Informazione
RICHIESTA DI AZIONE URGENTE
75 UOMINI + 24 DONNE = 99 PERSONE STANNO MORENDO!!!!!
Oggi, 28 Novembre 2000, e' il 40esimo giorno di sciopero della fame dei
prigionieri politici in Turchia. Invitiamo tutte le persone impegnate a
sostegno dei diritti dei prigionieri poltici a manifestare il loro
supporto
in questa fase critica della lotta. In Europa, il sostegno al Death Fast
sta
entrando nel suo 30esimo giorno di sciopero della fame. Anche i
militanti
che stanno sostendendo la battaglia dei prigionieri rivoluzionari in
Turchia
stanno conducendo oggi il loro 21esimo giorno di sciopero della fame.
La richiesta dei prigionieri di non entrare nelle celle d'isolamento e'
una
richiesta che dovrebbe essere raccolta da tutte le persone progressiste
e
democratiche.
La politica repressiva contro i prigionieri politici in Turchia si
manifesta
attraverso massacri e torture. Mentre le persone di questa terra
soffrono la
fame, il governo spende milioni di dollari nella costruzione di unita'
di
isolamento. Il loro obbiettivo e' di distruggere i prigionieri politici
e di
trasformare le prigioni in centri di tortura.
La resistenza dei prigionieri e' la speranza delle persone; i
prigionieri
non abbandoneranno mai la loro militanza e il loro amore per il popolo.
Cosa potete fare in questo momento? Come potete dimostrare il vostro
sostegno?
I prigionieri necessitano di vitamina B1. Se ognuno ne potesse inviare
200mg
sarebbe un aiuto veramente prezioso. Sarebbe altresi' importante che
giungessero in Turchia delegazioni per seguire il proseguio della lotta
e
per vedere le famiglie dei familiari.
E' fondamentale che le persone inviino messaggi di protesta alle
autorita'
turche e messaggi di solidarieta' ai prigionieri e alle loro famiglie.
Ovunque siate nel mondo, e' un diritto e un dovere resistere
all'oppressione. Ovunque siate nel mondo, e' un vostro dovere sostenere
chi
lotta e resiste.
Noi crediamo fortemente che tutte le dimostrazioni di solidarieta' che
si
agiranno sul piano europeo possano salvare molte vite oggi in pericolo
nelle
prigioni turche.
Inviate messaggi di protesta a:
PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE: Tel: 0090 312 417 04 76 Fax: 0090 312 434 21
10
JUSTICE MINISTER : Fax: 0090 312 414 62 57
INTERIOR MINISTER: Tel: 0090 312 425 40 80 Fax: 0090 312 418 76
96
Inviate messaggi di solidarieta' a: Tel: 0044 20 72541266 Fax: 0044
20
79232095
E-Mail: ikm_london@...
75 UOMINI + 24 DONNE = 99 PERSONE STANNO MORENDO!!!!!
AGIAMO SUBITO!
---
Oggetto:
DHKC Statement: 132 (Death Fast)
Data:
Tue, 28 Nov 2000 20:53:10 -0000
Da:
"dhkcbureau" <dhkcbureau@...>
A:
<Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
Date: November 25, 2000 Statement: 132
OUR APPEAL TO THE WORLD
Our appeal is to all forces and institutions in the world which are on
the
side of human rights, the law and justice and against fascism.
Resistance is continuing in the prisons of Turkey.
This resistance started on October 20 when nearly 1,000 prisoners
submitted
their bodies to hunger. And on November 19, 99 prisoners continued with
a
DEATH FAST.
The resistance in the prisons of Turkey expects your support. The
resistance
expects the support of all the peoples of the world, revolutionary,
democratic and progressive institutions and human rights organisations.
The resistance is appealing to all the peoples of the world to join its
resistance to fascism. In the name of those who are resisting and
marching
towards death, we seek to send this appeal to the entire world.
On November 19, that is, on the 30th day, the action was turned into a
DEATH
FAST, and today is the 37th DAY! Now, 99 revolutionary prisoners are on
the
DEATH FAST.
75 male captives and 24 women prisoners are marching towards death.
WHAT DO THE REVOLUTIONARY PRISONERS WANT?
WHY DID THEY GO ON THE DEATH FAST?
Let us briefly summarise their demands:
1 - They want the immediate closure of the "special" prisons, called the
'F'
Type prisons, created from isolation cells, designed to deprive
prisoners of
their revolutionary personality and to more conveniently inflict torture
and
death upon them. These prisons are meant to isolate all inmates and are
in
fact torture centres patented in the USA.
2 - They want the immediate abolition of Law No. 3713, called the
Anti-Terror Law, a law designed to obstruct every form of struggle by
the
people and every attempt by them to organise themselves. This is the
sort of
law which means that trade unionists and workers can be branded
"terrorists"
, and those who say hello to a revolutionary can be thrown in prison for
"aiding terrorism". This is the sort of law which has given legal
underpinning to the murder of thousands of people over the past decade.
This
law is the law of the torturers and the death squads.
3 - They want the abolition of the courts known as the State Security
Courts
which legitimise illegality and protect torturers and mafia members,
while
at the same illegally and without proof sentencing revolutionaries to
death
or decades in prison.
4 - They want those responsible for murdering three prisoners in Buca
Prison
(1995), four prisoners in Umraniye (1996), 10 prisoners in Diyarbakir
(1996)
and 10 prisoners in Ulucanlar (1999) to be brought to judgement, along
with
those who tortured prisoners in the course of operations carried out at
various dates. In short, they want justice, democracy and humane living
conditions in their country.
In Turkey, for the sake of these demands, 99 prisoners are marching
towards
death. 37 days have passed in which they have paid the price of hunger.
There is a strong possibility that they will begin to die after 50 days
have
elapsed. From the 60th day onward, each day will be a "day of death".
This is our appeal to the world: prevent their deaths!
Support this just and honourable resistance!
THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE TO THE PRO-AMERICAN FASCIST AUTHORITIES
In Turkey, in the prisons and in every area we are conducting a grim
struggle for democracy against the authorities, who are fascists backed
by
the USA. The decision to throw political prisoners and convicts into the
cells was not taken by the Justice Ministry nor by the prison
administrations, it was taken by the MGK (National Security Council).
And in
our country the MGK is the means whereby the army expresses its
dominance.
The racist and fascist party the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party - "Grey
Wolves") has taken its place in the pro-American government, and to
implement MGK decisions has unleashed one massacre and provocation in
the
prisons after another. It is continuing to do so.
On September 26, 1999, 10 prisoners were slaughtered at Ulucanlar for
refusing to accept the cell-type prisons. To legitimise throwing
prisoners
into the 'F' Type prisons, mafiosi in the jails were encouraged to start
rebellions. In every incident it was the revolutionary prisoners who
paid
the price.
The prisoners in the resistance are waging a democratic struggle against
a
fascist government.
To all individuals and institutions on the side of democracy, freedom,
human
rights and justice, all revolutionary, democratic and progressive
organisations!
THERE ARE MANY THINGS YOU CAN DO.
All institutions and organisations in your countries can organise
demonstrations and solidarity hunger strikes. Faxes, e-mails and letters
can
be sent to the Justice Ministry of Turkey and other relevant
institutions.
(At the end of our statement details of institutions are given.)
Internet sites of organisations and institutions can be used to make the
resistance more widely known and increase support for it.
The prisoners in the resistance expect your solidarity.
DO NOT WAIT FOR THEIR DEATHS!
Support this struggle against fascism and for justice and freedom!
Choose
ways convenient to you of protesting against the consulates of Turkey
which
exist in your countries. Support the hunger strikes and demonstrations
taking place in Europe. Our supporters in a number of European countries
are
continuing, through various associations and mass organisations, to plan
and
carry out hunger strikes, demonstrations and marches. Among them too are
people who have gone on the Death Fast. Our supporters in the prisons of
Europe are also on hunger strike. Unite your own strength with theirs.
HUNDREDS ARE PREPARED TO JOIN THE DEATH FAST!
The resistance of the revolutionary prisoners is a heroic resistance, a
matter of honour for all revolutionaries and progressives. At the
moment, in
17 prisons in our country about 900 revolutionary prisoners are on
hunger
strike. In 13 prisons, 99 prisoners have started the DEATH FAST.
The breakdown of the prisoners and convicts on the Death Fast according
to
the court proceedings opened against them (note: for alleged membership
of a
particular "illegal organisation") is as follows:
63 - DHKP-C: Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front
30 - TKP(ML): Communist Party of Turkey (Marxist-Leninist)
6 - TKIP: Communist Workers' Party of Turkey
75 of the Death Fasters are men and 24 are women.
They are marching towards death. The figures we have given are for the
FIRST
TEAM OF DEATH FASTERS.
Hundreds of revolutionary prisoners have volunteered for the Death Fast
and
are applying to
their organisations to take part.
According to the action programme of the revolutionary prisoners, SECOND
and
THIRD DEATH FAST TEAMS and yet further ones will start.
The decision taken by our comrades in the prisons is very clear:
"WE WILL DIE BUT WE WILL NOT GO INTO THE ISOLATION CELLS!"
THEY WILL WIN OR THEY WILL DIE!
The resisters are marching to their deaths for their political identity
and
their honour. To help them win we must mobilise our own strength.
Do not wait for their deaths!
It is obvious what will happen if their demands are not accepted. The
determination of the prisoners is beyond question.
They are part of a tradition of "doing what they say and defending what
they
do". In 1984, to stop the introduction of prison uniforms, they lay down
to
die and did die. Four revolutionary prisoners were martyred. In 1996,
when
the introduction of cell-type prisons was again brought on the agenda,
thousands of prisoners and convicts started resistance and 12
revolutionary
prisoners were martyred, creating a legend of heroism. In the event that
today's demands are not accepted, they will give new martyrs but again
they
will win!
The victory of the resistance will be the victory of justice and of
everyone
who defends freedom, the victory of all the revolutionaries,
progressives,
democrats, defenders of human rights and all the world's peoples.
THIS IS OUR APPEAL
Let us get moving and be able to win victory without giving dozens of
martyrs!
ALL FORCES WHICH ARE AGAINST FASCISM AND IMPERIALISM
This is an appeal by the DHKP-C to the entire world.
99 prisoners are marching towards death. and hundreds more are following
in
the footsteps of their great heroism.
Members of prisoners' families who are not themselves in jail have also
lain
down to die and joined the Death Fast.
Turkey is a country where a great price is paid to continue the
revolutionary struggle.
We have been paying this price for years. But we have not abandoned the
defence of democracy, justice, freedom, revolution and socialism, not
even
for a moment.
Again we are part of a great resistance to fascism in Turkey. We are
resisting fascism for the sake of democracy.
99 PRISONERS ARE MARCHING TOWARDS DEATH.
This great heroism, this great self-sacrifice, this great and deep
belief,
increases the burden borne by the consciences, morality and political
responsibility of all who describe themselves as human beings.
We appeal to all those who believe in justice and freedom to take up
their
responsibilities!
In the prisons of Turkey we are adding new pages to the pages recounting
the
honourable and heroic resistance of the world's peoples to fascism. We
are
writing history.
Once again we announce with all the strength of our belief and our
resolution:
THOSE WHO RESIST WILL WIN!
DEVRIMCI HALK KURTULUS CEPHESI
(REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT)
1 - From their Internet sites, the DHKC Bureaus of Belgium, Holland and
England are capable of informing you day by day of developments,
actions,
the health situation of the prisoners, and through the statements issued
by
our Party-Front. These sites can also be used to contact us and send
messages and questions. Messages will immediately be examined.
The addresses of our DHKC Bureaus
DHKC Bureau, Belgium
E-mail addresses:
DHKC - dhkc@...
DHKC - dhkc.bruxelles@...
DEATH FAST - deathfast@...
Internet site - www.dhkc.org
Telephone and fax numbers:
Tel: 0032 2 2802228
Tel/Fax: 0032 2 2300866
Fax: 0032 2 2802229
Address:
Rue Belliard 197
bte 8
1040 Bruxelles
DHKC Bureau, England
E-mails:
dhkc - dhkcbureau@...
dhkc - dhkc@...
Telephone and fax numbers:
Telephone: 0044 207 254 1266
Fax: 0044 207 923 2095
Telephone: 0044 207 254 1288
Address:
BM Box 8253
London WC1N 3XX.
Amsterdam, Holland
Press Agency Ozgurluk - ozgurluk@...
Internet site: www.ozgurluk.org
Telephone and fax numbers
tel/fax 0031 20 676 1745
Address:
Dusartstraat 38
1072 HT Amsterdam
2 - Also, in connection with the resistance, there is the Internet site
of
the prisoners' families in Turkey (TAYAD) as well as the IKM site in
Europe
(Committee For Struggle Against Torture Through Isolation), and
information
can also be obtained from these.
(TAYAD) hucreiskencedir.cjb.net
IKM in Turkish - www.hucreiskencedir.de
IKM in English - http://www.noisolation.de
www.ozgurluk.org
3 - To support the resistance and protest against fascism in Turkey's
'F'
Type prison policy, faxes can be sent to the following institutions:
Republic of Turkey Prime Minister's Office: Tel 0090 312 417 0476, Fax
0090
312 434 2110
Republic of Turkey Justice Ministry: Fax :0090 312 414 6257
Republic of Turkey Interior Ministry: Tel: 0090 312 425 4080, Fax: 0090
312
418 7696
---
----- Original Message -----
From: "DHKC" <dhkc@...>
>
> TO ALL EUROPEANS,
> TORTURE IS BEING BROUGHT TO EUROPE
> TORTURERS, RAPISTS AND MURDERERS ARE COMING TO EUROPE
>
> The Hunger Strike, which was begun on October 20, 2000 in Turkey's
> prisons, was converted into a Death Fast on November 19. The demands
> are: The closure of the 'F' Type cell prisons. Law 3713 with all its
> consequences must be abolished. The Tripartite Protocol must be
> abolished. The State Security Courts and all the consequences flowing
> from them must be abolished. At regular intervals, the prisons must be
> supervised by delegations of lawyers, doctors, prisoners' families,
> representatives of relevant non-governmental organisations and the
> Association of Judicial Personnel. Those responsible for the massacre
> and torture of our friends in Buca, Umraniye, Diyarbakir, Ulucanlar,
> Burdur prisons must be swiftly indicted and punished. Our friends who
> are suffering from various ailments or from the Death Fast or were
> wounded in operations in the prisons and have had no medical treatment
> are to be released. Those who tortured our sons and daughters when
they
> were detained are to be put on trial in a manner accessible to public
> opinion. All anti-democratic laws which impede the struggle for
people's
> democracy and freedom must be abolished, there must be an end to the
> oppression of the Kurdish nation and other national minorities. Where
> the integration phase of Turkey with Europe is concerned, this also
> means carrying the inhuman conditions in the prisons, which created
the
> basis for the Death Fast, to Europe. The European Union which tries to
> include Turkey, also imports inhuman practices into Europe. The
> institutions, political parties, governments, states and peoples of
> Europe should know this fact.
>
> HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY ARE SYSTEMATICALLY VIOLATED
> Police stations in Turkey are torture centres. The police HQs,
military
> garrisons, secret buildings of Turkish national intelligence are
torture
> centres. Up to the present, hundreds of thousands of our people have
> been tortured in these centres. Thousands of women and men were raped.
> Thousands of our people were massacred. Several European institutions
> are aware of at least the majority of these cases of torture and
> massacre. Because of these cases of torture, the European Court of
Human
> Rights (ECHR) has condemned Turkey on many occasions. Today, that is,
in
> the year 2000, nothing has changed. That same Turkey, without any
> change, has become part of the EU. Europe, which condemned Turkey in
the
> past because of its criminal activities against humanity, is ignoring
> the crimes of Turkey now and is becoming an accomplice of Turkey. The
> prisons of Turkey are the massacre centres. Besides the systematic
> violations of the captives' rights, these are the places where torture
> and mass murder takes place. Never mind protecting rights, lives are
in
> danger in the prisons. On September 21, 1995 in Buca Prison, three
> political prisoners were beaten to death; on January 6, 1996 in
Umraniye
> Prison, four political prisoners were beaten to death; on September
24,
> 1996 in Diyarbakir Prison, ten political prisoners were beaten to
death;
> on September 26, 1999 in Ulucanlar Prison, ten political prisoners
were
> killed by torture and gunshots. Also, hundreds of political prisoners
> were left handicapped after the operations by the security forces.
> Dozens of prisoners have died of illnesses because of ill treatment in
> the prisons. Thousands of prisoners have serious medical problems in
> these torture centres which are called prisons. Today, that is, in the
> year 2000, nothing has changed. On top of all these, they are trying
to
> change the existing ward-type prisons into cell-type prisons. The
> prisoners' lives were already at risk when they were living together
in
> wards. By putting them into individual cells the authorities are
trying
> to take away all possibility of them defending themselves. Turkey
wants
> more freedom to kill in prisons. Europe knows all these things. All
the
> European states, politicians and law practitioners know these facts
very
> well. To embrace Turkey while knowing all these things means being an
> accomplice in all these inhuman practices in prisons. The streets of
> Turkey are places where those who defend their rights are
> beaten and killed. Whether permitted or not, all democratic activities
> are subject to police
> attack. Young or old, men or women, children or adults. all those who
> take part in demonstrations are subjected to the attacks of the
security
> forces. It is free to beat and kill the workers, civil servants,
women,
> youth, students, pensioners and all sections of the people who are
using
> their
> constitutional right - participating in demonstrations - to defend
their
> rights. There is no permission to use existing rights of participating
> in unions and other legal rights. Today, that is, in the year 2000,
> nothing has changed. Europe knows these things very well. There is no
> need to enumerate the violations one by one. These are "ordinary"
things
> we come across on the streets. It will be enough
> to watch any of the television news. Our fathers, mothers and young
> girls are dragged on the streets and our people are subjected to
savage
> attacks. The Europe which welcomes Turkey will also carry this reality
> onto its own streets. In Turkey there is no freedom of thought and
> freedom of taking part in organisations.
> Laws in Turkey regulate the ban on thoughts. Opposing massacres,
> torture, violations of human rights and tyranny in Turkey, defending a
> dignified life and democratic liberties and propagating these thoughts
> are forbidden. Almost every day many journalists who oppose the
regime
> are detained, tortured and receive decades-long imprisonment.
> Newspapers, magazines, radio
> stations, TV channels are closed and their editors and responsible
> editors are sent to prison. In today's Turkey, if you are a
journalist,
> it is normal to be imprisoned for a time. Besides all this, Turkey is
> known for the highest number of cases of imprisonment and murder of
> journalists. The
> streets of Turkey were the scene of the murder of a 17-year-old
> newspaper distributor.
> Today, that is, in the year of 2000, nothing has changed. Europe knows
> well the censorship and punishment of press. The ECHR has also
condemned
> Turkey for this on several occasions.
> Everyone who defends his or her rights is a "terrorist" in Turkey. His
> or her punishment is torture, murder or imprisonment. In Turkey, those
> who are for a democratic system, those who want an
> independent and free country, those who want a just regime and not
> tyranny are seen as terrorists. They are murdered in the streets, in
> their houses or workplaces, wherever they are. They are tortured,
> detained and held in prisons - under inhuman conditions - for years.
But
> even prisons are not enough. In order to destroy their beliefs, they
try
> to put them in isolation cells. With article 3713, the anti-terror
law,
> the entire country is converted into a prison. Turkey wants to create
a
> decayed and intimidated population that is silent. This is the reason
> for the state terror, oppression, bans, torture and massacres. Europe
is
> well aware of this. The Kurdish people who want their national
identity
> are "terrorists". Even a minimum demand for nationhood is repressed by
> blood and terror. The rest of the world knows the savagery that the
> Kurdish people have faced for
> decades. The bombed and burned villages, torture, massacre, people who
> are forced to eat manure and the young people who are dragged to death
> behind tanks - all these things are the reality of the Kurdish people.
> The European Parliament, The Council of Europe and the ECHR are
> completely
> aware of these things. Up to the present, dozens of reports have been
> written and many times the state in Turkey has been condemned. The
> reality of the state in Turkey being the accused in one third of all
the
> ECHR hearings is proof of this. That is, Turkey being the country most
> on
> trial by European bodies on grounds of human rights violations is
enough
> to make everything understandable. In addition to these the annual
> reports of Amnesty International have shown clearly what we have tried
> to describe above.
> The European people must oppose the decision of the European
governments
> to accept Turkey into the EU just because of their economic interests.
> The European people know fascism. The recent past of Europe is still
> remembered. Today's policy on Turkey, which means to bring fascism
back
> to Europe, must be abandoned. Whether or not they are Liberal,
> Socialist, Green and Christian Democrat, all the European political
> parties and politicians from different tendencies will be accomplices
of
> fascism in Turkey by bringing Turkey to Europe. This means
re-importing
> fascism. This means bringing torture, massacres, "disappearances" in
> detention, burning villages. to
> Europe. This must be stopped immediately. The continuing Death Fast
> resistance in Turkey's prisons against the F-type isolation cells is
> bringing the reality of Turkey where all basic human rights are
> violated, onto the agenda again. The Death Fast resisters are
abandoning
> the most valuable things of human beings; their lives, loved ones and
> hopes for a dignified life. For thousands of years, mankind has
created
> numerous examples of heroism for the sake of a dignified life. Today
> this example is the Death Fast resisters. It is a duty of humanity to
> support them and not permit new deaths.
>
> IT IS IN OUR HANDS TO PREVENT DEATHS, TAKE THE DEMANDS OF THE DEATH
FAST
> RESISTERS AS YOUR OWN.
> PS: The following list is the list of volunteers who are currently
alive
> with their hopes, ideals, emotions and beliefs. They will leave us if
we
> react too late.
>
> ÜMRANÝYE PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: AHMET ÝBÝLÝ, AHMET ÖZDEMÝR, ERGÜL ACER, YILDIZ
GEMÝCÝOÐLU,
> ZEHRA KURTAY, ÜMÜÞ ÞAHÝNGÖZ, ZEYNEP ARIKAN, GÜLAY KAVAK, MEHMET
ZÝNCÝR,
> MUHARREM GENÇ, VELÝ GÜNEÞ, HASAN PINAR, ALÝ ÞANLI, ALÝ RIZA DEMÝR,
OSMAN
> OSMANAÐAOÐLU, TKP(ML) Trial: DURMUÞ KURT, MEHMET KEREM, CEM YILDIZ,
> ÖZGÜR AYRILMAZ, YAÞAR YAÐAN TKÝP Trial: SERVET PAKSOY
>
> ÇANKIRI PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: HASAN GÜNGÖRMEZ, ÝRFAN ORTAKÇI, CÝHAN ÞEKER, TEMEL
> ÇAÐIRTEKÝN, ÖZGÜR SONER TKÝP Trial: MUHARREM KURÞUN
>
> BURSA PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: ERDAL ARIKAN, MURAT ÖZDEMÝR, MESUT ÖRS
> TKP(ML) Trial: ORHAN BUDAK, A. ÝHSAN ÖZKAN, ERDAL ÇETÝNKAYA, ALÝ
KÖÇMEN,
> ADÝL KAPLAN, ÖZGÜR KOÇAK, YUSUF KARACA
>
> AYDIN PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: SÝNAN EREN, SUAT KARABULUT, BURHAN GARDAÞ
> ÇANAKKALE PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: FÝDAN KALÞEN, AYÞE BAÞTÝMUR, SEMRA ASKERÝ, FATMA ERSOY,
> AYÞE EREN, NAZAN YILMAZ, KEMAL ALTINGÜL, TUNCAY BERBER, MUHARREM
GÜZEL,
> DAÝMÝ ATEÞ.
> TKP(ML) Trial: BERNA ÜNSAL
>
> MALATYA PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: ESMA ARSLANBOÐAN, Þ. MURAT ÖZTEN
> TKP(ML) Trial: HAKKI ALPHAN, MAHMUT METE, ALI EKBER DOÐAN, HAVVA DOÐAN
>
> BARTIN PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: MUSTAFA ERKAN ÇETÝN, AHMET YILMAZ, HAMÝT SÜREN, ALÝ
ÇOLAK,
> CENGÝZ SOYDAÞ
> TKP(ML) Trial: C. TAYYAR BEKTAÞ, ÖZGÜR SALTIK
> TKÝP Trial: RESUL AYAZ
>
> GEBZE PRISON:
> TKP(ML) Trial: A. MUSA AYDIN, NEBAHAT POLAT, YADÝGAR BAYAR, ALÝ RIZA
> DERMANLI, ÇETÝN CAN.
> TKÝP Trial: DÜZGÜN ZENGÝN
>
>
> UÞAK PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: SEVGÝ ERDOÐAN, BERRÝN BIÇKILAR, VÝCDAN ÞAHÝN.
> TKP(ML) Trial: GÖNÜL ASLAN.
>
> BUCA PRISX-Mozilla-Status: 0009ESUT AVCI, ABDULLAH BOZDAÐ, SERHAT
KARADUMANLI.
> TKP(ML) Trial: CELAL ALPAY
> ULUCANLAR PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: FATMA HÜLYA TÜMGAN
> TKÝP Trial: HATÝCE YÜREKLÝ
>
> BAYRAMPAÞA PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: GÜLSEREN ÖZTÜRK, SUNA ÖKMEN, AYLA ÖZCAN, FIRAT TAVUK,
AÞUR
> KORKMAZ, ALÝ ATEÞ, RECEP CÝNGÝTAÞ, AYHAN KOÇ, ÝSMET ÜNVER, KADÝR KAYA.
> TKP(ML) Trial: MURAT TARGAY, HÜSEYÝN ASLAN, ÖKKEÞ KARAOÐLU.
>
> CEYHAN PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: HALÝL ÖNDER, MEHMET KAN, MURAT KIRSAY
>
> REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT
> (DHKC), BELGIUM
---
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75 UOMINI + 24 DONNE = 99 PERSONE STANNO MORENDO!!!!!
Oggi, 28 Novembre 2000, e' il 40esimo giorno di sciopero della fame dei
prigionieri politici in Turchia. Invitiamo tutte le persone impegnate a
sostegno dei diritti dei prigionieri poltici a manifestare il loro
supporto
in questa fase critica della lotta. In Europa, il sostegno al Death Fast
sta
entrando nel suo 30esimo giorno di sciopero della fame. Anche i
militanti
che stanno sostendendo la battaglia dei prigionieri rivoluzionari in
Turchia
stanno conducendo oggi il loro 21esimo giorno di sciopero della fame.
La richiesta dei prigionieri di non entrare nelle celle d'isolamento e'
una
richiesta che dovrebbe essere raccolta da tutte le persone progressiste
e
democratiche.
La politica repressiva contro i prigionieri politici in Turchia si
manifesta
attraverso massacri e torture. Mentre le persone di questa terra
soffrono la
fame, il governo spende milioni di dollari nella costruzione di unita'
di
isolamento. Il loro obbiettivo e' di distruggere i prigionieri politici
e di
trasformare le prigioni in centri di tortura.
La resistenza dei prigionieri e' la speranza delle persone; i
prigionieri
non abbandoneranno mai la loro militanza e il loro amore per il popolo.
Cosa potete fare in questo momento? Come potete dimostrare il vostro
sostegno?
I prigionieri necessitano di vitamina B1. Se ognuno ne potesse inviare
200mg
sarebbe un aiuto veramente prezioso. Sarebbe altresi' importante che
giungessero in Turchia delegazioni per seguire il proseguio della lotta
e
per vedere le famiglie dei familiari.
E' fondamentale che le persone inviino messaggi di protesta alle
autorita'
turche e messaggi di solidarieta' ai prigionieri e alle loro famiglie.
Ovunque siate nel mondo, e' un diritto e un dovere resistere
all'oppressione. Ovunque siate nel mondo, e' un vostro dovere sostenere
chi
lotta e resiste.
Noi crediamo fortemente che tutte le dimostrazioni di solidarieta' che
si
agiranno sul piano europeo possano salvare molte vite oggi in pericolo
nelle
prigioni turche.
Inviate messaggi di protesta a:
PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE: Tel: 0090 312 417 04 76 Fax: 0090 312 434 21
10
JUSTICE MINISTER : Fax: 0090 312 414 62 57
INTERIOR MINISTER: Tel: 0090 312 425 40 80 Fax: 0090 312 418 76
96
Inviate messaggi di solidarieta' a: Tel: 0044 20 72541266 Fax: 0044
20
79232095
E-Mail: ikm_london@...
75 UOMINI + 24 DONNE = 99 PERSONE STANNO MORENDO!!!!!
AGIAMO SUBITO!
---
Oggetto:
DHKC Statement: 132 (Death Fast)
Data:
Tue, 28 Nov 2000 20:53:10 -0000
Da:
"dhkcbureau" <dhkcbureau@...>
A:
<Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
Date: November 25, 2000 Statement: 132
OUR APPEAL TO THE WORLD
Our appeal is to all forces and institutions in the world which are on
the
side of human rights, the law and justice and against fascism.
Resistance is continuing in the prisons of Turkey.
This resistance started on October 20 when nearly 1,000 prisoners
submitted
their bodies to hunger. And on November 19, 99 prisoners continued with
a
DEATH FAST.
The resistance in the prisons of Turkey expects your support. The
resistance
expects the support of all the peoples of the world, revolutionary,
democratic and progressive institutions and human rights organisations.
The resistance is appealing to all the peoples of the world to join its
resistance to fascism. In the name of those who are resisting and
marching
towards death, we seek to send this appeal to the entire world.
On November 19, that is, on the 30th day, the action was turned into a
DEATH
FAST, and today is the 37th DAY! Now, 99 revolutionary prisoners are on
the
DEATH FAST.
75 male captives and 24 women prisoners are marching towards death.
WHAT DO THE REVOLUTIONARY PRISONERS WANT?
WHY DID THEY GO ON THE DEATH FAST?
Let us briefly summarise their demands:
1 - They want the immediate closure of the "special" prisons, called the
'F'
Type prisons, created from isolation cells, designed to deprive
prisoners of
their revolutionary personality and to more conveniently inflict torture
and
death upon them. These prisons are meant to isolate all inmates and are
in
fact torture centres patented in the USA.
2 - They want the immediate abolition of Law No. 3713, called the
Anti-Terror Law, a law designed to obstruct every form of struggle by
the
people and every attempt by them to organise themselves. This is the
sort of
law which means that trade unionists and workers can be branded
"terrorists"
, and those who say hello to a revolutionary can be thrown in prison for
"aiding terrorism". This is the sort of law which has given legal
underpinning to the murder of thousands of people over the past decade.
This
law is the law of the torturers and the death squads.
3 - They want the abolition of the courts known as the State Security
Courts
which legitimise illegality and protect torturers and mafia members,
while
at the same illegally and without proof sentencing revolutionaries to
death
or decades in prison.
4 - They want those responsible for murdering three prisoners in Buca
Prison
(1995), four prisoners in Umraniye (1996), 10 prisoners in Diyarbakir
(1996)
and 10 prisoners in Ulucanlar (1999) to be brought to judgement, along
with
those who tortured prisoners in the course of operations carried out at
various dates. In short, they want justice, democracy and humane living
conditions in their country.
In Turkey, for the sake of these demands, 99 prisoners are marching
towards
death. 37 days have passed in which they have paid the price of hunger.
There is a strong possibility that they will begin to die after 50 days
have
elapsed. From the 60th day onward, each day will be a "day of death".
This is our appeal to the world: prevent their deaths!
Support this just and honourable resistance!
THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE TO THE PRO-AMERICAN FASCIST AUTHORITIES
In Turkey, in the prisons and in every area we are conducting a grim
struggle for democracy against the authorities, who are fascists backed
by
the USA. The decision to throw political prisoners and convicts into the
cells was not taken by the Justice Ministry nor by the prison
administrations, it was taken by the MGK (National Security Council).
And in
our country the MGK is the means whereby the army expresses its
dominance.
The racist and fascist party the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party - "Grey
Wolves") has taken its place in the pro-American government, and to
implement MGK decisions has unleashed one massacre and provocation in
the
prisons after another. It is continuing to do so.
On September 26, 1999, 10 prisoners were slaughtered at Ulucanlar for
refusing to accept the cell-type prisons. To legitimise throwing
prisoners
into the 'F' Type prisons, mafiosi in the jails were encouraged to start
rebellions. In every incident it was the revolutionary prisoners who
paid
the price.
The prisoners in the resistance are waging a democratic struggle against
a
fascist government.
To all individuals and institutions on the side of democracy, freedom,
human
rights and justice, all revolutionary, democratic and progressive
organisations!
THERE ARE MANY THINGS YOU CAN DO.
All institutions and organisations in your countries can organise
demonstrations and solidarity hunger strikes. Faxes, e-mails and letters
can
be sent to the Justice Ministry of Turkey and other relevant
institutions.
(At the end of our statement details of institutions are given.)
Internet sites of organisations and institutions can be used to make the
resistance more widely known and increase support for it.
The prisoners in the resistance expect your solidarity.
DO NOT WAIT FOR THEIR DEATHS!
Support this struggle against fascism and for justice and freedom!
Choose
ways convenient to you of protesting against the consulates of Turkey
which
exist in your countries. Support the hunger strikes and demonstrations
taking place in Europe. Our supporters in a number of European countries
are
continuing, through various associations and mass organisations, to plan
and
carry out hunger strikes, demonstrations and marches. Among them too are
people who have gone on the Death Fast. Our supporters in the prisons of
Europe are also on hunger strike. Unite your own strength with theirs.
HUNDREDS ARE PREPARED TO JOIN THE DEATH FAST!
The resistance of the revolutionary prisoners is a heroic resistance, a
matter of honour for all revolutionaries and progressives. At the
moment, in
17 prisons in our country about 900 revolutionary prisoners are on
hunger
strike. In 13 prisons, 99 prisoners have started the DEATH FAST.
The breakdown of the prisoners and convicts on the Death Fast according
to
the court proceedings opened against them (note: for alleged membership
of a
particular "illegal organisation") is as follows:
63 - DHKP-C: Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front
30 - TKP(ML): Communist Party of Turkey (Marxist-Leninist)
6 - TKIP: Communist Workers' Party of Turkey
75 of the Death Fasters are men and 24 are women.
They are marching towards death. The figures we have given are for the
FIRST
TEAM OF DEATH FASTERS.
Hundreds of revolutionary prisoners have volunteered for the Death Fast
and
are applying to
their organisations to take part.
According to the action programme of the revolutionary prisoners, SECOND
and
THIRD DEATH FAST TEAMS and yet further ones will start.
The decision taken by our comrades in the prisons is very clear:
"WE WILL DIE BUT WE WILL NOT GO INTO THE ISOLATION CELLS!"
THEY WILL WIN OR THEY WILL DIE!
The resisters are marching to their deaths for their political identity
and
their honour. To help them win we must mobilise our own strength.
Do not wait for their deaths!
It is obvious what will happen if their demands are not accepted. The
determination of the prisoners is beyond question.
They are part of a tradition of "doing what they say and defending what
they
do". In 1984, to stop the introduction of prison uniforms, they lay down
to
die and did die. Four revolutionary prisoners were martyred. In 1996,
when
the introduction of cell-type prisons was again brought on the agenda,
thousands of prisoners and convicts started resistance and 12
revolutionary
prisoners were martyred, creating a legend of heroism. In the event that
today's demands are not accepted, they will give new martyrs but again
they
will win!
The victory of the resistance will be the victory of justice and of
everyone
who defends freedom, the victory of all the revolutionaries,
progressives,
democrats, defenders of human rights and all the world's peoples.
THIS IS OUR APPEAL
Let us get moving and be able to win victory without giving dozens of
martyrs!
ALL FORCES WHICH ARE AGAINST FASCISM AND IMPERIALISM
This is an appeal by the DHKP-C to the entire world.
99 prisoners are marching towards death. and hundreds more are following
in
the footsteps of their great heroism.
Members of prisoners' families who are not themselves in jail have also
lain
down to die and joined the Death Fast.
Turkey is a country where a great price is paid to continue the
revolutionary struggle.
We have been paying this price for years. But we have not abandoned the
defence of democracy, justice, freedom, revolution and socialism, not
even
for a moment.
Again we are part of a great resistance to fascism in Turkey. We are
resisting fascism for the sake of democracy.
99 PRISONERS ARE MARCHING TOWARDS DEATH.
This great heroism, this great self-sacrifice, this great and deep
belief,
increases the burden borne by the consciences, morality and political
responsibility of all who describe themselves as human beings.
We appeal to all those who believe in justice and freedom to take up
their
responsibilities!
In the prisons of Turkey we are adding new pages to the pages recounting
the
honourable and heroic resistance of the world's peoples to fascism. We
are
writing history.
Once again we announce with all the strength of our belief and our
resolution:
THOSE WHO RESIST WILL WIN!
DEVRIMCI HALK KURTULUS CEPHESI
(REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT)
1 - From their Internet sites, the DHKC Bureaus of Belgium, Holland and
England are capable of informing you day by day of developments,
actions,
the health situation of the prisoners, and through the statements issued
by
our Party-Front. These sites can also be used to contact us and send
messages and questions. Messages will immediately be examined.
The addresses of our DHKC Bureaus
DHKC Bureau, Belgium
E-mail addresses:
DHKC - dhkc@...
DHKC - dhkc.bruxelles@...
DEATH FAST - deathfast@...
Internet site - www.dhkc.org
Telephone and fax numbers:
Tel: 0032 2 2802228
Tel/Fax: 0032 2 2300866
Fax: 0032 2 2802229
Address:
Rue Belliard 197
bte 8
1040 Bruxelles
DHKC Bureau, England
E-mails:
dhkc - dhkcbureau@...
dhkc - dhkc@...
Telephone and fax numbers:
Telephone: 0044 207 254 1266
Fax: 0044 207 923 2095
Telephone: 0044 207 254 1288
Address:
BM Box 8253
London WC1N 3XX.
Amsterdam, Holland
Press Agency Ozgurluk - ozgurluk@...
Internet site: www.ozgurluk.org
Telephone and fax numbers
tel/fax 0031 20 676 1745
Address:
Dusartstraat 38
1072 HT Amsterdam
2 - Also, in connection with the resistance, there is the Internet site
of
the prisoners' families in Turkey (TAYAD) as well as the IKM site in
Europe
(Committee For Struggle Against Torture Through Isolation), and
information
can also be obtained from these.
(TAYAD) hucreiskencedir.cjb.net
IKM in Turkish - www.hucreiskencedir.de
IKM in English - http://www.noisolation.de
www.ozgurluk.org
3 - To support the resistance and protest against fascism in Turkey's
'F'
Type prison policy, faxes can be sent to the following institutions:
Republic of Turkey Prime Minister's Office: Tel 0090 312 417 0476, Fax
0090
312 434 2110
Republic of Turkey Justice Ministry: Fax :0090 312 414 6257
Republic of Turkey Interior Ministry: Tel: 0090 312 425 4080, Fax: 0090
312
418 7696
---
----- Original Message -----
From: "DHKC" <dhkc@...>
>
> TO ALL EUROPEANS,
> TORTURE IS BEING BROUGHT TO EUROPE
> TORTURERS, RAPISTS AND MURDERERS ARE COMING TO EUROPE
>
> The Hunger Strike, which was begun on October 20, 2000 in Turkey's
> prisons, was converted into a Death Fast on November 19. The demands
> are: The closure of the 'F' Type cell prisons. Law 3713 with all its
> consequences must be abolished. The Tripartite Protocol must be
> abolished. The State Security Courts and all the consequences flowing
> from them must be abolished. At regular intervals, the prisons must be
> supervised by delegations of lawyers, doctors, prisoners' families,
> representatives of relevant non-governmental organisations and the
> Association of Judicial Personnel. Those responsible for the massacre
> and torture of our friends in Buca, Umraniye, Diyarbakir, Ulucanlar,
> Burdur prisons must be swiftly indicted and punished. Our friends who
> are suffering from various ailments or from the Death Fast or were
> wounded in operations in the prisons and have had no medical treatment
> are to be released. Those who tortured our sons and daughters when
they
> were detained are to be put on trial in a manner accessible to public
> opinion. All anti-democratic laws which impede the struggle for
people's
> democracy and freedom must be abolished, there must be an end to the
> oppression of the Kurdish nation and other national minorities. Where
> the integration phase of Turkey with Europe is concerned, this also
> means carrying the inhuman conditions in the prisons, which created
the
> basis for the Death Fast, to Europe. The European Union which tries to
> include Turkey, also imports inhuman practices into Europe. The
> institutions, political parties, governments, states and peoples of
> Europe should know this fact.
>
> HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY ARE SYSTEMATICALLY VIOLATED
> Police stations in Turkey are torture centres. The police HQs,
military
> garrisons, secret buildings of Turkish national intelligence are
torture
> centres. Up to the present, hundreds of thousands of our people have
> been tortured in these centres. Thousands of women and men were raped.
> Thousands of our people were massacred. Several European institutions
> are aware of at least the majority of these cases of torture and
> massacre. Because of these cases of torture, the European Court of
Human
> Rights (ECHR) has condemned Turkey on many occasions. Today, that is,
in
> the year 2000, nothing has changed. That same Turkey, without any
> change, has become part of the EU. Europe, which condemned Turkey in
the
> past because of its criminal activities against humanity, is ignoring
> the crimes of Turkey now and is becoming an accomplice of Turkey. The
> prisons of Turkey are the massacre centres. Besides the systematic
> violations of the captives' rights, these are the places where torture
> and mass murder takes place. Never mind protecting rights, lives are
in
> danger in the prisons. On September 21, 1995 in Buca Prison, three
> political prisoners were beaten to death; on January 6, 1996 in
Umraniye
> Prison, four political prisoners were beaten to death; on September
24,
> 1996 in Diyarbakir Prison, ten political prisoners were beaten to
death;
> on September 26, 1999 in Ulucanlar Prison, ten political prisoners
were
> killed by torture and gunshots. Also, hundreds of political prisoners
> were left handicapped after the operations by the security forces.
> Dozens of prisoners have died of illnesses because of ill treatment in
> the prisons. Thousands of prisoners have serious medical problems in
> these torture centres which are called prisons. Today, that is, in the
> year 2000, nothing has changed. On top of all these, they are trying
to
> change the existing ward-type prisons into cell-type prisons. The
> prisoners' lives were already at risk when they were living together
in
> wards. By putting them into individual cells the authorities are
trying
> to take away all possibility of them defending themselves. Turkey
wants
> more freedom to kill in prisons. Europe knows all these things. All
the
> European states, politicians and law practitioners know these facts
very
> well. To embrace Turkey while knowing all these things means being an
> accomplice in all these inhuman practices in prisons. The streets of
> Turkey are places where those who defend their rights are
> beaten and killed. Whether permitted or not, all democratic activities
> are subject to police
> attack. Young or old, men or women, children or adults. all those who
> take part in demonstrations are subjected to the attacks of the
security
> forces. It is free to beat and kill the workers, civil servants,
women,
> youth, students, pensioners and all sections of the people who are
using
> their
> constitutional right - participating in demonstrations - to defend
their
> rights. There is no permission to use existing rights of participating
> in unions and other legal rights. Today, that is, in the year 2000,
> nothing has changed. Europe knows these things very well. There is no
> need to enumerate the violations one by one. These are "ordinary"
things
> we come across on the streets. It will be enough
> to watch any of the television news. Our fathers, mothers and young
> girls are dragged on the streets and our people are subjected to
savage
> attacks. The Europe which welcomes Turkey will also carry this reality
> onto its own streets. In Turkey there is no freedom of thought and
> freedom of taking part in organisations.
> Laws in Turkey regulate the ban on thoughts. Opposing massacres,
> torture, violations of human rights and tyranny in Turkey, defending a
> dignified life and democratic liberties and propagating these thoughts
> are forbidden. Almost every day many journalists who oppose the
regime
> are detained, tortured and receive decades-long imprisonment.
> Newspapers, magazines, radio
> stations, TV channels are closed and their editors and responsible
> editors are sent to prison. In today's Turkey, if you are a
journalist,
> it is normal to be imprisoned for a time. Besides all this, Turkey is
> known for the highest number of cases of imprisonment and murder of
> journalists. The
> streets of Turkey were the scene of the murder of a 17-year-old
> newspaper distributor.
> Today, that is, in the year of 2000, nothing has changed. Europe knows
> well the censorship and punishment of press. The ECHR has also
condemned
> Turkey for this on several occasions.
> Everyone who defends his or her rights is a "terrorist" in Turkey. His
> or her punishment is torture, murder or imprisonment. In Turkey, those
> who are for a democratic system, those who want an
> independent and free country, those who want a just regime and not
> tyranny are seen as terrorists. They are murdered in the streets, in
> their houses or workplaces, wherever they are. They are tortured,
> detained and held in prisons - under inhuman conditions - for years.
But
> even prisons are not enough. In order to destroy their beliefs, they
try
> to put them in isolation cells. With article 3713, the anti-terror
law,
> the entire country is converted into a prison. Turkey wants to create
a
> decayed and intimidated population that is silent. This is the reason
> for the state terror, oppression, bans, torture and massacres. Europe
is
> well aware of this. The Kurdish people who want their national
identity
> are "terrorists". Even a minimum demand for nationhood is repressed by
> blood and terror. The rest of the world knows the savagery that the
> Kurdish people have faced for
> decades. The bombed and burned villages, torture, massacre, people who
> are forced to eat manure and the young people who are dragged to death
> behind tanks - all these things are the reality of the Kurdish people.
> The European Parliament, The Council of Europe and the ECHR are
> completely
> aware of these things. Up to the present, dozens of reports have been
> written and many times the state in Turkey has been condemned. The
> reality of the state in Turkey being the accused in one third of all
the
> ECHR hearings is proof of this. That is, Turkey being the country most
> on
> trial by European bodies on grounds of human rights violations is
enough
> to make everything understandable. In addition to these the annual
> reports of Amnesty International have shown clearly what we have tried
> to describe above.
> The European people must oppose the decision of the European
governments
> to accept Turkey into the EU just because of their economic interests.
> The European people know fascism. The recent past of Europe is still
> remembered. Today's policy on Turkey, which means to bring fascism
back
> to Europe, must be abandoned. Whether or not they are Liberal,
> Socialist, Green and Christian Democrat, all the European political
> parties and politicians from different tendencies will be accomplices
of
> fascism in Turkey by bringing Turkey to Europe. This means
re-importing
> fascism. This means bringing torture, massacres, "disappearances" in
> detention, burning villages. to
> Europe. This must be stopped immediately. The continuing Death Fast
> resistance in Turkey's prisons against the F-type isolation cells is
> bringing the reality of Turkey where all basic human rights are
> violated, onto the agenda again. The Death Fast resisters are
abandoning
> the most valuable things of human beings; their lives, loved ones and
> hopes for a dignified life. For thousands of years, mankind has
created
> numerous examples of heroism for the sake of a dignified life. Today
> this example is the Death Fast resisters. It is a duty of humanity to
> support them and not permit new deaths.
>
> IT IS IN OUR HANDS TO PREVENT DEATHS, TAKE THE DEMANDS OF THE DEATH
FAST
> RESISTERS AS YOUR OWN.
> PS: The following list is the list of volunteers who are currently
alive
> with their hopes, ideals, emotions and beliefs. They will leave us if
we
> react too late.
>
> ÜMRANÝYE PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: AHMET ÝBÝLÝ, AHMET ÖZDEMÝR, ERGÜL ACER, YILDIZ
GEMÝCÝOÐLU,
> ZEHRA KURTAY, ÜMÜÞ ÞAHÝNGÖZ, ZEYNEP ARIKAN, GÜLAY KAVAK, MEHMET
ZÝNCÝR,
> MUHARREM GENÇ, VELÝ GÜNEÞ, HASAN PINAR, ALÝ ÞANLI, ALÝ RIZA DEMÝR,
OSMAN
> OSMANAÐAOÐLU, TKP(ML) Trial: DURMUÞ KURT, MEHMET KEREM, CEM YILDIZ,
> ÖZGÜR AYRILMAZ, YAÞAR YAÐAN TKÝP Trial: SERVET PAKSOY
>
> ÇANKIRI PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: HASAN GÜNGÖRMEZ, ÝRFAN ORTAKÇI, CÝHAN ÞEKER, TEMEL
> ÇAÐIRTEKÝN, ÖZGÜR SONER TKÝP Trial: MUHARREM KURÞUN
>
> BURSA PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: ERDAL ARIKAN, MURAT ÖZDEMÝR, MESUT ÖRS
> TKP(ML) Trial: ORHAN BUDAK, A. ÝHSAN ÖZKAN, ERDAL ÇETÝNKAYA, ALÝ
KÖÇMEN,
> ADÝL KAPLAN, ÖZGÜR KOÇAK, YUSUF KARACA
>
> AYDIN PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: SÝNAN EREN, SUAT KARABULUT, BURHAN GARDAÞ
> ÇANAKKALE PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: FÝDAN KALÞEN, AYÞE BAÞTÝMUR, SEMRA ASKERÝ, FATMA ERSOY,
> AYÞE EREN, NAZAN YILMAZ, KEMAL ALTINGÜL, TUNCAY BERBER, MUHARREM
GÜZEL,
> DAÝMÝ ATEÞ.
> TKP(ML) Trial: BERNA ÜNSAL
>
> MALATYA PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: ESMA ARSLANBOÐAN, Þ. MURAT ÖZTEN
> TKP(ML) Trial: HAKKI ALPHAN, MAHMUT METE, ALI EKBER DOÐAN, HAVVA DOÐAN
>
> BARTIN PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: MUSTAFA ERKAN ÇETÝN, AHMET YILMAZ, HAMÝT SÜREN, ALÝ
ÇOLAK,
> CENGÝZ SOYDAÞ
> TKP(ML) Trial: C. TAYYAR BEKTAÞ, ÖZGÜR SALTIK
> TKÝP Trial: RESUL AYAZ
>
> GEBZE PRISON:
> TKP(ML) Trial: A. MUSA AYDIN, NEBAHAT POLAT, YADÝGAR BAYAR, ALÝ RIZA
> DERMANLI, ÇETÝN CAN.
> TKÝP Trial: DÜZGÜN ZENGÝN
>
>
> UÞAK PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: SEVGÝ ERDOÐAN, BERRÝN BIÇKILAR, VÝCDAN ÞAHÝN.
> TKP(ML) Trial: GÖNÜL ASLAN.
>
> BUCA PRISX-Mozilla-Status: 0009ESUT AVCI, ABDULLAH BOZDAÐ, SERHAT
KARADUMANLI.
> TKP(ML) Trial: CELAL ALPAY
> ULUCANLAR PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: FATMA HÜLYA TÜMGAN
> TKÝP Trial: HATÝCE YÜREKLÝ
>
> BAYRAMPAÞA PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: GÜLSEREN ÖZTÜRK, SUNA ÖKMEN, AYLA ÖZCAN, FIRAT TAVUK,
AÞUR
> KORKMAZ, ALÝ ATEÞ, RECEP CÝNGÝTAÞ, AYHAN KOÇ, ÝSMET ÜNVER, KADÝR KAYA.
> TKP(ML) Trial: MURAT TARGAY, HÜSEYÝN ASLAN, ÖKKEÞ KARAOÐLU.
>
> CEYHAN PRISON:
> DHKP-C Trial: HALÝL ÖNDER, MEHMET KAN, MURAT KIRSAY
>
> REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT
> (DHKC), BELGIUM
---
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-------- Original Message --------
Oggetto: da ABC relazione su ultimo viaggio in Bosnia e Serbia
Rispedito-Data: Mon, 27 Nov 2000 16:44:57 +0100
Rispedito-Da: pck-yugoslavia@...
Data: Mon, 27 Nov 2000 16:38:01 +0100
Da: "abcsolidarieta" <abcsolidarieta@...>
Rispondi-a: pck-yugoslavia@...
A: pck-yugoslavia@...
Gentili amici,
i nostri affidi a distanza in Serbia hanno avuto un rapido aumento
durante e
subito dopo i bombardamenti dello scorso anno. Era bene accelerare
l'inizio
delle consegne nelle scuole e nelle fabbriche. Il nostro primo viaggio a
tal
fine si è quindi svolto nel settembre '99, per consegnare a ciascun
bambino
tre rate di affido. Poiché le adesioni continuavano a crescere, nuovo
viaggio in dicembre, per consegnare ancora tre rate in Serbia e, con
l'occasione, sei in Bosnia, dove le consegne precedenti erano avvenute
in
aprile.
Si poneva il problema di allineare le consegne in Serbia e Bosnia,
riducendo
i viaggi a due ogni anno, uno in primavera e uno in autunno, anche per
trovare le scuole aperte e condizioni climatiche favorevoli. Così, il
viaggio successivo è stato compiuto nel maggio 2000, con la consegna di
quattro rate sia in Serbia che in Bosnia; l'ultimo a fine ottobre, con
la
consegna di sei rate ovunque. Da ora in poi il ritmo rimarrà questo.
Cordiali saluti.ABC SOLIDARIETA' E PACE
BREVE RELAZIONE SUL VIAGGIO DI ABC IN SERBIA E BOSNIA E INTERVISTE
Partenza da Roma sabato 21 ottobre. Arrivo a Backa Topola domenica sera.
La
cittadina non è illuminata. La nostra ospite - direttrice della locale
scuola primaria (Osnovna Skola) "Nikola Tesla" - ci accoglie in casa a
lume
di candela. Vi sono frequenti interruzioni di energia elettrica - ci
dice -
non solo da noi, ma in tutta la Serbia.
Lunedì 23 - alla "Nikola Tesla", spettacolo in nostro onore: recite,
canti,
danze tradizionali in costume serbo ed ungherese. Poi i discorsi di
prammatica e la consegna delle borse di studio.
Martedì 24 - mattina: consegna delle borse di studio alla O.S."Svetozar
Markovic Toza", in Novi Sad. La scuola è gemellata con la nostra media
"P.Villari": lasciamo al direttore numerose lettere di alunni di
quest'ultima per i loro coetanei serbi. Pomeriggio: alla O.S. "Nikola
Tesla"
di Belgrado-Rakovica. Povero il quartiere, povera la scuola, poverissimi
gli
alunni cui diamo le borse di studio: stanno quasi tutti, da cinque anni,
in
un vicino campo profughi. Alla fine, come già in precedenti occasioni,
una
frotta di donne ci chiede di aggiungere i loro figli alla lista. Non
siamo
in grado, e ci si stringe il cuore. Arrivo a Kragujevac la sera.
Alloggio in
albergo, in un bel parco con un monumento che ricorda le centinaia di
civili
impiccati dai nazisti per rappresaglia anti-partigiana, compresi tutti
gli
alunni di una scuola media.
Mercoledì 25 - Consegna delle borse di studio a bambini e ragazzi figli
di
operai disoccupati (causa bombardamento della grande fabbrica
automobilistica "Zastava") iscritti al sindacato maggioritario. Cena a
lume
di candela offerta dalla dirigente di questo sindacato, un'abile ed
energica
signora che noi scherzosamente chiamiamo - e lei ci sta - la "Lady di
ferro
di Kragujevac". Qualche tempo prima, avvenuta la svolta politica a
livello
nazionale, lei e i suoi colleghi erano stati violentemente contestati da
gruppi di operai dissenzienti. Si è ora addivenuti - c'informa - a un
accordo per elezioni sindacali da tenere prossimamente.
Giovedì 26 - Consegna delle borse di studio nelle sedi dei due
sindacati
minori: "Nezavisnost!" (Indipendenza) e "Nezavisni Sindikat" (Sindacato
indipendente) Dovunque siamo andati, ieri e oggi, interviste di
giornalisti,
riprese televisive. A sera giungiamo a Nis.
Venerdì 27 - Alla "Industria Meccanica", poi alla "Industria
elettronica".
Anche qui, giornalisti e videocamere. Alla "Elettronica" il dinamico e
ambizioso direttore che ci aveva ricevuto cordialmente la volta scorsa è
stato sostituito, ancora sotto il vecchio regime, da un generale, e la
gente
di Nis ci scherza sopra. Si attendono ora le decisioni del DOS, la nuova
coalizione politica, presieduta da Kostunica, che ha vinto le elezioni
presidenziali di settembre.
Sabato 28 - la mattina alla O.S."Ivan Goran Kovacic"; il pomeriggio a
una
piccola scuola in estrema periferia: Ci sono soltanto le prime quattro
classi e due aule. Gli stessi genitori stanno ristrutturando l'edificio,
che
andava in rovina. Accoglienze calorose, spettacolo dei bambini, tavolata
con
vivande preparate dalle famiglie.
Arrivo in Bosnia domenica sera. Consegna delle borse di studio alla O.S.
"Pale" il 30 e il 31 mattina; alla O.S. "Sveti Sava" di Lukavica il 30
sera,
alla O.S. "Sveti Sava" di Rogatica il 31 pomeriggio. C'informano che è
appena finito uno sciopero degli insegnanti. In Bosnia la vita costa
sempre
di più, nel quadro di una rincorsa prezzi-stipendi. Una ex insegnante
della
scuola di Pale, ora dirigente del sindacato unico, ci dice che molte
fabbriche sono state acquistate dai loro stessi direttori, il che lascia
adito a evidenti sospetti. E' in corso la campagna elettorale per le
politiche. Nella zona delle nostre iniziative è scontato il successo del
partito nazionalista serbo.
Mercoledì 1° novembre - rientro in Serbia e cordiale colloquio, a
Pancevo,
con la dirigenza del locale Istituto d'igiene e protezione ambientale,
allo
scopo di concordare gli adempimenti burocratici per il trasporto e la
consegna come aiuti umanitari (quindi senza le esorbitanti spese
doganali)
di un primo, consistente blocco di strumenti da fornire all'Istituto nel
quadro della campagna "Pancevo chiama Italia", condotta da ABC con il
sostegno del "manifesto".
Giovedì 2 - riposo a Backa Topola. Il 3 partiamo per il viaggio di
ritorno, che si conclude il 4, sotto un inesorabile diluvio dal Tarvisio
a
Roma.
Qui di seguito troverete delle interviste fatte durante il nostro
viaggio in
Bosnia (Republika Srpska) e Serbia (una sintesi verraà pubblicata sul
prossimo numero di "A, B, C, solidarietà e pace" che riceverete a
dicembre).
Si è trattato di persone di vario livello ed estrazione sociale,
dall'insegnante al sindacalista, dal profugo al pensionato. Fedeli alla
nostra linea di sempre, della non ingerenza diretta negli affari interni
di
quel popolo e della fiducia nella sua capacità di risolverli
autonomamente,
le nostre domande riguardavano essenzialmente i problemi della vita
quotidiana. Per chi ha voluto fare riferimento, in un senso o
nell'altro,
anche a motivazioni politiche, abbiamo registrato le sue parole con la
massima obiettività.
Nelle riunioni, al termine delle quali sono state tenute alcune delle
interviste, il nostro rituale discorsetto di cortesia s'inquadrava
essenzialmente (slanci "lirici" a parte) nel seguente schema:
Voi sapete - ve lo abbiamo sempre detto - che la nostra associazione non
viene a intromettersi nei vostri problemi politici interni. Sappiamo che
voi
siete un popolo civile, capace di risolvere da solo i suoi problemi. Non
c'è
bisogno che nessuno venga a farvi il maestro di democrazia o di altro, e
meno che mai una piccola associazione come la nostra. Questo vuol forse
dire
che gli altri popoli possono tranquillamente disinteressarsi di voi e
fare
come se voi non esisteste? Evidentemente non è giusto e nemmeno
possibile.
In questo mondo in cui le distanze sono sempre più corte, l'economia
sempre
più integrata, il confronto culturale sempre più ravvicinato, è ora di
capire che tutti i popoli della Terra vivono insieme e sono
interdipendenti,
come i viaggiatori su una stessa nave.
E allora come comportarsi? Su quali basi fondare le relazioni fra i
popoli?
Sull'oppressione del più forte sul più debole? Sulla guerra, sui
bombardamenti? Sul "Tu devi fare quello che dico io"? Ancora no, tutto
il
contrario.
Perciò un'associazione come la nostra, con quale spirito e atteggiamento
deve venire da voi? Poco è l'aiuto economico che possiamo darvi: qualche
borsa di studio a bambini e ragazzi più bisognosi. Ma grande è
l'amicizia
reciproca: a poco a poco ci siamo affezionati a voi, e voi ci
riconoscete
come vostri fratelli.
Speriamo proprio che in un futuro non lontano potrete ricostruire la
vostra
Nazione, la vostra economia, così da non aver più bisogno di aiuti
"materiali". Quando ciò sarà ce lo direte voi stessi. Continueremo certo
a
venire da voi, ma per riabbracciarvi, per bere insieme un po' di rakja,
che
è molto buona; e voi ci ricambierete le visite, e berrete insieme a noi
il
nostro vino, che è esso pure molto buono.
Lunedì 23 ottobre- Jelena Simovic (Direttrice della O.S."Nikola Tesla",
Backa Topola)
Abbiamo attraversato tante situazioni problematiche in questi ultimi
dieci anni, che la parola "Speranza" è diventata un'astrazione. Ciò che
è
vero è vero. La nostra vita non è [adesso] né migliore né più facile. La
Vojvodina, il granaio della Jugoslavia, rischia la rovina, dato che
l'intera
produzione agricola sta attraversando un periodo estremamente negativo.
Grano, mais, barbabietole da zucchero, patate, frutta: peggio di così
non si
era mai visto.
A causa della mancata accumulazione di riserve, delle condizioni
tecniche
obsolete, dello sciopero dei minatori, abbiamo gravi problemi anche con
l'elettricità. Attualmente la sua erogazione è razionata: quattro ore si
e
sei no. Le candele sono l'articolo più venduto, proprio come il pane. Di
conseguenza c'è un altro grave problema: il riscaldamento. Le scuole
stanno
al freddo, per mancanza di carbone, di gasolio e di corrente elettrica.
Il tutto è aggravato dal cambiamento a livello di governo locale, tra
i
cui compiti dovrebbe esservi appunto il riscaldamento delle scuole. I
nuovi
amministratori hanno bisogno di tempo per acquisire capacità (forse
all'inizio, forse per sempre) per organizzare questo importante lavoro.
Il costo della vita cresce di giorno in giorno. La nafta del 50%. E'
vero
che adesso è disponibile alle stazioni di servizio, ma se i nostri
stipendi
medi sono di 70 DM, non è possibile spenderne 40 per rifornirsi di
gasolio
per tutto il mese (parlo di 40 litri) [La signora Simovic sta
evidentemente
riferendosi alle "pompe" statali, dove il carburante è contingentato e
non
si trova mai; non a quelle private, dove si trova, ma un litro di
gasolio
costa DM 1,5/1,6 e uno di benzina DM 2, cioè rispettivamente, lire
1.500/1.600 e lire 2000].
L'olio da cucina costa il 100% in più; il prezzo dei trasporti è
cresciuto del 50%, il latte del 50%, la carne dal 50% in su. Il pane
costa 8
dinari nei forni privati, 10 in quelli statali.
Stipendi e salari sono sempre gli stessi, tranne che nelle fabbriche,
dove i direttori li aumentano per paura dei sindacati (ma per molti
direttori fedeli all'ex governo si può ormai parlare soltanto di ex
accordi
con i sindacati).
Viaggiare con l'autobus costa troppo. Col treno, significa subire
forti
ritardi. Accade spesso che un treno passeggeri addirittura non parta, e
che
occorra aspettare la partenza di quello successivo,
per ore e ore.
Un marco tedesco (DM) è cambiato attualmente a 30 dinari (cambio
ufficiale). Io personalmente sono contraria all'affermarsi di valute
straniere qui da noi; preferirei un dinaro più forte e stabile.
Per molte famiglie è difficile mandare i figli a scuola. Libri,
quaderni
e soprattutto vestiti decenti, costano molto. La scuola si sforza sempre
di
organizzare iniziative finalizzate all'acquisto di libri e quaderni a
condizioni migliori: così, in febbraio, partiremo con un'iniziativa per
acquistare libri in tre rate. In aprile faremo lo stesso per i quaderni.
Così tutto è pronto perché entro la fine dell'anno scolastico corrente,
almeno il 90% degli alunni possa beneficiare di questo acquisto rateale
per
l'anno scolastico prossimo. Aiutiamo anche gli alunni profughi e poveri
con
libri e quaderni gratuiti.
La situazione dei profughi è estremamente dura. Nella nostra zona ne
sono
venuti almeno 3.000. Molti di loro trovano sistemazione presso parenti,
ma
circa 500 stanno in "centri collettivi", in pessime condizioni. Tutto è
problema per loro: cibo, riscaldamento, vestiario: Molte persone in una
sola
stanza; un bagno per molte persone. Non hanno ancora alcuna speranza di
tornare alle terre d'origine, di riavere le loro case, gli appartamenti,
i
campi che loro coltivavano in proprio..
Io sono felice che molta buona gente italiana abbia comprensione per
le
sofferenze del mio popolo e specialmente per i profughi. Grazie a Dio
abbiamo un'associazione come ABC, gente onesta, che ci dà l'anima e il
cuore. Con il sostegno dei donatori italiani, aiutano in Serbia circa
600
bambini e ragazzi con borse di studio, di cui vivono anche le loro
famiglie.
Fidiamo molto nella loro amicizia, sperando che questi tempi duri e
difficili finiranno un bel giorno, e che riusciremo a sopravvivere, come
sempre. Non crediamo nei governi europei. Stanno in ginocchio di fronte
agli
USA. Come hanno potuto permettere il bombardamento di un Paese vicino,
di
una nazione europea storicamente e culturalmente ricca. Le loro bombe,
le
bombe americane, ci hanno avvelenato tutti, i serbi e gli altri europei.
Tutti gli europei dovrebbero stringersi insieme, forti della loro
civiltà e
della loro storia. Gli USA dovrebbero esser messi in condizione di
bussare
alla porta dell'Europa con grande rispetto, come alla porta di una
vecchia
"Lady". Io non credo buona alcuna strada di accodamento agli USA.
Dobbiamo
avere una strada europea e un progresso europeo. Non dobbiamo credere ai
buoni propositi e ai fini umanitari americani. Dove arrivano, cominciano
le
guerre: E poi (quale cinismo!) gli interventi umanitari per aiutare la
povera gente. Preferiamo rimanere poveri che essere aiutati in questa
maniera. Rispettiamo gli amici veri e speriamo, con loro, di rimanere
tali
per sempre!
Lunedi 23 ottobre: Zeljko (da tempo direttore dell'AIK - "Agricoltura
Industria Kombinat" - e maggior esponente della comunità serba,
minoritaria
a Backa Topola). In questa cittadina il sindaco è tradizionalmente
ungherese, e il presidente del Consiglio comunale - precisamente, fino a
poco tempo fa, l'ing. Zeljko - un serbo. L'ingegnere era particolarmente
risentito - diciamo pure che era furibondo - per come sono andate le
elezioni presidenziali nella sua città e in altre vicine, dalla stessa
composizione etnica a maggioranza ungherese. Per i serbi, si è creato un
problema nuovo: o votare "da serbi", ma allora per il partito socialista
di
Milosevic, come facevano da tempo; ovvero votare "da democratici", ma
allora, non avendo localmente un partito democratico proprio, votare per
il
più moderato dei due partiti ungheresi. Risultato: i serbi hanno perso
ogni
posizione di potere nel Consiglio comunale, e rischiano di perdere la
loro
stessa identità politica.
Mercoledì 25 ottobre: Ruzica Milosavljevic (dirigente dell'
"Organizzazione
sindacale unitaria" - alla "Zastava", Kragujevac)
Il prossimo inverno sarà il più difficile di questi ultimi dieci
anni.
Il nostro sistema energetico è stato distrutto dai bombardamenti. Noi
abbiamo cominciato a ricostruire secondo priorità essenziali, ma in
mancanza
di investimenti, non abbiamo potuto fare tutto il necessario. Perciò, a
causa del maggior carico invernale, si è prodotta una caduta energetica
con
erogazione di elettricità interrotta per quattro o sei ore consecutive;
altri giorni abbiamo elettricità per due ore, poi per altre sei, e così
via.
Ciò si riflette sulla produzione industriale, che non può funzionare
regolarmente. Anche la vita quotidiana è più difficile: già si comincia
a
sentire il freddo nelle case e nelle scuole. Le riserve di gas sono al
minimo; la Russia non ce ne manda perché non abbiamo pagato i debiti
contratti al riguardo.
Nelle scuole, causa mancanza di riscaldamento e minor numero di ore
di
luce solare, le lezioni sono state ridotte a mezz'ora ciascuna (il
secondo
turno deve terminare alle 17). A casa, poi, gli alunni fanno i compiti
con
la candela, come durante i bombardamenti.
A causa delle quotidiane interruzioni di corrente, gli
elettrodomestici
[chiamati complessivamente, in Serbia, "Bela Tehnika", cioè "Tecnica
bianca"], generalmente vecchi di quindici anni, si guastano spesso, ed è
difficile ripararli; impossibile, nelle attuali condizioni, comprarne di
nuovi.
Siamo già stati avvertiti che, ciò nonostante, il prezzo della
corrente
elettrica sarà aumentato del 25%. Non so come la potranno pagare i
moltissimi lavoratori forzatamente a casa. Hanno accumulato debiti per
l'elettricità, ma anche per l'acqua. Ogni tanto gliele staccano per
qualche
giorno, più che altro come avvertimento; poi interviene il sindacato
sugli
Enti fornitori. Ma nessuno sa come pagare i debiti, ed è diffuso il
timore
che una volta o l'altra questa relativa tolleranza finisca. Non parliamo
poi
dell'affitto di casa, per tanti lavoratori al salario minimo garantito,
corrispondente a 15.000 lire italiane.
I prezzi aumentano ogni giorno; l'inflazione pure: il cambio di un
DM è
di 30 dinari.
Il regime precedente riusciva a mantenere la pace sociale mediante il
prezzo politico del pane, del latte, di altri generi di prima necessità.
Un
mese fa un kg. di zucchero costava 8 dinari; adesso 30. Un litro di olio
16
dinari, adesso 55. E così via [per prezzo "politico" s'intende quello
da
rifornimento statale, peraltro saltuario]. Prima la frutta e la verdura
non
erano care, ma adesso si fanno sentire gi effetti della siccità [che
durava
ancora, da mesi, quando siamo arrivati, e ha ceduto il posto ad
abbondante
pioggia, almeno in Vojvodina ma speriamo anche altrove, il giorno della
nostra partenza].
Quanto costa mandare un bambino a scuola. Circa 8-900 dinari per
zainetto, libri, quaderni, matite. I libri non si possono comprare
usati,
per molte materie per le quali sono da fare esercizi comportanti il
riempire
a penna una o più pagine, lezione per lezione
Alla "Zastava" siamo molto preoccupati di non poter portare a termine
il
programma di ricostruzione. A livello della Repubblica, è stata
completata
la prima fase della ricostruzione industriale ed era cominciata la
seconda.
Previsto, subito dopo, l'inizio della terza, e quindi una ripresa e un
aumento della produzione industriale per l'anno prossimo. Questo
pogramma è
stato sospeso dal nuovo governo.
Attualmente sono stabilite le seguenti priorità, nell'ordine:
polizia,
esercito, programma sociale e sanitario. L'industria è al sesto posto. I
nuovi dirigenti della "Zastava" hanno approvato un nuovo programma,
basandosi su una forte somma che dovrebbe essere stanziata entro la fine
dell'anno; ma non sappiamo se ciò si dimostrerà realizzabile.
Loro intanto, alla "Zastava", avevano ripreso la produzione [noi di
ABC
avevamo visto funzionare, già nel maggio scorso, il reparto automobili],
ma
c'è l'intralcio delle interruzioni di corrente elettrica. Nei reparti
non
c'è riscaldamento, dipendiamo dalla temperatura esterna, quindi non
possiamo
essere ottimisti.
Tutti aspettano le elezioni di dicembre [parlamentari], e ciò fa
dimenticare i problemi reali; quindi la "Zastava" non potrà compiere il
proprio programma, che era finanziato dal governo. Non potremo ottenere
finanziamenti per pagare gli operai e un programma sociale. I nuovi
dirigenti hanno accettato di continuare il programma stabilito, ma non
si sa
da dove devono arrivare i soldi. Si aspettano interventi dall'estero,
mentre
la "Zastava" ha fretta .
L'eventualità di investimenti esteri è reale. La fabbrica delle auto,
che
assorbe la maggior parte dei dipendenti, ha contattato tutti i più
grossi
produttori mondiali, ottenendo solo promesse di collaborazione futura,
"dichiarazioni d'intenti". Avevamo avuto offerte da ditte estere
riguardanti
la "componentistica" (principalmente, appunto, nel ramo automobili), ma
tutto è rimasto per aria a causa delle sanzioni. Speriamo che nel
prossimo
futuro si faranno discorsi concreti. Alcune ditte ci hanno avvertito che
verranno, ma il nuovo presidente del gruppo "Zastava", Savicevic, ha
detto
che con gli accordi col capitale straniero si andrà più piano, che
dovremo
programmare vetture più moderne. Esse sono state presentate a Belgrado,
Zagabria e Skoplje.
Sempre resistenti, duri da piegare, i lavoratori della "Zastava"
erano
già avanti nel realizzare il sogno della ricostruzione. Speriamo
verranno
tempi migliori. Ci spaventa solo la possibilità che lavoratori ridotti a
condizioni di povertà non perdano la pazienza e diano luogo a una
rivolta
sociale. Speriamo che questo inverno potremo sopravvivere, grazie agli
aiuti
e alle donazioni degli amici italiani (e tedeschi). Dovreste vedere la
felicità delle famiglie quando ricevono lettere dall'Italia.
Giovedì 26 ottobre, mattina - gruppo di donne rimaste dopo la
distribuzione
delle borse di studio al "Nezavisni Sindikat" di Kragujevac e di
Kraljevo-
Una di esse ci tiene a darci nome e cognome: Gordana Cosic.
Sperano che l'inverno sarà migliore di come si sta profilando.
Aspettano che dalle nuove autorità e dagli aiuti internazionali vengano
i
mezzi per un inverno sopportabile: gas, combustibile, elettricità. La
comunità internazionale non può tirarsi indietro. Attualmente hanno
riserve
di gas cittadino solo per 10-15 giorni, arrivate dall'Ungheria. Non è
certo
una soluzione di lungo periodo.
Il Paese è nel disastro economico. Occorrono aiuti non solo per il
riscaldamento, ma per tutto: viveri, medicine. Per l'elettricità, prima
ci
aiutavano Grecia, Romania e Bulgaria. Dalla Russia, solo promesse.
In una famiglia con un membro laureato, lo stipendio medio è di 80
DM
(2400) dinari. Per una famiglia operaia, la metà. Il salario minimo
garantito è pari a 12 DM (360 dinari).
Un kg. di zucchero costa 35-45 dinari, di pane 8-10 din.; un lt. di olio
50
din.; la carne da 300 in su.
Le scarpe da bambino costano 50 DM, da uomo 50-100 DM, un maglione
10-20. Tutto ciò è quindi fuori portata di una tasca media. Soprattutto
è
grave che manchino le medicine.
Loro saranno contenti se alla "Zastava" comincerà una produzione
con
capitale estero. Loro sanno fare tutto, ma non hanno capitali. Bisogna
cambiare i direttori dei vari rami produttivi, che hanno distrutto ciò
che
era rimasto. Ma durante la notte non si può fare niente, bisogna
aspettare.
I vecchi dirigenti hanno grandi colpe, non tutti, ma molti di loro erano
dei
disonesti. Quelli che non hanno fatto niente di male, rimangano pure.
Come
direttore generale hanno messo un esponente della coalizione DOS: era
stato
direttore di complessi alberghieri. Per questo era molto noto in Europa.
Loro non accettano le "Unità di crisi". Ha ragione Kostunica: tutti
gli
aspiranti a cariche direttive vadano in tribunale a far controllare la
loro
onestà e idoneità. Nel campo culturale, ad esempio, dieci anni fa il
museo
d'arte di Belgrado ha cambiato direttore, che aveva portato artisti da
tutto
il mondo. Adesso da dieci anni è senza lavoro. Ha pubblicato molti
libri, ne
scriverà uno anche per italiani. Si chiama Zoran Gavric: scriverà una
monografia sul famoso pittore francese Marcel Duchamp. Le persone come
lui
vengono reintegrate dalla coalizione DOS nelle loro primitive funzioni.
26 ottobre- pomeriggio- Prof. Veroljub Dugalic, presidente del "Gruppo
G.17
Plus" - Come ci ha spiegato, il gruppo ha carattere umanitario ma anche
una
valenza genericamente politica di opposizione al vecchio regime e quindi
di
adesione alla coalizione DOS. Il nome si spiega col fatto che ai soci
fondatori, 17 economisti, si sono poi aggiunti numerosi professionisti
di
altri rami.
Riferiamo quanto ci ha detto, secondo l'ordine da lui spontaneamente
seguito.
Il governo di Svezia ha stanziato un milione di DM all'anno, per
borse
di studio destinate a 1000 studenti universitari in tutta la Serbia, dei
quali 700 a Kragujevac. A questa città giungono aiuti anche da Germania
e
Norvegia. Sono arrivate da poco 320 tonnellate di bitume, sufficienti
per
aggiustare 150 km. di strade. L'anno scorso veniva nafta da Venezia,
quest'anno niente. Adesso, però, la cosa più importante sono le
medicine. La
loro ricezione è già pronta.
Il prossimo inverno sarà molto difficile. Se non arrivano la nafta,
l'elettricità, ecc., i problemi saranno molto gravi. Abbiamo avuto tante
promesse: ma la gente non vede ancora miglioramenti concreti, e qualcuno
comincia a dire: "era meglio prima...". Sono urgenti aiuti umanitari di
emergenza.
E' importante continuare la collaborazione con l'Italia. I serbi da
dieci anni sono isolati. La produzione è a terra. L'industria lavora al
ritmo di 1/3 rispetto a dieci anni fa.
Lo stipendio medio è pari a 60-70 DM. Kruscevac, Kragujevac, Nis
sono
città che stanno certamente male. Ma altre città della Serbia
meridionale
stanno ancora peggio: più profughi e minore sviluppo. Nis ha avuto
l'industria del tabacco [la fabbrica è attualmente distrutta], Vranje
quella
dei mobili, ma in altri posti della Serbia meridionale non c'è quasi
niente.
Annoso problema dell'industria di Nis: esportavano prodotti da
varie
fabbriche in Slovenia, Macedonia, Croazia, Bosnia: questo adesso non c'è
più. Per mancanza di capitali e di sbocchi di mercato, ora tutti i
maggiori
sistemi industriali sono fermi. Non possiamo fare più niente senza
capitale
estero. Ci servono investitori seri.
Gli aiuti che ci servono comportano due tempi: nell'immediato, gli
aiuti
umanitari più urgenti; più in là investimenti, con interesse reciproco.
Certo, la nostra tecnologia è troppo vecchia, ma abbiamo il capitale
umano.
Inoltre, chi investisse adesso in Serbia non vi troverebbe concorrenti.
L'opposizione democratica ha vinto. Le porte sono aperte al
cambiamento:
c'è da fare il primo passo, il più difficile. Ma adesso debbono venire
aiuti
umanitari al più presto, altrimenti la gente si stanca, non vedendo
cambiamenti reali.
La popolazione - giova insistere - è stanca di soffrire, spera nel
cambiamento. Ma una riconversione dell'economia richiede del tempo. Per
il
momento ci servono aiuti immediati; da parte nostra abbiamo fatto tutto
ciò
che era necessario per averli, ma la comunità internazionale deve
accelerare
i tempi. Le cose elementari della vita, dal cibo alla corrente
elettrica,
alle medicine, ci servono subito.
Sabato 28 ottobre- Il pensionato Jovan ci riceve nella stanzetta in cui
vive, da solo. C'è appena spazio per il letto, un tavolo con sedie, una
cucina e una stufa a carbone. La sua pensione - ci dice - è
relativamente
buona, pari a 60 marchi al mese, cioè 1800 dinari. Quale paniere di beni
ci
può comprare in un mese?
Ci pensa su, prende carta e matita e ci scrive questo elenco: 300 dinari
per
il pane, 110 per l'olio, 90 per lo zucchero, 250 per la carne, 120 per
medicine, 300 per la stufa a carbone, 250 per l'elettricità, 100 per
caffè e
thè, 60 per i trasporti, 200 spese varie, 20 per tasse. Non c'è da stare
allegri, commenta, ma c'è chi sta peggio di me.
Giovedì 2 novembre- Sulla via del ritorno, ci fermiamo nuovamente alla
scuola primaria di Backa Topola. Parliamo a lungo con la signora
Smiljana
Krkovic, insegnante di matematica e fisica, profuga da Glina (Croazia).
Per
l'80% della popolazione serba - ci dice - si prospetta un inverno duro,
per
le lunghe interruzioni di corrente elettrica, loro fonte principale di
riscaldamento, il vestiario non abbastanza pesante, spesso scarpe rotte,
e
così via. Non dubita della buona volontà del nuovo governo di risolvere
questa drammatica situazione, ma senza adeguate risorse finanziarie, non
vede come sia possibile.
Il costo della vita è aumentato notevolmente dal periodo delle
elezioni
ad oggi. Sia i produttori che i commercianti approfittano del carattere
transitorio e non ancora consolidato della situazione politica. Il nuovo
governo non è ancora in grado di controllare gli aumenti, davvero
eccessivi,
dei prezzi dei generi alimentari e non solo. Siamo quasi a livelli di
fame.
Riguardo al rapporto fra marco tedesco e dinaro, pensa che il
cambio
ufficiale di 1 a 30 corrisponda a quello reale, poiché l'economia è in
pezzi. Spera che in futuro si arriverà a un rapporto di 1 a 3.
La maggior parte degli alunni della scuola rientra nella fascia
della
popolazione che può considerarsi povera, e che comprende circa l'80% del
totale. Spesso li vede seguire le lezioni non motivati, perché denutriti
e
vestiti in modo non adeguato alle temperature della regione. Hanno
l'indispensabile di libri, quaderni e altro materiale scolastico, ma
abbisognano di manuali per le esercitazioni di matematica, fisica,
chimica e
varie altre materie, nonché di vocabolari per le lingue straniere e di
testi
letterari.
Il personale docente non si trova certo in una situazione migliore:
gli
insegnanti non hanno stipendi sufficienti e, per sopravvivere, sono
costretti a svolgere anche altri lavori, a discapito della scuola.
Molto doloroso è il problema dei profughi. Anche lei appartiene a questa
categoria, da ben cinque anni. Abbiamo alloggi precari - ci dice. In 15
famiglie, 50 persone in tutto, siamo sistemati in una baracca di legno
con
15 stanze, il che vuol dire che ogni famiglia abita in una stanzetta non
più
ampia di 16 mq. Abbiamo in comune 3 WC e una doccia. In un corridoio
sono
ammassati legna, viveri in scatola, ecc. Abbiamo avuto dall'Italia,
tramite
l'UNHCR [Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati], una
lavatrice, un frigorifero e un congelatore. Ciascuna famiglia può
utilizzare
la lavatrice ogni otto giorni. Abbiamo anche una cucina elettrica, ma il
problema maggiore è farsi la doccia: ci tocca riscaldare l'acqua in
pentoloni. Ogni famiglia ha lettini da campo, un armadio di metallo, un
tavolo e un paio di sedie. Su quello stesso tavolo si prepara il cibo,
si
mangia, si studia, si fanno i compiti.
Quasi nessuno dei profughi è tornato a casa propria in Croazia,
perché
lì di dire di essere serbo uno non se lo può nemmeno sognare. E poi
anche lì
la situazione economica è degradata, c'è molta disoccupazione: per un
serbo,
trovare lavoro sarebbe ancora più difficile. Per un insegnante, ci
sarebbe
ben poco da fare, dato che gli alunni croati debbono avere soltanto
insegnanti croati. Molti profughi sono stati costretti ad andare a
vivere in
Paesi lontani: Canada, Australia, USA, Svezia, e qualcuno anche in
Italia.
Alcuni sono morti di nostalgia, altri per il dolore di aver perduto i
loro
beni, la loro dignità; altri ancora sono finiti in ospedali
psichiatrici.
La gente è sempre più alla ricerca quotidiana di come sopravvivere,
e
per molti ciò significa essere psicologicamente a rischio. E' anche
vero,
però, che noi serbi sappiamo adattarci a qualunque situazione. E' la
nostra
grande risorsa: saper scherzare su noi stessi anche nei momenti più
difficili. Moltissimi serbi, oramai, hanno toccato il fondo, ma non
hanno
perso la speranza di tornare a galla.
L'Europa può aiutarci molto a rimetterci in piedi. L'aiuto
principale
dovrebbe essere un contributo serio alla riattivazione della nostra
economia. Molti Paesi europei sono in debito con noi, dovrebbero darci
una
mano a ricostruire ciò che hanno distrutto con i bombardamenti.
Penso che la Serbia appartenga all'Europa non solo geograficamente,
ma
con la sua civiltà, il suo patrimonio culturale, con la sua gente
laboriosa
e con la nuova generazione di giovani che riesce a superare così dure
prove.
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Oggetto: da ABC relazione su ultimo viaggio in Bosnia e Serbia
Rispedito-Data: Mon, 27 Nov 2000 16:44:57 +0100
Rispedito-Da: pck-yugoslavia@...
Data: Mon, 27 Nov 2000 16:38:01 +0100
Da: "abcsolidarieta" <abcsolidarieta@...>
Rispondi-a: pck-yugoslavia@...
A: pck-yugoslavia@...
Gentili amici,
i nostri affidi a distanza in Serbia hanno avuto un rapido aumento
durante e
subito dopo i bombardamenti dello scorso anno. Era bene accelerare
l'inizio
delle consegne nelle scuole e nelle fabbriche. Il nostro primo viaggio a
tal
fine si è quindi svolto nel settembre '99, per consegnare a ciascun
bambino
tre rate di affido. Poiché le adesioni continuavano a crescere, nuovo
viaggio in dicembre, per consegnare ancora tre rate in Serbia e, con
l'occasione, sei in Bosnia, dove le consegne precedenti erano avvenute
in
aprile.
Si poneva il problema di allineare le consegne in Serbia e Bosnia,
riducendo
i viaggi a due ogni anno, uno in primavera e uno in autunno, anche per
trovare le scuole aperte e condizioni climatiche favorevoli. Così, il
viaggio successivo è stato compiuto nel maggio 2000, con la consegna di
quattro rate sia in Serbia che in Bosnia; l'ultimo a fine ottobre, con
la
consegna di sei rate ovunque. Da ora in poi il ritmo rimarrà questo.
Cordiali saluti.ABC SOLIDARIETA' E PACE
BREVE RELAZIONE SUL VIAGGIO DI ABC IN SERBIA E BOSNIA E INTERVISTE
Partenza da Roma sabato 21 ottobre. Arrivo a Backa Topola domenica sera.
La
cittadina non è illuminata. La nostra ospite - direttrice della locale
scuola primaria (Osnovna Skola) "Nikola Tesla" - ci accoglie in casa a
lume
di candela. Vi sono frequenti interruzioni di energia elettrica - ci
dice -
non solo da noi, ma in tutta la Serbia.
Lunedì 23 - alla "Nikola Tesla", spettacolo in nostro onore: recite,
canti,
danze tradizionali in costume serbo ed ungherese. Poi i discorsi di
prammatica e la consegna delle borse di studio.
Martedì 24 - mattina: consegna delle borse di studio alla O.S."Svetozar
Markovic Toza", in Novi Sad. La scuola è gemellata con la nostra media
"P.Villari": lasciamo al direttore numerose lettere di alunni di
quest'ultima per i loro coetanei serbi. Pomeriggio: alla O.S. "Nikola
Tesla"
di Belgrado-Rakovica. Povero il quartiere, povera la scuola, poverissimi
gli
alunni cui diamo le borse di studio: stanno quasi tutti, da cinque anni,
in
un vicino campo profughi. Alla fine, come già in precedenti occasioni,
una
frotta di donne ci chiede di aggiungere i loro figli alla lista. Non
siamo
in grado, e ci si stringe il cuore. Arrivo a Kragujevac la sera.
Alloggio in
albergo, in un bel parco con un monumento che ricorda le centinaia di
civili
impiccati dai nazisti per rappresaglia anti-partigiana, compresi tutti
gli
alunni di una scuola media.
Mercoledì 25 - Consegna delle borse di studio a bambini e ragazzi figli
di
operai disoccupati (causa bombardamento della grande fabbrica
automobilistica "Zastava") iscritti al sindacato maggioritario. Cena a
lume
di candela offerta dalla dirigente di questo sindacato, un'abile ed
energica
signora che noi scherzosamente chiamiamo - e lei ci sta - la "Lady di
ferro
di Kragujevac". Qualche tempo prima, avvenuta la svolta politica a
livello
nazionale, lei e i suoi colleghi erano stati violentemente contestati da
gruppi di operai dissenzienti. Si è ora addivenuti - c'informa - a un
accordo per elezioni sindacali da tenere prossimamente.
Giovedì 26 - Consegna delle borse di studio nelle sedi dei due
sindacati
minori: "Nezavisnost!" (Indipendenza) e "Nezavisni Sindikat" (Sindacato
indipendente) Dovunque siamo andati, ieri e oggi, interviste di
giornalisti,
riprese televisive. A sera giungiamo a Nis.
Venerdì 27 - Alla "Industria Meccanica", poi alla "Industria
elettronica".
Anche qui, giornalisti e videocamere. Alla "Elettronica" il dinamico e
ambizioso direttore che ci aveva ricevuto cordialmente la volta scorsa è
stato sostituito, ancora sotto il vecchio regime, da un generale, e la
gente
di Nis ci scherza sopra. Si attendono ora le decisioni del DOS, la nuova
coalizione politica, presieduta da Kostunica, che ha vinto le elezioni
presidenziali di settembre.
Sabato 28 - la mattina alla O.S."Ivan Goran Kovacic"; il pomeriggio a
una
piccola scuola in estrema periferia: Ci sono soltanto le prime quattro
classi e due aule. Gli stessi genitori stanno ristrutturando l'edificio,
che
andava in rovina. Accoglienze calorose, spettacolo dei bambini, tavolata
con
vivande preparate dalle famiglie.
Arrivo in Bosnia domenica sera. Consegna delle borse di studio alla O.S.
"Pale" il 30 e il 31 mattina; alla O.S. "Sveti Sava" di Lukavica il 30
sera,
alla O.S. "Sveti Sava" di Rogatica il 31 pomeriggio. C'informano che è
appena finito uno sciopero degli insegnanti. In Bosnia la vita costa
sempre
di più, nel quadro di una rincorsa prezzi-stipendi. Una ex insegnante
della
scuola di Pale, ora dirigente del sindacato unico, ci dice che molte
fabbriche sono state acquistate dai loro stessi direttori, il che lascia
adito a evidenti sospetti. E' in corso la campagna elettorale per le
politiche. Nella zona delle nostre iniziative è scontato il successo del
partito nazionalista serbo.
Mercoledì 1° novembre - rientro in Serbia e cordiale colloquio, a
Pancevo,
con la dirigenza del locale Istituto d'igiene e protezione ambientale,
allo
scopo di concordare gli adempimenti burocratici per il trasporto e la
consegna come aiuti umanitari (quindi senza le esorbitanti spese
doganali)
di un primo, consistente blocco di strumenti da fornire all'Istituto nel
quadro della campagna "Pancevo chiama Italia", condotta da ABC con il
sostegno del "manifesto".
Giovedì 2 - riposo a Backa Topola. Il 3 partiamo per il viaggio di
ritorno, che si conclude il 4, sotto un inesorabile diluvio dal Tarvisio
a
Roma.
Qui di seguito troverete delle interviste fatte durante il nostro
viaggio in
Bosnia (Republika Srpska) e Serbia (una sintesi verraà pubblicata sul
prossimo numero di "A, B, C, solidarietà e pace" che riceverete a
dicembre).
Si è trattato di persone di vario livello ed estrazione sociale,
dall'insegnante al sindacalista, dal profugo al pensionato. Fedeli alla
nostra linea di sempre, della non ingerenza diretta negli affari interni
di
quel popolo e della fiducia nella sua capacità di risolverli
autonomamente,
le nostre domande riguardavano essenzialmente i problemi della vita
quotidiana. Per chi ha voluto fare riferimento, in un senso o
nell'altro,
anche a motivazioni politiche, abbiamo registrato le sue parole con la
massima obiettività.
Nelle riunioni, al termine delle quali sono state tenute alcune delle
interviste, il nostro rituale discorsetto di cortesia s'inquadrava
essenzialmente (slanci "lirici" a parte) nel seguente schema:
Voi sapete - ve lo abbiamo sempre detto - che la nostra associazione non
viene a intromettersi nei vostri problemi politici interni. Sappiamo che
voi
siete un popolo civile, capace di risolvere da solo i suoi problemi. Non
c'è
bisogno che nessuno venga a farvi il maestro di democrazia o di altro, e
meno che mai una piccola associazione come la nostra. Questo vuol forse
dire
che gli altri popoli possono tranquillamente disinteressarsi di voi e
fare
come se voi non esisteste? Evidentemente non è giusto e nemmeno
possibile.
In questo mondo in cui le distanze sono sempre più corte, l'economia
sempre
più integrata, il confronto culturale sempre più ravvicinato, è ora di
capire che tutti i popoli della Terra vivono insieme e sono
interdipendenti,
come i viaggiatori su una stessa nave.
E allora come comportarsi? Su quali basi fondare le relazioni fra i
popoli?
Sull'oppressione del più forte sul più debole? Sulla guerra, sui
bombardamenti? Sul "Tu devi fare quello che dico io"? Ancora no, tutto
il
contrario.
Perciò un'associazione come la nostra, con quale spirito e atteggiamento
deve venire da voi? Poco è l'aiuto economico che possiamo darvi: qualche
borsa di studio a bambini e ragazzi più bisognosi. Ma grande è
l'amicizia
reciproca: a poco a poco ci siamo affezionati a voi, e voi ci
riconoscete
come vostri fratelli.
Speriamo proprio che in un futuro non lontano potrete ricostruire la
vostra
Nazione, la vostra economia, così da non aver più bisogno di aiuti
"materiali". Quando ciò sarà ce lo direte voi stessi. Continueremo certo
a
venire da voi, ma per riabbracciarvi, per bere insieme un po' di rakja,
che
è molto buona; e voi ci ricambierete le visite, e berrete insieme a noi
il
nostro vino, che è esso pure molto buono.
Lunedì 23 ottobre- Jelena Simovic (Direttrice della O.S."Nikola Tesla",
Backa Topola)
Abbiamo attraversato tante situazioni problematiche in questi ultimi
dieci anni, che la parola "Speranza" è diventata un'astrazione. Ciò che
è
vero è vero. La nostra vita non è [adesso] né migliore né più facile. La
Vojvodina, il granaio della Jugoslavia, rischia la rovina, dato che
l'intera
produzione agricola sta attraversando un periodo estremamente negativo.
Grano, mais, barbabietole da zucchero, patate, frutta: peggio di così
non si
era mai visto.
A causa della mancata accumulazione di riserve, delle condizioni
tecniche
obsolete, dello sciopero dei minatori, abbiamo gravi problemi anche con
l'elettricità. Attualmente la sua erogazione è razionata: quattro ore si
e
sei no. Le candele sono l'articolo più venduto, proprio come il pane. Di
conseguenza c'è un altro grave problema: il riscaldamento. Le scuole
stanno
al freddo, per mancanza di carbone, di gasolio e di corrente elettrica.
Il tutto è aggravato dal cambiamento a livello di governo locale, tra
i
cui compiti dovrebbe esservi appunto il riscaldamento delle scuole. I
nuovi
amministratori hanno bisogno di tempo per acquisire capacità (forse
all'inizio, forse per sempre) per organizzare questo importante lavoro.
Il costo della vita cresce di giorno in giorno. La nafta del 50%. E'
vero
che adesso è disponibile alle stazioni di servizio, ma se i nostri
stipendi
medi sono di 70 DM, non è possibile spenderne 40 per rifornirsi di
gasolio
per tutto il mese (parlo di 40 litri) [La signora Simovic sta
evidentemente
riferendosi alle "pompe" statali, dove il carburante è contingentato e
non
si trova mai; non a quelle private, dove si trova, ma un litro di
gasolio
costa DM 1,5/1,6 e uno di benzina DM 2, cioè rispettivamente, lire
1.500/1.600 e lire 2000].
L'olio da cucina costa il 100% in più; il prezzo dei trasporti è
cresciuto del 50%, il latte del 50%, la carne dal 50% in su. Il pane
costa 8
dinari nei forni privati, 10 in quelli statali.
Stipendi e salari sono sempre gli stessi, tranne che nelle fabbriche,
dove i direttori li aumentano per paura dei sindacati (ma per molti
direttori fedeli all'ex governo si può ormai parlare soltanto di ex
accordi
con i sindacati).
Viaggiare con l'autobus costa troppo. Col treno, significa subire
forti
ritardi. Accade spesso che un treno passeggeri addirittura non parta, e
che
occorra aspettare la partenza di quello successivo,
per ore e ore.
Un marco tedesco (DM) è cambiato attualmente a 30 dinari (cambio
ufficiale). Io personalmente sono contraria all'affermarsi di valute
straniere qui da noi; preferirei un dinaro più forte e stabile.
Per molte famiglie è difficile mandare i figli a scuola. Libri,
quaderni
e soprattutto vestiti decenti, costano molto. La scuola si sforza sempre
di
organizzare iniziative finalizzate all'acquisto di libri e quaderni a
condizioni migliori: così, in febbraio, partiremo con un'iniziativa per
acquistare libri in tre rate. In aprile faremo lo stesso per i quaderni.
Così tutto è pronto perché entro la fine dell'anno scolastico corrente,
almeno il 90% degli alunni possa beneficiare di questo acquisto rateale
per
l'anno scolastico prossimo. Aiutiamo anche gli alunni profughi e poveri
con
libri e quaderni gratuiti.
La situazione dei profughi è estremamente dura. Nella nostra zona ne
sono
venuti almeno 3.000. Molti di loro trovano sistemazione presso parenti,
ma
circa 500 stanno in "centri collettivi", in pessime condizioni. Tutto è
problema per loro: cibo, riscaldamento, vestiario: Molte persone in una
sola
stanza; un bagno per molte persone. Non hanno ancora alcuna speranza di
tornare alle terre d'origine, di riavere le loro case, gli appartamenti,
i
campi che loro coltivavano in proprio..
Io sono felice che molta buona gente italiana abbia comprensione per
le
sofferenze del mio popolo e specialmente per i profughi. Grazie a Dio
abbiamo un'associazione come ABC, gente onesta, che ci dà l'anima e il
cuore. Con il sostegno dei donatori italiani, aiutano in Serbia circa
600
bambini e ragazzi con borse di studio, di cui vivono anche le loro
famiglie.
Fidiamo molto nella loro amicizia, sperando che questi tempi duri e
difficili finiranno un bel giorno, e che riusciremo a sopravvivere, come
sempre. Non crediamo nei governi europei. Stanno in ginocchio di fronte
agli
USA. Come hanno potuto permettere il bombardamento di un Paese vicino,
di
una nazione europea storicamente e culturalmente ricca. Le loro bombe,
le
bombe americane, ci hanno avvelenato tutti, i serbi e gli altri europei.
Tutti gli europei dovrebbero stringersi insieme, forti della loro
civiltà e
della loro storia. Gli USA dovrebbero esser messi in condizione di
bussare
alla porta dell'Europa con grande rispetto, come alla porta di una
vecchia
"Lady". Io non credo buona alcuna strada di accodamento agli USA.
Dobbiamo
avere una strada europea e un progresso europeo. Non dobbiamo credere ai
buoni propositi e ai fini umanitari americani. Dove arrivano, cominciano
le
guerre: E poi (quale cinismo!) gli interventi umanitari per aiutare la
povera gente. Preferiamo rimanere poveri che essere aiutati in questa
maniera. Rispettiamo gli amici veri e speriamo, con loro, di rimanere
tali
per sempre!
Lunedi 23 ottobre: Zeljko (da tempo direttore dell'AIK - "Agricoltura
Industria Kombinat" - e maggior esponente della comunità serba,
minoritaria
a Backa Topola). In questa cittadina il sindaco è tradizionalmente
ungherese, e il presidente del Consiglio comunale - precisamente, fino a
poco tempo fa, l'ing. Zeljko - un serbo. L'ingegnere era particolarmente
risentito - diciamo pure che era furibondo - per come sono andate le
elezioni presidenziali nella sua città e in altre vicine, dalla stessa
composizione etnica a maggioranza ungherese. Per i serbi, si è creato un
problema nuovo: o votare "da serbi", ma allora per il partito socialista
di
Milosevic, come facevano da tempo; ovvero votare "da democratici", ma
allora, non avendo localmente un partito democratico proprio, votare per
il
più moderato dei due partiti ungheresi. Risultato: i serbi hanno perso
ogni
posizione di potere nel Consiglio comunale, e rischiano di perdere la
loro
stessa identità politica.
Mercoledì 25 ottobre: Ruzica Milosavljevic (dirigente dell'
"Organizzazione
sindacale unitaria" - alla "Zastava", Kragujevac)
Il prossimo inverno sarà il più difficile di questi ultimi dieci
anni.
Il nostro sistema energetico è stato distrutto dai bombardamenti. Noi
abbiamo cominciato a ricostruire secondo priorità essenziali, ma in
mancanza
di investimenti, non abbiamo potuto fare tutto il necessario. Perciò, a
causa del maggior carico invernale, si è prodotta una caduta energetica
con
erogazione di elettricità interrotta per quattro o sei ore consecutive;
altri giorni abbiamo elettricità per due ore, poi per altre sei, e così
via.
Ciò si riflette sulla produzione industriale, che non può funzionare
regolarmente. Anche la vita quotidiana è più difficile: già si comincia
a
sentire il freddo nelle case e nelle scuole. Le riserve di gas sono al
minimo; la Russia non ce ne manda perché non abbiamo pagato i debiti
contratti al riguardo.
Nelle scuole, causa mancanza di riscaldamento e minor numero di ore
di
luce solare, le lezioni sono state ridotte a mezz'ora ciascuna (il
secondo
turno deve terminare alle 17). A casa, poi, gli alunni fanno i compiti
con
la candela, come durante i bombardamenti.
A causa delle quotidiane interruzioni di corrente, gli
elettrodomestici
[chiamati complessivamente, in Serbia, "Bela Tehnika", cioè "Tecnica
bianca"], generalmente vecchi di quindici anni, si guastano spesso, ed è
difficile ripararli; impossibile, nelle attuali condizioni, comprarne di
nuovi.
Siamo già stati avvertiti che, ciò nonostante, il prezzo della
corrente
elettrica sarà aumentato del 25%. Non so come la potranno pagare i
moltissimi lavoratori forzatamente a casa. Hanno accumulato debiti per
l'elettricità, ma anche per l'acqua. Ogni tanto gliele staccano per
qualche
giorno, più che altro come avvertimento; poi interviene il sindacato
sugli
Enti fornitori. Ma nessuno sa come pagare i debiti, ed è diffuso il
timore
che una volta o l'altra questa relativa tolleranza finisca. Non parliamo
poi
dell'affitto di casa, per tanti lavoratori al salario minimo garantito,
corrispondente a 15.000 lire italiane.
I prezzi aumentano ogni giorno; l'inflazione pure: il cambio di un
DM è
di 30 dinari.
Il regime precedente riusciva a mantenere la pace sociale mediante il
prezzo politico del pane, del latte, di altri generi di prima necessità.
Un
mese fa un kg. di zucchero costava 8 dinari; adesso 30. Un litro di olio
16
dinari, adesso 55. E così via [per prezzo "politico" s'intende quello
da
rifornimento statale, peraltro saltuario]. Prima la frutta e la verdura
non
erano care, ma adesso si fanno sentire gi effetti della siccità [che
durava
ancora, da mesi, quando siamo arrivati, e ha ceduto il posto ad
abbondante
pioggia, almeno in Vojvodina ma speriamo anche altrove, il giorno della
nostra partenza].
Quanto costa mandare un bambino a scuola. Circa 8-900 dinari per
zainetto, libri, quaderni, matite. I libri non si possono comprare
usati,
per molte materie per le quali sono da fare esercizi comportanti il
riempire
a penna una o più pagine, lezione per lezione
Alla "Zastava" siamo molto preoccupati di non poter portare a termine
il
programma di ricostruzione. A livello della Repubblica, è stata
completata
la prima fase della ricostruzione industriale ed era cominciata la
seconda.
Previsto, subito dopo, l'inizio della terza, e quindi una ripresa e un
aumento della produzione industriale per l'anno prossimo. Questo
pogramma è
stato sospeso dal nuovo governo.
Attualmente sono stabilite le seguenti priorità, nell'ordine:
polizia,
esercito, programma sociale e sanitario. L'industria è al sesto posto. I
nuovi dirigenti della "Zastava" hanno approvato un nuovo programma,
basandosi su una forte somma che dovrebbe essere stanziata entro la fine
dell'anno; ma non sappiamo se ciò si dimostrerà realizzabile.
Loro intanto, alla "Zastava", avevano ripreso la produzione [noi di
ABC
avevamo visto funzionare, già nel maggio scorso, il reparto automobili],
ma
c'è l'intralcio delle interruzioni di corrente elettrica. Nei reparti
non
c'è riscaldamento, dipendiamo dalla temperatura esterna, quindi non
possiamo
essere ottimisti.
Tutti aspettano le elezioni di dicembre [parlamentari], e ciò fa
dimenticare i problemi reali; quindi la "Zastava" non potrà compiere il
proprio programma, che era finanziato dal governo. Non potremo ottenere
finanziamenti per pagare gli operai e un programma sociale. I nuovi
dirigenti hanno accettato di continuare il programma stabilito, ma non
si sa
da dove devono arrivare i soldi. Si aspettano interventi dall'estero,
mentre
la "Zastava" ha fretta .
L'eventualità di investimenti esteri è reale. La fabbrica delle auto,
che
assorbe la maggior parte dei dipendenti, ha contattato tutti i più
grossi
produttori mondiali, ottenendo solo promesse di collaborazione futura,
"dichiarazioni d'intenti". Avevamo avuto offerte da ditte estere
riguardanti
la "componentistica" (principalmente, appunto, nel ramo automobili), ma
tutto è rimasto per aria a causa delle sanzioni. Speriamo che nel
prossimo
futuro si faranno discorsi concreti. Alcune ditte ci hanno avvertito che
verranno, ma il nuovo presidente del gruppo "Zastava", Savicevic, ha
detto
che con gli accordi col capitale straniero si andrà più piano, che
dovremo
programmare vetture più moderne. Esse sono state presentate a Belgrado,
Zagabria e Skoplje.
Sempre resistenti, duri da piegare, i lavoratori della "Zastava"
erano
già avanti nel realizzare il sogno della ricostruzione. Speriamo
verranno
tempi migliori. Ci spaventa solo la possibilità che lavoratori ridotti a
condizioni di povertà non perdano la pazienza e diano luogo a una
rivolta
sociale. Speriamo che questo inverno potremo sopravvivere, grazie agli
aiuti
e alle donazioni degli amici italiani (e tedeschi). Dovreste vedere la
felicità delle famiglie quando ricevono lettere dall'Italia.
Giovedì 26 ottobre, mattina - gruppo di donne rimaste dopo la
distribuzione
delle borse di studio al "Nezavisni Sindikat" di Kragujevac e di
Kraljevo-
Una di esse ci tiene a darci nome e cognome: Gordana Cosic.
Sperano che l'inverno sarà migliore di come si sta profilando.
Aspettano che dalle nuove autorità e dagli aiuti internazionali vengano
i
mezzi per un inverno sopportabile: gas, combustibile, elettricità. La
comunità internazionale non può tirarsi indietro. Attualmente hanno
riserve
di gas cittadino solo per 10-15 giorni, arrivate dall'Ungheria. Non è
certo
una soluzione di lungo periodo.
Il Paese è nel disastro economico. Occorrono aiuti non solo per il
riscaldamento, ma per tutto: viveri, medicine. Per l'elettricità, prima
ci
aiutavano Grecia, Romania e Bulgaria. Dalla Russia, solo promesse.
In una famiglia con un membro laureato, lo stipendio medio è di 80
DM
(2400) dinari. Per una famiglia operaia, la metà. Il salario minimo
garantito è pari a 12 DM (360 dinari).
Un kg. di zucchero costa 35-45 dinari, di pane 8-10 din.; un lt. di olio
50
din.; la carne da 300 in su.
Le scarpe da bambino costano 50 DM, da uomo 50-100 DM, un maglione
10-20. Tutto ciò è quindi fuori portata di una tasca media. Soprattutto
è
grave che manchino le medicine.
Loro saranno contenti se alla "Zastava" comincerà una produzione
con
capitale estero. Loro sanno fare tutto, ma non hanno capitali. Bisogna
cambiare i direttori dei vari rami produttivi, che hanno distrutto ciò
che
era rimasto. Ma durante la notte non si può fare niente, bisogna
aspettare.
I vecchi dirigenti hanno grandi colpe, non tutti, ma molti di loro erano
dei
disonesti. Quelli che non hanno fatto niente di male, rimangano pure.
Come
direttore generale hanno messo un esponente della coalizione DOS: era
stato
direttore di complessi alberghieri. Per questo era molto noto in Europa.
Loro non accettano le "Unità di crisi". Ha ragione Kostunica: tutti
gli
aspiranti a cariche direttive vadano in tribunale a far controllare la
loro
onestà e idoneità. Nel campo culturale, ad esempio, dieci anni fa il
museo
d'arte di Belgrado ha cambiato direttore, che aveva portato artisti da
tutto
il mondo. Adesso da dieci anni è senza lavoro. Ha pubblicato molti
libri, ne
scriverà uno anche per italiani. Si chiama Zoran Gavric: scriverà una
monografia sul famoso pittore francese Marcel Duchamp. Le persone come
lui
vengono reintegrate dalla coalizione DOS nelle loro primitive funzioni.
26 ottobre- pomeriggio- Prof. Veroljub Dugalic, presidente del "Gruppo
G.17
Plus" - Come ci ha spiegato, il gruppo ha carattere umanitario ma anche
una
valenza genericamente politica di opposizione al vecchio regime e quindi
di
adesione alla coalizione DOS. Il nome si spiega col fatto che ai soci
fondatori, 17 economisti, si sono poi aggiunti numerosi professionisti
di
altri rami.
Riferiamo quanto ci ha detto, secondo l'ordine da lui spontaneamente
seguito.
Il governo di Svezia ha stanziato un milione di DM all'anno, per
borse
di studio destinate a 1000 studenti universitari in tutta la Serbia, dei
quali 700 a Kragujevac. A questa città giungono aiuti anche da Germania
e
Norvegia. Sono arrivate da poco 320 tonnellate di bitume, sufficienti
per
aggiustare 150 km. di strade. L'anno scorso veniva nafta da Venezia,
quest'anno niente. Adesso, però, la cosa più importante sono le
medicine. La
loro ricezione è già pronta.
Il prossimo inverno sarà molto difficile. Se non arrivano la nafta,
l'elettricità, ecc., i problemi saranno molto gravi. Abbiamo avuto tante
promesse: ma la gente non vede ancora miglioramenti concreti, e qualcuno
comincia a dire: "era meglio prima...". Sono urgenti aiuti umanitari di
emergenza.
E' importante continuare la collaborazione con l'Italia. I serbi da
dieci anni sono isolati. La produzione è a terra. L'industria lavora al
ritmo di 1/3 rispetto a dieci anni fa.
Lo stipendio medio è pari a 60-70 DM. Kruscevac, Kragujevac, Nis
sono
città che stanno certamente male. Ma altre città della Serbia
meridionale
stanno ancora peggio: più profughi e minore sviluppo. Nis ha avuto
l'industria del tabacco [la fabbrica è attualmente distrutta], Vranje
quella
dei mobili, ma in altri posti della Serbia meridionale non c'è quasi
niente.
Annoso problema dell'industria di Nis: esportavano prodotti da
varie
fabbriche in Slovenia, Macedonia, Croazia, Bosnia: questo adesso non c'è
più. Per mancanza di capitali e di sbocchi di mercato, ora tutti i
maggiori
sistemi industriali sono fermi. Non possiamo fare più niente senza
capitale
estero. Ci servono investitori seri.
Gli aiuti che ci servono comportano due tempi: nell'immediato, gli
aiuti
umanitari più urgenti; più in là investimenti, con interesse reciproco.
Certo, la nostra tecnologia è troppo vecchia, ma abbiamo il capitale
umano.
Inoltre, chi investisse adesso in Serbia non vi troverebbe concorrenti.
L'opposizione democratica ha vinto. Le porte sono aperte al
cambiamento:
c'è da fare il primo passo, il più difficile. Ma adesso debbono venire
aiuti
umanitari al più presto, altrimenti la gente si stanca, non vedendo
cambiamenti reali.
La popolazione - giova insistere - è stanca di soffrire, spera nel
cambiamento. Ma una riconversione dell'economia richiede del tempo. Per
il
momento ci servono aiuti immediati; da parte nostra abbiamo fatto tutto
ciò
che era necessario per averli, ma la comunità internazionale deve
accelerare
i tempi. Le cose elementari della vita, dal cibo alla corrente
elettrica,
alle medicine, ci servono subito.
Sabato 28 ottobre- Il pensionato Jovan ci riceve nella stanzetta in cui
vive, da solo. C'è appena spazio per il letto, un tavolo con sedie, una
cucina e una stufa a carbone. La sua pensione - ci dice - è
relativamente
buona, pari a 60 marchi al mese, cioè 1800 dinari. Quale paniere di beni
ci
può comprare in un mese?
Ci pensa su, prende carta e matita e ci scrive questo elenco: 300 dinari
per
il pane, 110 per l'olio, 90 per lo zucchero, 250 per la carne, 120 per
medicine, 300 per la stufa a carbone, 250 per l'elettricità, 100 per
caffè e
thè, 60 per i trasporti, 200 spese varie, 20 per tasse. Non c'è da stare
allegri, commenta, ma c'è chi sta peggio di me.
Giovedì 2 novembre- Sulla via del ritorno, ci fermiamo nuovamente alla
scuola primaria di Backa Topola. Parliamo a lungo con la signora
Smiljana
Krkovic, insegnante di matematica e fisica, profuga da Glina (Croazia).
Per
l'80% della popolazione serba - ci dice - si prospetta un inverno duro,
per
le lunghe interruzioni di corrente elettrica, loro fonte principale di
riscaldamento, il vestiario non abbastanza pesante, spesso scarpe rotte,
e
così via. Non dubita della buona volontà del nuovo governo di risolvere
questa drammatica situazione, ma senza adeguate risorse finanziarie, non
vede come sia possibile.
Il costo della vita è aumentato notevolmente dal periodo delle
elezioni
ad oggi. Sia i produttori che i commercianti approfittano del carattere
transitorio e non ancora consolidato della situazione politica. Il nuovo
governo non è ancora in grado di controllare gli aumenti, davvero
eccessivi,
dei prezzi dei generi alimentari e non solo. Siamo quasi a livelli di
fame.
Riguardo al rapporto fra marco tedesco e dinaro, pensa che il
cambio
ufficiale di 1 a 30 corrisponda a quello reale, poiché l'economia è in
pezzi. Spera che in futuro si arriverà a un rapporto di 1 a 3.
La maggior parte degli alunni della scuola rientra nella fascia
della
popolazione che può considerarsi povera, e che comprende circa l'80% del
totale. Spesso li vede seguire le lezioni non motivati, perché denutriti
e
vestiti in modo non adeguato alle temperature della regione. Hanno
l'indispensabile di libri, quaderni e altro materiale scolastico, ma
abbisognano di manuali per le esercitazioni di matematica, fisica,
chimica e
varie altre materie, nonché di vocabolari per le lingue straniere e di
testi
letterari.
Il personale docente non si trova certo in una situazione migliore:
gli
insegnanti non hanno stipendi sufficienti e, per sopravvivere, sono
costretti a svolgere anche altri lavori, a discapito della scuola.
Molto doloroso è il problema dei profughi. Anche lei appartiene a questa
categoria, da ben cinque anni. Abbiamo alloggi precari - ci dice. In 15
famiglie, 50 persone in tutto, siamo sistemati in una baracca di legno
con
15 stanze, il che vuol dire che ogni famiglia abita in una stanzetta non
più
ampia di 16 mq. Abbiamo in comune 3 WC e una doccia. In un corridoio
sono
ammassati legna, viveri in scatola, ecc. Abbiamo avuto dall'Italia,
tramite
l'UNHCR [Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati], una
lavatrice, un frigorifero e un congelatore. Ciascuna famiglia può
utilizzare
la lavatrice ogni otto giorni. Abbiamo anche una cucina elettrica, ma il
problema maggiore è farsi la doccia: ci tocca riscaldare l'acqua in
pentoloni. Ogni famiglia ha lettini da campo, un armadio di metallo, un
tavolo e un paio di sedie. Su quello stesso tavolo si prepara il cibo,
si
mangia, si studia, si fanno i compiti.
Quasi nessuno dei profughi è tornato a casa propria in Croazia,
perché
lì di dire di essere serbo uno non se lo può nemmeno sognare. E poi
anche lì
la situazione economica è degradata, c'è molta disoccupazione: per un
serbo,
trovare lavoro sarebbe ancora più difficile. Per un insegnante, ci
sarebbe
ben poco da fare, dato che gli alunni croati debbono avere soltanto
insegnanti croati. Molti profughi sono stati costretti ad andare a
vivere in
Paesi lontani: Canada, Australia, USA, Svezia, e qualcuno anche in
Italia.
Alcuni sono morti di nostalgia, altri per il dolore di aver perduto i
loro
beni, la loro dignità; altri ancora sono finiti in ospedali
psichiatrici.
La gente è sempre più alla ricerca quotidiana di come sopravvivere,
e
per molti ciò significa essere psicologicamente a rischio. E' anche
vero,
però, che noi serbi sappiamo adattarci a qualunque situazione. E' la
nostra
grande risorsa: saper scherzare su noi stessi anche nei momenti più
difficili. Moltissimi serbi, oramai, hanno toccato il fondo, ma non
hanno
perso la speranza di tornare a galla.
L'Europa può aiutarci molto a rimetterci in piedi. L'aiuto
principale
dovrebbe essere un contributo serio alla riattivazione della nostra
economia. Molti Paesi europei sono in debito con noi, dovrebbero darci
una
mano a ricostruire ciò che hanno distrutto con i bombardamenti.
Penso che la Serbia appartenga all'Europa non solo geograficamente,
ma
con la sua civiltà, il suo patrimonio culturale, con la sua gente
laboriosa
e con la nuova generazione di giovani che riesce a superare così dure
prove.
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"La sinistra italiana e i nuovi Hitler"
articolo apparso su Aginform n.14 (ottobre 2000)
e' leggibile alla URL:
http://www.pasti.org/hitler.htm
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Italian Interests and Policies
in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans
Lieutenant General Carlo Jean
Introductory Remarks
Italy and Central-Eastern Europe
History's Weight and Opportunities
Political and Security Interests
Economic Interests
Conclusions
Summary
Introductory Remarks
When speaking of national interests, it may be advisable to provide a
precise definition of the phrase. By its nature, its meaning is
ambiguous,
so that this expression used to be censored and banned from the Italian
public debate. However, the phrase "national interests" refers to a
crucial concept which, at least implicitly, lays at the very basis of
any
foreign policy goal.
Interests are not objective or deterministic, although they are defined
on
the basis of domestic and international influence and opportunities as
well as on strong and weak points both of a material character and
relating to the political and institutional systems. Opting for one
particular interest or policy means giving up other interests and
policies. Political, diplomatic, economic and military resources are
always limited. Therefore, an interest cannot merely be defined in
absolute terms. It must also be viewed in comparative terms. In defining
national interests and policies, the availability of adequate resources
to
implement them must be taken into consideration. An interest is such
only
if it can be achieved. If not, it is a mere wish or just empty talk.
Moreover, interests are influenced by the time factor. Short-term
interests usually differ and sometimes widely diverge from long-term
ones.
The present concurrence of radical geo-political, demographic, social
and
technological changes has dramatically accelerated the pace of domestic
and international developments. Therefore, global and long-term
forecasts
and projects have acquired a far more crucial significance than they
used
to have. Italian politics must widen its time horizon through adequate
institutional reforms, and the various Ministries involved in foreign
policy must improve their forecast, planning and inter-sectorial
cooperation capabilities. The planned institutional reforms - such as
the
proposed Foreign Ministry reform and the creation of a foreign policy
planning and coordination body at the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers - seem to indicate that the Italian situation in this respect
may rapidly improve.
This essay focuses on Central Europe and the Balkans only. However,
since,
as it was mentioned above, interests and policies have a global
character,
Italy's future prospects, vocations, limits and potential capabilities
are
shortly outlined in order to provide the wider context needed to fully
understand sectorial and regional evaluations. A brief account of past
Italian policies in the area is also provided, because historical
experience is bound to affect present perceptions in Italy, Central
Europe
and the Balkans. An evaluation of Italy's security and economic
interests
follows. Lastly, the potentials of the policies Italy can implement are
analysed, with special reference to the Central European Initiative,
which
Italy identified as a key component of its "Ostpolitik" at the Graz,
November 6-8 1996 meeting.
Italy and Central-Eastern Europe
A cursory glance at a geographical map conveys the impression that Italy
is a Mediterranean country or, at least, a Southern European country, an
appendix of Central Europe. Some even claim Italy's "insularity" and -
although not going so far as to propose a revival of the "mare nostrum"
concept - state that Italy's national identity can find its full
expression in the Mediterranean only. According to this approach, the
Balkans and Southern-Eastern Europe belong to the East rather than to
the
West or, at least, to a gray area between the two.
However, if physical geography and historical reminiscences of the Roman
Empire, the sea-faring Republics and the Middle Ages are put aside and
if
the present and possible future fluxes are taken into consideration -
that
is, if a geopolitical approach is adopted - the resulting evaluation is
quite different. Italy is a European rather than a Mediterranean, a
continental rather than a maritime country. Its weak and its strong
points
in the Mediterranean (merely in terms of foreign trade shares) clearly
indicate that it has a role in the South only because it belongs to the
North. The huge problems and conflicts in the Mediterranean are
incompatible with Italy's limited political, economic and military
resources. Italy can play a role in the area only by taking part in
common
initiatives within a EU and NATO framework. The Mediterranean is
extremely
important and even crucial for Italy, from the points of view of
non-military threats (e.g. migration waves), of its energy sources and
of
the economic prospects offers. However, Italy will be able to exploit
these opportunities to the full only when the cost of labour in Eastern
Europe will increase to the point that Italian companies will be induced
to transfer their labour-intensive productions southwards. In turn, such
a
development will be possible only if this latter area offers acceptable
stability conditions. If not, there will be no alternative but a
separation policy, i.e. a Bysantium-style grand policy rather than a
Roman-style grand policy based on cooperation and integration.
Whilst Central-Eastern Europe and, in the longer run, the Balkans, are
bound to become fully integrated in the Western system - since this
process is but a "return to Europe", as Milan Kundera defined it - the
South has much fewer integration prospects. Whilst the East wants to be
absorbed into the West, the South claims its own identity and cultural
specificity as distinct from and even in conflict with the West. Since
it
will never become a part of Europe, it cannot achieve as much importance
as Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Although Eastern Europe's problems are admittedly serious, the Middle
Eastern and North African ones are far worse. Since Italy's resources
are
limited, it has no choice but to take part in common initiatives within
Europe and NATO (Barcelona, MENA Economic Summit, CSCM, PFM, etc.). In
this respect, the main risk for Italy is being isolated or marginalized
in
the Mediterranean, although the present situation is quite different
from
that of the period when the slogan "let us cling to the Alps" was
popular.
Should Europe be dominated, in the future, by the so-called "Weimar
triangle" (France, Germany and Poland), with which Spain is apparently
developing increasingly close links, the consequences for Italy might be
much more disastrous than those of its exclusion from the Contact Group
for the former Yugoslavia - which may even have been a piece of luck,
because it has left a larger room for manoeuvre to Italy or, at least,
has
dissociated Italy from the meager results of the former.
On the other hand, in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, Italy
has
greater competitive advantages (for instance, as far as the volume of
foreign trade is concerned, it ranks second in the former area rather
than
fourth as in the Mediterranean). Since the end of the Cold War, Italy
has
rediscovered the geo-politics of pre-unitarian states and, especially,
their links to Central-Eastern Europe, Russia and Ukraine. The Adriatic
Sea is turning into a kind of internal lake connecting the Italian
Peninsula with the Balkans. Moreover, it is becoming the only route -
apart from the Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest axis - leading to
Central-Eastern Europe.
As was authoritatively stated, "the European circle remains our priority
and implies a twofold line of deepening the Union and widening it to the
East". The strategic priority in Italy's foreign policy lies in Central
Europe and in the Balkans. This objective must be transformed into a
real
"Italian Ostpolitik". Priorities must be global. Convergent - and
therefore compatible - policies must be defined in the various sectors.
Furthermore, Italy is a medium power. Therefore, it cannot confine
itself
to implementing a regional policy, as it may have done in the past. It
has
global interests, and it must pursue them by exploiting its potential,
which is undoubtedly greater in trade than in the political or military
sectors. Strengthening its relations with Eastern Europe may enable
Italy
to play a greater role in Europe, especially in view of EU's
enlargement.
In this respect, we do not share the frequently voiced opinion that the
"loss of a barycentre", that is, EU's and NATO's enlargement to Northern
Central Europe alone, must be regretted. We believe that this
enlargement
may be beneficial for Italy, provided that it succeeds in replacing the
ecumenist and Third-worldist aspirations marking its foreign policy
rethorics and a large part of the domestic political background, with a
comprehensive, consistent definition of Italy's interests and policies
towards Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and that adequate
efforts,
resours and political attention are devoted to their implementation.
These
interests don’t consist in the creation of a political sphere of
influence, but in the economic integration not only to expand the
Italian
economy, but most importantly to increase the stability in an area
strictly linked to the Italian security. For this reason Italy strongly
supports the rapid entering of Slovenia and Romania in the Atlantic
Alliance and in the European Union. The Central European Initiative is
an
instrument to support the implementation of this goal.
History's Weight and Opportunities
In the Risorgimento, Italy entertained very close relations with the
national movements in the Balkans, in Hungary and in Poland, as shown by
the number of volunteers from these countries who fought in the
Risorgimento wars and by the number of Italian volunteers who fought in
these countries' wars of independence. In the aftermath of World War I,
the Italian nationalist movement squandered this capital of friendly
relations.
Ironically, Italy's policy towards the former Yugoslavia has always
displayed a quality of contrariness: it was inflexible and aggressive
when
Yugoslavia was strong and enjoyed large international support, and it
was
hesitant and conciliatory when Yugoslavia was weak and isolated. In the
first post-war period, Italy backed Croat and Macedonian secessionism,
thus weakening Yugoslavia which, on the other hand, was a key element in
the balances developed in the Versailles and Trianon Treaties. It
supported Bulgaria and especially Hungary, that is, the countries which
wanted to change the status quo. It tried to compete with Germany's
penetration into the Danube and Balkan regions and backed Austria's
independence, thus helping to destabilize the European balances. As a
consequence, it became a vassal of Germany's and several of its
North-Eastern provinces were absorbed into the German Reich.
In the second post-war period, the situation improved considerably after
the territorial dispute with Yugoslavia was solved, especially with the
1975 Osimo Treaty. Relations with Belgrade were rapidly intensified, and
not only in the economic field. They also extended to politico-strategic
relations, since Yugoslavia had the role of a rampart between Italy and
the Warsaw Pact and helped maintaining stability in the Balkans, thus
increasing Italy's weight within NATO. Moreover, better relations with
Yugoslavia also brought about domestic benefits, since they made it
easier
to accept the defeat in the war and, especially, helped to create
cohesion
among the domestic political forces, and to ease clashes between the
majority and the opposition on Italy's international position.
Relations to Central-Eastern European countries, and especially Hungary
and Poland, were just as well-developed. Regarding Czechoslovakia,
relations were initially strained by a few negative episodes, such as
Radio Prague's aggressiveness against Italy and allegations that the
Czech
secret service was colluding with Italian terrorist groups. Relations
with
Bulgaria suffered a setback after the attempt on the Pope's life. On the
other hand, in the 1980's relations to Poland, which were already
intensive, were greatly boosted by the presence of a Polish Pope and by
the support provided by the Italian Catholic groups and Trade Unions to
the Solidarity movement. The latter undoubtedly played an important role
in undermining the Soviet Empire in Central-Eastern Europe, and in
determining its eventual collapse.
During the Cold War, Italy entertained fairly intensive relations to
Romania, which claimed to belong to Europe because of its Latin, rather
than Slav and Orthodox, heritage and pursued a policy of national
independence, didn’t participate to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and
cooperated with Yugoslavia reinforcing its non-aligned status. As a
whole,
during the whole Cold War period, Italy's relations with Central-Eastern
Europe tended to intensify in periods of detente with the Soviet Union.
However, ties remained close also in periods of high East-West tensions.
The current role of Italy's presence in Central-Eastern Europe as a
whole
and the favour it generally enjoys in the region stems from Italy's
"mini-Ostpolitik", launched in the 1950's by Fanfani and Gronchi, much
earlier than the great German "Ostpolitik" of the 1970's and 1980's.
Until
the collapse of the "wall", these two policies always converged and
displayed interesting factors of complementarity and synergy.
The various initiative which were adopted within this context - such as
the inter-regional agreements of Alpe Adria, marked by a strong
involvement of Bavaria, and the accords which led to the 1989 Budapest
declaration, which created the Quadrangular alliance (Italy, Austria,
Hungary and Yugoslavia) and shifted cooperation onto government level -
played an important role in weakening the Soviet external Empire and in
paving the way for more intensive and fruitful cooperation initiatives
after 1989, when Europe's geo-political division ended.
Discrepancies started with the end of the Cold War and the increasingly
tangible prospects of German re-unification, which gave rise, in Italy,
to
exaggerated fears that Germany would acquire a hegemonic role in the
whole
area, undermining Italy's position. This scenario gave rise to rather
incongruous reactions, such as the attempt to counterbalance the Weimar
axis, i.e. the "Paris-Berlin-Warsaw" axis, by creating a "Barcelona
(sic!)-Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Kiev" axis. In this respect, an
"influence zone" concept was revived, according to which Italy and
Germany
were supposed to compete in the whole Danube-Carpatians area. It was
also
suggested that Italy might exploit the temporary weakening of Germany's
external-projection capabilities during its re-unification process in
order to consolidate its own position in the area.
At the outset, Italy mobilized considerable financial means to pursue
this
policy. However, the concept rapidly lost credibility when the
initiative
was extended north of the Danube, to the Baltic Sea. As Luigi Vittorio
Ferraris humorously put it, Italy was planning to build a Mitteleuropa
without Germany, which equated "making an omelet without eggs".
Yugoslavia's collapse as well as Italy's political and institutional
crisis and plummeting budgets greatly reduced the momentum of the
initiative, although it progressively expanded to reach its present 16
member and observer states.
Basically, the end of the Cold War and German re-unification have
radically changed the situation. Apparently, Italy has not yet fully
realized that it is one of the main "victors" of the Cold War and that
its
overall geo-political situation has altered with respect to the past,
not
only because of the collapse of its domestic "wall", but also because of
the vast opportunities that have opened in Eastern Europe. By
concentrating too much on its domestic problems and on its political and
institutional crisis, and by devoting too few attention and resources to
its foreign policy in what is a crucial period of transition in
Central-Eastern Europe, it runs the risk of losing vital opportunities
and
of reducing its role in the Western integration and stabilization of the
area.
The geo-political concepts of vital space, exclusive influence zones and
territorial expansion have lost all meanings. International economic and
political relations are no longer marked by a vertical and hierarchical
structure. At present, geo-politics is dominated by flows, rather than
by
space, and is marked by network structures. Each country's ability to
safeguard its own interests mainly depends on its involvement in the
networks and on its capability to attract flows. International relations
are no longer zero-sum games, and are increasingly becoming positive-sum
games. Contacts and cooperation have acquired decisive importance as
against competition for dominance and power. The new situation offers
vast
opportunities for Italy to develop its relations in the region.
Therefore,
Italy has a great interest in promoting the region's stability, order
and
development.
The definition of national interests and foreign policy options - also
in
the sector of military policy, either at national or multinational
level,
especially in European and NATO contexts - must be aimed at fully
exploiting Italy's potential in Central-Eastern Europe and in the
Balkans.
In this region, there are excellent conditions to develop cooperation
with
Germany, which shares Italy's interest in the rapid normalization and
integration of the whole area into the great Western institutions, such
as
the European Union and NATO. Italy's and Germany's "Ostpolitik" policies
would be enhanced by complementarity, rather than by competition.
However,
cooperation with Germany in Central-Eastern Europe requires that Germany
is prepared to pursue this line, which, for the time being, cannot be
taken for granted, although now all countries are following in the area
common European, rather than competitive national approaches.
Political and Security Interests
The disappearance of the Soviet threat has dramatically changed the
concept of security. Security does no longer imply defending one's
national territory against aggression. It involves maintaining stability
in order to enable Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans to achieve
political and economic integration into the European regional system. If
politico-strategical stability were not achieved, their integration
would
be unfeasible, because high political risks would make private
investments
too expensive and because no stable economic cooperation would be
possible.
This basic interest, which Italy can pursue only by cooperating with the
other European countries which share the same objectives, is made even
more crucial by the fact that an outbreak of ethnic and identity-based
conflicts and the deriving destabilization of the whole Balkanic area
may
result in uncontrollable migration tides and in an intensification of
fundamentalism and terrorism which are bound to directly involve Italy.
Lastly, this development might result in strife within the alliances in
which Italy is a member and, domestically, in tensions between ethical
and
humanitarian claims and the need for a "Realpolitik" which keeps into
account Italy's national priorities and scant public resources.
The need to prevent conflicts which would be bound to involve Italy also
stems from the country's political and military weakness, although so
far
Italy has erred on the side of caution, taking tardy and limited
actions.
In particular, Italy's refusal to take part in the British-French Rapid
Reaction Force seems wholly unjustified.
These problems do not confine themselves to the Balkans - from Bosnia to
Kosovo and Macedonia - whose conflicts may destabilize the whole
Adriatic
region and extend to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. Other
potential
dangers are the presence of Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia
and
Vojvodina and, although to a lesser extent, the tensions between Greece
and Turkey and between Bulgaria and Turkey.
Intensive Italian engagement in the multilateral actions organized to
solve these problems - both peace-supporting operations and political,
economic and humanitarian initiatives - can help maintain Italy's
presence
in the whole region, promote Italy's role in Europe, improve its tainted
national image and, more practically, safeguard its national interests
in
the EU and in NATO.
In defining Italy's policy in the region, the key point to be considered
is the implementation of an order in former Yugoslavia which can be
maintained in the long run, after the withdrawal of Western forces from
Bosnia. At that date, the risk of conflicts breaking out in Kosovo,
which
implies even greater dangers for Italy, will increase. The problem,
however, reaches much further. It also involves NATO's and EU's eastward
enlargement as well as US-Russian relations and interests in the Balkans
and in Central-Eastern Europe as a whole. In this respect, short-term
interests often diverge from long-term ones, and sub-regional interests
often clash with regional or pan-European interests.
In the case of Bosnia, it is obvious that stability could have been
attained much more easily, in the short period, by partitioning Bosnia
between Serbia and Croatia or breaking it up into three ethnically
"pure"
states than by the Dayton solution of creating a multi-ethnic state
which
imposes coexistence on people who do not want to coexist. However, the
two
former options do not only clash with Western values and principles.
They
are also liable to fuel instability in the long period. A similar
discrepancy emerges as far as the debate on war criminals in Bosnia is
concerned. If NATO forces had been entrusted with the task of hunting
down
and arresting war criminals, attacks and retaliations would have
certainly
ensued, jeopardizing NATO's presence in Bosnia and, therefore, the
likelihood of putting a stop to the conflict. However, in the longer
period, only the arrest and the trial of war criminals by the Hague
Supreme High Court can be a decisive factor of stabilization. Should
local
courts submit war crinals to trial, their verdicts would be considered
biased and retaliatory and would trigger further reprisals or even
large-scale guerrilla and terrorist initiatives which have not yet taken
place in the former Yugoslavia.
It seems justified to accuse the international community of following an
inconsistent strategy, which is oriented to the long term
(multi-ethnical
Bosnia) on the one hand, and on the short period on the other (failed
arrest and trial of war criminals). However, it must be pointed out
that,
de facto, NATO has carefully avoided any decisive actions in issues
which
could help, at least theoretically, to create a really multi-ethnic
Bosnia, such as, for instance, the repatriation of refugees. In this
respect, doubts have emerged on whether implementing multiethnicity
really
is the truly objective of the international community.
Italy's action has been balanced. Its maintaining relations to Beograd
and
its refraining from the anti-Serb hysteria which marked many other
Western
states have been an advantage for the international community as a
whole.
Italy's line, far from deriving from Machiavellian considerations,
merely
stemmed from a pragmatic assessment that there were two options
available:
either imposing an international mandate on all the former Yugoslavia
for
an indefinite period of time, or seeking an agreement with all the
involved parties. Since the former option was wholly unrealistic, the
second was to be adopted. On the other hand, it must be highlighted that
many of the critics of the meetings between Italian Foreign Ministers
and
Serb President Slobodan Milosevic were the same people who greeted the
attack on Moscow's White House and the accession of Russia into the
Council of Europe! Should their motives be analysed, it might be
discovered that the "Idealpolitik" facade really concealed a
"Realpolitik".
Easing the international attitude towards the Serbs and promoting
Beograd's return into the European institutions, starting with OSCE and
the Central European Initiative, is not only in the Italian interest. It
can help ensuring long-term stability in the Balkans. The recent
anti-Milosevic demonstrations organized by students and workers in
Beograd, although unlikely to bring about a political change, are
helping
to improve the image of the Serb people, who used to be consistently
criminalized, in the eyes of the international public. This may provide
a
starting point to face Serbia's basic problems with realism - in the
style
launched by the American negotiator, Richard Holbrooke - and help it to
join Europe, to which it, too, belongs.
A plan which seems to completely fulfil the objective of stability in
the
Balkans is the so-called Euroslavia project. Its goal is not to impose
anything or to rebuild a new Yugoslavia, not even according to a smooth
confederation model. It aims at re-establishing economic relations among
the various Republics, promoting development in order to damp down the
conflict and preparing the whole area for association and, in the long
term, integration into the European Union. The direct or indirect
actions
which are being carried out by the Italian diplomacy to prevent a
conflict
in Kosovo should be comprised into this project, intensified and, if
possible, coordinated with similar US and EU initiatives.
Should the situation in Kosovo break down, a consequent mass migration
of
a few hundred thousand people might deteriorate the situation to
breaking
point throughout the Balkans. If the migrants flowed into Macedonia,
they
would destabilize the present situation there. If, on the other hand -
which is much more likely, since the Serbs would block all entries into
Macedonia to prevent the situation from worsening - the refugees headed
into Albania, they would trigger a "domino effect" resulting in an
immigrant tide to Apulia on a scale which would make the 1991 "invasion"
pale in comparison.
Besides pressurizing Beograd into accepting a reasonable and
internationally-guaranteed autonomy for Kosovo, there is an immediate
need
to start preparing for the worst case. It would be reasonable to draw
plans for an emergency logistic intervention and especially to promote
turistic development on the Albanian coast, in order to host possible
refugees in Albania and eventually repatriate them into their regions of
origin. The project may be funded through new allocations in line with
the
Italian Bill on Frontier Areas, which should be extended to the whole
Adriatic Sea, by relaunching the Adriatic Initiative and by coordinating
it with the Central European Initiative.
The Euroslavia and the Kosovo projects undoubtedly have an utmost
priority
and must be granted full political and financial support despite the
current budget difficulties. They are not merely to be viewed as
insurance
premiums. They are actual investments, since Italy has a strong
potential
interest in the development of these regions.
Another critical problem for Italy is NATO's - and, in the longer
period,
EU's - eastward enlargement. Actually, the enlargement is the only way
to
consolidate US presence and engagement in Europe, which are essential
both
to preserve balances in Europe and in the Mediterranean and to ensure
political and strategic links between the Mediterranean and Central
Europe. NATO's enlargement can increase internal stability, which is an
essential prerequisite for economic development, and can especially
prevent divergencies in the policies of the various Western European
states, such as those which had the well-known negative effects in
former
Yugoslavia. Rather than an enlargement proper, this process can be
defined
as the re-absorption into Europe of countries which had been separated
from it by the Cold War.
Whilst Germany has a direct interest in the enlargement of NATO to the
Visegrad countries, Italy attaches great importance to the accession of
Slovenia and Romania (and Bulgaria, if it applies) into NATO in the
first
group. Slovenia's membership is important in that this country provides
a
link between Italy and Hungary. The recent intensification in relations
among Italy, Slovenia and Hungary ("Trilateral") within the Central
European Initiative mirrors this basic Italian interest, which is shared
by Slovenia and Hungary. The same interest emerges in the Italian
Defence
Minister's proposal to create joint German-Italian units which should be
open for participation to Austria, Slovenia, Hungary and possibly the
Czech Republic. To date, Germany has not taken the proposal into
consideration, although its implementation would provide a clear signal
that it is not pursuing hegemonic interests in Eastern Europe. An
increased military cooperation has been therefore forecast in the
framework of the "Trilaterale".
Furthermore, Romania's accession into NATO would prevent Turkey from
being
isolated in the Black Sea region. On the other hand, its exclusion may
increase the existing tensions in the Hungarian minority in
Transylvania,
who would view it as a first step towards exclusion from Europe.
Logically, this interest should lead to greater Italian preparedness to
cooperate in the military sector, too. For instance, it should take part
more intensively in joint activities within NATO's "Partnership for
Peace"
project and, if necessary, provide additional funding to NATO's common
infrastructure programme. The latter should be coordinated with the
construction of the road and railway axes which are to link the Adriatic
Sea with Hungary on one side, Serbia and Romania on another and
Macedonia
and Bulgaria on a third side.
However, initiatives to prevent NATO's selective enlargement - which is,
in a certain sense, paradoxically, confined to the most stable
countries,
that is, to those which have less urgent need of NATO guarantees - from
creating insecurity and instability in the excluded applicants should be
implemented as soon as possible. The Central European Initiative may be
an
adequate forum to discuss these problems before they become explosive.
As
much is also proved by the fact that the Central European Initiative was
acknowledged to have the potential not merely to prepare Central and
Eastern European countries for prospective association and membership
into
the European Union, but also to implement security objectives typical of
OSCE, which took part in the November 1996 Graz meeting with observer
status.
Economic Interests
The economic importance of Central and Eastern Europe and of the Balkans
for Italy has recently been highlighted by the Agnelli Foundation in a
report of the series "Nuova Geoeconomia". Over time, the whole area is
bound to be associated and eventually integrated into the European
Union.
All the Italian Regions, and especially the Adriatic-rim ones, will
derive
great benefits from it. Integration is facilitated both by geographical
proximity and by similar basic values. The return to Europe is a central
goal for the peoples of Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans and
features in the political programmes of ruling and opposition parties
alike.
Italy has a strong interest in the rapid and full integration of the
whole area. Apart from obvious political and security reasons, its
economic position will become more competitive as a result. Small and
medium Italian companies have already shifted many sectors of production
which are labour-intensive or directed to the lower market niches in the
area. The flexibility of small and medium companies makes them
particularly able to penetrate and cooperate with the markets of the
area,
which are characterized by considerable fluctuations.
Regarding volume of trade, Italy ranks second after Germany in the
Eastern
European markets and first in the Balkanic peninsula and in
South-Eastern
Europe. Moreover, it has a strong potential to increase its trade in the
area. According to recent estimates, it may not only consolidate its
position, but also gain market shares as compared to Germany.
Italy will be able to fully exploit this trade potential only if it
steps
up its engagement in the sectors of development aid, public support to
exports, banking and insurance. Therefore, an important national
interest
- which, obviously, is not merely confined to Central-Eastern Europe and
the Balkans - is providing the "system-country" with adequate means to
face regional and global geo-economic competition. This objective can
only
be achieved by relinquishing Italy's conservative and obsolete welfare
state policy. This process is strongly supported by the present Italian
Government.
Italy's economic penetration in the area, too, is complementary, rather
than competitive, with Germany's. As a consequence, cooperative rather
than competitive policies may be pursued in the economic sector, too,
and
the two countries' initiatives may be coordinated both at a bilateral
level and within the EU and the world's economic institutions. The
spectre
of a Mitteleuropa viewed as Germany's exclusive influence and hegemony
area seems a myth with no real foundations.
The sector which deserves the most intensive and determined efforts is
that of large infrastructure projects - especially roads and railways,
but
also the ambitious project of a navigable waterway connecting the rivers
Isonzo and Danube. All these projects would connect the Adriatic Basin
with the Danube and, further eastward, with Ukraine and Russia. The
opening of the Rhein-Danube canal and the future opening of the
Danube-Oder waterway give a competitive edge to the North Sea and Baltic
harbours as against the Northern Adriatic ones. Moreover, the latter are
not yet coordinated so as to achieve economies of scale. In short, they
lag well behind as compared to the improvements in the transport system
north of the Alps.
Besides their economic role, infrastructure projects also have political
importance. For instance, the growth of Euroslavia is mainly based on
them. Clearly, Italy cannot sustain these projects alone, but should
promote them within the European Union. Visions and integrative
proposals
tailored to the specific situation of the Balkans and South-Eastern
Europe
are needed, as is already happening as far as Central Europe is
concerned.
Delays in this respect may undermine Italy's competitive advantages in
the
whole region.
Conclusions
So far, in Italy, the impact of the end of the Cold War and of the
deriving changes in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans has not
been
fully understood. As much has hampered a far-sighted definition of
Italy's
national interests and foreign policy regarding this region, which has a
crucial role for Italy because of its geographical proximity and of
Italy's intensive present and, especially, potential economic relations
with it.
These deficiencies have partly been determined by regional and local
pressure, especially regarding relations with former Yugoslav republics;
by Italy's political and institutional crisis, which has drawn attention
almost exclusively to domestic problems; by the fact that single issues
such as the problem of the properties of Istrian and Dalmatian exiles,
which, although undoubtedly important, should have been viewed within a
more far-sighted context, have been unduly exploited for domestic policy
objectives. In the recent past, the Italian diplomacy has found itself
in
the embarrassing situation of seeing Italy depicted as a potentially
destabilizing, revisionist state which wished to carry out an arrogant
power policy it could not afford unless at a very local level. Italy's
exclusion from the Contact Group undoubtely was partly due to its image
as
an overly ambitious country incapable of carrying out realistic and
long-term projects.
The "collapse of the wall" has radically changed the very foundations of
Italy's "Ostpolitik", the strategic role of the Balkans and the role of
the regional or bilateral initiatives in which Italy took part.
Only recently, a clearer perception of Italy's interests in the area and
a
greater coordination of Italy's, Germany's and Austria's policies has
apparently begun to emerge. Complementarity should be maximized in the
place of competition, both because the latter - being based on past
geo-political logics - would be ineffective, and because Italy does not
possess the means or the political and diplomatic capabilities to
compete
with Germany. At most, it can implement a disturbance policy and occupy
marginal political and market niches. However, the level of cooperation
between Rome and Bonn is not yet optimal, partly because the Italian
initiatives of the late 1980's and early 1990's were often presented as
endeavours to contain German penetration in the Balkans and in Central
Europe. Obviously, the results were far from brilliant, although -
luckily
- not totally disastrous.
The recent relaunching of the Central European Initiative, its linking
with the Adriatic, the Balkanic and the Black Sea initiatives, the
intensification of relations with Slovenia and Hungary, which should be
rapidly extended to Austria, and possibly Croatia, seem to give a more
realistic character to Italy's role in stabilizing the area and
especially
in preparing it for progressive integration into Europe. Only within
this
framework can Italy's roles and interests be defined in detail and
satisfactory solutions be found also for the still discussed problem of
the Italian minorities in Slovenia and Croatia. This issue cannot
possibly
be solved but through the consolidation of these countries' democratic
institutions and economies in view of their rapid integration into
Europe
and NATO.
Summary
>>From a merely geographical point of view, Italy may seem a Mediterranean
country, due to its marginal position to Central Europe. Actually,
however, if geo-political and geo-economic trends are taken into
consideration, it is a European rather than a Mediterranean country.
Trade
and economic integration with the East play a far greater role for Italy
than those with the South.
Because of its political and military weakness, Italy's role in the
Mediterranean Basin is merely due to its membership in Europe and NATO.
Moreover, the solution to the most serious Italian problem - that of the
Mezzogiorno - cannot be found in the development of Southern
Mediterranean
countries, but in reinforcing Italy's ties with the North. Hence the
importance of Italy's relations with Central and Eastern Europe and with
the Balkans.
For Italy, from the geo-political point of view, there is no difference
between Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, both of which are
linked to the Italian peninsula by an inner lake - the Adriatic Sea -
which is a transit area for both regions.
Italy does not pursue a power policy or the goal of creating exclusive
influence zones. It has adopted, in coordination with Germany, a
cooperative policy whose aim is restoring societies and economies in the
whole area in order to promote both its trade interests and these
countries' stability and development.
To attain these goals, the Central European Initiative was relaunched
during its November 1996 meeting in Graz. Special cooperation ties have
been established with Hungary and Slovenia and a comprehensive programme
to improve the transport network through Slovenia and the Balkans has
been
developed. It has to be implemented by a reinforced cooperation with all
the former Yugoslavia Republics and the countries of South-Eastern
Europe,
avoiding any new dividing line between the North and the South.
---
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Italian Interests and Policies
in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans
Lieutenant General Carlo Jean
Introductory Remarks
Italy and Central-Eastern Europe
History's Weight and Opportunities
Political and Security Interests
Economic Interests
Conclusions
Summary
Introductory Remarks
When speaking of national interests, it may be advisable to provide a
precise definition of the phrase. By its nature, its meaning is
ambiguous,
so that this expression used to be censored and banned from the Italian
public debate. However, the phrase "national interests" refers to a
crucial concept which, at least implicitly, lays at the very basis of
any
foreign policy goal.
Interests are not objective or deterministic, although they are defined
on
the basis of domestic and international influence and opportunities as
well as on strong and weak points both of a material character and
relating to the political and institutional systems. Opting for one
particular interest or policy means giving up other interests and
policies. Political, diplomatic, economic and military resources are
always limited. Therefore, an interest cannot merely be defined in
absolute terms. It must also be viewed in comparative terms. In defining
national interests and policies, the availability of adequate resources
to
implement them must be taken into consideration. An interest is such
only
if it can be achieved. If not, it is a mere wish or just empty talk.
Moreover, interests are influenced by the time factor. Short-term
interests usually differ and sometimes widely diverge from long-term
ones.
The present concurrence of radical geo-political, demographic, social
and
technological changes has dramatically accelerated the pace of domestic
and international developments. Therefore, global and long-term
forecasts
and projects have acquired a far more crucial significance than they
used
to have. Italian politics must widen its time horizon through adequate
institutional reforms, and the various Ministries involved in foreign
policy must improve their forecast, planning and inter-sectorial
cooperation capabilities. The planned institutional reforms - such as
the
proposed Foreign Ministry reform and the creation of a foreign policy
planning and coordination body at the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers - seem to indicate that the Italian situation in this respect
may rapidly improve.
This essay focuses on Central Europe and the Balkans only. However,
since,
as it was mentioned above, interests and policies have a global
character,
Italy's future prospects, vocations, limits and potential capabilities
are
shortly outlined in order to provide the wider context needed to fully
understand sectorial and regional evaluations. A brief account of past
Italian policies in the area is also provided, because historical
experience is bound to affect present perceptions in Italy, Central
Europe
and the Balkans. An evaluation of Italy's security and economic
interests
follows. Lastly, the potentials of the policies Italy can implement are
analysed, with special reference to the Central European Initiative,
which
Italy identified as a key component of its "Ostpolitik" at the Graz,
November 6-8 1996 meeting.
Italy and Central-Eastern Europe
A cursory glance at a geographical map conveys the impression that Italy
is a Mediterranean country or, at least, a Southern European country, an
appendix of Central Europe. Some even claim Italy's "insularity" and -
although not going so far as to propose a revival of the "mare nostrum"
concept - state that Italy's national identity can find its full
expression in the Mediterranean only. According to this approach, the
Balkans and Southern-Eastern Europe belong to the East rather than to
the
West or, at least, to a gray area between the two.
However, if physical geography and historical reminiscences of the Roman
Empire, the sea-faring Republics and the Middle Ages are put aside and
if
the present and possible future fluxes are taken into consideration -
that
is, if a geopolitical approach is adopted - the resulting evaluation is
quite different. Italy is a European rather than a Mediterranean, a
continental rather than a maritime country. Its weak and its strong
points
in the Mediterranean (merely in terms of foreign trade shares) clearly
indicate that it has a role in the South only because it belongs to the
North. The huge problems and conflicts in the Mediterranean are
incompatible with Italy's limited political, economic and military
resources. Italy can play a role in the area only by taking part in
common
initiatives within a EU and NATO framework. The Mediterranean is
extremely
important and even crucial for Italy, from the points of view of
non-military threats (e.g. migration waves), of its energy sources and
of
the economic prospects offers. However, Italy will be able to exploit
these opportunities to the full only when the cost of labour in Eastern
Europe will increase to the point that Italian companies will be induced
to transfer their labour-intensive productions southwards. In turn, such
a
development will be possible only if this latter area offers acceptable
stability conditions. If not, there will be no alternative but a
separation policy, i.e. a Bysantium-style grand policy rather than a
Roman-style grand policy based on cooperation and integration.
Whilst Central-Eastern Europe and, in the longer run, the Balkans, are
bound to become fully integrated in the Western system - since this
process is but a "return to Europe", as Milan Kundera defined it - the
South has much fewer integration prospects. Whilst the East wants to be
absorbed into the West, the South claims its own identity and cultural
specificity as distinct from and even in conflict with the West. Since
it
will never become a part of Europe, it cannot achieve as much importance
as Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Although Eastern Europe's problems are admittedly serious, the Middle
Eastern and North African ones are far worse. Since Italy's resources
are
limited, it has no choice but to take part in common initiatives within
Europe and NATO (Barcelona, MENA Economic Summit, CSCM, PFM, etc.). In
this respect, the main risk for Italy is being isolated or marginalized
in
the Mediterranean, although the present situation is quite different
from
that of the period when the slogan "let us cling to the Alps" was
popular.
Should Europe be dominated, in the future, by the so-called "Weimar
triangle" (France, Germany and Poland), with which Spain is apparently
developing increasingly close links, the consequences for Italy might be
much more disastrous than those of its exclusion from the Contact Group
for the former Yugoslavia - which may even have been a piece of luck,
because it has left a larger room for manoeuvre to Italy or, at least,
has
dissociated Italy from the meager results of the former.
On the other hand, in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, Italy
has
greater competitive advantages (for instance, as far as the volume of
foreign trade is concerned, it ranks second in the former area rather
than
fourth as in the Mediterranean). Since the end of the Cold War, Italy
has
rediscovered the geo-politics of pre-unitarian states and, especially,
their links to Central-Eastern Europe, Russia and Ukraine. The Adriatic
Sea is turning into a kind of internal lake connecting the Italian
Peninsula with the Balkans. Moreover, it is becoming the only route -
apart from the Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest axis - leading to
Central-Eastern Europe.
As was authoritatively stated, "the European circle remains our priority
and implies a twofold line of deepening the Union and widening it to the
East". The strategic priority in Italy's foreign policy lies in Central
Europe and in the Balkans. This objective must be transformed into a
real
"Italian Ostpolitik". Priorities must be global. Convergent - and
therefore compatible - policies must be defined in the various sectors.
Furthermore, Italy is a medium power. Therefore, it cannot confine
itself
to implementing a regional policy, as it may have done in the past. It
has
global interests, and it must pursue them by exploiting its potential,
which is undoubtedly greater in trade than in the political or military
sectors. Strengthening its relations with Eastern Europe may enable
Italy
to play a greater role in Europe, especially in view of EU's
enlargement.
In this respect, we do not share the frequently voiced opinion that the
"loss of a barycentre", that is, EU's and NATO's enlargement to Northern
Central Europe alone, must be regretted. We believe that this
enlargement
may be beneficial for Italy, provided that it succeeds in replacing the
ecumenist and Third-worldist aspirations marking its foreign policy
rethorics and a large part of the domestic political background, with a
comprehensive, consistent definition of Italy's interests and policies
towards Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and that adequate
efforts,
resours and political attention are devoted to their implementation.
These
interests don’t consist in the creation of a political sphere of
influence, but in the economic integration not only to expand the
Italian
economy, but most importantly to increase the stability in an area
strictly linked to the Italian security. For this reason Italy strongly
supports the rapid entering of Slovenia and Romania in the Atlantic
Alliance and in the European Union. The Central European Initiative is
an
instrument to support the implementation of this goal.
History's Weight and Opportunities
In the Risorgimento, Italy entertained very close relations with the
national movements in the Balkans, in Hungary and in Poland, as shown by
the number of volunteers from these countries who fought in the
Risorgimento wars and by the number of Italian volunteers who fought in
these countries' wars of independence. In the aftermath of World War I,
the Italian nationalist movement squandered this capital of friendly
relations.
Ironically, Italy's policy towards the former Yugoslavia has always
displayed a quality of contrariness: it was inflexible and aggressive
when
Yugoslavia was strong and enjoyed large international support, and it
was
hesitant and conciliatory when Yugoslavia was weak and isolated. In the
first post-war period, Italy backed Croat and Macedonian secessionism,
thus weakening Yugoslavia which, on the other hand, was a key element in
the balances developed in the Versailles and Trianon Treaties. It
supported Bulgaria and especially Hungary, that is, the countries which
wanted to change the status quo. It tried to compete with Germany's
penetration into the Danube and Balkan regions and backed Austria's
independence, thus helping to destabilize the European balances. As a
consequence, it became a vassal of Germany's and several of its
North-Eastern provinces were absorbed into the German Reich.
In the second post-war period, the situation improved considerably after
the territorial dispute with Yugoslavia was solved, especially with the
1975 Osimo Treaty. Relations with Belgrade were rapidly intensified, and
not only in the economic field. They also extended to politico-strategic
relations, since Yugoslavia had the role of a rampart between Italy and
the Warsaw Pact and helped maintaining stability in the Balkans, thus
increasing Italy's weight within NATO. Moreover, better relations with
Yugoslavia also brought about domestic benefits, since they made it
easier
to accept the defeat in the war and, especially, helped to create
cohesion
among the domestic political forces, and to ease clashes between the
majority and the opposition on Italy's international position.
Relations to Central-Eastern European countries, and especially Hungary
and Poland, were just as well-developed. Regarding Czechoslovakia,
relations were initially strained by a few negative episodes, such as
Radio Prague's aggressiveness against Italy and allegations that the
Czech
secret service was colluding with Italian terrorist groups. Relations
with
Bulgaria suffered a setback after the attempt on the Pope's life. On the
other hand, in the 1980's relations to Poland, which were already
intensive, were greatly boosted by the presence of a Polish Pope and by
the support provided by the Italian Catholic groups and Trade Unions to
the Solidarity movement. The latter undoubtedly played an important role
in undermining the Soviet Empire in Central-Eastern Europe, and in
determining its eventual collapse.
During the Cold War, Italy entertained fairly intensive relations to
Romania, which claimed to belong to Europe because of its Latin, rather
than Slav and Orthodox, heritage and pursued a policy of national
independence, didn’t participate to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and
cooperated with Yugoslavia reinforcing its non-aligned status. As a
whole,
during the whole Cold War period, Italy's relations with Central-Eastern
Europe tended to intensify in periods of detente with the Soviet Union.
However, ties remained close also in periods of high East-West tensions.
The current role of Italy's presence in Central-Eastern Europe as a
whole
and the favour it generally enjoys in the region stems from Italy's
"mini-Ostpolitik", launched in the 1950's by Fanfani and Gronchi, much
earlier than the great German "Ostpolitik" of the 1970's and 1980's.
Until
the collapse of the "wall", these two policies always converged and
displayed interesting factors of complementarity and synergy.
The various initiative which were adopted within this context - such as
the inter-regional agreements of Alpe Adria, marked by a strong
involvement of Bavaria, and the accords which led to the 1989 Budapest
declaration, which created the Quadrangular alliance (Italy, Austria,
Hungary and Yugoslavia) and shifted cooperation onto government level -
played an important role in weakening the Soviet external Empire and in
paving the way for more intensive and fruitful cooperation initiatives
after 1989, when Europe's geo-political division ended.
Discrepancies started with the end of the Cold War and the increasingly
tangible prospects of German re-unification, which gave rise, in Italy,
to
exaggerated fears that Germany would acquire a hegemonic role in the
whole
area, undermining Italy's position. This scenario gave rise to rather
incongruous reactions, such as the attempt to counterbalance the Weimar
axis, i.e. the "Paris-Berlin-Warsaw" axis, by creating a "Barcelona
(sic!)-Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Kiev" axis. In this respect, an
"influence zone" concept was revived, according to which Italy and
Germany
were supposed to compete in the whole Danube-Carpatians area. It was
also
suggested that Italy might exploit the temporary weakening of Germany's
external-projection capabilities during its re-unification process in
order to consolidate its own position in the area.
At the outset, Italy mobilized considerable financial means to pursue
this
policy. However, the concept rapidly lost credibility when the
initiative
was extended north of the Danube, to the Baltic Sea. As Luigi Vittorio
Ferraris humorously put it, Italy was planning to build a Mitteleuropa
without Germany, which equated "making an omelet without eggs".
Yugoslavia's collapse as well as Italy's political and institutional
crisis and plummeting budgets greatly reduced the momentum of the
initiative, although it progressively expanded to reach its present 16
member and observer states.
Basically, the end of the Cold War and German re-unification have
radically changed the situation. Apparently, Italy has not yet fully
realized that it is one of the main "victors" of the Cold War and that
its
overall geo-political situation has altered with respect to the past,
not
only because of the collapse of its domestic "wall", but also because of
the vast opportunities that have opened in Eastern Europe. By
concentrating too much on its domestic problems and on its political and
institutional crisis, and by devoting too few attention and resources to
its foreign policy in what is a crucial period of transition in
Central-Eastern Europe, it runs the risk of losing vital opportunities
and
of reducing its role in the Western integration and stabilization of the
area.
The geo-political concepts of vital space, exclusive influence zones and
territorial expansion have lost all meanings. International economic and
political relations are no longer marked by a vertical and hierarchical
structure. At present, geo-politics is dominated by flows, rather than
by
space, and is marked by network structures. Each country's ability to
safeguard its own interests mainly depends on its involvement in the
networks and on its capability to attract flows. International relations
are no longer zero-sum games, and are increasingly becoming positive-sum
games. Contacts and cooperation have acquired decisive importance as
against competition for dominance and power. The new situation offers
vast
opportunities for Italy to develop its relations in the region.
Therefore,
Italy has a great interest in promoting the region's stability, order
and
development.
The definition of national interests and foreign policy options - also
in
the sector of military policy, either at national or multinational
level,
especially in European and NATO contexts - must be aimed at fully
exploiting Italy's potential in Central-Eastern Europe and in the
Balkans.
In this region, there are excellent conditions to develop cooperation
with
Germany, which shares Italy's interest in the rapid normalization and
integration of the whole area into the great Western institutions, such
as
the European Union and NATO. Italy's and Germany's "Ostpolitik" policies
would be enhanced by complementarity, rather than by competition.
However,
cooperation with Germany in Central-Eastern Europe requires that Germany
is prepared to pursue this line, which, for the time being, cannot be
taken for granted, although now all countries are following in the area
common European, rather than competitive national approaches.
Political and Security Interests
The disappearance of the Soviet threat has dramatically changed the
concept of security. Security does no longer imply defending one's
national territory against aggression. It involves maintaining stability
in order to enable Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans to achieve
political and economic integration into the European regional system. If
politico-strategical stability were not achieved, their integration
would
be unfeasible, because high political risks would make private
investments
too expensive and because no stable economic cooperation would be
possible.
This basic interest, which Italy can pursue only by cooperating with the
other European countries which share the same objectives, is made even
more crucial by the fact that an outbreak of ethnic and identity-based
conflicts and the deriving destabilization of the whole Balkanic area
may
result in uncontrollable migration tides and in an intensification of
fundamentalism and terrorism which are bound to directly involve Italy.
Lastly, this development might result in strife within the alliances in
which Italy is a member and, domestically, in tensions between ethical
and
humanitarian claims and the need for a "Realpolitik" which keeps into
account Italy's national priorities and scant public resources.
The need to prevent conflicts which would be bound to involve Italy also
stems from the country's political and military weakness, although so
far
Italy has erred on the side of caution, taking tardy and limited
actions.
In particular, Italy's refusal to take part in the British-French Rapid
Reaction Force seems wholly unjustified.
These problems do not confine themselves to the Balkans - from Bosnia to
Kosovo and Macedonia - whose conflicts may destabilize the whole
Adriatic
region and extend to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. Other
potential
dangers are the presence of Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia
and
Vojvodina and, although to a lesser extent, the tensions between Greece
and Turkey and between Bulgaria and Turkey.
Intensive Italian engagement in the multilateral actions organized to
solve these problems - both peace-supporting operations and political,
economic and humanitarian initiatives - can help maintain Italy's
presence
in the whole region, promote Italy's role in Europe, improve its tainted
national image and, more practically, safeguard its national interests
in
the EU and in NATO.
In defining Italy's policy in the region, the key point to be considered
is the implementation of an order in former Yugoslavia which can be
maintained in the long run, after the withdrawal of Western forces from
Bosnia. At that date, the risk of conflicts breaking out in Kosovo,
which
implies even greater dangers for Italy, will increase. The problem,
however, reaches much further. It also involves NATO's and EU's eastward
enlargement as well as US-Russian relations and interests in the Balkans
and in Central-Eastern Europe as a whole. In this respect, short-term
interests often diverge from long-term ones, and sub-regional interests
often clash with regional or pan-European interests.
In the case of Bosnia, it is obvious that stability could have been
attained much more easily, in the short period, by partitioning Bosnia
between Serbia and Croatia or breaking it up into three ethnically
"pure"
states than by the Dayton solution of creating a multi-ethnic state
which
imposes coexistence on people who do not want to coexist. However, the
two
former options do not only clash with Western values and principles.
They
are also liable to fuel instability in the long period. A similar
discrepancy emerges as far as the debate on war criminals in Bosnia is
concerned. If NATO forces had been entrusted with the task of hunting
down
and arresting war criminals, attacks and retaliations would have
certainly
ensued, jeopardizing NATO's presence in Bosnia and, therefore, the
likelihood of putting a stop to the conflict. However, in the longer
period, only the arrest and the trial of war criminals by the Hague
Supreme High Court can be a decisive factor of stabilization. Should
local
courts submit war crinals to trial, their verdicts would be considered
biased and retaliatory and would trigger further reprisals or even
large-scale guerrilla and terrorist initiatives which have not yet taken
place in the former Yugoslavia.
It seems justified to accuse the international community of following an
inconsistent strategy, which is oriented to the long term
(multi-ethnical
Bosnia) on the one hand, and on the short period on the other (failed
arrest and trial of war criminals). However, it must be pointed out
that,
de facto, NATO has carefully avoided any decisive actions in issues
which
could help, at least theoretically, to create a really multi-ethnic
Bosnia, such as, for instance, the repatriation of refugees. In this
respect, doubts have emerged on whether implementing multiethnicity
really
is the truly objective of the international community.
Italy's action has been balanced. Its maintaining relations to Beograd
and
its refraining from the anti-Serb hysteria which marked many other
Western
states have been an advantage for the international community as a
whole.
Italy's line, far from deriving from Machiavellian considerations,
merely
stemmed from a pragmatic assessment that there were two options
available:
either imposing an international mandate on all the former Yugoslavia
for
an indefinite period of time, or seeking an agreement with all the
involved parties. Since the former option was wholly unrealistic, the
second was to be adopted. On the other hand, it must be highlighted that
many of the critics of the meetings between Italian Foreign Ministers
and
Serb President Slobodan Milosevic were the same people who greeted the
attack on Moscow's White House and the accession of Russia into the
Council of Europe! Should their motives be analysed, it might be
discovered that the "Idealpolitik" facade really concealed a
"Realpolitik".
Easing the international attitude towards the Serbs and promoting
Beograd's return into the European institutions, starting with OSCE and
the Central European Initiative, is not only in the Italian interest. It
can help ensuring long-term stability in the Balkans. The recent
anti-Milosevic demonstrations organized by students and workers in
Beograd, although unlikely to bring about a political change, are
helping
to improve the image of the Serb people, who used to be consistently
criminalized, in the eyes of the international public. This may provide
a
starting point to face Serbia's basic problems with realism - in the
style
launched by the American negotiator, Richard Holbrooke - and help it to
join Europe, to which it, too, belongs.
A plan which seems to completely fulfil the objective of stability in
the
Balkans is the so-called Euroslavia project. Its goal is not to impose
anything or to rebuild a new Yugoslavia, not even according to a smooth
confederation model. It aims at re-establishing economic relations among
the various Republics, promoting development in order to damp down the
conflict and preparing the whole area for association and, in the long
term, integration into the European Union. The direct or indirect
actions
which are being carried out by the Italian diplomacy to prevent a
conflict
in Kosovo should be comprised into this project, intensified and, if
possible, coordinated with similar US and EU initiatives.
Should the situation in Kosovo break down, a consequent mass migration
of
a few hundred thousand people might deteriorate the situation to
breaking
point throughout the Balkans. If the migrants flowed into Macedonia,
they
would destabilize the present situation there. If, on the other hand -
which is much more likely, since the Serbs would block all entries into
Macedonia to prevent the situation from worsening - the refugees headed
into Albania, they would trigger a "domino effect" resulting in an
immigrant tide to Apulia on a scale which would make the 1991 "invasion"
pale in comparison.
Besides pressurizing Beograd into accepting a reasonable and
internationally-guaranteed autonomy for Kosovo, there is an immediate
need
to start preparing for the worst case. It would be reasonable to draw
plans for an emergency logistic intervention and especially to promote
turistic development on the Albanian coast, in order to host possible
refugees in Albania and eventually repatriate them into their regions of
origin. The project may be funded through new allocations in line with
the
Italian Bill on Frontier Areas, which should be extended to the whole
Adriatic Sea, by relaunching the Adriatic Initiative and by coordinating
it with the Central European Initiative.
The Euroslavia and the Kosovo projects undoubtedly have an utmost
priority
and must be granted full political and financial support despite the
current budget difficulties. They are not merely to be viewed as
insurance
premiums. They are actual investments, since Italy has a strong
potential
interest in the development of these regions.
Another critical problem for Italy is NATO's - and, in the longer
period,
EU's - eastward enlargement. Actually, the enlargement is the only way
to
consolidate US presence and engagement in Europe, which are essential
both
to preserve balances in Europe and in the Mediterranean and to ensure
political and strategic links between the Mediterranean and Central
Europe. NATO's enlargement can increase internal stability, which is an
essential prerequisite for economic development, and can especially
prevent divergencies in the policies of the various Western European
states, such as those which had the well-known negative effects in
former
Yugoslavia. Rather than an enlargement proper, this process can be
defined
as the re-absorption into Europe of countries which had been separated
from it by the Cold War.
Whilst Germany has a direct interest in the enlargement of NATO to the
Visegrad countries, Italy attaches great importance to the accession of
Slovenia and Romania (and Bulgaria, if it applies) into NATO in the
first
group. Slovenia's membership is important in that this country provides
a
link between Italy and Hungary. The recent intensification in relations
among Italy, Slovenia and Hungary ("Trilateral") within the Central
European Initiative mirrors this basic Italian interest, which is shared
by Slovenia and Hungary. The same interest emerges in the Italian
Defence
Minister's proposal to create joint German-Italian units which should be
open for participation to Austria, Slovenia, Hungary and possibly the
Czech Republic. To date, Germany has not taken the proposal into
consideration, although its implementation would provide a clear signal
that it is not pursuing hegemonic interests in Eastern Europe. An
increased military cooperation has been therefore forecast in the
framework of the "Trilaterale".
Furthermore, Romania's accession into NATO would prevent Turkey from
being
isolated in the Black Sea region. On the other hand, its exclusion may
increase the existing tensions in the Hungarian minority in
Transylvania,
who would view it as a first step towards exclusion from Europe.
Logically, this interest should lead to greater Italian preparedness to
cooperate in the military sector, too. For instance, it should take part
more intensively in joint activities within NATO's "Partnership for
Peace"
project and, if necessary, provide additional funding to NATO's common
infrastructure programme. The latter should be coordinated with the
construction of the road and railway axes which are to link the Adriatic
Sea with Hungary on one side, Serbia and Romania on another and
Macedonia
and Bulgaria on a third side.
However, initiatives to prevent NATO's selective enlargement - which is,
in a certain sense, paradoxically, confined to the most stable
countries,
that is, to those which have less urgent need of NATO guarantees - from
creating insecurity and instability in the excluded applicants should be
implemented as soon as possible. The Central European Initiative may be
an
adequate forum to discuss these problems before they become explosive.
As
much is also proved by the fact that the Central European Initiative was
acknowledged to have the potential not merely to prepare Central and
Eastern European countries for prospective association and membership
into
the European Union, but also to implement security objectives typical of
OSCE, which took part in the November 1996 Graz meeting with observer
status.
Economic Interests
The economic importance of Central and Eastern Europe and of the Balkans
for Italy has recently been highlighted by the Agnelli Foundation in a
report of the series "Nuova Geoeconomia". Over time, the whole area is
bound to be associated and eventually integrated into the European
Union.
All the Italian Regions, and especially the Adriatic-rim ones, will
derive
great benefits from it. Integration is facilitated both by geographical
proximity and by similar basic values. The return to Europe is a central
goal for the peoples of Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans and
features in the political programmes of ruling and opposition parties
alike.
Italy has a strong interest in the rapid and full integration of the
whole area. Apart from obvious political and security reasons, its
economic position will become more competitive as a result. Small and
medium Italian companies have already shifted many sectors of production
which are labour-intensive or directed to the lower market niches in the
area. The flexibility of small and medium companies makes them
particularly able to penetrate and cooperate with the markets of the
area,
which are characterized by considerable fluctuations.
Regarding volume of trade, Italy ranks second after Germany in the
Eastern
European markets and first in the Balkanic peninsula and in
South-Eastern
Europe. Moreover, it has a strong potential to increase its trade in the
area. According to recent estimates, it may not only consolidate its
position, but also gain market shares as compared to Germany.
Italy will be able to fully exploit this trade potential only if it
steps
up its engagement in the sectors of development aid, public support to
exports, banking and insurance. Therefore, an important national
interest
- which, obviously, is not merely confined to Central-Eastern Europe and
the Balkans - is providing the "system-country" with adequate means to
face regional and global geo-economic competition. This objective can
only
be achieved by relinquishing Italy's conservative and obsolete welfare
state policy. This process is strongly supported by the present Italian
Government.
Italy's economic penetration in the area, too, is complementary, rather
than competitive, with Germany's. As a consequence, cooperative rather
than competitive policies may be pursued in the economic sector, too,
and
the two countries' initiatives may be coordinated both at a bilateral
level and within the EU and the world's economic institutions. The
spectre
of a Mitteleuropa viewed as Germany's exclusive influence and hegemony
area seems a myth with no real foundations.
The sector which deserves the most intensive and determined efforts is
that of large infrastructure projects - especially roads and railways,
but
also the ambitious project of a navigable waterway connecting the rivers
Isonzo and Danube. All these projects would connect the Adriatic Basin
with the Danube and, further eastward, with Ukraine and Russia. The
opening of the Rhein-Danube canal and the future opening of the
Danube-Oder waterway give a competitive edge to the North Sea and Baltic
harbours as against the Northern Adriatic ones. Moreover, the latter are
not yet coordinated so as to achieve economies of scale. In short, they
lag well behind as compared to the improvements in the transport system
north of the Alps.
Besides their economic role, infrastructure projects also have political
importance. For instance, the growth of Euroslavia is mainly based on
them. Clearly, Italy cannot sustain these projects alone, but should
promote them within the European Union. Visions and integrative
proposals
tailored to the specific situation of the Balkans and South-Eastern
Europe
are needed, as is already happening as far as Central Europe is
concerned.
Delays in this respect may undermine Italy's competitive advantages in
the
whole region.
Conclusions
So far, in Italy, the impact of the end of the Cold War and of the
deriving changes in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans has not
been
fully understood. As much has hampered a far-sighted definition of
Italy's
national interests and foreign policy regarding this region, which has a
crucial role for Italy because of its geographical proximity and of
Italy's intensive present and, especially, potential economic relations
with it.
These deficiencies have partly been determined by regional and local
pressure, especially regarding relations with former Yugoslav republics;
by Italy's political and institutional crisis, which has drawn attention
almost exclusively to domestic problems; by the fact that single issues
such as the problem of the properties of Istrian and Dalmatian exiles,
which, although undoubtedly important, should have been viewed within a
more far-sighted context, have been unduly exploited for domestic policy
objectives. In the recent past, the Italian diplomacy has found itself
in
the embarrassing situation of seeing Italy depicted as a potentially
destabilizing, revisionist state which wished to carry out an arrogant
power policy it could not afford unless at a very local level. Italy's
exclusion from the Contact Group undoubtely was partly due to its image
as
an overly ambitious country incapable of carrying out realistic and
long-term projects.
The "collapse of the wall" has radically changed the very foundations of
Italy's "Ostpolitik", the strategic role of the Balkans and the role of
the regional or bilateral initiatives in which Italy took part.
Only recently, a clearer perception of Italy's interests in the area and
a
greater coordination of Italy's, Germany's and Austria's policies has
apparently begun to emerge. Complementarity should be maximized in the
place of competition, both because the latter - being based on past
geo-political logics - would be ineffective, and because Italy does not
possess the means or the political and diplomatic capabilities to
compete
with Germany. At most, it can implement a disturbance policy and occupy
marginal political and market niches. However, the level of cooperation
between Rome and Bonn is not yet optimal, partly because the Italian
initiatives of the late 1980's and early 1990's were often presented as
endeavours to contain German penetration in the Balkans and in Central
Europe. Obviously, the results were far from brilliant, although -
luckily
- not totally disastrous.
The recent relaunching of the Central European Initiative, its linking
with the Adriatic, the Balkanic and the Black Sea initiatives, the
intensification of relations with Slovenia and Hungary, which should be
rapidly extended to Austria, and possibly Croatia, seem to give a more
realistic character to Italy's role in stabilizing the area and
especially
in preparing it for progressive integration into Europe. Only within
this
framework can Italy's roles and interests be defined in detail and
satisfactory solutions be found also for the still discussed problem of
the Italian minorities in Slovenia and Croatia. This issue cannot
possibly
be solved but through the consolidation of these countries' democratic
institutions and economies in view of their rapid integration into
Europe
and NATO.
Summary
>>From a merely geographical point of view, Italy may seem a Mediterranean
country, due to its marginal position to Central Europe. Actually,
however, if geo-political and geo-economic trends are taken into
consideration, it is a European rather than a Mediterranean country.
Trade
and economic integration with the East play a far greater role for Italy
than those with the South.
Because of its political and military weakness, Italy's role in the
Mediterranean Basin is merely due to its membership in Europe and NATO.
Moreover, the solution to the most serious Italian problem - that of the
Mezzogiorno - cannot be found in the development of Southern
Mediterranean
countries, but in reinforcing Italy's ties with the North. Hence the
importance of Italy's relations with Central and Eastern Europe and with
the Balkans.
For Italy, from the geo-political point of view, there is no difference
between Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, both of which are
linked to the Italian peninsula by an inner lake - the Adriatic Sea -
which is a transit area for both regions.
Italy does not pursue a power policy or the goal of creating exclusive
influence zones. It has adopted, in coordination with Germany, a
cooperative policy whose aim is restoring societies and economies in the
whole area in order to promote both its trade interests and these
countries' stability and development.
To attain these goals, the Central European Initiative was relaunched
during its November 1996 meeting in Graz. Special cooperation ties have
been established with Hungary and Slovenia and a comprehensive programme
to improve the transport network through Slovenia and the Balkans has
been
developed. It has to be implemented by a reinforced cooperation with all
the former Yugoslavia Republics and the countries of South-Eastern
Europe,
avoiding any new dividing line between the North and the South.
---
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