to prevent the situation from worsening - the refugees headed
into Albania, they would trigger a "domino effect" resulting in an
immigrant tide to Apulia on a scale which would make the 1991 "invasion"
pale in comparison.
Besides pressurizing Beograd into accepting a reasonable and
internationally-guaranteed autonomy for Kosovo, there is an immediate
need
to start preparing for the worst case. It would be reasonable to draw
plans for an emergency logistic intervention and especially to promote
turistic development on the Albanian coast, in order to host possible
refugees in Albania and eventually repatriate them into their regions of
origin. The project may be funded through new allocations in line with
the
Italian Bill on Frontier Areas, which should be extended to the whole
Adriatic Sea, by relaunching the Adriatic Initiative and by coordinating
it with the Central European Initiative.
The Euroslavia and the Kosovo projects undoubtedly have an utmost
priority
and must be granted full political and financial support despite the
current budget difficulties. They are not merely to be viewed as
insurance
premiums. They are actual investments, since Italy has a strong
potential
interest in the development of these regions.
Another critical problem for Italy is NATO's - and, in the longer
period,
EU's - eastward enlargement. Actually, the enlargement is the only way
to
consolidate US presence and engagement in Europe, which are essential
both
to preserve balances in Europe and in the Mediterranean and to ensure
political and strategic links between the Mediterranean and Central
Europe. NATO's enlargement can increase internal stability, which is an
essential prerequisite for economic development, and can especially
prevent divergencies in the policies of the various Western European
states, such as those which had the well-known negative effects in
former
Yugoslavia. Rather than an enlargement proper, this process can be
defined
as the re-absorption into Europe of countries which had been separated
from it by the Cold War.
Whilst Germany has a direct interest in the enlargement of NATO to the
Visegrad countries, Italy attaches great importance to the accession of
Slovenia and Romania (and Bulgaria, if it applies) into NATO in the
first
group. Slovenia's membership is important in that this country provides
a
link between Italy and Hungary. The recent intensification in relations
among Italy, Slovenia and Hungary ("Trilateral") within the Central
European Initiative mirrors this basic Italian interest, which is shared
by Slovenia and Hungary. The same interest emerges in the Italian
Defence
Minister's proposal to create joint German-Italian units which should be
open for participation to Austria, Slovenia, Hungary and possibly the
Czech Republic. To date, Germany has not taken the proposal into
consideration, although its implementation would provide a clear signal
that it is not pursuing hegemonic interests in Eastern Europe. An
increased military cooperation has been therefore forecast in the
framework of the "Trilaterale".
Furthermore, Romania's accession into NATO would prevent Turkey from
being
isolated in the Black Sea region. On the other hand, its exclusion may
increase the existing tensions in the Hungarian minority in
Transylvania,
who would view it as a first step towards exclusion from Europe.
Logically, this interest should lead to greater Italian preparedness to
cooperate in the military sector, too. For instance, it should take part
more intensively in joint activities within NATO's "Partnership for
Peace"
project and, if necessary, provide additional funding to NATO's common
infrastructure programme. The latter should be coordinated with the
construction of the road and railway axes which are to link the Adriatic
Sea with Hungary on one side, Serbia and Romania on another and
Macedonia
and Bulgaria on a third side.
However, initiatives to prevent NATO's selective enlargement - which is,
in a certain sense, paradoxically, confined to the most stable
countries,
that is, to those which have less urgent need of NATO guarantees - from
creating insecurity and instability in the excluded applicants should be
implemented as soon as possible. The Central European Initiative may be
an
adequate forum to discuss these problems before they become explosive.
As
much is also proved by the fact that the Central European Initiative was
acknowledged to have the potential not merely to prepare Central and
Eastern European countries for prospective association and membership
into
the European Union, but also to implement security objectives typical of
OSCE, which took part in the November 1996 Graz meeting with observer
status.
Economic Interests
The economic importance of Central and Eastern Europe and of the Balkans
for Italy has recently been highlighted by the Agnelli Foundation in a
report of the series "Nuova Geoeconomia". Over time, the whole area is
bound to be associated and eventually integrated into the European
Union.
All the Italian Regions, and especially the Adriatic-rim ones, will
derive
great benefits from it. Integration is facilitated both by geographical
proximity and by similar basic values. The return to Europe is a central
goal for the peoples of Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans and
features in the political programmes of ruling and opposition parties
alike.
Italy has a strong interest in the rapid and full integration of the
whole area. Apart from obvious political and security reasons, its
economic position will become more competitive as a result. Small and
medium Italian companies have already shifted many sectors of production
which are labour-intensive or directed to the lower market niches in the
area. The flexibility of small and medium companies makes them
particularly able to penetrate and cooperate with the markets of the
area,
which are characterized by considerable fluctuations.
Regarding volume of trade, Italy ranks second after Germany in the
Eastern
European markets and first in the Balkanic peninsula and in
South-Eastern
Europe. Moreover, it has a strong potential to increase its trade in the
area. According to recent estimates, it may not only consolidate its
position, but also gain market shares as compared to Germany.
Italy will be able to fully exploit this trade potential only if it
steps
up its engagement in the sectors of development aid, public support to
exports, banking and insurance. Therefore, an important national
interest
- which, obviously, is not merely confined to Central-Eastern Europe and
the Balkans - is providing the "system-country" with adequate means to
face regional and global geo-economic competition. This objective can
only
be achieved by relinquishing Italy's conservative and obsolete welfare
state policy. This process is strongly supported by the present Italian
Government.
Italy's economic penetration in the area, too, is complementary, rather
than competitive, with Germany's. As a consequence, cooperative rather
than competitive policies may be pursued in the economic sector, too,
and
the two countries' initiatives may be coordinated both at a bilateral
level and within the EU and the world's economic institutions. The
spectre
of a Mitteleuropa viewed as Germany's exclusive influence and hegemony
area seems a myth with no real foundations.
The sector which deserves the most intensive and determined efforts is
that of large infrastructure projects - especially roads and railways,
but
also the ambitious project of a navigable waterway connecting the rivers
Isonzo and Danube. All these projects would connect the Adriatic Basin
with the Danube and, further eastward, with Ukraine and Russia. The
opening of the Rhein-Danube canal and the future opening of the
Danube-Oder waterway give a competitive edge to the North Sea and Baltic
harbours as against the Northern Adriatic ones. Moreover, the latter are
not yet coordinated so as to achieve economies of scale. In short, they
lag well behind as compared to the improvements in the transport system
north of the Alps.
Besides their economic role, infrastructure projects also have political
importance. For instance, the growth of Euroslavia is mainly based on
them. Clearly, Italy cannot sustain these projects alone, but should
promote them within the European Union. Visions and integrative
proposals
tailored to the specific situation of the Balkans and South-Eastern
Europe
are needed, as is already happening as far as Central Europe is
concerned.
Delays in this respect may undermine Italy's competitive advantages in
the
whole region.
Conclusions
So far, in Italy, the impact of the end of the Cold War and of the
deriving changes in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans has not
been
fully understood. As much has hampered a far-sighted definition of
Italy's
national interests and foreign policy regarding this region, which has a
crucial role for Italy because of its geographical proximity and of
Italy's intensive present and, especially, potential economic relations
with it.
These deficiencies have partly been determined by regional and local
pressure, especially regarding relations with former Yugoslav republics;
by Italy's political and institutional crisis, which has drawn attention
almost exclusively to domestic problems; by the fact that single issues
such as the problem of the properties of Istrian and Dalmatian exiles,
which, although undoubtedly important, should have been viewed within a
more far-sighted context, have been unduly exploited for domestic policy
objectives. In the recent past, the Italian diplomacy has found itself
in
the embarrassing situation of seeing Italy depicted as a potentially
destabilizing, revisionist state which wished to carry out an arrogant
power policy it could not afford unless at a very local level. Italy's
exclusion from the Contact Group undoubtely was partly due to its image
as
an overly ambitious country incapable of carrying out realistic and
long-term projects.
The "collapse of the wall" has radically changed the very foundations of
Italy's "Ostpolitik", the strategic role of the Balkans and the role of
the regional or bilateral initiatives in which Italy took part.
Only recently, a clearer perception of Italy's interests in the area and
a
greater coordination of Italy's, Germany's and Austria's policies has
apparently begun to emerge. Complementarity should be maximized in the
place of competition, both because the latter - being based on past
geo-political logics - would be ineffective, and because Italy does not
possess the means or the political and diplomatic capabilities to
compete
with Germany. At most, it can implement a disturbance policy and occupy
marginal political and market niches. However, the level of cooperation
between Rome and Bonn is not yet optimal, partly because the Italian
initiatives of the late 1980's and early 1990's were often presented as
endeavours to contain German penetration in the Balkans and in Central
Europe. Obviously, the results were far from brilliant, although -
luckily
- not totally disastrous.
The recent relaunching of the Central European Initiative, its linking
with the Adriatic, the Balkanic and the Black Sea initiatives, the
intensification of relations with Slovenia and Hungary, which should be
rapidly extended to Austria, and possibly Croatia, seem to give a more
realistic character to Italy's role in stabilizing the area and
especially
in preparing it for progressive integration into Europe. Only within
this
framework can Italy's roles and interests be defined in detail and
satisfactory solutions be found also for the still discussed problem of
the Italian minorities in Slovenia and Croatia. This issue cannot
possibly
be solved but through the consolidation of these countries' democratic
institutions and economies in view of their rapid integration into
Europe
and NATO.
Summary
>>From a merely geographical point of view, Italy may seem a Mediterranean
country, due to its marginal position to Central Europe. Actually,
however, if geo-political and geo-economic trends are taken into
consideration, it is a European rather than a Mediterranean country.
Trade
and economic integration with the East play a far greater role for Italy
than those with the South.
Because of its political and military weakness, Italy's role in the
Mediterranean Basin is merely due to its membership in Europe and NATO.
Moreover, the solution to the most serious Italian problem - that of the
Mezzogiorno - cannot be found in the development of Southern
Mediterranean
countries, but in reinforcing Italy's ties with the North. Hence the
importance of Italy's relations with Central and Eastern Europe and with
the Balkans.
For Italy, from the geo-political point of view, there is no difference
between Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, both of which are
linked to the Italian peninsula by an inner lake - the Adriatic Sea -
which is a transit area for both regions.
Italy does not pursue a power policy or the goal of creating exclusive
influence zones. It has adopted, in coordination with Germany, a
cooperative policy whose aim is restoring societies and economies in the
whole area in order to promote both its trade interests and these
countries' stability and development.
To attain these goals, the Central European Initiative was relaunched
during its November 1996 meeting in Graz. Special cooperation ties have
been established with Hungary and Slovenia and a comprehensive programme
to improve the transport network through Slovenia and the Balkans has
been
developed. It has to be implemented by a reinforced cooperation with all
the former Yugoslavia Republics and the countries of South-Eastern
Europe,
avoiding any new dividing line between the North and the South.
---
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Italian Interests and Policies
in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans
Lieutenant General Carlo Jean
Introductory Remarks
Italy and Central-Eastern Europe
History's Weight and Opportunities
Political and Security Interests
Economic Interests
Conclusions
Summary
Introductory Remarks
When speaking of national interests, it may be advisable to provide a
precise definition of the phrase. By its nature, its meaning is
ambiguous,
so that this expression used to be censored and banned from the Italian
public debate. However, the phrase "national interests" refers to a
crucial concept which, at least implicitly, lays at the very basis of
any
foreign policy goal.
Interests are not objective or deterministic, although they are defined
on
the basis of domestic and international influence and opportunities as
well as on strong and weak points both of a material character and
relating to the political and institutional systems. Opting for one
particular interest or policy means giving up other interests and
policies. Political, diplomatic, economic and military resources are
always limited. Therefore, an interest cannot merely be defined in
absolute terms. It must also be viewed in comparative terms. In defining
national interests and policies, the availability of adequate resources
to
implement them must be taken into consideration. An interest is such
only
if it can be achieved. If not, it is a mere wish or just empty talk.
Moreover, interests are influenced by the time factor. Short-term
interests usually differ and sometimes widely diverge from long-term
ones.
The present concurrence of radical geo-political, demographic, social
and
technological changes has dramatically accelerated the pace of domestic
and international developments. Therefore, global and long-term
forecasts
and projects have acquired a far more crucial significance than they
used
to have. Italian politics must widen its time horizon through adequate
institutional reforms, and the various Ministries involved in foreign
policy must improve their forecast, planning and inter-sectorial
cooperation capabilities. The planned institutional reforms - such as
the
proposed Foreign Ministry reform and the creation of a foreign policy
planning and coordination body at the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers - seem to indicate that the Italian situation in this respect
may rapidly improve.
This essay focuses on Central Europe and the Balkans only. However,
since,
as it was mentioned above, interests and policies have a global
character,
Italy's future prospects, vocations, limits and potential capabilities
are
shortly outlined in order to provide the wider context needed to fully
understand sectorial and regional evaluations. A brief account of past
Italian policies in the area is also provided, because historical
experience is bound to affect present perceptions in Italy, Central
Europe
and the Balkans. An evaluation of Italy's security and economic
interests
follows. Lastly, the potentials of the policies Italy can implement are
analysed, with special reference to the Central European Initiative,
which
Italy identified as a key component of its "Ostpolitik" at the Graz,
November 6-8 1996 meeting.
Italy and Central-Eastern Europe
A cursory glance at a geographical map conveys the impression that Italy
is a Mediterranean country or, at least, a Southern European country, an
appendix of Central Europe. Some even claim Italy's "insularity" and -
although not going so far as to propose a revival of the "mare nostrum"
concept - state that Italy's national identity can find its full
expression in the Mediterranean only. According to this approach, the
Balkans and Southern-Eastern Europe belong to the East rather than to
the
West or, at least, to a gray area between the two.
However, if physical geography and historical reminiscences of the Roman
Empire, the sea-faring Republics and the Middle Ages are put aside and
if
the present and possible future fluxes are taken into consideration -
that
is, if a geopolitical approach is adopted - the resulting evaluation is
quite different. Italy is a European rather than a Mediterranean, a
continental rather than a maritime country. Its weak and its strong
points
in the Mediterranean (merely in terms of foreign trade shares) clearly
indicate that it has a role in the South only because it belongs to the
North. The huge problems and conflicts in the Mediterranean are
incompatible with Italy's limited political, economic and military
resources. Italy can play a role in the area only by taking part in
common
initiatives within a EU and NATO framework. The Mediterranean is
extremely
important and even crucial for Italy, from the points of view of
non-military threats (e.g. migration waves), of its energy sources and
of
the economic prospects offers. However, Italy will be able to exploit
these opportunities to the full only when the cost of labour in Eastern
Europe will increase to the point that Italian companies will be induced
to transfer their labour-intensive productions southwards. In turn, such
a
development will be possible only if this latter area offers acceptable
stability conditions. If not, there will be no alternative but a
separation policy, i.e. a Bysantium-style grand policy rather than a
Roman-style grand policy based on cooperation and integration.
Whilst Central-Eastern Europe and, in the longer run, the Balkans, are
bound to become fully integrated in the Western system - since this
process is but a "return to Europe", as Milan Kundera defined it - the
South has much fewer integration prospects. Whilst the East wants to be
absorbed into the West, the South claims its own identity and cultural
specificity as distinct from and even in conflict with the West. Since
it
will never become a part of Europe, it cannot achieve as much importance
as Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Although Eastern Europe's problems are admittedly serious, the Middle
Eastern and North African ones are far worse. Since Italy's resources
are
limited, it has no choice but to take part in common initiatives within
Europe and NATO (Barcelona, MENA Economic Summit, CSCM, PFM, etc.). In
this respect, the main risk for Italy is being isolated or marginalized
in
the Mediterranean, although the present situation is quite different
from
that of the period when the slogan "let us cling to the Alps" was
popular.
Should Europe be dominated, in the future, by the so-called "Weimar
triangle" (France, Germany and Poland), with which Spain is apparently
developing increasingly close links, the consequences for Italy might be
much more disastrous than those of its exclusion from the Contact Group
for the former Yugoslavia - which may even have been a piece of luck,
because it has left a larger room for manoeuvre to Italy or, at least,
has
dissociated Italy from the meager results of the former.
On the other hand, in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, Italy
has
greater competitive advantages (for instance, as far as the volume of
foreign trade is concerned, it ranks second in the former area rather
than
fourth as in the Mediterranean). Since the end of the Cold War, Italy
has
rediscovered the geo-politics of pre-unitarian states and, especially,
their links to Central-Eastern Europe, Russia and Ukraine. The Adriatic
Sea is turning into a kind of internal lake connecting the Italian
Peninsula with the Balkans. Moreover, it is becoming the only route -
apart from the Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest axis - leading to
Central-Eastern Europe.
As was authoritatively stated, "the European circle remains our priority
and implies a twofold line of deepening the Union and widening it to the
East". The strategic priority in Italy's foreign policy lies in Central
Europe and in the Balkans. This objective must be transformed into a
real
"Italian Ostpolitik". Priorities must be global. Convergent - and
therefore compatible - policies must be defined in the various sectors.
Furthermore, Italy is a medium power. Therefore, it cannot confine
itself
to implementing a regional policy, as it may have done in the past. It
has
global interests, and it must pursue them by exploiting its potential,
which is undoubtedly greater in trade than in the political or military
sectors. Strengthening its relations with Eastern Europe may enable
Italy
to play a greater role in Europe, especially in view of EU's
enlargement.
In this respect, we do not share the frequently voiced opinion that the
"loss of a barycentre", that is, EU's and NATO's enlargement to Northern
Central Europe alone, must be regretted. We believe that this
enlargement
may be beneficial for Italy, provided that it succeeds in replacing the
ecumenist and Third-worldist aspirations marking its foreign policy
rethorics and a large part of the domestic political background, with a
comprehensive, consistent definition of Italy's interests and policies
towards Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and that adequate
efforts,
resours and political attention are devoted to their implementation.
These
interests don’t consist in the creation of a political sphere of
influence, but in the economic integration not only to expand the
Italian
economy, but most importantly to increase the stability in an area
strictly linked to the Italian security. For this reason Italy strongly
supports the rapid entering of Slovenia and Romania in the Atlantic
Alliance and in the European Union. The Central European Initiative is
an
instrument to support the implementation of this goal.
History's Weight and Opportunities
In the Risorgimento, Italy entertained very close relations with the
national movements in the Balkans, in Hungary and in Poland, as shown by
the number of volunteers from these countries who fought in the
Risorgimento wars and by the number of Italian volunteers who fought in
these countries' wars of independence. In the aftermath of World War I,
the Italian nationalist movement squandered this capital of friendly
relations.
Ironically, Italy's policy towards the former Yugoslavia has always
displayed a quality of contrariness: it was inflexible and aggressive
when
Yugoslavia was strong and enjoyed large international support, and it
was
hesitant and conciliatory when Yugoslavia was weak and isolated. In the
first post-war period, Italy backed Croat and Macedonian secessionism,
thus weakening Yugoslavia which, on the other hand, was a key element in
the balances developed in the Versailles and Trianon Treaties. It
supported Bulgaria and especially Hungary, that is, the countries which
wanted to change the status quo. It tried to compete with Germany's
penetration into the Danube and Balkan regions and backed Austria's
independence, thus helping to destabilize the European balances. As a
consequence, it became a vassal of Germany's and several of its
North-Eastern provinces were absorbed into the German Reich.
In the second post-war period, the situation improved considerably after
the territorial dispute with Yugoslavia was solved, especially with the
1975 Osimo Treaty. Relations with Belgrade were rapidly intensified, and
not only in the economic field. They also extended to politico-strategic
relations, since Yugoslavia had the role of a rampart between Italy and
the Warsaw Pact and helped maintaining stability in the Balkans, thus
increasing Italy's weight within NATO. Moreover, better relations with
Yugoslavia also brought about domestic benefits, since they made it
easier
to accept the defeat in the war and, especially, helped to create
cohesion
among the domestic political forces, and to ease clashes between the
majority and the opposition on Italy's international position.
Relations to Central-Eastern European countries, and especially Hungary
and Poland, were just as well-developed. Regarding Czechoslovakia,
relations were initially strained by a few negative episodes, such as
Radio Prague's aggressiveness against Italy and allegations that the
Czech
secret service was colluding with Italian terrorist groups. Relations
with
Bulgaria suffered a setback after the attempt on the Pope's life. On the
other hand, in the 1980's relations to Poland, which were already
intensive, were greatly boosted by the presence of a Polish Pope and by
the support provided by the Italian Catholic groups and Trade Unions to
the Solidarity movement. The latter undoubtedly played an important role
in undermining the Soviet Empire in Central-Eastern Europe, and in
determining its eventual collapse.
During the Cold War, Italy entertained fairly intensive relations to
Romania, which claimed to belong to Europe because of its Latin, rather
than Slav and Orthodox, heritage and pursued a policy of national
independence, didn’t participate to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and
cooperated with Yugoslavia reinforcing its non-aligned status. As a
whole,
during the whole Cold War period, Italy's relations with Central-Eastern
Europe tended to intensify in periods of detente with the Soviet Union.
However, ties remained close also in periods of high East-West tensions.
The current role of Italy's presence in Central-Eastern Europe as a
whole
and the favour it generally enjoys in the region stems from Italy's
"mini-Ostpolitik", launched in the 1950's by Fanfani and Gronchi, much
earlier than the great German "Ostpolitik" of the 1970's and 1980's.
Until
the collapse of the "wall", these two policies always converged and
displayed interesting factors of complementarity and synergy.
The various initiative which were adopted within this context - such as
the inter-regional agreements of Alpe Adria, marked by a strong
involvement of Bavaria, and the accords which led to the 1989 Budapest
declaration, which created the Quadrangular alliance (Italy, Austria,
Hungary and Yugoslavia) and shifted cooperation onto government level -
played an important role in weakening the Soviet external Empire and in
paving the way for more intensive and fruitful cooperation initiatives
after 1989, when Europe's geo-political division ended.
Discrepancies started with the end of the Cold War and the increasingly
tangible prospects of German re-unification, which gave rise, in Italy,
to
exaggerated fears that Germany would acquire a hegemonic role in the
whole
area, undermining Italy's position. This scenario gave rise to rather
incongruous reactions, such as the attempt to counterbalance the Weimar
axis, i.e. the "Paris-Berlin-Warsaw" axis, by creating a "Barcelona
(sic!)-Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Kiev" axis. In this respect, an
"influence zone" concept was revived, according to which Italy and
Germany
were supposed to compete in the whole Danube-Carpatians area. It was
also
suggested that Italy might exploit the temporary weakening of Germany's
external-projection capabilities during its re-unification process in
order to consolidate its own position in the area.
At the outset, Italy mobilized considerable financial means to pursue
this
policy. However, the concept rapidly lost credibility when the
initiative
was extended north of the Danube, to the Baltic Sea. As Luigi Vittorio
Ferraris humorously put it, Italy was planning to build a Mitteleuropa
without Germany, which equated "making an omelet without eggs".
Yugoslavia's collapse as well as Italy's political and institutional
crisis and plummeting budgets greatly reduced the momentum of the
initiative, although it progressively expanded to reach its present 16
member and observer states.
Basically, the end of the Cold War and German re-unification have
radically changed the situation. Apparently, Italy has not yet fully
realized that it is one of the main "victors" of the Cold War and that
its
overall geo-political situation has altered with respect to the past,
not
only because of the collapse of its domestic "wall", but also because of
the vast opportunities that have opened in Eastern Europe. By
concentrating too much on its domestic problems and on its political and
institutional crisis, and by devoting too few attention and resources to
its foreign policy in what is a crucial period of transition in
Central-Eastern Europe, it runs the risk of losing vital opportunities
and
of reducing its role in the Western integration and stabilization of the
area.
The geo-political concepts of vital space, exclusive influence zones and
territorial expansion have lost all meanings. International economic and
political relations are no longer marked by a vertical and hierarchical
structure. At present, geo-politics is dominated by flows, rather than
by
space, and is marked by network structures. Each country's ability to
safeguard its own interests mainly depends on its involvement in the
networks and on its capability to attract flows. International relations
are no longer zero-sum games, and are increasingly becoming positive-sum
games. Contacts and cooperation have acquired decisive importance as
against competition for dominance and power. The new situation offers
vast
opportunities for Italy to develop its relations in the region.
Therefore,
Italy has a great interest in promoting the region's stability, order
and
development.
The definition of national interests and foreign policy options - also
in
the sector of military policy, either at national or multinational
level,
especially in European and NATO contexts - must be aimed at fully
exploiting Italy's potential in Central-Eastern Europe and in the
Balkans.
In this region, there are excellent conditions to develop cooperation
with
Germany, which shares Italy's interest in the rapid normalization and
integration of the whole area into the great Western institutions, such
as
the European Union and NATO. Italy's and Germany's "Ostpolitik" policies
would be enhanced by complementarity, rather than by competition.
However,
cooperation with Germany in Central-Eastern Europe requires that Germany
is prepared to pursue this line, which, for the time being, cannot be
taken for granted, although now all countries are following in the area
common European, rather than competitive national approaches.
Political and Security Interests
The disappearance of the Soviet threat has dramatically changed the
concept of security. Security does no longer imply defending one's
national territory against aggression. It involves maintaining stability
in order to enable Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans to achieve
political and economic integration into the European regional system. If
politico-strategical stability were not achieved, their integration
would
be unfeasible, because high political risks would make private
investments
too expensive and because no stable economic cooperation would be
possible.
This basic interest, which Italy can pursue only by cooperating with the
other European countries which share the same objectives, is made even
more crucial by the fact that an outbreak of ethnic and identity-based
conflicts and the deriving destabilization of the whole Balkanic area
may
result in uncontrollable migration tides and in an intensification of
fundamentalism and terrorism which are bound to directly involve Italy.
Lastly, this development might result in strife within the alliances in
which Italy is a member and, domestically, in tensions between ethical
and
humanitarian claims and the need for a "Realpolitik" which keeps into
account Italy's national priorities and scant public resources.
The need to prevent conflicts which would be bound to involve Italy also
stems from the country's political and military weakness, although so
far
Italy has erred on the side of caution, taking tardy and limited
actions.
In particular, Italy's refusal to take part in the British-French Rapid
Reaction Force seems wholly unjustified.
These problems do not confine themselves to the Balkans - from Bosnia to
Kosovo and Macedonia - whose conflicts may destabilize the whole
Adriatic
region and extend to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. Other
potential
dangers are the presence of Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia
and
Vojvodina and, although to a lesser extent, the tensions between Greece
and Turkey and between Bulgaria and Turkey.
Intensive Italian engagement in the multilateral actions organized to
solve these problems - both peace-supporting operations and political,
economic and humanitarian initiatives - can help maintain Italy's
presence
in the whole region, promote Italy's role in Europe, improve its tainted
national image and, more practically, safeguard its national interests
in
the EU and in NATO.
In defining Italy's policy in the region, the key point to be considered
is the implementation of an order in former Yugoslavia which can be
maintained in the long run, after the withdrawal of Western forces from
Bosnia. At that date, the risk of conflicts breaking out in Kosovo,
which
implies even greater dangers for Italy, will increase. The problem,
however, reaches much further. It also involves NATO's and EU's eastward
enlargement as well as US-Russian relations and interests in the Balkans
and in Central-Eastern Europe as a whole. In this respect, short-term
interests often diverge from long-term ones, and sub-regional interests
often clash with regional or pan-European interests.
In the case of Bosnia, it is obvious that stability could have been
attained much more easily, in the short period, by partitioning Bosnia
between Serbia and Croatia or breaking it up into three ethnically
"pure"
states than by the Dayton solution of creating a multi-ethnic state
which
imposes coexistence on people who do not want to coexist. However, the
two
former options do not only clash with Western values and principles.
They
are also liable to fuel instability in the long period. A similar
discrepancy emerges as far as the debate on war criminals in Bosnia is
concerned. If NATO forces had been entrusted with the task of hunting
down
and arresting war criminals, attacks and retaliations would have
certainly
ensued, jeopardizing NATO's presence in Bosnia and, therefore, the
likelihood of putting a stop to the conflict. However, in the longer
period, only the arrest and the trial of war criminals by the Hague
Supreme High Court can be a decisive factor of stabilization. Should
local
courts submit war crinals to trial, their verdicts would be considered
biased and retaliatory and would trigger further reprisals or even
large-scale guerrilla and terrorist initiatives which have not yet taken
place in the former Yugoslavia.
It seems justified to accuse the international community of following an
inconsistent strategy, which is oriented to the long term
(multi-ethnical
Bosnia) on the one hand, and on the short period on the other (failed
arrest and trial of war criminals). However, it must be pointed out
that,
de facto, NATO has carefully avoided any decisive actions in issues
which
could help, at least theoretically, to create a really multi-ethnic
Bosnia, such as, for instance, the repatriation of refugees. In this
respect, doubts have emerged on whether implementing multiethnicity
really
is the truly objective of the international community.
Italy's action has been balanced. Its maintaining relations to Beograd
and
its refraining from the anti-Serb hysteria which marked many other
Western
states have been an advantage for the international community as a
whole.
Italy's line, far from deriving from Machiavellian considerations,
merely
stemmed from a pragmatic assessment that there were two options
available:
either imposing an international mandate on all the former Yugoslavia
for
an indefinite period of time, or seeking an agreement with all the
involved parties. Since the former option was wholly unrealistic, the
second was to be adopted. On the other hand, it must be highlighted that
many of the critics of the meetings between Italian Foreign Ministers
and
Serb President Slobodan Milosevic were the same people who greeted the
attack on Moscow's White House and the accession of Russia into the
Council of Europe! Should their motives be analysed, it might be
discovered that the "Idealpolitik" facade really concealed a
"Realpolitik".
Easing the international attitude towards the Serbs and promoting
Beograd's return into the European institutions, starting with OSCE and
the Central European Initiative, is not only in the Italian interest. It
can help ensuring long-term stability in the Balkans. The recent
anti-Milosevic demonstrations organized by students and workers in
Beograd, although unlikely to bring about a political change, are
helping
to improve the image of the Serb people, who used to be consistently
criminalized, in the eyes of the international public. This may provide
a
starting point to face Serbia's basic problems with realism - in the
style
launched by the American negotiator, Richard Holbrooke - and help it to
join Europe, to which it, too, belongs.
A plan which seems to completely fulfil the objective of stability in
the
Balkans is the so-called Euroslavia project. Its goal is not to impose
anything or to rebuild a new Yugoslavia, not even according to a smooth
confederation model. It aims at re-establishing economic relations among
the various Republics, promoting development in order to damp down the
conflict and preparing the whole area for association and, in the long
term, integration into the European Union. The direct or indirect
actions
which are being carried out by the Italian diplomacy to prevent a
conflict
in Kosovo should be comprised into this project, intensified and, if
possible, coordinated with similar US and EU initiatives.
Should the situation in Kosovo break down, a consequent mass migration
of
a few hundred thousand people might deteriorate the situation to
breaking
point throughout the Balkans. If the migrants flowed into Macedonia,
they
would destabilize the present situation there. If, on the other hand -
which is much more likely, since the Serbs would block all entries into
Macedonia to prevent the situation from worsening - the refugees headed
into Albania, they would trigger a "domino effect" resulting in an
immigrant tide to Apulia on a scale which would make the 1991 "invasion"
pale in comparison.
Besides pressurizing Beograd into accepting a reasonable and
internationally-guaranteed autonomy for Kosovo, there is an immediate
need
to start preparing for the worst case. It would be reasonable to draw
plans for an emergency logistic intervention and especially to promote
turistic development on the Albanian coast, in order to host possible
refugees in Albania and eventually repatriate them into their regions of
origin. The project may be funded through new allocations in line with
the
Italian Bill on Frontier Areas, which should be extended to the whole
Adriatic Sea, by relaunching the Adriatic Initiative and by coordinating
it with the Central European Initiative.
The Euroslavia and the Kosovo projects undoubtedly have an utmost
priority
and must be granted full political and financial support despite the
current budget difficulties. They are not merely to be viewed as
insurance
premiums. They are actual investments, since Italy has a strong
potential
interest in the development of these regions.
Another critical problem for Italy is NATO's - and, in the longer
period,
EU's - eastward enlargement. Actually, the enlargement is the only way
to
consolidate US presence and engagement in Europe, which are essential
both
to preserve balances in Europe and in the Mediterranean and to ensure
political and strategic links between the Mediterranean and Central
Europe. NATO's enlargement can increase internal stability, which is an
essential prerequisite for economic development, and can especially
prevent divergencies in the policies of the various Western European
states, such as those which had the well-known negative effects in
former
Yugoslavia. Rather than an enlargement proper, this process can be
defined
as the re-absorption into Europe of countries which had been separated
from it by the Cold War.
Whilst Germany has a direct interest in the enlargement of NATO to the
Visegrad countries, Italy attaches great importance to the accession of
Slovenia and Romania (and Bulgaria, if it applies) into NATO in the
first
group. Slovenia's membership is important in that this country provides
a
link between Italy and Hungary. The recent intensification in relations
among Italy, Slovenia and Hungary ("Trilateral") within the Central
European Initiative mirrors this basic Italian interest, which is shared
by Slovenia and Hungary. The same interest emerges in the Italian
Defence
Minister's proposal to create joint German-Italian units which should be
open for participation to Austria, Slovenia, Hungary and possibly the
Czech Republic. To date, Germany has not taken the proposal into
consideration, although its implementation would provide a clear signal
that it is not pursuing hegemonic interests in Eastern Europe. An
increased military cooperation has been therefore forecast in the
framework of the "Trilaterale".
Furthermore, Romania's accession into NATO would prevent Turkey from
being
isolated in the Black Sea region. On the other hand, its exclusion may
increase the existing tensions in the Hungarian minority in
Transylvania,
who would view it as a first step towards exclusion from Europe.
Logically, this interest should lead to greater Italian preparedness to
cooperate in the military sector, too. For instance, it should take part
more intensively in joint activities within NATO's "Partnership for
Peace"
project and, if necessary, provide additional funding to NATO's common
infrastructure programme. The latter should be coordinated with the
construction of the road and railway axes which are to link the Adriatic
Sea with Hungary on one side, Serbia and Romania on another and
Macedonia
and Bulgaria on a third side.
However, initiatives to prevent NATO's selective enlargement - which is,
in a certain sense, paradoxically, confined to the most stable
countries,
that is, to those which have less urgent need of NATO guarantees - from
creating insecurity and instability in the excluded applicants should be
implemented as soon as possible. The Central European Initiative may be
an
adequate forum to discuss these problems before they become explosive.
As
much is also proved by the fact that the Central European Initiative was
acknowledged to have the potential not merely to prepare Central and
Eastern European countries for prospective association and membership
into
the European Union, but also to implement security objectives typical of
OSCE, which took part in the November 1996 Graz meeting with observer
status.
Economic Interests
The economic importance of Central and Eastern Europe and of the Balkans
for Italy has recently been highlighted by the Agnelli Foundation in a
report of the series "Nuova Geoeconomia". Over time, the whole area is
bound to be associated and eventually integrated into the European
Union.
All the Italian Regions, and especially the Adriatic-rim ones, will
derive
great benefits from it. Integration is facilitated both by geographical
proximity and by similar basic values. The return to Europe is a central
goal for the peoples of Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans and
features in the political programmes of ruling and opposition parties
alike.
Italy has a strong interest in the rapid and full integration of the
whole area. Apart from obvious political and security reasons, its
economic position will become more competitive as a result. Small and
medium Italian companies have already shifted many sectors of production
which are labour-intensive or directed to the lower market niches in the
area. The flexibility of small and medium companies makes them
particularly able to penetrate and cooperate with the markets of the
area,
which are characterized by considerable fluctuations.
Regarding volume of trade, Italy ranks second after Germany in the
Eastern
European markets and first in the Balkanic peninsula and in
South-Eastern
Europe. Moreover, it has a strong potential to increase its trade in the
area. According to recent estimates, it may not only consolidate its
position, but also gain market shares as compared to Germany.
Italy will be able to fully exploit this trade potential only if it
steps
up its engagement in the sectors of development aid, public support to
exports, banking and insurance. Therefore, an important national
interest
- which, obviously, is not merely confined to Central-Eastern Europe and
the Balkans - is providing the "system-country" with adequate means to
face regional and global geo-economic competition. This objective can
only
be achieved by relinquishing Italy's conservative and obsolete welfare
state policy. This process is strongly supported by the present Italian
Government.
Italy's economic penetration in the area, too, is complementary, rather
than competitive, with Germany's. As a consequence, cooperative rather
than competitive policies may be pursued in the economic sector, too,
and
the two countries' initiatives may be coordinated both at a bilateral
level and within the EU and the world's economic institutions. The
spectre
of a Mitteleuropa viewed as Germany's exclusive influence and hegemony
area seems a myth with no real foundations.
The sector which deserves the most intensive and determined efforts is
that of large infrastructure projects - especially roads and railways,
but
also the ambitious project of a navigable waterway connecting the rivers
Isonzo and Danube. All these projects would connect the Adriatic Basin
with the Danube and, further eastward, with Ukraine and Russia. The
opening of the Rhein-Danube canal and the future opening of the
Danube-Oder waterway give a competitive edge to the North Sea and Baltic
harbours as against the Northern Adriatic ones. Moreover, the latter are
not yet coordinated so as to achieve economies of scale. In short, they
lag well behind as compared to the improvements in the transport system
north of the Alps.
Besides their economic role, infrastructure projects also have political
importance. For instance, the growth of Euroslavia is mainly based on
them. Clearly, Italy cannot sustain these projects alone, but should
promote them within the European Union. Visions and integrative
proposals
tailored to the specific situation of the Balkans and South-Eastern
Europe
are needed, as is already happening as far as Central Europe is
concerned.
Delays in this respect may undermine Italy's competitive advantages in
the
whole region.
Conclusions
So far, in Italy, the impact of the end of the Cold War and of the
deriving changes in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans has not
been
fully understood. As much has hampered a far-sighted definition of
Italy's
national interests and foreign policy regarding this region, which has a
crucial role for Italy because of its geographical proximity and of
Italy's intensive present and, especially, potential economic relations
with it.
These deficiencies have partly been determined by regional and local
pressure, especially regarding relations with former Yugoslav republics;
by Italy's political and institutional crisis, which has drawn attention
almost exclusively to domestic problems; by the fact that single issues
such as the problem of the properties of Istrian and Dalmatian exiles,
which, although undoubtedly important, should have been viewed within a
more far-sighted context, have been unduly exploited for domestic policy
objectives. In the recent past, the Italian diplomacy has found itself
in
the embarrassing situation of seeing Italy depicted as a potentially
destabilizing, revisionist state which wished to carry out an arrogant
power policy it could not afford unless at a very local level. Italy's
exclusion from the Contact Group undoubtely was partly due to its image
as
an overly ambitious country incapable of carrying out realistic and
long-term projects.
The "collapse of the wall" has radically changed the very foundations of
Italy's "Ostpolitik", the strategic role of the Balkans and the role of
the regional or bilateral initiatives in which Italy took part.
Only recently, a clearer perception of Italy's interests in the area and
a
greater coordination of Italy's, Germany's and Austria's policies has
apparently begun to emerge. Complementarity should be maximized in the
place of competition, both because the latter - being based on past
geo-political logics - would be ineffective, and because Italy does not
possess the means or the political and diplomatic capabilities to
compete
with Germany. At most, it can implement a disturbance policy and occupy
marginal political and market niches. However, the level of cooperation
between Rome and Bonn is not yet optimal, partly because the Italian
initiatives of the late 1980's and early 1990's were often presented as
endeavours to contain German penetration in the Balkans and in Central
Europe. Obviously, the results were far from brilliant, although -
luckily
- not totally disastrous.
The recent relaunching of the Central European Initiative, its linking
with the Adriatic, the Balkanic and the Black Sea initiatives, the
intensification of relations with Slovenia and Hungary, which should be
rapidly extended to Austria, and possibly Croatia, seem to give a more
realistic character to Italy's role in stabilizing the area and
especially
in preparing it for progressive integration into Europe. Only within
this
framework can Italy's roles and interests be defined in detail and
satisfactory solutions be found also for the still discussed problem of
the Italian minorities in Slovenia and Croatia. This issue cannot
possibly
be solved but through the consolidation of these countries' democratic
institutions and economies in view of their rapid integration into
Europe
and NATO.
Summary
>>From a merely geographical point of view, Italy may seem a Mediterranean
country, due to its marginal position to Central Europe. Actually,
however, if geo-political and geo-economic trends are taken into
consideration, it is a European rather than a Mediterranean country.
Trade
and economic integration with the East play a far greater role for Italy
than those with the South.
Because of its political and military weakness, Italy's role in the
Mediterranean Basin is merely due to its membership in Europe and NATO.
Moreover, the solution to the most serious Italian problem - that of the
Mezzogiorno - cannot be found in the development of Southern
Mediterranean
countries, but in reinforcing Italy's ties with the North. Hence the
importance of Italy's relations with Central and Eastern Europe and with
the Balkans.
For Italy, from the geo-political point of view, there is no difference
between Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, both of which are
linked to the Italian peninsula by an inner lake - the Adriatic Sea -
which is a transit area for both regions.
Italy does not pursue a power policy or the goal of creating exclusive
influence zones. It has adopted, in coordination with Germany, a
cooperative policy whose aim is restoring societies and economies in the
whole area in order to promote both its trade interests and these
countries' stability and development.
To attain these goals, the Central European Initiative was relaunched
during its November 1996 meeting in Graz. Special cooperation ties have
been established with Hungary and Slovenia and a comprehensive programme
to improve the transport network through Slovenia and the Balkans has
been
developed. It has to be implemented by a reinforced cooperation with all
the former Yugoslavia Republics and the countries of South-Eastern
Europe,
avoiding any new dividing line between the North and the South.
---
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1. KOSOVSKA MITROVICA, La voce del Kosovo impossibile.
2. FARNESINA/BALCANI, L'Italia in fuga dal Kosovo.
3. FATTI D'EUROPA EST - Presevo, Albania, Vienna, Romania,
Armenia-Azerbajan
(dal Manifesto, 30 novembre 2000)
----------------------------------------
La voce del Kosovo impossibile
Intervista a Oliver Ivanovic, leader del Consiglio nazionale
serbo in Kosovo.
MARIO BOCCIA - KOSOVSKA MITROVICA
"Libertà di movimento, sicurezza, diritto al ritorno": parole
ricorrenti, persino abusate nei discorsi dei governatori-
rappresentanti della comunità internazionale in Kosovo. Parole
svuotate di contenuto dai fatti.
A due anni dalla firma degli accordi di Kumanovo, la guerra
continua contro le minoranze, l'economia è drogata dalla presenza
delle organizzazioni umanitarie e/o militari, la mafia impone i
suoi diktat su chiunque voglia mettere in piedi un attività
autonoma. Eppure su queste parole-speranze si gioca il futuro del
Kosovo e di quella parte dei suoi "nativi" che ne sono
attualmente esclusi.
Le parole cambiano di senso a seconda della bocca che le
pronuncia, sembra dire Oliver Ivanovic (leader del Consiglio
nazionale serbo e autorevole interlocutore del governo
dell'Unmik) mentre sottolinea con la penna le parti del discorso
del 20 novembre di Bernard Kouchner che lo irritano di più. Non
sono i rimbrotti diplomatici ("...sebbene questa non sia un
assemblea di membri eletti...") ma i passaggi nei quali il
governatore si dice cosciente di "non aver fatto abbastanza per i
serbi", promette di "intensificare gli sforzi per garantire a
tutti libertà di movimento", si impegna a far tornare "tutti
coloro che han lasciato il Kosovo, inclusi i serbi".
Eppure si era trattato di un discorso importante, fatto "a nome
del segretario generale Kofi Annan", alla cerimonia inaugurale
delle quattro assemblee comunali autocostituite di Mitrovica-
nord, Zvecan, Zubin Potok e Leposavic (dove è avvenuto
l'incontro): vale a dire i comuni dove vive la maggioranza dei
serbi residenti in Kosovo. Un territorio "privilegiato" per la
continuità territoriale con la Serbia e per le sue dimensioni,
rispetto altre comunità più piccole e isolate.
D. Non era scontato che il governatore fosse presente ad una
iniziativa che appariva in contrasto con la consultazione
elettorale da lui voluta e boicottata dalla stragrande
maggioranza dei serbi.
Di che si è trattato, signor Ivanovic?
R. Abbiamo nominato questi consigli comunali per avviare un
processo di normalizzazione che dovrà concludersi con il rientro
di tutti i profughi. Ci siamo mossi nel rispetto delle linee-
guida della risoluzione 1244. I nuovi consigli provvisori sono
stati nominati rispettando la composizione etnica della
popolazione sul territorio e considerando rappresentatività,
ruolo sociale, cultura e popolarità delle persone. Dovranno
svolgere il loro compito naturale in una situazione
straordinaria. Per fare un esempio: a Leposavic abbiamo nominato
14 serbi, due albanesi e 1 musulmano; a Mitrovica (nord), 15
serbi, 2 albanesi, 1 musulmano e 1 rom.
D. I serbi nominati d'ufficio nei consigli comunali eletti con il
voto delle ultime elezioni non si presentano. Quando qualcuno,
serbo o di altre minoranze, accetta di farlo, gli eletti del Pdk
bloccano i lavori abbandonando l'aula. Succederà lo stesso anche
con i vostri "cooptati"?
R. Finora non sappiamo se tutti gli albanesi accetteranno, ci
hanno chiesto tempo per riflettere, noi comunque saremmo
soddisfatti della loro presenza e certi del valore del loro
contributo.
D. Non andando alle "elezioni di Kouchner" e convocando i "suoi"
consigli comunali, il Consiglio nazionale serbo ha deciso di
andare verso la spartizione del Kosovo? La presenza stessa di
Kouchner, che nei primi quattro paragrafi del suo saluto augurale
all'assemblea di Leposavic, ripete quattro volte: "le vostre
municipalità", avalla questa tendenza?
R. Assolutamente no. Quelle elezioni non dovevano essere fatte
perché non c'erano le condizioni minime, elementari per una
libera espressione di voto. Sono state imposte da Kouchner alla
fine del suo mandato, per mascherare il totale fallimento della
sua missione. Hanno dato una verniciatura di normalità ad una
situazione gravissima. Che normalità è senza i profughi? Non
erano solo inutili, ma hanno peggiorato la situazione. Basti
guardare alla violenza che ha insanguinato la campagna
elettorale. Chi ha avuto diritto al voto? Quanti tra quelli che
hanno votato abitano questo paese solo da giugno del '99? Come si
può parlare di volontà popolare se oltre duecentomila profughi
(quelli sì, kosovari) sono fuori dal paese? Come era possibile
fare la campagna elettorale, quando a tutt'oggi in Kosovo non
sono garantiti libertà di movimento, sicurezza per le minoranze e
diritto al ritorno? L'omicidio dei quattro aschkalija che avevano
accettato di rientrare a Dosevac, è un avvertimento a tutti, noi
per primi. Se vengono trucidati anche loro, che parlano la stessa
lingua, che succederà agli altri? Era un rientro concordato e
doveva essere protetto. Chi non lo ha fatto è complice degli
assassini. Lei dice che i serbi rifutano la nomina d'ufficio, è
vero, ma per non mascherare con la loro presenza l'imbroglio che
c'è dietro queste elezioni. Come posso andare alle riunioni del
consiglio comunale che si trova nella parte sud, dove la mia
faccia è esposta per le strade in un manifesto che mi indica come
"criminale di guerra n1"? Comunque le assicuro che, da parte
nostra, non c'è nessuna volontà di separazione. Al contrario: la
nostra priorità è che tutti possano tornare da dove sono stati
cacciati.
D. Dopo che la parte del complesso industriale di Trepca (oltre
40 differenti impianti, anche fuori dal Kosovo) che sta sul
vostro territorio è stata chiusa per motivi "ecologici", cosa ne
è dell'impianto?
R. Le tensioni di allora sono state superate, ma la Trepca di
Zvecan è ferma ed è indispensabile all'economia della regione.
400 operai serbi mantengono l'impianto alle condizioni di
manutenzione minime per impedire il deterioramento e prendono 50
marchi al mese di indennizzo dall'Unmik. Quello dell'inquinamento
è un problema reale e l'impianto deve essere ristrutturato, ma
non tollero che il problema possa essere posto da chi ha
contaminato il nostro territorio con l'uranio impoverito. Perché
non si preoccupano del livello di inquinamento delle centrali
elettriche di Obilic? L'impianto di Zvecan lavorava al 10% delle
sue possibilità per evitare un inquinamento eccessivo. Le accuse
contro il direttore della fabbrica (incriminato per "danni
all'ambiente", per avere incrementato l'attività della Trepca
prima della chiusura messa in atto dalla Kfor ad agosto, alla
vigilia delle elezioni presidenziali in Serbia, ndr) sono false e
ipocrite.
D. In questi giorni si sono svolte manifestazioni e scioperi di
protesta per chiedere la liberazione dei prigionieri albanesi
detenuti in Serbia. Non pensa che un amnistia favorirebbe, se non
la ripresa del dialogo, almeno un raffreddamento della tensione?
R. So che verrà istituita una commissione mista, su modello
sudafricano, che vaglierà caso per caso. Avvocati albanesi sono
già a Belgrado. Ma perché nessuno parla dei 1300 serbi scomparsi?
Dove sono? Sono stati tutti uccisi? Qui da noi ce ne sono 18 in
un carcere sorvegliato dall'Unmik, da otto mesi, senza nessuna
accusa specifica formalizzata. Non possiamo accettare che vengano
giudicati da una corte composta da giudici albanesi. Sono state
violate anche le leggi jugoslave sulla detenzione preventiva, che
prevedono termini di sei mesi.
D. In situazioni come questa, la criminalità trova terreno
fertile. Anche da voi?
R. Noi non abbiamo ancora avuto la possibilità di organizzare una
nostra polizia autonoma e quella internazionale, prima di trovare
i criminali, deve imparare a trovare la strada per tornare in
caserma senza perdersi. Ma il problema del diffondersi della
malavita è essenzialmente un problema sociale. Quello che manca
qui è il lavoro. Se un operaio per vivere è obbligato a
trasformarsi in un "borsaro nero", perde la sua dignità. Manca il
lavoro e la criminalità aumenta, anche se, da noi, la comunità
stessa mette in atto forme di controllo. Comunque il lavoro è la
nostra priorità sociale.
D. Lei è stato descritto come uomo di Milosevic e ora come uomo
di Kostunica dagli stessi giornali, a distanza di pochi mesi. Ma
lei con chi sta?
R. Io non sto con nessuno - ride. Quello che non hanno capito è
che sono il rappresentante riconosciuto di questa comunità e a
questa rispondo delle mie azioni. E' un vizio culturale, una
visione della politica vecchia. Se vogliamo, questo è stato uno
dei nostri principali difetti del passato: una gestione
centralista che non tiene conto delle realtà locali. Noi vogliamo
decidere il nostro futuro, non pretendiamo di avere sempre
ragione, ma vogliamo essere consultati. Nessuna soluzione per il
Kosovo potrà mai essere elaborata senza sentire chi ci vive e chi
ci vuole tornare. Io non sono mai stato eletto, ma credo di
rappresentare tutti, senza distinzioni politiche.
D. Dopo i giudizi duri che lei ha dato sulla politica di Bernard
Kouchner, cosa pensa del suo successore inglese?
R. Venisse anche il diavolo, chiunque sarebbe meglio di Kouchner!
---------------------------------------------------
FARNESINA/BALCANI
L'Italia in fuga dal Kosovo
Si è dimesso Dionisio Spoliti, Governatore di Gnijlane gia'
"numero 2" del Sisde. Dini tace.
TOMMASO DI FRANCESCO
L'area che va dalla Valle di Presevo in Serbia, all'est del
Kosovo, fino al nord-Albania, è di nuovo in fiamme. A Pristina
non si è spenta ancora l'eco delle parole di Ibrahim Rugova ai
funerali del suo più stretto collaboratore, Xhemajl Mustafa,
ucciso la scorsa settimana da settori del formalmente disciolto
Uck: "Con te - ha detto Rugova - hanno ucciso la cultura e il
giornalismo albanese"; nel nord Albania i militanti "democratici"
di Berisha vanno allo scontro armato con i socialisti al governo;
l'area di Presevo e la fascia smilitarizzata di 5 km con la zona
contigua del Kosovo "controllata" dal contingente Kfor-Nato degli
Stati uniti - che nell'area, a Bondsteel, hanno costruito la più
grande base militare dei Balcani - è nel turbine di una nuova
guerra, con 5 agenti serbi uccisi, duemila profughi albanesi,
tank e, solo ora, perquisizioni della Nato. Ieri, dopo una
"tregua concordata", le truppe di Belgrado hanno rioccupato i 4
villaggi presi per giorni dai separatisti albanesi dell'Ucpmb.
Per la Nato l'area è "tra le più pericolose al mondo".
Ci si dovrebbe aspettare un surplus d'iniziativa politica e
diplomatica. Soprattutto da parte di chi, come l'Italia, vanta
una presenza "di valore" in Kosovo. Ma la realtà dimostra il
contrario. Il punto più caldo è Gnijlane, da lì partono le bande
dell'Ucpmb. Il Kosovo è diviso in 5 distretti militari e
amministrativi - Pristina, Mitrovica, Gnijlane, Pec, Prizren -,
sotto controllo di contingenti Nato e governatori Onu.
Governatore di Gnijlane è l'italiano Dionisio Spoliti. Sarebbe
meglio dire era, giacché, proprio di fronte al precipitare della
situazione, non ha trovato di meglio da fare che dimettersi. Del
resto da lui non era venuta nessuna iniziativa diplomatica da
quando s'insediò circa 6 mesi fa: ignorante di diplomazia,
Balcani e lingue, l'ex "numero 2" del Sisde ha brillato per
l'assenza.
Lo aveva inviato il ministro Dini. A fare che? E' possibile che
non abbia niente da dire ora?
Dini tace per abitudine. In Kosovo l'Italia non ha fatto che
dimettersi: nel 1998 non durò 48 ore il dottor Perugini (vice-
questore d'Arezzo) nella missione Osce guidata dall'infido
William Walker; due mesi durò Giovanni Koessler (magistrato di
Bolzano) già nel 1999; cinque mesi a Mitrovica, Mario Morcone
(prefetto di Arezzo). Spie, questurini, prefetti. E nessuno ci
racconti la favola del generale Cabigiosu che in Kosovo comanda
la Kfor: quella è la Nato dove - dopo i raid di Aviano -
l'esercito italiano brilla. A noi, agli albanesi e ai serbi,
interesserebbe il ruolo diplomatico dell'Italia. E quello,
purtroppo, non si vede.
-----------------------------------------------------
FATTI D'EUROPA EST
Presevo, interviene la Nato
In una sorprendente ma non inaspettata inversione dei ruoli e
delle alleanze, la Nato si è detta ieri disponibile alla
collaborazione con Belgrado per intervenire contro le attività
"terroristiche" degli albanesi in Kosovo. Un passo dettato
senz'altro dai migliori rapporti tral l'Alleanza e il nuovo
leader jugoslava, ma anche dalla ormai sempre più chiara
insofferenza dell'Occidente nei confronti del Kosovo. La Nato ha
stabilito un piano in sei punti per risolvere la crisi nella
valle di Presevo. Fra questi una campagna di informazione per
mettere in luce le attività terroristiche degli albanesi a
Presevo, rapporti più stretti tra la Kfor e la polizia serba,
controllo rafforzato sulle linee di confine e massima allerta
contro il traffico di armi.
Tensione in Albania
Iseguaci di Sali Berisha non ci stanno. Martedì sera l'arresto, e
il rilascio dopo qualche ora, del leader dell'opposizione
conservatrice, ha infervorato gli animi, e non solo, di alcuni
albanesi. Scontri sanguinosi si sono verificati a Tropoja, nel
nord del paese, da sempre regione fedele all'ex presidente
Berisha. Alcuni uomini hanno circondato il posto di polizia
locale e poi hanno dato fuoco al tribunale. La tensione è
altissima fin dai giorni delle elezioni amministrative di
ottobre, che avevano visto la sconfitta del partito di Berisha,
anche nella capitale. Da allora quotidianamente i suoi partigiani
manifestano nelle piazze delle principali città albanesi, in modo
sempre più violento. L'altro ieri, proprio nel corso di una di
queste manifestazioni, Berisha era stato fermato dalla polizia e
contemporaneamente esercito e blindati venivano schierati nei
punti chiave della città. Il primo ministro albanese, dal canto
suo, ha lanciato un avvertimento all'opposizione radicale: "Tutti
coloro che attaccheranno le istituzioni dovranno risponderne in
tribunale".
Chirac a Vienna
Non si è trattato esattamente un incontro cordiale, ma pur sempre
un incontro c'è stato. Dopo mesi di reciproca diffidenza, il
presidente francese Jacques Chirac si è recato a Vienna dove ha
stretto la mano al cancelliere austriaco Wolfgang Schüssel. I
colloqui si sono incentrati sullo sviluppo delle istituzioni
comunitarie europee alla vigilia del summit di Nizza. L'Austria,
come tutti i paesi di piccole dimensioni, propende al
mantenimento dell'attuale
status e composizione della commissione, nel timore di perdere, altrimenti,
peso politico in seno all'Europa. Chirac, in qualità di presidente dell'Unione,
ha tenuto a precisare che il significato della visita rientra nell'ambito di un
tour di tutte le capitali europee, e non ha voluto affrontare il problema della
presenza nel governo austriaco del partito di Haider, all'origine di tante
tensioni tra Vienna e Bruxelles.
Romania, elezioni
Il partito della Grande Romania tende la mano ai socialdemocratici. In base ai
risultati ancora provvisori delle elezioni di domenica scorsa, il partito
dell'estrema destra rumena dovrebbe aver ottenuto circa il 28 percento dei
voti, contro il 37 percento del partito socialdemocratico, guidato dall'ex
presidente Ion Iliescu. Il leader del Partito della Grande Romania Vadim Tudor
ha offerto al suo avversario, che finora si è sempre detto contrario, la
collaborazione per un governo di grande coalizione. Ion Iliescu e Vadim Tudor
si affronteranno il 10 dicembre prossimo nel ballottaggio per la carica di
presidente della repubblica.
Armenia e Azerbajan
Dopo 13 anni di conflitto, un primo passo verso una possibile distensione tra i
due paesi. Ieri il vicepresidente del parlamento azero si è recato a Yerevan,
capitale dell'Armenia, dove era in corso un forum degli 11 paesi che si
affacciano sul Mar nero. Si tratta della figura istituzionale più importante
che si sia finora mai recata nel paese nemico. Tanto il
parlamentare azero che il suo omologo armeno hanno mostrato una
certa disponibilità a riprendere il dialogo. Armenia e Azerbajan,
due ex repubbliche sovietiche, si contendono la regione del
Nagorno-Karabak, enclave popolata da una maggioranza armena in
territorio azero, che si è dichiarata indipendente nel 1988. Una
tregua nel 1994 ha messo fine ad una guerra che ha fatto oltre
15.000 vittime e un milione di profughi, ma il problema della
sovranità del Nagorno Karbak resta ancora del tutto irrisolto.
-------------------------------------------------
Il Manifesto, 30 novembre 2000
------
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2. FARNESINA/BALCANI, L'Italia in fuga dal Kosovo.
3. FATTI D'EUROPA EST - Presevo, Albania, Vienna, Romania,
Armenia-Azerbajan
(dal Manifesto, 30 novembre 2000)
----------------------------------------
La voce del Kosovo impossibile
Intervista a Oliver Ivanovic, leader del Consiglio nazionale
serbo in Kosovo.
MARIO BOCCIA - KOSOVSKA MITROVICA
"Libertà di movimento, sicurezza, diritto al ritorno": parole
ricorrenti, persino abusate nei discorsi dei governatori-
rappresentanti della comunità internazionale in Kosovo. Parole
svuotate di contenuto dai fatti.
A due anni dalla firma degli accordi di Kumanovo, la guerra
continua contro le minoranze, l'economia è drogata dalla presenza
delle organizzazioni umanitarie e/o militari, la mafia impone i
suoi diktat su chiunque voglia mettere in piedi un attività
autonoma. Eppure su queste parole-speranze si gioca il futuro del
Kosovo e di quella parte dei suoi "nativi" che ne sono
attualmente esclusi.
Le parole cambiano di senso a seconda della bocca che le
pronuncia, sembra dire Oliver Ivanovic (leader del Consiglio
nazionale serbo e autorevole interlocutore del governo
dell'Unmik) mentre sottolinea con la penna le parti del discorso
del 20 novembre di Bernard Kouchner che lo irritano di più. Non
sono i rimbrotti diplomatici ("...sebbene questa non sia un
assemblea di membri eletti...") ma i passaggi nei quali il
governatore si dice cosciente di "non aver fatto abbastanza per i
serbi", promette di "intensificare gli sforzi per garantire a
tutti libertà di movimento", si impegna a far tornare "tutti
coloro che han lasciato il Kosovo, inclusi i serbi".
Eppure si era trattato di un discorso importante, fatto "a nome
del segretario generale Kofi Annan", alla cerimonia inaugurale
delle quattro assemblee comunali autocostituite di Mitrovica-
nord, Zvecan, Zubin Potok e Leposavic (dove è avvenuto
l'incontro): vale a dire i comuni dove vive la maggioranza dei
serbi residenti in Kosovo. Un territorio "privilegiato" per la
continuità territoriale con la Serbia e per le sue dimensioni,
rispetto altre comunità più piccole e isolate.
D. Non era scontato che il governatore fosse presente ad una
iniziativa che appariva in contrasto con la consultazione
elettorale da lui voluta e boicottata dalla stragrande
maggioranza dei serbi.
Di che si è trattato, signor Ivanovic?
R. Abbiamo nominato questi consigli comunali per avviare un
processo di normalizzazione che dovrà concludersi con il rientro
di tutti i profughi. Ci siamo mossi nel rispetto delle linee-
guida della risoluzione 1244. I nuovi consigli provvisori sono
stati nominati rispettando la composizione etnica della
popolazione sul territorio e considerando rappresentatività,
ruolo sociale, cultura e popolarità delle persone. Dovranno
svolgere il loro compito naturale in una situazione
straordinaria. Per fare un esempio: a Leposavic abbiamo nominato
14 serbi, due albanesi e 1 musulmano; a Mitrovica (nord), 15
serbi, 2 albanesi, 1 musulmano e 1 rom.
D. I serbi nominati d'ufficio nei consigli comunali eletti con il
voto delle ultime elezioni non si presentano. Quando qualcuno,
serbo o di altre minoranze, accetta di farlo, gli eletti del Pdk
bloccano i lavori abbandonando l'aula. Succederà lo stesso anche
con i vostri "cooptati"?
R. Finora non sappiamo se tutti gli albanesi accetteranno, ci
hanno chiesto tempo per riflettere, noi comunque saremmo
soddisfatti della loro presenza e certi del valore del loro
contributo.
D. Non andando alle "elezioni di Kouchner" e convocando i "suoi"
consigli comunali, il Consiglio nazionale serbo ha deciso di
andare verso la spartizione del Kosovo? La presenza stessa di
Kouchner, che nei primi quattro paragrafi del suo saluto augurale
all'assemblea di Leposavic, ripete quattro volte: "le vostre
municipalità", avalla questa tendenza?
R. Assolutamente no. Quelle elezioni non dovevano essere fatte
perché non c'erano le condizioni minime, elementari per una
libera espressione di voto. Sono state imposte da Kouchner alla
fine del suo mandato, per mascherare il totale fallimento della
sua missione. Hanno dato una verniciatura di normalità ad una
situazione gravissima. Che normalità è senza i profughi? Non
erano solo inutili, ma hanno peggiorato la situazione. Basti
guardare alla violenza che ha insanguinato la campagna
elettorale. Chi ha avuto diritto al voto? Quanti tra quelli che
hanno votato abitano questo paese solo da giugno del '99? Come si
può parlare di volontà popolare se oltre duecentomila profughi
(quelli sì, kosovari) sono fuori dal paese? Come era possibile
fare la campagna elettorale, quando a tutt'oggi in Kosovo non
sono garantiti libertà di movimento, sicurezza per le minoranze e
diritto al ritorno? L'omicidio dei quattro aschkalija che avevano
accettato di rientrare a Dosevac, è un avvertimento a tutti, noi
per primi. Se vengono trucidati anche loro, che parlano la stessa
lingua, che succederà agli altri? Era un rientro concordato e
doveva essere protetto. Chi non lo ha fatto è complice degli
assassini. Lei dice che i serbi rifutano la nomina d'ufficio, è
vero, ma per non mascherare con la loro presenza l'imbroglio che
c'è dietro queste elezioni. Come posso andare alle riunioni del
consiglio comunale che si trova nella parte sud, dove la mia
faccia è esposta per le strade in un manifesto che mi indica come
"criminale di guerra n1"? Comunque le assicuro che, da parte
nostra, non c'è nessuna volontà di separazione. Al contrario: la
nostra priorità è che tutti possano tornare da dove sono stati
cacciati.
D. Dopo che la parte del complesso industriale di Trepca (oltre
40 differenti impianti, anche fuori dal Kosovo) che sta sul
vostro territorio è stata chiusa per motivi "ecologici", cosa ne
è dell'impianto?
R. Le tensioni di allora sono state superate, ma la Trepca di
Zvecan è ferma ed è indispensabile all'economia della regione.
400 operai serbi mantengono l'impianto alle condizioni di
manutenzione minime per impedire il deterioramento e prendono 50
marchi al mese di indennizzo dall'Unmik. Quello dell'inquinamento
è un problema reale e l'impianto deve essere ristrutturato, ma
non tollero che il problema possa essere posto da chi ha
contaminato il nostro territorio con l'uranio impoverito. Perché
non si preoccupano del livello di inquinamento delle centrali
elettriche di Obilic? L'impianto di Zvecan lavorava al 10% delle
sue possibilità per evitare un inquinamento eccessivo. Le accuse
contro il direttore della fabbrica (incriminato per "danni
all'ambiente", per avere incrementato l'attività della Trepca
prima della chiusura messa in atto dalla Kfor ad agosto, alla
vigilia delle elezioni presidenziali in Serbia, ndr) sono false e
ipocrite.
D. In questi giorni si sono svolte manifestazioni e scioperi di
protesta per chiedere la liberazione dei prigionieri albanesi
detenuti in Serbia. Non pensa che un amnistia favorirebbe, se non
la ripresa del dialogo, almeno un raffreddamento della tensione?
R. So che verrà istituita una commissione mista, su modello
sudafricano, che vaglierà caso per caso. Avvocati albanesi sono
già a Belgrado. Ma perché nessuno parla dei 1300 serbi scomparsi?
Dove sono? Sono stati tutti uccisi? Qui da noi ce ne sono 18 in
un carcere sorvegliato dall'Unmik, da otto mesi, senza nessuna
accusa specifica formalizzata. Non possiamo accettare che vengano
giudicati da una corte composta da giudici albanesi. Sono state
violate anche le leggi jugoslave sulla detenzione preventiva, che
prevedono termini di sei mesi.
D. In situazioni come questa, la criminalità trova terreno
fertile. Anche da voi?
R. Noi non abbiamo ancora avuto la possibilità di organizzare una
nostra polizia autonoma e quella internazionale, prima di trovare
i criminali, deve imparare a trovare la strada per tornare in
caserma senza perdersi. Ma il problema del diffondersi della
malavita è essenzialmente un problema sociale. Quello che manca
qui è il lavoro. Se un operaio per vivere è obbligato a
trasformarsi in un "borsaro nero", perde la sua dignità. Manca il
lavoro e la criminalità aumenta, anche se, da noi, la comunità
stessa mette in atto forme di controllo. Comunque il lavoro è la
nostra priorità sociale.
D. Lei è stato descritto come uomo di Milosevic e ora come uomo
di Kostunica dagli stessi giornali, a distanza di pochi mesi. Ma
lei con chi sta?
R. Io non sto con nessuno - ride. Quello che non hanno capito è
che sono il rappresentante riconosciuto di questa comunità e a
questa rispondo delle mie azioni. E' un vizio culturale, una
visione della politica vecchia. Se vogliamo, questo è stato uno
dei nostri principali difetti del passato: una gestione
centralista che non tiene conto delle realtà locali. Noi vogliamo
decidere il nostro futuro, non pretendiamo di avere sempre
ragione, ma vogliamo essere consultati. Nessuna soluzione per il
Kosovo potrà mai essere elaborata senza sentire chi ci vive e chi
ci vuole tornare. Io non sono mai stato eletto, ma credo di
rappresentare tutti, senza distinzioni politiche.
D. Dopo i giudizi duri che lei ha dato sulla politica di Bernard
Kouchner, cosa pensa del suo successore inglese?
R. Venisse anche il diavolo, chiunque sarebbe meglio di Kouchner!
---------------------------------------------------
FARNESINA/BALCANI
L'Italia in fuga dal Kosovo
Si è dimesso Dionisio Spoliti, Governatore di Gnijlane gia'
"numero 2" del Sisde. Dini tace.
TOMMASO DI FRANCESCO
L'area che va dalla Valle di Presevo in Serbia, all'est del
Kosovo, fino al nord-Albania, è di nuovo in fiamme. A Pristina
non si è spenta ancora l'eco delle parole di Ibrahim Rugova ai
funerali del suo più stretto collaboratore, Xhemajl Mustafa,
ucciso la scorsa settimana da settori del formalmente disciolto
Uck: "Con te - ha detto Rugova - hanno ucciso la cultura e il
giornalismo albanese"; nel nord Albania i militanti "democratici"
di Berisha vanno allo scontro armato con i socialisti al governo;
l'area di Presevo e la fascia smilitarizzata di 5 km con la zona
contigua del Kosovo "controllata" dal contingente Kfor-Nato degli
Stati uniti - che nell'area, a Bondsteel, hanno costruito la più
grande base militare dei Balcani - è nel turbine di una nuova
guerra, con 5 agenti serbi uccisi, duemila profughi albanesi,
tank e, solo ora, perquisizioni della Nato. Ieri, dopo una
"tregua concordata", le truppe di Belgrado hanno rioccupato i 4
villaggi presi per giorni dai separatisti albanesi dell'Ucpmb.
Per la Nato l'area è "tra le più pericolose al mondo".
Ci si dovrebbe aspettare un surplus d'iniziativa politica e
diplomatica. Soprattutto da parte di chi, come l'Italia, vanta
una presenza "di valore" in Kosovo. Ma la realtà dimostra il
contrario. Il punto più caldo è Gnijlane, da lì partono le bande
dell'Ucpmb. Il Kosovo è diviso in 5 distretti militari e
amministrativi - Pristina, Mitrovica, Gnijlane, Pec, Prizren -,
sotto controllo di contingenti Nato e governatori Onu.
Governatore di Gnijlane è l'italiano Dionisio Spoliti. Sarebbe
meglio dire era, giacché, proprio di fronte al precipitare della
situazione, non ha trovato di meglio da fare che dimettersi. Del
resto da lui non era venuta nessuna iniziativa diplomatica da
quando s'insediò circa 6 mesi fa: ignorante di diplomazia,
Balcani e lingue, l'ex "numero 2" del Sisde ha brillato per
l'assenza.
Lo aveva inviato il ministro Dini. A fare che? E' possibile che
non abbia niente da dire ora?
Dini tace per abitudine. In Kosovo l'Italia non ha fatto che
dimettersi: nel 1998 non durò 48 ore il dottor Perugini (vice-
questore d'Arezzo) nella missione Osce guidata dall'infido
William Walker; due mesi durò Giovanni Koessler (magistrato di
Bolzano) già nel 1999; cinque mesi a Mitrovica, Mario Morcone
(prefetto di Arezzo). Spie, questurini, prefetti. E nessuno ci
racconti la favola del generale Cabigiosu che in Kosovo comanda
la Kfor: quella è la Nato dove - dopo i raid di Aviano -
l'esercito italiano brilla. A noi, agli albanesi e ai serbi,
interesserebbe il ruolo diplomatico dell'Italia. E quello,
purtroppo, non si vede.
-----------------------------------------------------
FATTI D'EUROPA EST
Presevo, interviene la Nato
In una sorprendente ma non inaspettata inversione dei ruoli e
delle alleanze, la Nato si è detta ieri disponibile alla
collaborazione con Belgrado per intervenire contro le attività
"terroristiche" degli albanesi in Kosovo. Un passo dettato
senz'altro dai migliori rapporti tral l'Alleanza e il nuovo
leader jugoslava, ma anche dalla ormai sempre più chiara
insofferenza dell'Occidente nei confronti del Kosovo. La Nato ha
stabilito un piano in sei punti per risolvere la crisi nella
valle di Presevo. Fra questi una campagna di informazione per
mettere in luce le attività terroristiche degli albanesi a
Presevo, rapporti più stretti tra la Kfor e la polizia serba,
controllo rafforzato sulle linee di confine e massima allerta
contro il traffico di armi.
Tensione in Albania
Iseguaci di Sali Berisha non ci stanno. Martedì sera l'arresto, e
il rilascio dopo qualche ora, del leader dell'opposizione
conservatrice, ha infervorato gli animi, e non solo, di alcuni
albanesi. Scontri sanguinosi si sono verificati a Tropoja, nel
nord del paese, da sempre regione fedele all'ex presidente
Berisha. Alcuni uomini hanno circondato il posto di polizia
locale e poi hanno dato fuoco al tribunale. La tensione è
altissima fin dai giorni delle elezioni amministrative di
ottobre, che avevano visto la sconfitta del partito di Berisha,
anche nella capitale. Da allora quotidianamente i suoi partigiani
manifestano nelle piazze delle principali città albanesi, in modo
sempre più violento. L'altro ieri, proprio nel corso di una di
queste manifestazioni, Berisha era stato fermato dalla polizia e
contemporaneamente esercito e blindati venivano schierati nei
punti chiave della città. Il primo ministro albanese, dal canto
suo, ha lanciato un avvertimento all'opposizione radicale: "Tutti
coloro che attaccheranno le istituzioni dovranno risponderne in
tribunale".
Chirac a Vienna
Non si è trattato esattamente un incontro cordiale, ma pur sempre
un incontro c'è stato. Dopo mesi di reciproca diffidenza, il
presidente francese Jacques Chirac si è recato a Vienna dove ha
stretto la mano al cancelliere austriaco Wolfgang Schüssel. I
colloqui si sono incentrati sullo sviluppo delle istituzioni
comunitarie europee alla vigilia del summit di Nizza. L'Austria,
come tutti i paesi di piccole dimensioni, propende al
mantenimento dell'attuale
status e composizione della commissione, nel timore di perdere, altrimenti,
peso politico in seno all'Europa. Chirac, in qualità di presidente dell'Unione,
ha tenuto a precisare che il significato della visita rientra nell'ambito di un
tour di tutte le capitali europee, e non ha voluto affrontare il problema della
presenza nel governo austriaco del partito di Haider, all'origine di tante
tensioni tra Vienna e Bruxelles.
Romania, elezioni
Il partito della Grande Romania tende la mano ai socialdemocratici. In base ai
risultati ancora provvisori delle elezioni di domenica scorsa, il partito
dell'estrema destra rumena dovrebbe aver ottenuto circa il 28 percento dei
voti, contro il 37 percento del partito socialdemocratico, guidato dall'ex
presidente Ion Iliescu. Il leader del Partito della Grande Romania Vadim Tudor
ha offerto al suo avversario, che finora si è sempre detto contrario, la
collaborazione per un governo di grande coalizione. Ion Iliescu e Vadim Tudor
si affronteranno il 10 dicembre prossimo nel ballottaggio per la carica di
presidente della repubblica.
Armenia e Azerbajan
Dopo 13 anni di conflitto, un primo passo verso una possibile distensione tra i
due paesi. Ieri il vicepresidente del parlamento azero si è recato a Yerevan,
capitale dell'Armenia, dove era in corso un forum degli 11 paesi che si
affacciano sul Mar nero. Si tratta della figura istituzionale più importante
che si sia finora mai recata nel paese nemico. Tanto il
parlamentare azero che il suo omologo armeno hanno mostrato una
certa disponibilità a riprendere il dialogo. Armenia e Azerbajan,
due ex repubbliche sovietiche, si contendono la regione del
Nagorno-Karabak, enclave popolata da una maggioranza armena in
territorio azero, che si è dichiarata indipendente nel 1988. Una
tregua nel 1994 ha messo fine ad una guerra che ha fatto oltre
15.000 vittime e un milione di profughi, ma il problema della
sovranità del Nagorno Karbak resta ancora del tutto irrisolto.
-------------------------------------------------
Il Manifesto, 30 novembre 2000
------
Bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'"
Sito WEB : http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only")
Archivio di JUGOINFO:
> http://www.ecircle.it/an_ecircle/articles?ecircleid%c2%91979 oppure
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------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
eCircle ti offre una nuova opportunita:
la tua agenda sul web - per te e per i tuoi amici
Organizza on line i tuoi appuntamenti .
E' facile, veloce e gratuito!
Da oggi su
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-------- Original Message --------
Oggetto: Notizie dalla Zastava
Data: Wed, 29 Nov 2000 05:13:10 +0100
Da: "Rossi Alma" <alma@...>
A: "0 -CGIL-Lomb-Lino" <rosolino_anelli.cgil_regionale@...>
Le notizie che ci vengono dalla Jugoslavia parlano di una situazione
niente
affatto ‘normalizzata’.
Alla Zastava-automobili di Kragujevac dovevano tenersi il 24 novembre le
elezioni per il rinnovo dei delegati sindacali del Samostalni Sindikat
(il
più grande sindacato jugoslavo).
Le elezioni sono state boicottate e sospese a causa dell'ennesima azione
intimidatoria da parte della componente del sindacato che fa riferimento
al
DOS.
Come è noto, nei giorni immediatamente successivi al 5 ottobre, alla
Zastava-Iveco, erano stati già
aggrediti, e costretti alle dimissioni, il segretario Sekula e il
vicesegretario Milan Doncic del sindacato Zastava Iveco.
Gli stessi agressori nominavano successivamente, nelle cariche sindacali
rimaste "vacanti", elementi iscritti al DOS, a partire dalla teoria che
essendo cambiato il governo dovevano cambiare anche le rappresentanze
sindacali in fabbrica. Il tutto, come evidente, al di fuori di qualsiasi
legalità, tanto è vero che (come succederebbe in ogni organizzazione
sindacale) la struttura nazionale del sindacato e la stessa segreteria
nazionale del sindacato dei metalmeccanici invalidavano l'operazione, in
quanto avvenuta senza alcuna votazione da parte dei lavoratori della
zastava-iveco, ed imposta con procedure illegali ed arbitrarie.
Sempre nella stessa occasione era invece fallito il tentativo di imporre
con
la forza le dimissioni del
presidente del sindacato della Zastava, Ruzica Milosavljevic, per la
ferma e
decisa risposta di quest’ultima.
In risposta all’ondata di violenze scatenata dagli appartenenti alla
DOS, la
presidente del sindacato Zastava proponeva quindi di andare ad una
consultazione tra i lavoratori iscritti per il rinnovo di tutti gli
incarichi sindacali all’interno del Samostalni della Zastava, attraverso
congressi ed elezioni, secondo il regolamento statutario e procedure
democratiche.
Le elezioni vengono fissate per il 24 novembre
Nelle settimane precedenti si svolgono riunioni ed assemblee nei singoli
reparti della fabbrica per la designazione dei candidati. Alcuni ex
delegati
del Samostalni della Zastav decidono di non ricandidarsi
proprio per non dare adito ad alcuna accusa di “occupazione delle
poltrone”,
e favorire così un rinnovo delle cariche sindacali in un clima di minore
tensione.
Ma questo evidentemente non basta ai membri DOS della Zastava.
Da lunedì 20 novembre un gruppo di loro ha iniziato un’agitazione nei
reparti che è divenuta sempre più violenta e aggressiva. L'iniziativa
punta
esplicitamente ad impedire la presentazione di candidature di quanti non
si
riconoscono nella corrente della DOS ed è sostenuta da vere e proprie
minacce di linciaggio e con la devastazione degli uffici sindacali.
Il culmine delle agressioni e delle violenze si è registrato giovedì 23
novembre, con l'occupazione degli uffici sindacali della Zastava-auto e
con
l'aperto boicottaggio delle elezioni convocate il giorno successivo.
Venerdì 24 la TV privata locale di Kragujevac, “Canale 9”, annuncia l’
annullamento delle elezioni sindacali previste per il 24. E questo senza
che
nessuno dei componenti le comissioni elettorali precedentemente
istituite in
zastava avesse comunicato alcunchè a riguardo.
La decisione di boicottare le elezioni è quindi chiaramente stata decisa
altrove, non certo in fabbrica.
L'inasprimento delle violenze, fino al boicottaggio, nasce da una
valutazione su come sono andate le assemblee precongressuali di reparto
(una
specie di elezioni primarie) dove gran parte delle candidature espresse
dai
lavoratori iscritti al sindacato zastava (il 94% dei lavoratori della
fabbrica) non risultavano probabilmente gradite alla componente della
DOS
che non era riuscita ad imporsi come avrebbe voluto in occasione di
queste
assemblee precongressuali di reparto.
Subito dopo il boiccotaggio delle elezioni (boicottaggio riuscito grazie
ad
una ben orientata campagna di stampa su giornali e TV private locali e
grazie ad una presenza minacciosa di militanti del DOS davanti alla
fabbrica
per scoraggiare quanti si presentavano alle urne) la componente DOS, che
si
è rifiutata di confrontarsiin una democratica verifica elettorale, ha
iniziato una raccolta di firme per chiedere una sostituzione d'ufficio,
degli attuali rappresentanti sindacali.
Ogni lavoratore viene avvicinato singolarmente da un gruppo di militanti
della DOS che si è nominato "Comitato rivoluzionario per la difesa della
democrazia". Molti lavoratori, a casa perchè ancora senza lavoro,
vengono
cercati nelle loro abitazioni e "costretti a firmare" pena l'essere
etichettati "Filo Milosevic" e quindi minacciati di ritorsione sulle
loro
aspettative di tornare al lavoro o di avere i sussidi comunali e
governativi.
Così, i lavoratori, sono privati del loro diritto democratico ad
esprimere
le loro preferenze sulle candidature sindacali e sulla stessa linea
sindacale proprio in un momento importante della lotta per la
sopravvivenza
della fabbrica.
Il nuovo governo transitorio della repubblica serba e quello della
Federazione non stanno mantenendo gli impegni assunti dal precedente
governo, che aveva destinato molte risorse per la ricostruzione della
grande
fabbrica automobilistica.
La mancata erogazione negli ultimi due mesi dei fondi previsti ha
bloccato
praticamente la produzione. Per pagare i salari sono stati “mangiati” i
fondi destinati all’investimento: 1.100.000 DM che servivano a
finanziare la
fase 2 del programma di ricostruzione, ed erano destinati al reparto
verniciatura.
Sta saltando in tal modo il programma di ricostruzione brillantemente
realizzato nei mesi precedenti con grandi sacrifici e lavoro degli
operai e
che faceva prevedere una produzione di 20.000 vetture entro la fine del
2000. Ora, invece, non si produce, e non si vende.
Di questo passo, si prevede che tra qualche mese non sarà possibile più
pagare i salari. Agitazione e malcontento diffusi tra i lavoratori
potrebbero sfociare in clamorose azioni di lotta. E’ per questo che la
DOS
vuol buttare fuori i compagni del Samostalni oggi impegnati
sull'obiettivo
di aprire una vertenza col governo per il rilancio della fabbrica ?
Se non c’è una chiara inversione di tendenza nella politica del governo
serbo e della Federazione, tra qualche mese la situazione si farà
drammatica, col rischio di bancarotta della fabbrica.
Ma i segnali che sono venuti sinora dal nuovo governo vanno in senso
opposto: la produzione e la vendita delle autovetture della Zastava non
vengono più protette dallo Stato. Dinkic, il leader del G-17 plus (il
gruppo
di economisti neoliberisti che ha stilato il programma economico della
DOS),
dichiara di voler ridurre le tasse sull’importazione di autovetture
straniere. E per quelle usate, il limite massimo di anzianità viene
elevato
da 4 a 6 anni. Inoltre, vengono fortemente abbassati i controlli sulle
auto
provenienti dal Montenegro (in sostanza, sarà più facile riciclare in
Serbia
le auto rubate...).
All’aeroporto di Belgrado è esposta una fiammante Peugeot, l’impresa
automobilistica francese, che, secondo notizie diffuse da radio e
televisione di Kragujevac ai primi di ottobre, avrebbe acquisito gli
stabilimenti della Zastava. Ma su di essi sembra riaffacciarsi
l’attenzione
della FIAT.
Che intendono fare le multinazionali?
Nel comitato di gestione (upravni odbor) della Zastava sono entrati due
rappresentanti del minuscolo partito democristiano, conquistando
addirittura
la presidenza con Milorad Savicevic. Qualche giornale di Kragujevac ha
anche
ironizzato, con qualche preoccupazione, sul peso eccessivo che ha
ottenuto
nella grande fabbrica un partito che nella coalizione della DOS non
conta
molto. Anche questo sembra essere un cattivo segnale per le prospettive
di
sopravvivenza della grande fabbrica.
In queste condizioni, con un consiglio d’amministrazione controllato
dagli
“amici” della DOS e un sindacato, i cui dirigenti più combattivi e
vicini ai
lavoratori vengono allontanati con la violenza, le multinazionali
possono
imporre prezzi stracciati per l’acquisto della grande fabbrica. Per
farne
che? Forse semplicemente comprarla per farla chiudere definitivamente,
eliminando il più grande produttore di auto nell’area balcanica: è così
che
l’Europa “entra” in Serbia, imponendo le sue merci...
Oppure per ristrutturarne qualche reparto, mantenendo al più un migliaio
di
lavoratori e “mettendo in libertà” tutti gli altri.
E’ per questo probabilmente che si scatena l’offensiva contro gli
attuali
rappresentanti del sindacato Zastava. Le multinazionali - è noto -
tollerano
al più un sindacato giallo, non un sindacato che si opponga alla loro
penetrazione.
Queste notizie sono state raccolte sulla base di testimonianze di alcuni
delegati zastava, di lavoratori della zastava che, per via
dell'iniziativa
di adozioni a distanza sono in contatto con alcune famiglie italiane, e
della testimonianza di Andrea Catone della associazione "un ponte per ..
in
terra di Bari" presente a Kragujevac proprio nei giorni precedenti il 24
novembre per consegnare le quote relative a 270 adozioni a distanza
raccolte
in Puglia.
Una delegazione del Coordinamento nazionale delle RSU andrà a Kragujevac
nei
giorni 8 e 9 dicembre.
Faremo il punto della situazione al ritorno
ciao alma
Alma Rossi - email - alma@...
indirizzo email del coordinamento RSU - coord.naz.rsu@...
indirizzo internet del Coordinamento RSU - http://www.ecn.org/coord.rsu/
---
Questo e' il bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'".
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only").
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
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Sito WEB del Coordinamento:
> http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Oggetto: Notizie dalla Zastava
Data: Wed, 29 Nov 2000 05:13:10 +0100
Da: "Rossi Alma" <alma@...>
A: "0 -CGIL-Lomb-Lino" <rosolino_anelli.cgil_regionale@...>
Le notizie che ci vengono dalla Jugoslavia parlano di una situazione
niente
affatto ‘normalizzata’.
Alla Zastava-automobili di Kragujevac dovevano tenersi il 24 novembre le
elezioni per il rinnovo dei delegati sindacali del Samostalni Sindikat
(il
più grande sindacato jugoslavo).
Le elezioni sono state boicottate e sospese a causa dell'ennesima azione
intimidatoria da parte della componente del sindacato che fa riferimento
al
DOS.
Come è noto, nei giorni immediatamente successivi al 5 ottobre, alla
Zastava-Iveco, erano stati già
aggrediti, e costretti alle dimissioni, il segretario Sekula e il
vicesegretario Milan Doncic del sindacato Zastava Iveco.
Gli stessi agressori nominavano successivamente, nelle cariche sindacali
rimaste "vacanti", elementi iscritti al DOS, a partire dalla teoria che
essendo cambiato il governo dovevano cambiare anche le rappresentanze
sindacali in fabbrica. Il tutto, come evidente, al di fuori di qualsiasi
legalità, tanto è vero che (come succederebbe in ogni organizzazione
sindacale) la struttura nazionale del sindacato e la stessa segreteria
nazionale del sindacato dei metalmeccanici invalidavano l'operazione, in
quanto avvenuta senza alcuna votazione da parte dei lavoratori della
zastava-iveco, ed imposta con procedure illegali ed arbitrarie.
Sempre nella stessa occasione era invece fallito il tentativo di imporre
con
la forza le dimissioni del
presidente del sindacato della Zastava, Ruzica Milosavljevic, per la
ferma e
decisa risposta di quest’ultima.
In risposta all’ondata di violenze scatenata dagli appartenenti alla
DOS, la
presidente del sindacato Zastava proponeva quindi di andare ad una
consultazione tra i lavoratori iscritti per il rinnovo di tutti gli
incarichi sindacali all’interno del Samostalni della Zastava, attraverso
congressi ed elezioni, secondo il regolamento statutario e procedure
democratiche.
Le elezioni vengono fissate per il 24 novembre
Nelle settimane precedenti si svolgono riunioni ed assemblee nei singoli
reparti della fabbrica per la designazione dei candidati. Alcuni ex
delegati
del Samostalni della Zastav decidono di non ricandidarsi
proprio per non dare adito ad alcuna accusa di “occupazione delle
poltrone”,
e favorire così un rinnovo delle cariche sindacali in un clima di minore
tensione.
Ma questo evidentemente non basta ai membri DOS della Zastava.
Da lunedì 20 novembre un gruppo di loro ha iniziato un’agitazione nei
reparti che è divenuta sempre più violenta e aggressiva. L'iniziativa
punta
esplicitamente ad impedire la presentazione di candidature di quanti non
si
riconoscono nella corrente della DOS ed è sostenuta da vere e proprie
minacce di linciaggio e con la devastazione degli uffici sindacali.
Il culmine delle agressioni e delle violenze si è registrato giovedì 23
novembre, con l'occupazione degli uffici sindacali della Zastava-auto e
con
l'aperto boicottaggio delle elezioni convocate il giorno successivo.
Venerdì 24 la TV privata locale di Kragujevac, “Canale 9”, annuncia l’
annullamento delle elezioni sindacali previste per il 24. E questo senza
che
nessuno dei componenti le comissioni elettorali precedentemente
istituite in
zastava avesse comunicato alcunchè a riguardo.
La decisione di boicottare le elezioni è quindi chiaramente stata decisa
altrove, non certo in fabbrica.
L'inasprimento delle violenze, fino al boicottaggio, nasce da una
valutazione su come sono andate le assemblee precongressuali di reparto
(una
specie di elezioni primarie) dove gran parte delle candidature espresse
dai
lavoratori iscritti al sindacato zastava (il 94% dei lavoratori della
fabbrica) non risultavano probabilmente gradite alla componente della
DOS
che non era riuscita ad imporsi come avrebbe voluto in occasione di
queste
assemblee precongressuali di reparto.
Subito dopo il boiccotaggio delle elezioni (boicottaggio riuscito grazie
ad
una ben orientata campagna di stampa su giornali e TV private locali e
grazie ad una presenza minacciosa di militanti del DOS davanti alla
fabbrica
per scoraggiare quanti si presentavano alle urne) la componente DOS, che
si
è rifiutata di confrontarsiin una democratica verifica elettorale, ha
iniziato una raccolta di firme per chiedere una sostituzione d'ufficio,
degli attuali rappresentanti sindacali.
Ogni lavoratore viene avvicinato singolarmente da un gruppo di militanti
della DOS che si è nominato "Comitato rivoluzionario per la difesa della
democrazia". Molti lavoratori, a casa perchè ancora senza lavoro,
vengono
cercati nelle loro abitazioni e "costretti a firmare" pena l'essere
etichettati "Filo Milosevic" e quindi minacciati di ritorsione sulle
loro
aspettative di tornare al lavoro o di avere i sussidi comunali e
governativi.
Così, i lavoratori, sono privati del loro diritto democratico ad
esprimere
le loro preferenze sulle candidature sindacali e sulla stessa linea
sindacale proprio in un momento importante della lotta per la
sopravvivenza
della fabbrica.
Il nuovo governo transitorio della repubblica serba e quello della
Federazione non stanno mantenendo gli impegni assunti dal precedente
governo, che aveva destinato molte risorse per la ricostruzione della
grande
fabbrica automobilistica.
La mancata erogazione negli ultimi due mesi dei fondi previsti ha
bloccato
praticamente la produzione. Per pagare i salari sono stati “mangiati” i
fondi destinati all’investimento: 1.100.000 DM che servivano a
finanziare la
fase 2 del programma di ricostruzione, ed erano destinati al reparto
verniciatura.
Sta saltando in tal modo il programma di ricostruzione brillantemente
realizzato nei mesi precedenti con grandi sacrifici e lavoro degli
operai e
che faceva prevedere una produzione di 20.000 vetture entro la fine del
2000. Ora, invece, non si produce, e non si vende.
Di questo passo, si prevede che tra qualche mese non sarà possibile più
pagare i salari. Agitazione e malcontento diffusi tra i lavoratori
potrebbero sfociare in clamorose azioni di lotta. E’ per questo che la
DOS
vuol buttare fuori i compagni del Samostalni oggi impegnati
sull'obiettivo
di aprire una vertenza col governo per il rilancio della fabbrica ?
Se non c’è una chiara inversione di tendenza nella politica del governo
serbo e della Federazione, tra qualche mese la situazione si farà
drammatica, col rischio di bancarotta della fabbrica.
Ma i segnali che sono venuti sinora dal nuovo governo vanno in senso
opposto: la produzione e la vendita delle autovetture della Zastava non
vengono più protette dallo Stato. Dinkic, il leader del G-17 plus (il
gruppo
di economisti neoliberisti che ha stilato il programma economico della
DOS),
dichiara di voler ridurre le tasse sull’importazione di autovetture
straniere. E per quelle usate, il limite massimo di anzianità viene
elevato
da 4 a 6 anni. Inoltre, vengono fortemente abbassati i controlli sulle
auto
provenienti dal Montenegro (in sostanza, sarà più facile riciclare in
Serbia
le auto rubate...).
All’aeroporto di Belgrado è esposta una fiammante Peugeot, l’impresa
automobilistica francese, che, secondo notizie diffuse da radio e
televisione di Kragujevac ai primi di ottobre, avrebbe acquisito gli
stabilimenti della Zastava. Ma su di essi sembra riaffacciarsi
l’attenzione
della FIAT.
Che intendono fare le multinazionali?
Nel comitato di gestione (upravni odbor) della Zastava sono entrati due
rappresentanti del minuscolo partito democristiano, conquistando
addirittura
la presidenza con Milorad Savicevic. Qualche giornale di Kragujevac ha
anche
ironizzato, con qualche preoccupazione, sul peso eccessivo che ha
ottenuto
nella grande fabbrica un partito che nella coalizione della DOS non
conta
molto. Anche questo sembra essere un cattivo segnale per le prospettive
di
sopravvivenza della grande fabbrica.
In queste condizioni, con un consiglio d’amministrazione controllato
dagli
“amici” della DOS e un sindacato, i cui dirigenti più combattivi e
vicini ai
lavoratori vengono allontanati con la violenza, le multinazionali
possono
imporre prezzi stracciati per l’acquisto della grande fabbrica. Per
farne
che? Forse semplicemente comprarla per farla chiudere definitivamente,
eliminando il più grande produttore di auto nell’area balcanica: è così
che
l’Europa “entra” in Serbia, imponendo le sue merci...
Oppure per ristrutturarne qualche reparto, mantenendo al più un migliaio
di
lavoratori e “mettendo in libertà” tutti gli altri.
E’ per questo probabilmente che si scatena l’offensiva contro gli
attuali
rappresentanti del sindacato Zastava. Le multinazionali - è noto -
tollerano
al più un sindacato giallo, non un sindacato che si opponga alla loro
penetrazione.
Queste notizie sono state raccolte sulla base di testimonianze di alcuni
delegati zastava, di lavoratori della zastava che, per via
dell'iniziativa
di adozioni a distanza sono in contatto con alcune famiglie italiane, e
della testimonianza di Andrea Catone della associazione "un ponte per ..
in
terra di Bari" presente a Kragujevac proprio nei giorni precedenti il 24
novembre per consegnare le quote relative a 270 adozioni a distanza
raccolte
in Puglia.
Una delegazione del Coordinamento nazionale delle RSU andrà a Kragujevac
nei
giorni 8 e 9 dicembre.
Faremo il punto della situazione al ritorno
ciao alma
Alma Rossi - email - alma@...
indirizzo email del coordinamento RSU - coord.naz.rsu@...
indirizzo internet del Coordinamento RSU - http://www.ecn.org/coord.rsu/
---
Questo e' il bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'".
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only").
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
Per contributi e segnalazioni: <jugocoord@...>
Archivio di JUGOINFO:
> http://www.ecircle.it/an_ecircle/articles?ecircleid=91979 oppure
> http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
Sito WEB del Coordinamento:
> http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Vuoi sapere proprio tutto su eCircle?
Chi siamo, cosa facciamo e a cosa serviamo?
Conoscici meglio...
http://www.ecircle.it/ad503991/www.ecircle.it
http://www.sps.org.yu/eng/index-n.htm
The Fifth Extraordinary Congress
25 november 2000
The Fifth Extraordinary Congress
Address of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic,
Chairman of the Socialist Party of
Serbia to the Fifth Extraordinary
Congress of the Party
Belgrade, 25 November 2000
Comrades,
In the elements for the discussion of SPS members, in the
preparation for this Congress, dramatic and highly
unfavorable circumstances, internal and external, were
pointed out marking the conditions in which the 2000
elections were held. At the same time, anyone in this hall is
fully aware what kind of violence and lawlessness prevailed
after the 5 October coup – setting on fire the Federal
Parliament and the national TV. The background of these
events and the continuation of the occupation of Yugoslavia,
which started several years ago, as was revealed in
Rambouillet and during the last year’s war, will be something
that both the contemporaries and the generations to come
will discuss.
War against this country, is now a money war. We have
large-scale corruption at works here. A lot of money is in
circulation and great privileges are granted to those who
should accept all that is against this country – loss of
independence, separation of Montenegro, Kosovo and
Vojvodina, humiliation and annihilation of the Serb people,
handing the national heroes to the new Gestapo
headquartered in The Hague. Thanks to that money, the
media are in the hands of foreign intelligence services.
But the war against our country is also waged through
intimidation. The SPS headquarters in Belgrade were burnt
down, its leadership is threatened, they are being
eavesdropped, blackmailed and falsely accused.
The biggest force in the defense of the State and national
interests is the SPS and that is why is it now targeted for
major attacks. Its ruin or at least destabilization is a priority
task of the enemies of our State.
That task is being carried out in a perfidious manner, from
the inside, seeking to pit as many people as possible against
each other. But through direct and brutal pressures – sacking
and humiliating people, the party officials are often
pressured into leaving the party.
At the same time, there is an absurd – all those that defended
the country and were in the country during the war, are now
labeled as enemies, while those who fled, supported the
bombing campaign and cooperated with the aggressors, are
now playing the part of patriots and saviors of the country.
Thieves are saying that honest people are thieves.
These difficult times require that all those who may take
responsibility do so. That is why the SPS has to reinforce its
unity and reaffirm itself as a major factor in the defense of
the State and national interests.
Therefore, the SPS has nothing more important to do than
close its ranks in defending this program, in defending the
interests of citizens and the people. This is a task that this
Congress has to perform.
At the Fourth Congress, we concluded that the country was
threatened. Our primary task concerned the unity and the
need to mobilize "all patriotic parties and people". I also
emphasize "in this time this is a priority task for this
country". It was also assessed then that:
"Now the country is defending itself from the evil that is
hovering above and we should have the left and the right join
forces, believers and atheists, highly educated and those
who are not, the old and the young, those that did not get
along and spoke to each other, those who think that they
have forever and for better parted their ways. They all have
one thing in common – the love of their country. And they feel
an obligation to defend it from becoming a colony where
foreign armies will march in, whose economy will be in the
function of development of other countries’ development,
whose culture will be done away with, whose past will be
wiped out and whose leaders will be bribed or blackmailed
swindlers that every nation has even when the going is good,
particularly so when the going gets tough".
The idea of the Government of national unity was
successfully realized for entire seven years.
The tragic fault of the entire patriotic block which is the main
cause for the current crisis was its inability to preserve the
unity.
The lack of unity within the patriotic block, which
successfully cooperated in the Government of the national
unity for years, was brought about only partially due to
narrow-mindedness of our party leadership, to a lesser
extent and to a more extent due to immoderate demands of
the Radical Party. In any case, the weakness of the patriotic
block expressed through its inability to preserve the unity,
was the main cause. And then the pressures exerted on the
party only to look for its negative traits, even when there are
none, and it surely has less of those than all the others.
Speaking of narrow-mindedness, as our weakness that came
to the fore before the elections, I would like to say that this is
the weakness that we did not manage to get rid of either in
the preparations for this extraordinary Congress. Due to that
weakness, our list for the party leadership does not include
young people, farmers or women to the extent it is necessary
in the SPS, despite our statutory norms.
Comrades,
Only nine months ago, we held the regular Fourth Congress
of our party. We advanced a concept of further development
of our society on the whole, as well as in certain fields,
particularly in the economy. Our party prepared well for a
Congress conceived in such way, because we wanted to
confront the party and the widest public with responses that
related to the perspectives of the society, which almost for a
decade faced huge outside pressures and coped with many
internal difficulties and the consequences of such pressures.
And then, only a few months before the Congress, the war
NATO fought against Yugoslavia, mostly in the territory of
Serbia, ended.
In view of all of that, the Socialist Party of Serbia took as its
task at the Congress to confront all citizens, the entire
people, with the responses related to freedom,
independence, economic development, social stability,
international cooperation, situation in the region, our future,
and partially the future in general.
Now, the same as then, I consider that the Congress was an
invaluable contribution to the future of our country, and
above all that it provided the answers that concerned other
countries and peoples with which we enter the 21st century.
These are not merely my assessments or the assessments of
our party at the Fourth Congress of the Socialist Party of
Serbia. Similar or identical assessments were made by many
prominent international politicians and guests who attended
the Congress and there were, as you know, the
representatives from more than 100 parties from all over the
world. Positive assessments of the Congress could be found
in many international media, months later.
We have been, for many reasons, convinced that despite the
difficulties that continued, primarily in the form of outside
pressures, we are entering a period of renewal, reforms and
development, hopeful that we shall find a common language
with the international community, primarily with those
democratic, progressive and human factors in the
international community and start to shake off the pressure,
blackmail and threats which for a decade have made our life
difficult and tied our hands in terms of development,
prosperity above all.
Immediately after the war, with great enthusiasm and great
achievements we entered a period of the reconstruction of
the country, rebuilding all that was destroyed in the war and
we almost completed the reconstruction before the elections
took place in September. Our public responded well to the
reconstruction and its achievements, the international public
followed it and where it commented it, the comments were
very positive. How else could one comment a quick,
successful and self-reliant reconstruction of the country
ravaged by the war, without outside assistance and war
reparations.
At the federal elections held in September, the Socialist
Party of Serbia and its coalition partners – Yugoslav Left
(JUL) and Socialist Peoples Party of Montenegro (SNP), could
have won majority in Parliament. But, without its coalition
partners, it could not win the majority in Parliament and it did
not enter the Federal Government. It was the will of the SNP
of Montenegro. In doing so, at the level of the Federal State,
the Socialist Party of Serbia found itself in the role of
opposition party. Among other things, we are having this
Congress in order to prepare for the role of an opposition
party in the Federal State and to assess the situation in the
Federal State where we are opposition. But also to
consolidate our party on the eve of the elections in Serbia.
The party that has for ten years been a ruling one, cannot
possibly overnight, be it alone or with other parties, at the
level of the Federal State or at the republican level, quickly
and easily switch from the ruling to the opposition party.
Many parties in the world, particularly in Europe following a
long or longer periods of rule had to adapt to the role of
opposition. In this period, they usually lose members, but
sometimes their old members returned after a while, there
were tensions in the leadership which manifested through
seeking justified or often unjustified responsibility, the
changed or only considered that they had to change
something, anything – program, name, leadership, structure
of organization, approach to media, symbols ... believing that
these changes would heal the wounds that the party suffered
assuming the role of the opposition.
The countries with longer multi-party traditions have gained
all these experiences long ago. They have not been followed
attentively in our party, although I think that they have not
been followed in other parties and our society on the whole,
because since the Second World War until 1990, we lived in a
different, one-party system. Now we need to learn about the
experience of other parties in the world which faced a similar
situation and take advantage of them to the extent they are
good for us.
By all accounts, in such circumstances, the major tasks of
any party
include establishing its identity, preserving its current
identity but changing it somewhat or much, but insistence on
the party’s identity is its major task. I think that in this
respect, our party should maintain the concept of the
development of society it embraced at its Fourth Congress in
February, and to be an opposition from the point of view of
that concept, to all that is taking place in the Yugoslav
society now, to the extent it is contrary to our perception of
the interests of the Yugoslav society.
As at the previous Congress, we shall continue to advocate
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a common State of two
equal republics – Serbia and Montenegro. We shall therefore
be against the so-called "community" of Serbia and
Montenegro, as a state solution for these two republics.
As at the previous Congress, we shall advocate our positions
on Kosovo, firmly believing that they are principled, genuine
and just.
Of all the wounds we suffered, Kosovo is the most serious.
The former Yugoslavia started to die in Kosovo. Perhaps, in
the beginning of 1980s, maybe 1970s or even 1960s, but
surely in Kosovo.
Its independence and secession, fuelling of hatred between
the Serb and Albanian people, ill-intentioned attempts at
domination of one over the other, outside financial support,
outside Yugoslavia, to trigger mutual conflicts – this is how
the former Yugoslavia entered a tragic crisis.
But the same Kosovo story is the greatest wound of the
present-day Yugoslavia. Outside factors did all they can so
that the wound may never heal. These efforts resulted in fear
that all living in Kosovo had to endure for years – Serbs and
Albanians alike, in poverty engulfing all in Kosovo – Serbs
and Albanians, in bombing that was killing all in Kosovo –
Serbs and Albanians, in evil hovering over the heads of all
children – Serb and Albanian.
One part of the international community blamed the Serbs
and the authorities in Serbia for the alleged genocide against
the Albanians. However, it is thanks to them, to that part of
the international community, that genocide was committed
against the Serbs. They have left Kosovo for most part. They
are walking, as greatest European destitute, along the
periphery of the territory where until recently their houses
used to be and still are, the territory that used to be their
native land and their centuries' old homeland. Those that
remained, became the greatest martyrs and the greatest
heroes of this century, and at this moment perhaps the
greatest martyrs and greatest heroes in the entire world. In
any case, the greatest patriots of all.
For more than a decade, the authorities in Serbia invested
outstanding efforts to prove to the world, angry and
unbelieving, that Kosovo is a part of Serbia. For themselves,
it does not even have to be neither holy or the most
important part. But we, the Serbs, have every right to see it
like that if that is the case. It is up to us and no one else. The
French have the Notre Dame and the Arch of Triumph, the
Russians have the Kremlin and the Battle of Borodin, the
Americans have their Empire State building, the Greeks have
Acropolis and the Serbs have Gracanica, Gazimestan and the
Patriarchate of Pec.
That is why the violence against Kosovo is violence against
Serbia. Violence against the Serbs from Kosovo is violence
against all Serbs. All the Serbs know that - even those that
have been paid to forget. They know it when they return
home, when they are by themselves and no one is watching.
But the Albanians in Kosovo, even those that currently enjoy
the support of some powers which resulted in the Serbs
being expelled from Kosovo, not even them are living a happy
life. Even those that are filled with hatred and violence
cannot possibly choose to live with that hatred and violence.
Particularly when that choice was not a result of their own
will and emotions but for foreign interests. These interests
use Albanians as an instrument to break-up yet another
country and occupy yet another territory.
SPS is advocating a free Kosovo in free Serbia, a free Serbia
in free Yugoslavia, free Yugoslavia in free Balkans, where all
Balkan countries and their people should live in peace. SPS
is advocating freedom for each country and all people in the
world.
If such political platform is undemocratic and inhuman, than
the membership of this party seeks that a text of democratic
and human platform be read.
Comrades,
I dwelled on the issue of Kosovo and Metohija since I felt that
the dramatic situation in Kosovo required that.
Now, let me continue to explain the SPS platform and the
policies that it should lead on the basis of this platform in the
current circumstances.
Therefore, as at the previous Congress will shall advocate
the independence of Yugoslavia since that was a historical
principle in line with which the people of Serbia and
Montenegro functioned throughout their entire history. We
shall also advocate the sovereignty of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, not questioning the need to cooperate in all
fields (economic, cultural, scientific, technological, political)
with the entire world, with all countries, with all people on
the basis of equality. The preservation of the sovereignty of
one country and its cooperation with other countries are
really possible only if among those countries there exist the
relations of equality and basic mutual trust. That is why the
Socialist Party of Serbia will be against those political,
economic, national, cultural, technological and other
concessions that the authorities of the FRY will make under
the pretext of cooperation with the world, to the detriment of
independence and sovereignty of the country.
When those concessions are made (which is already the
case), they are impossible to see immediately, i.e. it is not
possible to see that these are concessions, and that
interests of the State and its citizens are at stake. Facing the
consequences of these concessions is something that
comes later, often when it is difficult to remove the
consequences.
The Socialist Party of Serbia has been warning to that for an
entire decade. The composition of the Federal Government
has prevented the SPS from protecting the State and its
citizens from the position of power from dangers posed to
their livelihood, in the wake of these concessions. But as an
opposition party in Yugoslavia it will do all it can so that the
broad public, the entire people be warned on the dangers to
its survival, particularly for sound and successful
development of society in case this practice of limiting the
sovereignty and questioning the independence of the
country be continued.
As was the case at the previous Congress, the Socialist Party
of Serbia will advocate economic development in line with
the principles of market economy and diversity of ownership
relations which combined will provide for a better standard of
the society and citizens. We do not have a problem with
private ownership. But we do have a problem with all those
forms of ownership that are manifested as depletion of
national and individual assets, as give-away of the State and
material and moral degradation of citizens that acquired their
property for a long time and legally. At this moment, this
process of (alleged) ownership transformation threatens to
turn into something that the Socialist Party of Serbia feared
might happen and what it warned might happen - selling of
the State and social property at give-away prices to foreign
and domestic buyers, foreign investments of dubious
character without a possibility to control and assess to what
extent are those investments in the national interest or
perhaps contrary to it.
Hence the first consequences of the policies pursued in this
field by a new Government such as huge price increases,
particularly of basic staples, food, shortage of electricity
(which we had even in the most difficult period of the
sanctions and the war when during night the were bombs
dropped on electricity supply systems, but tomorrow, we had
enough power supply in the entire territory of the Republic as
well as during the entire time after the war until the moment
when these affairs fell into the hands of new authorities),
increases in the price of electricity, increases in the price of
medicines making them unavailable to a great number of
sick people, great and sudden unemployment. In short, the
fall of living standards.
In that respect, unemployment is not only a consequence of
wrongful economic policies, but it also has a political
dimension. A large number of people was sacked exclusively
on political grounds. In the 21st century in Europe it should
be inadmissible that the authorities professionally degrade
people of different political views. Sacking people with
different political views is a practice linked to the darkest
experiences of terror against people in the 20th century.
However, speaking of violence, it is not manifested only
through sacking and professional and human degradation at
workplace, but it is manifested as violent physical removal of
people from executive positions to which they were
appointed by Governments, assemblies, or where they were
elected by managing boards; the property of people of
different political views is seized as well as that of parties
and lastly, this also included physical violence towards
people who hold different political views.
At first glance it may look unnecessary, but it is essentially
necessary to emphasize that the Socialist Party throughout
all these ten long and difficult years fraught with all the evils
in this world, hovering above our small country and small
people, managed to preserve not only the country, and
ensure a relatively decent life for its citizens, but also
managed to ensure the functioning of all institutions on
which the State relies, guaranteeing citizens personal and
property security. Today, the functioning of these institutions
is threatened. They are in the hands of the forces that do not
recognize the Constitution, laws and often not even
elementary moral norms. Hundreds of directors, university
deans, rectors, directors of hospitals, presidents of managing
boards are thrown out from their offices and sacked from
their positions to which they were appointed by assemblies
and governments, under the threat of various groups or
sufficiently angry people in the face of which legally elected
or legally appointed people had to give way - to take a sick
leave, without being sick, early retirement, or to take a
holiday they do not need or even become really sick... Most
of these people are prominent experts, honorable citizens,
often with long professional and life experience.
Committed to the democratic functioning of the State and
democratic society, the Socialist Party of Serbia not only
expresses it deep concern for the fate of its beliefs, but
expresses its most profound concern for the respect of
fundamental human and civil rights in conditions when such
rights are not protected by the competent institutions, but
unidentified force will do all it can to suspend those
institutions.
As at the Fourth Congress, the Socialist Party of Serbia
remains committed to a multi-party system and free
expression of different political views. Moreover, the SPS has
initiated the introduction of a multi-party system in Serbia. In
that sense, SPS shall oppose the practice that at the current
moment threatens to start its unusual, awkward life - to ban
and discriminate against the political parties that are
opposition just for being opposition. In all its documents,
particularly from the Fourth Congress, SPS
emphasized the need for a free, true and responsible
management of the media. The Socialist Party of Serbia
waged a long-term war with the media financed from abroad,
whose task was to misinform the citizens of Serbia and
Yugoslavia, to demoralize them, to discredit them and falsely
accuse all for whom they assess are not sufficiently loyal to
the interests outside Yugoslavia to limit the country's
sovereignty. Consistently committed to such position until
the present day, the Socialist Party of Serbia has to express
its deepest concern with the fate of the society in which the
media exclude different opinions and advocate only one
opinion. Even if that one and only opinion were an expression
of an absolute domination of a political party in the
Assembly, the media which care about the principles of truth,
freedom and responsibility, should not deprive their public of
different opinions, even if they belonged to small parties,
non-parliamentary parties or even individual political and
intellectual views of the realities and future developments.
So, when I said that one of the most important tasks of our
party at the present time was to establish its identity, I
thought, let me repeat, that SPS should remain committed to
all those values its has been committed to since its very
inception, throughout this turbulent decade - freedom,
independence, economic prosperity, free cultural
development, constant improvement of standards,
integration with the rest of the world, cooperation on an
equal footing with all nations and peoples. SPS should also
remain committed to the vision of the development of society
advanced at the Fourth Congress. In addition, it should add
to its identity an obligation of critical evaluation of the
reality, in an analytical, principled, public and argumented
manner, the reality that is contrary to, today even absolutely
contrary to the commitments of SPS and the documents from
the party's Fourth Congress.
The second task of the SPS in the present circumstances is
not only the preservation of the party network, but expansion
of its structure and of course, an accurate evaluation of its
membership. After the announcement of election results, as
well as after setting up majority in the Assembly contrary to
pre-election campaign promises, after setting up the Federal
Government with one leftist party and one coalition of 18
political groupings of different political affiliations, the
membership of the Socialist Party of Serbia reacted painfully,
and there was even some commotion, justified confusion,
disappointment ... This is all a normal reaction from political
and human aspect. I think that the initial thrust of such
reactions is over and that the membership in all local and
municipal organizations for most part gathered around their
program and their obligations under the program, preparing
themselves for the republican elections scheduled a year
ahead causing justified surprise of its membership and
probably justified discontent of the membership. Of course,
now that the elections were called, the SPS has to prepare
for them. In conditions of the media blockade this will be
difficult. However, even if there were no elections, our party
has a second great and important obligation - to consolidate
the membership and activate and expand the network with a
view to presenting the reality as it is and for the umpteenth
time in a new and old and any way, say where the reality is
leading the society and the citizens. If it is not to be
changed.
As for its membership, some its members are
leaving the party, in the first place from
the
leadership ranks. We should not of course,
mourn them. It is now obvious that they
joined
the party because it was in power and that they stayed there
while it was in power. For the first time when it is not, they
are leaving. If only they were to do so quietly, as profiteering
cowards... However, they are leaving it with a lot of noise,
demonstrating that their departure from the party in whose
leadership they were is also a departure from the policies to
which they paid lip service until a month ago and it is still
ringing in the ears of those who listened them on dozens of
TV and radio stations. But not only words. They advocated
the policies with which they now part with in deeds as well,
before the very eyes of all SPS members and all citizens,
because they did not take place three decades ago but three
months ago. In turbulently parting ways with our party they
are just buying a ticket for a new midst where they expect
some profit, first of all material, then in terms of status and
privileges and perhaps protection of assets they illegally and
unlawfully seized.
The current analysis of political situation in the country will
not be faced with a difficult task if they should seek to
identify the radical changes that the political elite in this
country has gone through in this country. A decade ago, it
was not the easiest job to find documents indicating who
was a member of the Crown Council from 1992 and
euphorically wrote on socialist self-management as a
necessary outcome in 1976. Such research efforts should
now be very easy to undertake. In the course of one autumn
alone, the same persons spoke volumes of the resistance to
NATO aggression, while only a few days after the coup they
supported European social-democracy whose governments,
as is well-known, took part in NATO aggression. Not to
mention those fierce national freedom-fighters of the Serbian
people from early 1990s who now renounce their
participation in that struggle, claiming that this national story
is overtaken and now they see themselves as citizens of
Europe.
Difficult times exist, among other things, so that a man may
prove his worth - whether in difficult times he will remain with
those with whom he was when the going was good or will
they now join others so that they may again have a good and
prosperous time. In politics, the same as in life, there are
people who are ready to always move to places where it is
nice and sunny, particularly where the authorities are. But in
life, the same as in politics, there are others who see that
and should speak about that, not on account of those who
move towards the authorities but for the authorities
themselves. Because all authorities wishing well to its
people, have to beware of the candidates who want to be
peoples representatives, who present themselves as
candidates for any authorities, those who are essentially
interested only in representing themselves.
I am appealing the delegates of this Congress, to all
members of SPS, to all those that can hear or read my words:
the interest of our country is to be free, independent,
developed and integrated with the rest of the world. The
interest of our citizens is to live in peace and freedom, not
fearing for their life and property, so that all of them can work
and live well and better from their work, to respect their
history and have a better future.
The Socialist Party of Serbia has a task - to protect,
represent and realize such interests of the country and its
people.
It is therefore not important how big it will be but what it will
look like. The greatest party is the best party.
The Socialist Party of Serbia used to be that for ten years,
may it continue to be like that in the future.
Copyright © 1997-2000SPS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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The Fifth Extraordinary Congress
25 november 2000
The Fifth Extraordinary Congress
Address of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic,
Chairman of the Socialist Party of
Serbia to the Fifth Extraordinary
Congress of the Party
Belgrade, 25 November 2000
Comrades,
In the elements for the discussion of SPS members, in the
preparation for this Congress, dramatic and highly
unfavorable circumstances, internal and external, were
pointed out marking the conditions in which the 2000
elections were held. At the same time, anyone in this hall is
fully aware what kind of violence and lawlessness prevailed
after the 5 October coup – setting on fire the Federal
Parliament and the national TV. The background of these
events and the continuation of the occupation of Yugoslavia,
which started several years ago, as was revealed in
Rambouillet and during the last year’s war, will be something
that both the contemporaries and the generations to come
will discuss.
War against this country, is now a money war. We have
large-scale corruption at works here. A lot of money is in
circulation and great privileges are granted to those who
should accept all that is against this country – loss of
independence, separation of Montenegro, Kosovo and
Vojvodina, humiliation and annihilation of the Serb people,
handing the national heroes to the new Gestapo
headquartered in The Hague. Thanks to that money, the
media are in the hands of foreign intelligence services.
But the war against our country is also waged through
intimidation. The SPS headquarters in Belgrade were burnt
down, its leadership is threatened, they are being
eavesdropped, blackmailed and falsely accused.
The biggest force in the defense of the State and national
interests is the SPS and that is why is it now targeted for
major attacks. Its ruin or at least destabilization is a priority
task of the enemies of our State.
That task is being carried out in a perfidious manner, from
the inside, seeking to pit as many people as possible against
each other. But through direct and brutal pressures – sacking
and humiliating people, the party officials are often
pressured into leaving the party.
At the same time, there is an absurd – all those that defended
the country and were in the country during the war, are now
labeled as enemies, while those who fled, supported the
bombing campaign and cooperated with the aggressors, are
now playing the part of patriots and saviors of the country.
Thieves are saying that honest people are thieves.
These difficult times require that all those who may take
responsibility do so. That is why the SPS has to reinforce its
unity and reaffirm itself as a major factor in the defense of
the State and national interests.
Therefore, the SPS has nothing more important to do than
close its ranks in defending this program, in defending the
interests of citizens and the people. This is a task that this
Congress has to perform.
At the Fourth Congress, we concluded that the country was
threatened. Our primary task concerned the unity and the
need to mobilize "all patriotic parties and people". I also
emphasize "in this time this is a priority task for this
country". It was also assessed then that:
"Now the country is defending itself from the evil that is
hovering above and we should have the left and the right join
forces, believers and atheists, highly educated and those
who are not, the old and the young, those that did not get
along and spoke to each other, those who think that they
have forever and for better parted their ways. They all have
one thing in common – the love of their country. And they feel
an obligation to defend it from becoming a colony where
foreign armies will march in, whose economy will be in the
function of development of other countries’ development,
whose culture will be done away with, whose past will be
wiped out and whose leaders will be bribed or blackmailed
swindlers that every nation has even when the going is good,
particularly so when the going gets tough".
The idea of the Government of national unity was
successfully realized for entire seven years.
The tragic fault of the entire patriotic block which is the main
cause for the current crisis was its inability to preserve the
unity.
The lack of unity within the patriotic block, which
successfully cooperated in the Government of the national
unity for years, was brought about only partially due to
narrow-mindedness of our party leadership, to a lesser
extent and to a more extent due to immoderate demands of
the Radical Party. In any case, the weakness of the patriotic
block expressed through its inability to preserve the unity,
was the main cause. And then the pressures exerted on the
party only to look for its negative traits, even when there are
none, and it surely has less of those than all the others.
Speaking of narrow-mindedness, as our weakness that came
to the fore before the elections, I would like to say that this is
the weakness that we did not manage to get rid of either in
the preparations for this extraordinary Congress. Due to that
weakness, our list for the party leadership does not include
young people, farmers or women to the extent it is necessary
in the SPS, despite our statutory norms.
Comrades,
Only nine months ago, we held the regular Fourth Congress
of our party. We advanced a concept of further development
of our society on the whole, as well as in certain fields,
particularly in the economy. Our party prepared well for a
Congress conceived in such way, because we wanted to
confront the party and the widest public with responses that
related to the perspectives of the society, which almost for a
decade faced huge outside pressures and coped with many
internal difficulties and the consequences of such pressures.
And then, only a few months before the Congress, the war
NATO fought against Yugoslavia, mostly in the territory of
Serbia, ended.
In view of all of that, the Socialist Party of Serbia took as its
task at the Congress to confront all citizens, the entire
people, with the responses related to freedom,
independence, economic development, social stability,
international cooperation, situation in the region, our future,
and partially the future in general.
Now, the same as then, I consider that the Congress was an
invaluable contribution to the future of our country, and
above all that it provided the answers that concerned other
countries and peoples with which we enter the 21st century.
These are not merely my assessments or the assessments of
our party at the Fourth Congress of the Socialist Party of
Serbia. Similar or identical assessments were made by many
prominent international politicians and guests who attended
the Congress and there were, as you know, the
representatives from more than 100 parties from all over the
world. Positive assessments of the Congress could be found
in many international media, months later.
We have been, for many reasons, convinced that despite the
difficulties that continued, primarily in the form of outside
pressures, we are entering a period of renewal, reforms and
development, hopeful that we shall find a common language
with the international community, primarily with those
democratic, progressive and human factors in the
international community and start to shake off the pressure,
blackmail and threats which for a decade have made our life
difficult and tied our hands in terms of development,
prosperity above all.
Immediately after the war, with great enthusiasm and great
achievements we entered a period of the reconstruction of
the country, rebuilding all that was destroyed in the war and
we almost completed the reconstruction before the elections
took place in September. Our public responded well to the
reconstruction and its achievements, the international public
followed it and where it commented it, the comments were
very positive. How else could one comment a quick,
successful and self-reliant reconstruction of the country
ravaged by the war, without outside assistance and war
reparations.
At the federal elections held in September, the Socialist
Party of Serbia and its coalition partners – Yugoslav Left
(JUL) and Socialist Peoples Party of Montenegro (SNP), could
have won majority in Parliament. But, without its coalition
partners, it could not win the majority in Parliament and it did
not enter the Federal Government. It was the will of the SNP
of Montenegro. In doing so, at the level of the Federal State,
the Socialist Party of Serbia found itself in the role of
opposition party. Among other things, we are having this
Congress in order to prepare for the role of an opposition
party in the Federal State and to assess the situation in the
Federal State where we are opposition. But also to
consolidate our party on the eve of the elections in Serbia.
The party that has for ten years been a ruling one, cannot
possibly overnight, be it alone or with other parties, at the
level of the Federal State or at the republican level, quickly
and easily switch from the ruling to the opposition party.
Many parties in the world, particularly in Europe following a
long or longer periods of rule had to adapt to the role of
opposition. In this period, they usually lose members, but
sometimes their old members returned after a while, there
were tensions in the leadership which manifested through
seeking justified or often unjustified responsibility, the
changed or only considered that they had to change
something, anything – program, name, leadership, structure
of organization, approach to media, symbols ... believing that
these changes would heal the wounds that the party suffered
assuming the role of the opposition.
The countries with longer multi-party traditions have gained
all these experiences long ago. They have not been followed
attentively in our party, although I think that they have not
been followed in other parties and our society on the whole,
because since the Second World War until 1990, we lived in a
different, one-party system. Now we need to learn about the
experience of other parties in the world which faced a similar
situation and take advantage of them to the extent they are
good for us.
By all accounts, in such circumstances, the major tasks of
any party
include establishing its identity, preserving its current
identity but changing it somewhat or much, but insistence on
the party’s identity is its major task. I think that in this
respect, our party should maintain the concept of the
development of society it embraced at its Fourth Congress in
February, and to be an opposition from the point of view of
that concept, to all that is taking place in the Yugoslav
society now, to the extent it is contrary to our perception of
the interests of the Yugoslav society.
As at the previous Congress, we shall continue to advocate
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a common State of two
equal republics – Serbia and Montenegro. We shall therefore
be against the so-called "community" of Serbia and
Montenegro, as a state solution for these two republics.
As at the previous Congress, we shall advocate our positions
on Kosovo, firmly believing that they are principled, genuine
and just.
Of all the wounds we suffered, Kosovo is the most serious.
The former Yugoslavia started to die in Kosovo. Perhaps, in
the beginning of 1980s, maybe 1970s or even 1960s, but
surely in Kosovo.
Its independence and secession, fuelling of hatred between
the Serb and Albanian people, ill-intentioned attempts at
domination of one over the other, outside financial support,
outside Yugoslavia, to trigger mutual conflicts – this is how
the former Yugoslavia entered a tragic crisis.
But the same Kosovo story is the greatest wound of the
present-day Yugoslavia. Outside factors did all they can so
that the wound may never heal. These efforts resulted in fear
that all living in Kosovo had to endure for years – Serbs and
Albanians alike, in poverty engulfing all in Kosovo – Serbs
and Albanians, in bombing that was killing all in Kosovo –
Serbs and Albanians, in evil hovering over the heads of all
children – Serb and Albanian.
One part of the international community blamed the Serbs
and the authorities in Serbia for the alleged genocide against
the Albanians. However, it is thanks to them, to that part of
the international community, that genocide was committed
against the Serbs. They have left Kosovo for most part. They
are walking, as greatest European destitute, along the
periphery of the territory where until recently their houses
used to be and still are, the territory that used to be their
native land and their centuries' old homeland. Those that
remained, became the greatest martyrs and the greatest
heroes of this century, and at this moment perhaps the
greatest martyrs and greatest heroes in the entire world. In
any case, the greatest patriots of all.
For more than a decade, the authorities in Serbia invested
outstanding efforts to prove to the world, angry and
unbelieving, that Kosovo is a part of Serbia. For themselves,
it does not even have to be neither holy or the most
important part. But we, the Serbs, have every right to see it
like that if that is the case. It is up to us and no one else. The
French have the Notre Dame and the Arch of Triumph, the
Russians have the Kremlin and the Battle of Borodin, the
Americans have their Empire State building, the Greeks have
Acropolis and the Serbs have Gracanica, Gazimestan and the
Patriarchate of Pec.
That is why the violence against Kosovo is violence against
Serbia. Violence against the Serbs from Kosovo is violence
against all Serbs. All the Serbs know that - even those that
have been paid to forget. They know it when they return
home, when they are by themselves and no one is watching.
But the Albanians in Kosovo, even those that currently enjoy
the support of some powers which resulted in the Serbs
being expelled from Kosovo, not even them are living a happy
life. Even those that are filled with hatred and violence
cannot possibly choose to live with that hatred and violence.
Particularly when that choice was not a result of their own
will and emotions but for foreign interests. These interests
use Albanians as an instrument to break-up yet another
country and occupy yet another territory.
SPS is advocating a free Kosovo in free Serbia, a free Serbia
in free Yugoslavia, free Yugoslavia in free Balkans, where all
Balkan countries and their people should live in peace. SPS
is advocating freedom for each country and all people in the
world.
If such political platform is undemocratic and inhuman, than
the membership of this party seeks that a text of democratic
and human platform be read.
Comrades,
I dwelled on the issue of Kosovo and Metohija since I felt that
the dramatic situation in Kosovo required that.
Now, let me continue to explain the SPS platform and the
policies that it should lead on the basis of this platform in the
current circumstances.
Therefore, as at the previous Congress will shall advocate
the independence of Yugoslavia since that was a historical
principle in line with which the people of Serbia and
Montenegro functioned throughout their entire history. We
shall also advocate the sovereignty of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, not questioning the need to cooperate in all
fields (economic, cultural, scientific, technological, political)
with the entire world, with all countries, with all people on
the basis of equality. The preservation of the sovereignty of
one country and its cooperation with other countries are
really possible only if among those countries there exist the
relations of equality and basic mutual trust. That is why the
Socialist Party of Serbia will be against those political,
economic, national, cultural, technological and other
concessions that the authorities of the FRY will make under
the pretext of cooperation with the world, to the detriment of
independence and sovereignty of the country.
When those concessions are made (which is already the
case), they are impossible to see immediately, i.e. it is not
possible to see that these are concessions, and that
interests of the State and its citizens are at stake. Facing the
consequences of these concessions is something that
comes later, often when it is difficult to remove the
consequences.
The Socialist Party of Serbia has been warning to that for an
entire decade. The composition of the Federal Government
has prevented the SPS from protecting the State and its
citizens from the position of power from dangers posed to
their livelihood, in the wake of these concessions. But as an
opposition party in Yugoslavia it will do all it can so that the
broad public, the entire people be warned on the dangers to
its survival, particularly for sound and successful
development of society in case this practice of limiting the
sovereignty and questioning the independence of the
country be continued.
As was the case at the previous Congress, the Socialist Party
of Serbia will advocate economic development in line with
the principles of market economy and diversity of ownership
relations which combined will provide for a better standard of
the society and citizens. We do not have a problem with
private ownership. But we do have a problem with all those
forms of ownership that are manifested as depletion of
national and individual assets, as give-away of the State and
material and moral degradation of citizens that acquired their
property for a long time and legally. At this moment, this
process of (alleged) ownership transformation threatens to
turn into something that the Socialist Party of Serbia feared
might happen and what it warned might happen - selling of
the State and social property at give-away prices to foreign
and domestic buyers, foreign investments of dubious
character without a possibility to control and assess to what
extent are those investments in the national interest or
perhaps contrary to it.
Hence the first consequences of the policies pursued in this
field by a new Government such as huge price increases,
particularly of basic staples, food, shortage of electricity
(which we had even in the most difficult period of the
sanctions and the war when during night the were bombs
dropped on electricity supply systems, but tomorrow, we had
enough power supply in the entire territory of the Republic as
well as during the entire time after the war until the moment
when these affairs fell into the hands of new authorities),
increases in the price of electricity, increases in the price of
medicines making them unavailable to a great number of
sick people, great and sudden unemployment. In short, the
fall of living standards.
In that respect, unemployment is not only a consequence of
wrongful economic policies, but it also has a political
dimension. A large number of people was sacked exclusively
on political grounds. In the 21st century in Europe it should
be inadmissible that the authorities professionally degrade
people of different political views. Sacking people with
different political views is a practice linked to the darkest
experiences of terror against people in the 20th century.
However, speaking of violence, it is not manifested only
through sacking and professional and human degradation at
workplace, but it is manifested as violent physical removal of
people from executive positions to which they were
appointed by Governments, assemblies, or where they were
elected by managing boards; the property of people of
different political views is seized as well as that of parties
and lastly, this also included physical violence towards
people who hold different political views.
At first glance it may look unnecessary, but it is essentially
necessary to emphasize that the Socialist Party throughout
all these ten long and difficult years fraught with all the evils
in this world, hovering above our small country and small
people, managed to preserve not only the country, and
ensure a relatively decent life for its citizens, but also
managed to ensure the functioning of all institutions on
which the State relies, guaranteeing citizens personal and
property security. Today, the functioning of these institutions
is threatened. They are in the hands of the forces that do not
recognize the Constitution, laws and often not even
elementary moral norms. Hundreds of directors, university
deans, rectors, directors of hospitals, presidents of managing
boards are thrown out from their offices and sacked from
their positions to which they were appointed by assemblies
and governments, under the threat of various groups or
sufficiently angry people in the face of which legally elected
or legally appointed people had to give way - to take a sick
leave, without being sick, early retirement, or to take a
holiday they do not need or even become really sick... Most
of these people are prominent experts, honorable citizens,
often with long professional and life experience.
Committed to the democratic functioning of the State and
democratic society, the Socialist Party of Serbia not only
expresses it deep concern for the fate of its beliefs, but
expresses its most profound concern for the respect of
fundamental human and civil rights in conditions when such
rights are not protected by the competent institutions, but
unidentified force will do all it can to suspend those
institutions.
As at the Fourth Congress, the Socialist Party of Serbia
remains committed to a multi-party system and free
expression of different political views. Moreover, the SPS has
initiated the introduction of a multi-party system in Serbia. In
that sense, SPS shall oppose the practice that at the current
moment threatens to start its unusual, awkward life - to ban
and discriminate against the political parties that are
opposition just for being opposition. In all its documents,
particularly from the Fourth Congress, SPS
emphasized the need for a free, true and responsible
management of the media. The Socialist Party of Serbia
waged a long-term war with the media financed from abroad,
whose task was to misinform the citizens of Serbia and
Yugoslavia, to demoralize them, to discredit them and falsely
accuse all for whom they assess are not sufficiently loyal to
the interests outside Yugoslavia to limit the country's
sovereignty. Consistently committed to such position until
the present day, the Socialist Party of Serbia has to express
its deepest concern with the fate of the society in which the
media exclude different opinions and advocate only one
opinion. Even if that one and only opinion were an expression
of an absolute domination of a political party in the
Assembly, the media which care about the principles of truth,
freedom and responsibility, should not deprive their public of
different opinions, even if they belonged to small parties,
non-parliamentary parties or even individual political and
intellectual views of the realities and future developments.
So, when I said that one of the most important tasks of our
party at the present time was to establish its identity, I
thought, let me repeat, that SPS should remain committed to
all those values its has been committed to since its very
inception, throughout this turbulent decade - freedom,
independence, economic prosperity, free cultural
development, constant improvement of standards,
integration with the rest of the world, cooperation on an
equal footing with all nations and peoples. SPS should also
remain committed to the vision of the development of society
advanced at the Fourth Congress. In addition, it should add
to its identity an obligation of critical evaluation of the
reality, in an analytical, principled, public and argumented
manner, the reality that is contrary to, today even absolutely
contrary to the commitments of SPS and the documents from
the party's Fourth Congress.
The second task of the SPS in the present circumstances is
not only the preservation of the party network, but expansion
of its structure and of course, an accurate evaluation of its
membership. After the announcement of election results, as
well as after setting up majority in the Assembly contrary to
pre-election campaign promises, after setting up the Federal
Government with one leftist party and one coalition of 18
political groupings of different political affiliations, the
membership of the Socialist Party of Serbia reacted painfully,
and there was even some commotion, justified confusion,
disappointment ... This is all a normal reaction from political
and human aspect. I think that the initial thrust of such
reactions is over and that the membership in all local and
municipal organizations for most part gathered around their
program and their obligations under the program, preparing
themselves for the republican elections scheduled a year
ahead causing justified surprise of its membership and
probably justified discontent of the membership. Of course,
now that the elections were called, the SPS has to prepare
for them. In conditions of the media blockade this will be
difficult. However, even if there were no elections, our party
has a second great and important obligation - to consolidate
the membership and activate and expand the network with a
view to presenting the reality as it is and for the umpteenth
time in a new and old and any way, say where the reality is
leading the society and the citizens. If it is not to be
changed.
As for its membership, some its members are
leaving the party, in the first place from
the
leadership ranks. We should not of course,
mourn them. It is now obvious that they
joined
the party because it was in power and that they stayed there
while it was in power. For the first time when it is not, they
are leaving. If only they were to do so quietly, as profiteering
cowards... However, they are leaving it with a lot of noise,
demonstrating that their departure from the party in whose
leadership they were is also a departure from the policies to
which they paid lip service until a month ago and it is still
ringing in the ears of those who listened them on dozens of
TV and radio stations. But not only words. They advocated
the policies with which they now part with in deeds as well,
before the very eyes of all SPS members and all citizens,
because they did not take place three decades ago but three
months ago. In turbulently parting ways with our party they
are just buying a ticket for a new midst where they expect
some profit, first of all material, then in terms of status and
privileges and perhaps protection of assets they illegally and
unlawfully seized.
The current analysis of political situation in the country will
not be faced with a difficult task if they should seek to
identify the radical changes that the political elite in this
country has gone through in this country. A decade ago, it
was not the easiest job to find documents indicating who
was a member of the Crown Council from 1992 and
euphorically wrote on socialist self-management as a
necessary outcome in 1976. Such research efforts should
now be very easy to undertake. In the course of one autumn
alone, the same persons spoke volumes of the resistance to
NATO aggression, while only a few days after the coup they
supported European social-democracy whose governments,
as is well-known, took part in NATO aggression. Not to
mention those fierce national freedom-fighters of the Serbian
people from early 1990s who now renounce their
participation in that struggle, claiming that this national story
is overtaken and now they see themselves as citizens of
Europe.
Difficult times exist, among other things, so that a man may
prove his worth - whether in difficult times he will remain with
those with whom he was when the going was good or will
they now join others so that they may again have a good and
prosperous time. In politics, the same as in life, there are
people who are ready to always move to places where it is
nice and sunny, particularly where the authorities are. But in
life, the same as in politics, there are others who see that
and should speak about that, not on account of those who
move towards the authorities but for the authorities
themselves. Because all authorities wishing well to its
people, have to beware of the candidates who want to be
peoples representatives, who present themselves as
candidates for any authorities, those who are essentially
interested only in representing themselves.
I am appealing the delegates of this Congress, to all
members of SPS, to all those that can hear or read my words:
the interest of our country is to be free, independent,
developed and integrated with the rest of the world. The
interest of our citizens is to live in peace and freedom, not
fearing for their life and property, so that all of them can work
and live well and better from their work, to respect their
history and have a better future.
The Socialist Party of Serbia has a task - to protect,
represent and realize such interests of the country and its
people.
It is therefore not important how big it will be but what it will
look like. The greatest party is the best party.
The Socialist Party of Serbia used to be that for ten years,
may it continue to be like that in the future.
Copyright © 1997-2000SPS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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