SERBIA: A BELGRADO PRIMO CAMPO DA GOLF DEL PAESE

Disoccupazione? Quisquilie. Cancri allo stomaco e leucemie? Non ci
risulta. Il paese verso la disintegrazione? Tanto meglio. Corruzione?
Macche' macche', se c'e' e' certo "una eredita' del passato regime".
Secondo l'ANSA, a Belgrado schioccano piuttosto i tappi delle bottiglie
di spumante, e la popolazione e' in festa, perche' e' stato finalmente
inaugurato, lo scorso 19 settembre, "il primo campo da golf della
Serbia e Montenegro, un impianto di 30 ettari nella zona di Ada
Tziganlja, in riva al fiume Sava, uno dei punti piu' suggestivi della
citta'."
Tra una notizia di costume ("Pitbull: dalla Serbia con orrore") ed un
commento soddisfatto sul disfacimento delle istituzioni della Serbia
(dopo quelle della Jugoslavia, sul cui cadavere i giornalisti sputano
sempre con piacere), l'agenzia di stampa dello Stato dal quale
partivano i bombardieri ad ammazzare i cittadini nelle piazze e sui
treni ci racconta una nuova favola: "Il proprietario, Aleksander
Andjelkovic, ha dichiarato di avere speso circa 2 milioni di euro per
la sistemazione del campo, e di sperare che l'iniziativa dia impulso a
questo sport, finora piuttosto disertato nel paese." Speriamo dunque
che i lavoratori della Zastava e le loro famiglie accorrano in massa a
giocare a golf, al fianco dei nuovi ricchi e dei mafiosi italiani in
trasferta. (i.s.)

(si veda:
http://www.ansa.it/balcani/serbiamontenegro/20030919190832695033.html )

SECRET WAR: US and EU INTERVENTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/yu_kriza/2003-10-02.html
http://www3.sympatico.ca/sr.gowans/elich1.html

What's Left
November 8, 2002
By Gregory Elich

For one long decade, the West waged a fierce campaign to subjugate
Yugoslavia. Every means was utilized: support for violent
secessionists, the imposition of severe sanctions, a 78-day
bombardment, followed by forcible occupation of the region of Kosovo.
The Yugoslav Federation withstood it all, but it was Western covert
operations that finally brought disaster.

In November 1998, President Clinton launched a plan for the overthrow
of the government of Yugoslavia. The initial emphasis of the plan
centered on supporting secessionist forces in Montenegro and the
right-wing opposition in Serbia. (1) Several months later, while NATO
bombs fell on Yugoslavia, Clinton signed a secret paper instructing the
CIA to topple the Yugoslav government. The plan called for the CIA to
secretly fund opposition groups and the recruitment of moles in the
Yugoslav government and military. (2) The effort to recruit moles in
the police and army eventually yielded fruit nearly two years later,
when renegade policemen aided the mob assault on the Federal Parliament.
There were several components to the plan, and assassination was a key
element in the Western arsenal. On July 8, 1999, U.S. and British
officials revealed that commando teams were training snatch operations
to seize alleged war criminals and Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic. As an encouragement to mercenaries, the U.S. State
Department also announced a $5 million bounty for President Milosevic.
(3) Several Yugoslav government officials and prominent individuals,
including
Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic, were gunned down. Most of those
crimes remained unsolved, as the assassins managed to escape. Goran
Zugic, security advisor to secessionist Montenegrin President Milo
Djukanovic, was murdered late on May 31, 2000. The assassin escaped,
allowing Western leaders to place blame on President Milosevic. Coming
just one week before crucial local elections in Montenegro, forces
opposing President Milosevic stood to gain from the murder, as the
effect would tend to sway undecided voters in favor of secessionist
parties. A few days after the assassination, Yugoslav Minister of
Information Goran Matic held a press conference, at which he accused
the CIA of complicity in the murder. Matic played a taped recording of
two telephone
conversations between head of the U.S. mission in Dubrovnik Sean Burns,
U.S. State Department official James Swaggert, Gabriel Escobar of the
U.S. economic group in Montenegro and Paul Davies of the U.S. Agency
for International Development. Excerpts of the conversations, recorded
20
minutes after the assassination and again three hours later, included
comments such as, "It was professional," and "Mission accomplished." (4)
The first publicly known Western plan to assassinate President
Milosevic was drafted in 1992. Richard Tomlinson, a former British MI6
employee, later disclosed the plan. His task as an MI6 agent was to
carry out undercover operations in Eastern Europe while posing as a
businessman or journalist. Tomlinson frequently met with MI6 officer
Nick Fishwick.
During one their meetings, Fishwick showed Tomlinson a document
entitled, "The Need to Assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia."
Three methods were proposed for the assassination of Milosevic. The
first method, Tomlinson recalled, "was to train and equip a Serbian
paramilitary
opposition group," which would have the advantage of deniability but an
unpredictable chance of success. The second method would employ a
specially trained British SAS squad to murder President Milosevic
"either with a bomb or sniper ambush." Fishwick considered this more
reliable, but it lacked deniability. The third method would be to kill
Milosevic
"in a staged car crash." (5) Seven years later, on October 3, 1999, the
third method was employed against the leader of the Serbian Renewal
Movement, Vuk Draskovic, when a truck filled with sand plowed into his
car, killing everyone inside except for Draskovic. The temperamental
Draskovic had been a major factor in the chronic fragmentation of the
right-wing opposition, frustrating Washington's efforts to forge a
unified
opposition. (6)
During NATO's war against Yugoslavia, a missile struck President
Milosevic's home on April 22, 1999. Fortunately, he and his wife were
staying elsewhere that evening. Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon was quick
to announce that "we are not targeting President Milosevic." What else
would a missile striking Milosevic's bedroom at 3:10 AM be? (7)

In November 1999, members of an assassination squad, code-named
"Spider," were arrested in Yugoslavia. According to Minister Goran
Matic, "French intelligence was behind" the Spider group, whose aim was
the assassination of President Milosevic. Planned scenarios included a
sniper attack, planting an explosive device alongside a route they
expected Milosevic to travel, planting an explosive in his car, and
organizing 10 trained commandos to storm the presidential residence.
The leader of the group, Jugoslav Petrusic, had dual Yugoslav and
French citizenship. Matic claimed that Petrusic worked for French
intelligence for ten years. During interrogations, Petrusic said that
he had killed 50 men on orders by French intelligence. Matic announced
that one of the members of Spider was a "specialist for killings with a
truck full of sand" - the same method used against Draskovic the
previous month.
Following the Bosnian war, Petrusic organized the transport of 180
Bosnian Serb mercenaries to fight for Mobutu Sese Seku in Zaire, an
affair that was managed by French intelligence. According to a Bosnian
Serb businessman, Petrusic "did not hide the fact that he was working
for the French intelligence service. I have personally seen a photo of
him next to Mitterrand as his bodyguard." In younger days, Petrusic was
a member of the French Foreign Legion. During NATO's war against
Yugoslavia, the Spider group infiltrated the Yugoslav Army, supplying
information to the French and guiding NATO warplanes to their targets.
Yugoslav secret service sources revealed that the Spider group trained
at NATO bases in Bosnia where "buildings resembling those where
Milosevic
lives were constructed." Money from the French intelligence service for
Spider was brought to the border between Hungary and Yugoslavia by a
man named Serge Lazarevic. (8)
One month later, the members of a second hit team, calling itself the
Serbian Liberation Army, was arrested. Their aim was to assassinate
President Milosevic and restore the monarchy. (9)
At the end of July 2000, a squad of four Dutch commandos was
apprehended while attempting to cross into Serbia from Montenegro.
During the investigation, they admitted that they intended to kill or
kidnap President Milosevic. The four said that they were informed that
$30 million had been offered for "Milosevic's head," and that they
intended to "claim a reward." One of the men said that the group
planned to abduct
Milosevic or former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and
"surrender them to The Hague." The group planned to put them atop a car
"in a ski box and transport them out of the country." If the abduction
failed, one of the men "had the idea to kill the president, to
decapitate" him, and to put his head "in the box and to send it home"
to the Netherlands.
One of the arrested men, Gotfrides de Ri, belonged to the openly racist
neo-nazi Center Party. During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the
Center Party sent Dutch mercenaries to fight in right-wing Croatian
paramilitary units. At the time of their arrest, the four were found
with several knives, including one with a swastika, and wires with
hooks for strangulation. All four admitted that they had trained under
the British SAS. At a news conference on August 1, 2000, Goran Matic
accused the U.S of being the prime sponsor of assassinations and
attempted assassinations.
"It is obvious that they are recruiting various terrorist groups
because they are frustrated with the fact that their military,
political and economic goals in southeastern Europe have not been
realized. [They are] trying to send them into the country so that they
can change our political and social environment." (10)

Flagrant Western interference distorted the political process in
Yugoslavia. U.S. and Western European funds were channelled to
right-wing opposition parties and media through such organizations as
the National Endowment for Democracy and George Soros' Open Society
Institute. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is yet another of
the myriad semi-private organizations that have attached themselves
like leeches on Eastern Europe. The NDI opened an office in Belgrade in
1997, hoping to capitalize on opposition attempts to bring down the
government through street demonstrations. By 1999, the NDI had already
trained over 900 right-wing party leaders and activists on "message
development, public outreach and election strategy." NDI also claimed
to have provided "organizational training and coalition-building
expertise" to the opposition. (11)
The New Serbia Forum, funded by the British Foreign Office, brought
Serbian professionals and academics to Hungary on a regular basis for
discussions with British and Central European "experts." The aim of the
meetings was to "design a blueprint for post-Milosevic society." The
Forum developed reports intended to serve as "an action plan" for a
future pro-Western government. Subjects under discussion included
privatization
and economic stabilization. The Forum called for the "reintegration of
Yugoslavia into the European family," a phrase that translated into the
dismantling of the socialist economy and turning it over to Western
corporations. (12)
Western aims were clearly spelled out in the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe of June 10, 1999. This document called for
"creating vibrant market economies" in the Balkans, and "markets open
to greatly expanded foreign trade and private sector investment." One
year later, the White House issued a fact sheet detailing the "major
achievements" of the Pact. Among the achievements listed, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the International
Finance Corporations were said to be "mobilizing private investment,"
and the Pact's Business Advisory Council was "visiting all of the
countries of Southeast Europe" to "offer advice" on investment issues.
Another initiative was Hungarian involvement with opposition-led local
governments and opposition media in Serbia leading up the September 24,
2000 election in Yugoslavia.
On July 26, 2000, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
inaugurated an investment fund to be managed by Soros Private Funds
Management. The Southeast Europe Equity Fund "will invest in companies
in the region in a range of sectors." Its purpose, according to the
U.S. Embassy in Macedonia, is "to provide capital for new business
development, expansion and privatization." In March 2000, Montenegro
signed an agreement permitting the operation of OPIC on its territory.
Billionaire George Soros spelled out what all this means. U.S.
involvement in the region, he said, "creates investment opportunities,"
and "I am happy to put my money where they are putting theirs." Bluntly
put, there is money to be made. George Munoz, President and CEO of
OPIC, was also clear. "The Southeast Europe Equity Fund," he announced,
"is an ideal vehicle to connect American institutional capital with
European entrepreneurs eager to help Americans tap their growing
markets. OPIC is pleased that Soros Private Funds Management has chosen
to send a strong, positive signal that
Southeast Europe is open for business." The final text of the Stability
Pact for Southeast Europe suggested that a Yugoslavia that would
"respect" the Pact's "principles and objectives" would be "welcome" to
become a full member. "In order to draw the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia closer to this goal," the document declared, Montenegro
would be an "early
beneficiary." Western leaders expressed hope that a future pro-Western
Yugoslavia would, as had the rest of Eastern Europe, be "eager to help
Americans" make money. (13)
Western leaders yearned to install a puppet government in Belgrade, and
placed their hopes in the fragmented right-wing opposition parties in
Serbia. In 1999, American officials encouraged these parties to
organize mass demonstrations to overthrow the government, but the
rallies quickly fizzled. When upcoming Yugoslav Federal and local
elections were announced on July 24, 2000, American and Western
European officials met with leaders of Serbian opposition parties,
urging them to unite behind one presidential candidate. The opposition
presidential candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, was essentially hand-picked
by US officials when American-run polls demonstrated that he was the
only candidate capable of
garnering enough support to win the election. (14)

At the beginning of August 2000, the U.S. opened an office in Budapest
specifically tasked to assist opposition parties in Yugoslavia. Among
the staff were at least 30 psychological warfare specialists, some of
whom had earlier been engaged in psychological warfare operations
during NATO's war against Yugoslavia and against Iraq in the Gulf War.
(15) Members of the student opposition group, Otpor, were invited to
attend ten-day courses, beginning August 28, and again on September 11,
2000, at the American embassies in Bulgaria and Romania. The courses,
conducted by CIA personnel and propaganda experts, focused on political
and public-image techniques. (16) In Bulgaria, the Western-financed
Political Academy for Central and Southeastern Europe established a
program for training the Serbian opposition. The academy was tied to
Vojislav Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia, Otpor and various
opposition groups. Another Bulgarian-based and Western-financed
organization, the Balkan Academy of Leading Reporters, gave "financial,
technical and expert assistance" to Yugoslav opposition media prior to
the election. (17)
On August 13 through 15, CIA Director George Tenet visited Bulgaria. In
a series of extraordinary meetings, Tenet met with Bulgarian President
Petur Stoyanov, as well as the Prime Minister, Interior Minister and
Defense Minister. Officially, the purpose of Tenet's visit was to
discuss the problem of organized crime and narcotics. However, Tenet
spent a combined total of only 20 minutes at the headquarters of the
National Security Service and the National Service for Combating
Organized Crime. Unnamed diplomatic sources revealed that the proposed
oil transit pipeline from the Caspian Sea was also a topic of
discussion. The driving motivation for Tenet's visit, though, was to
discuss Yugoslavia. According to an unnamed diplomatic source,
Montenegrin secession from Yugoslavia topped the agenda. Following the
meeting between Tenet and Major General Dimo Gyaurov, Director of the
National Intelligence Service, a public statement was issued which
stressed their "commonality of interests." Reports in the Bulgarian
press revealed that various options were discussed with Bulgaria's
president and prime minister. Leaked information from the meetings
indicated that Tenet's preferred option was the removal of the Yugoslav
government, either as a result of the September 24 election, or by
street demonstrations or an internal coup. Another alternative Tenet
discussed was a NATO military assault that would install a puppet
government. The third option was Montenegrin secession from Yugoslavia.
Were open warfare to break out over Montenegro's secession from
Yugoslavia, then the United States planned to wage a full-scale war.
Sofia's Monitor reported that the "CIA coup machine" was forming. "A
strike against Belgrade is imminent," it warned, and "Bulgaria will
serve as a base." (18) In preparation for possible military action, the
Italian army signed a lease contract to conduct training exercises
beginning in October at the Koren training ground, near Kaskovo in
southeast Bulgaria. The French army signed a similar agreement, in
which French soldiers and tanks would train at the Novo Selo grounds in
central Bulgaria from October 11 to December 12. Plans called for the
U.S. military to lease the Shabla training grounds in northeastern
Bulgaria. All could have served as a launching pad for a NATO strike.
(19) An amphibious training exercise with Croatian and U.S forces was
conducted near Split, Croatia immediately following the Yugoslav
election, and 15 British warships were sent to the
region. (20)
Tenet's third option, the secession of Montenegro from Yugoslavia,
would follow the well-tested model of swallowing Yugoslavia, bite by
bite. The paths of Yugoslavia's two republics had sharply diverged.
Only Serbia stood in the way of the West's grand scheme to integrate
the Balkans into an economic model in which the region's economies
would be subordinated to Western corporate interests. Serbia's economy
included a strong socialist component, and large and medium sized firms
were socially owned. In contrast, Montenegro had embarked on a program
to place its entire economy at the service of the West. November 1999
saw the introduction in Montenegro of the German mark as an official
currency and the passage of legislation eliminating socially owned
property. One month later, several large firms were publicly offered
for sale, including the Electric Power Company, the 13th July
Agricultural Complex, the Hotel-Tourist firm Boka and several others.
(21) The republic's privatization program for 2000 called for
privatization of most state-owned industries, and included measures to
"protect domestic and foreign investors." In early 2000, the U.S.
signed an agreement to provide Montenegro $62 million, including $44
million from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
According to the agency, it would also undertake "assistance programs to
support economic reform and restructuring the economy..to advance
Montenegro toward a free market economy." U.S. policy advisor on the
Balkans James Dobbins indicated that the U.S. viewed the
"market-oriented reforms of the Djukanovic regime as a model and
stimulus for similar reforms throughout the former Yugoslavia." The
U.S. also offered guarantees for private investors in the republic.
Additional aid was provided by the European Union (EU), which approved
$36 million for Montenegro. "From the first day," admitted Djukanovic,
"we have had British and European consultants." (22)
The Center for International Private Enterprise, an affiliate of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, provided support to the Center for
Entrepreneurship (CEP) in Montenegro. According to the center's
executive director, Petar Ivanovic, the organization "focuses on
elementary and high schools," establishing entrepreneurship as a new
subject to be taught in schools. As Ivanovic explained it, "Introducing
young people to the concept of entrepreneurship will make them less
resistant to the private sector." The CEP also intends to "educate
government officials about the potential rewards of the private
sector," and to help them "understand the benefits
of economic reform and privatization." (23) According to Djukanovic,
when he met with President Clinton on June 21, 1999, the U.S. president
gave the privatization process a shove by telling Djukanovic that the
U.S. planned to "stimulate the economy" by "encouraging U.S.
corporations and banks to invest capital in Montenegro." (24)
Djukanovic moved steadily toward secession from Yugoslavia, indicating
that he would push for separation if President Milosevic were reelected
in the September 24 election. In a phone call to Djukanovic in July
2000, Madeleine Albright promised that the U.S would provide him with
an additional $16.5 million. That same week, Djukanovic blurted out
that Montenegro "is no longer part of Yugoslavia." He also made the
astonishing claim that he considered it a "priority" for Montenegro to
join NATO, the organization that had bombed his country only the year
before. The next month, Albright announced that she and Djukanovic "try
and talk to each other and meet on a regular basis," and that the
"United States is supportive of the approach that President Djukanovic
has taken in terms of democratic development and his approach to the
economic reforms also." (25)
Western support for secession extended beyond Albright meeting and
talking with Djukanovic. More than half of the population of Montenegro
opposed secession, and any such move was likely to explode into
violence. In preparation for a rift, Djukanovic built up a private army
of over 20,000 soldiers, the Special Police, including units armed with
anti-tank weapons and mortars. Sources in Montenegro revealed that
Western special forces trained Djukanovic's private army. Prior to the
election, Djukanovic requested that NATO establish an "air shield over
Montenegro." One member of the Special Police, named Velibor, confirmed
that they had received training from the British SAS. "If there is a
situation where weapons will decide the outcome, we are ready," he
said. "We are training for that." At a press conference on August 1,
2000, Minister Goran Matic declared that the "British are carrying out
part of the training of the Montenegrin special units. It is also
true," he added, that the Special Police "are intensively obtaining
various kinds and types of weapons, starting with anti-aircraft and
anti-helicopter weapons and so on, and they are also being assisted by
Croatia, as the weapons go through
Dubrovnik and other places." Furthermore, Matic pointed, "[L]ast year,
before and after the aggression, a group from within the Montenegrin
MUP [Ministry of Interior Affairs] structure left for training within
the U.S. police structure and the U.S. intelligence structures." In
August 2000, two armored vehicles bound for Montenegro were discovered
in the port of Ancona, Italy. One of the vehicles was fitted with a
turret suitable for mounting a machine gun or anti-tank weapon. Italian
customs officials, reported the Italian news service ANSA, were
"convinced" that arms trafficking to Montenegro was "of far greater
magnitude than this single episode might lead one to believe."
Revelling in anticipation of armed conflict, Djukanovic bragged that
"many will tuck their tails between their legs and will soon have to
flee Montenegro." (26)
A violent conflict in Montenegro would have provided NATO with a
pretext for intervention. As early as October 1999, General Wesley
Clark drew up plans for a NATO invasion of Montenegro. The plan
envisioned an amphibious assault by more than 2,000 Marines storming
the port of Bar and securing the port as a beachhead for pushing
inland. Troops ferried by helicopters would seize the airport at
Podgorica, while NATO warplanes would bomb and strafe resisting
Yugoslav forces. According to U.S. officials, other Western countries
had also developed invasion plans. (27) Richard Holbrooke, U.S.
Ambassador to the UN declared, "We are in constant touch with the
leadership of Montenegro," and warned that a conflict in Montenegro
"would be directly affecting NATO's vital interest." (28) NATO General
Secretary George Robertson was more explicit. "I say to Milosevic:
watch out, look what happened the last time you miscalculated." (29)

What the U.S. truly wanted, though, was all of Yugoslavia, not merely
another piece. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expected and
demanded street demonstrations to topple the government if the election
result did not satisfy her. At meetings held in Banja Luka in spring
2000, Albright expressed disappointment with the failure of past
efforts to overthrow the legally elected Yugoslav government. Albright
said that she had hoped sanctions would lead people to "blame Milosevic
for this suffering." An exasperated Albright wondered, "What was
stopping the people from taking to the streets?" Indicating that the
U.S. was casting about for a pretext for intervention, she added,
"Something needs to happen in Serbia that the West can support." (30)
Every contingency was planned for in the multifaceted U.S.
destabilization campaign. In the end, it was George Tenet's preferred
scenario that unfolded. An electoral process distorted by Western
intervention, combined with street action, finally toppled the
government of Yugoslavia.

The U.S. pumped $35 million into the pockets of the right-wing
opposition in the year preceding the September 24, 2000 election. This
haul included transmitters for opposition radio, and computers,
telephones and fax machines for several organizations. Right-wing media
received an additional $6 million from the European Union during this
period. Two organizations under the umbrella of the National Endowment
for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute and the International
Republican Institute, provided $4 million for a door-to-door campaign
and get-out-the-vote programs. (31) American officials assured
opposition media "not to worry about how much they're spending now,"
because much more was on the way. (32) Immediately following the
election, the U.S. House of Representatives passed by voice vote a bill
authorizing an additional $105 million for right-wing parties and media
in Yugoslavia. (33) Organizations such as the International Republican
Institute and the Agency for International Development pumped several
million dollars into the pockets of Otpor, building up the small
student opposition group into a major force. By the time the election
date was announced in Yugoslavia, Otpor had already printed over 60
tons of campaign material. (34)
The week before the election, the European Union issued a "Message to
the Serbian People," in which it announced that a victory for
opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica would result in lifting of
sanctions. "Even if Milosevic were to be returned by democratic vote,"
stated one EU official, sanctions would remain. This was a powerful
inducement for a population impoverished and devastated by years of
Western sanctions. (35) US State Department official William Montgomery
noted, "Seldom has so much fire, energy, enthusiasm, money - everything
- gone into anything as into Serbia in the months before Milosevic
went." (36) Before the election even took place, Western officials were
accusing the Yugoslav government of electoral fraud, planting the seeds
for disruption.

Throughout election day and the days that followed, the Democratic
Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition proclaimed their candidate's
victory. American officials encouraged the opposition to call for mass
demonstrations, even before official results were announced. Virtually
every day, DOS claimed a different percentage for their candidate. At
one point they claimed 57 percent. Two days after the election, on
September 26, DOS claimed Kostunica won 54.66 percent of the vote,
based on 97.5 percent of the ballots processed, but that 130,000 votes
"and the votes from Kosovo and Montenegro" had yet to be processed by
DOS. The next day, DOS announced that Kostunica led with 52.54 percent
of the vote. The tally, they said, was based on 98.72 percent of the
ballots counted. This time, DOS Electoral Staff spokesman Cedomir
Jovanovic changed his tune, claiming that unprocessed ballots were from
soldiers and mail-in ballots. According to Jovanovic, on September 26,
5,093,038 ballots out of a total of 5,223,629 were processed for a
total of percentage of 97.5. Based on the total given by Jovanovic,
that would have meant less than 64,000 ballots were counted the
following day, when he claimed a count of 98.72 percent. Assuming that
Kostunica lost every single one of those votes, his percentage would
have dropped to 52.75 percent, higher than the announced 52.54 figure.
DOS disposed of this awkwardness by issuing significantly different
totals. On September 26, Jovanovic announced that Kostunica led with
2,783,870 votes, yet on the following day he claimed that when all
votes were counted, "Kostunica will have 2,649,000 votes." Four days
later, Jovanovic claimed 2,424,187 votes for Kostunica, and then on
October 2 opposition spokesman Zoran Sami lowered the total still
further to 2,414,876, for a percentage of 51.34. Later, Sami claimed
the final result showed 2,377,440 votes and a percentage of 50.35 for
Kostunica. Excluded from these counts were the votes from Kosovo and
refugees from Kosovo. Western media treated DOS's claims uncritically,
proclaiming them to be based on precise and meticulous tallying of
ballots, and loud cries of fraud were levelled against the Yugoslav
government. Clearly there was fraud. The figures given out by DOS
itself indicate who was perpetuating the fraud. (37)
Despite claims made to the contrary in the Western media, the official
vote count was publicized widely in Yugoslavia. Vojislav Kostunica won
48.96 percent of the vote, falling just short of the 50 percent
required for outright victory. President Milosevic trailed with 38.62
percent of the vote. A second electoral round for the two top
candidates was called for October 8. (38) Backed by Western officials,
Kostunica and DOS refused to participate in the second round, claiming
that they had already won. DOS filed a complaint with first the Federal
Election Commission, and then the Constitutional Court. They demanded,
among other things, the annulment of votes by refugees from Kosovo, and
from Kosovo itself, where President Milosevic led by a wide margin. The
Constitutional Court upheld the proposal by Milovan Zivkovic, a member
of the Federal Election Commission, for returns from all voting
districts to be reexamined so as to dispel doubts. (39) It was the
threat of a recount that motivated the almost daily reduction in the
number and percentage of votes claimed by DOS for their candidate. The
final percentage DOS announced was close to the official result.
However, DOS refused to include votes cast in Kosovo and by many
refugees from Kosovo, ostensibly because polls in Kosovo closed at 4:00
PM, rather than 8:00 PM. According to DOS, the scheduled early closing
time invalidated all of the ballots cast by these voters. Only by
discounting votes from Kosovo residents and refugees could DOS claim a
50 percent victory for Kostunica.

Over 200 international observers from 54 countries monitored the
election. The observers attended every stage of the election, including
vote counting and correlation of results. One of the observers, Greek
Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias, concluded, "Those who had announced
widespread fraud, like [EU foreign policy chief] Javier Solana have
been proved wrong," and that the vote had been conducted in "an
impeccable manner."
Atila Volnay, an observer from Hungary, said his delegation had visited
several polling stations and confirmed the presence of opposition
representatives in electoral commissions, and that "there could be no
anomalies." A three-person delegation from Great Britain's Socialist
Labour Party declared that the Federal Electoral Commission "did
everything in its power to ensure that people were able to cast their
votes without intimidation and in an orderly manner," but that
irregularities were observed in Montenegro. "We received many
first-hand reports from people who stated that they had been threatened
[by Djukanovic supporters] with the loss of their jobs if they turned
out to vote." The delegation also noted that "countless refugees from
Kosovo had been deliberately excluded from the electoral lists in
Montenegro," and that the delegation "could only conclude that these
tactics of intimidation and disenfranchisement were designed to benefit
the so-called Democratic Opposition." The head of the Russian
delegation, Konstantin Kosachev, said that they "were satisfied that
virtually no large-scale falsification of the election in Yugoslavia
was possible." A final statement by the observers declared that "the
voting process overall was orderly and smooth" and that, "in the
opinion of many, was equal or superior to the ones in their own
countries." (40)

Given his commanding lead in the first electoral round, a Kostunica
victory in the runoff on October 8 was a near certainty. Why then, did
Kostunica refuse to participate in the runoff? As a result of the
September 24 election, the left coalition won 74 out of 137 seats in
the Chamber of Citizens and 26 out of 40 seats in the Chamber of
Republics.
The left-led coalition already held a majority in the Serbian
Parliament, whose seats were not up for election until the following
year. It would have been impossible for DOS to implement its program,
as the President's duties are rather limited. Only a coup d'etat would
allow DOS to bypass legal constraints, sweep aside the government and
reign unopposed.
Kostunica's campaign manager, Zoran Djindjic, called for a general
strike. "We shall seek to paralyze all institutions, schools, theaters,
cinemas, offices," and "call everyone onto the streets." (41) DOS
supporters throughout the country heeded his call, bringing segments of
the economy
to a standstill, while mass demonstrations sprang up throughout Serbia.
Madeleine Albright's cherished scenario became reality, as
demonstrators demanded the removal of the government. According to
opposition sources, as many as 10,000 armed DOS supporters joined the
final mass demonstration in Belgrade. The assault on the Federal
Parliament and Radio Television Serbia was led by a group of specially
trained squads of former soldiers. Velimir Ilic, opposition mayor of
Cacak, led the assault. "Our action had been planned in advance," he
later explained. "Our aim was very clear; take control of the regime's
key institutions, including the parliament
and the television." Ilic also arranged prior contacts with turncoat
policemen, who assisted Ilic's soldiers. (42) It is probable that the
CIA was involved in the planning of the well-coordinated attacks. After
armed squads forced their way into the Federal Parliament, they were
followed by a drunken mob of DOS supporters, who rampaged through the
building, smashing furniture and computers and setting the Parliament
ablaze. Police were beaten and drunken gangs, many armed with guns,
roamed the streets. Ambulances taking injured police to hospitals were
stopped by DOS activists, who demanded that the injured policemen be
turned over to them. After Radio Television Serbia in Belgrade was
seized, it too was torched. Throughout Serbia, offices of the Socialist
Party of Serbia and Yugoslav United Left were demolished. Socialists
were threatened and beaten, and many received threats over the
telephone. In Kragujevac, ten socialists were tied and abused for
hours. DOS thugs forced their way into the home of Zivojin Stefanovic,
president of the Socialist Party in Leskovac. After looting and
smashing Stefanovic's belongings, they set his house afire. (43)

While roving gangs overturned and burned police vehicles, vandalized
buildings and beat people, Kostunica announced, "Democracy has happened
in Serbia. Communism is falling. It is just a matter of hours." (44)
Establishing their democratic credentials, DOS activists systematically
seized left-oriented
media throughout Yugoslavia. Left-wing newspapers, radio and television
stations were reoriented in support of the right. A formerly rich and
diverse media culture, representing the entire political spectrum, took
on overnight a hue of uniformity, churning out praise for DOS. Gangs of
DOS thugs forcibly removed management at state-run factories and
enterprises, universities, banks and hospitals in towns and cities all
across Serbia. Government ministers were pressured to resign, and DOS
established a crisis committee to perform government functions,
circumventing the Federal Parliament and government ministries. DOS
officials openly threatened to call forth more street violence as a
means of pressuring the Serbian Parliament to agree to new election,
one year ahead of schedule.
Western officials couldn't hide their glee. American and European
corporations were waiting to snatch up state enterprises. The economic
program for DOS was drawn up by an organization named Group 17 Plus.
Their plan, called Project for Serbia, called for a rapid transition to
a full market economy. Immediately following the coup, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development promptly announced plans to
open an office in Belgrade. "It's important that we be there quickly,"
explained the bank's spokesman Jeff Hiday. "We suspect there will be a
lot to do with privatization and restructuring." (45)
Days before the coup, President Milosevic warned that DOS was an
instrument in NATO's campaign to impose neocolonial control over
Yugoslavia. Milosevic pointed out that neighboring countries already
under Western dictate "have speedily become impoverished in a manner
destroying all hope for more just and humane social relations," and
that Eastern Europe had seen a "great division into a poor majority and
a rich minority." Inevitably, he said, "That picture would also include
us." (46)

Alone and isolated, Yugoslavia resisted imperial domination,
withstanding Western-backed secessions, sanctions, war, and covert
operations. Against all odds, they remained independent and committed
to an economy in which socially owned property played a primary role.
The most powerful forces on the planet were arrayed against them, and
yet they held out for a decade. The NATO-backed coup swept all that
away. In one of his first acts as President, Kostunica joined the
Balkan Stability Pact. His privatization minister, Aleksandar Vlahovic,
announced a plan for the privatization of 7,000 firms... "I expect that
four years from now socially-owned capital will be completely
eliminated," Vlahovic explained, and that privatization of the largest
firms would be underway by then. (47) The millions of dollars that the
West stuffed into the pockets of DOS officials will pay handsome
dividends.

NOTES

1) Paul Beaver, "Clinton Tells CIA to Oust Milosevic," The Observer,
November 29, 1998.
Fran Visnar, "Clinton and the CIA Have Created a Scenario to Overthrow
Milosevic," Vijesnik (Zagreb), November 30, 1998.

2) Douglas Waller, "Tearing Down Milosevic," Time Magazine, July 12,
1999.

3) Michael Moran, "A Threat to 'Snatch' Milosevic," MSNBC, July 8, 1999.

4) "Yugoslav Official Accuses CIA of Being Behind Montenegro Murder,"
Agence France-Presse, June 6, 2000.
Aleksandar Vasovic, "Serb Aide Says CIA Behind Slaying," Associated
Press, June 6, 2000.
"Yugoslav Information Minister Accuses CIA of Complicity in Zugic
Murder," Borba (Belgrade), June 6, 2000.

5) Statement by Richard Tomlinson, addressed to John Wadham, September
11, 1998.

6) "Serb Consensus: Draskovic Crash Was No Accident," Seattle Times
News Services, October 13, 1999.

7) "NATO: Milosevic Not Target," BBC News, April 22, 1999.

8) "Serbs Allege Milosevic Assassination Plot," Reuters, November 25,
1999.
"France Plots to Murder Milosevic," Agence France-Presse, November 26,
1999.
"SFOR Units Involved in a Plot to Kill Milosevic," Agence
France-Presse, December 1, 1999.
Gordana Igric, "Alleged 'Assassins' Were No Stranger to France," IWPR
Balkan Crisis Report (London), November 26, 1999.
Milenko Vasovic, "Belgrade's French Connection," IWPR Balkan Crisis
Report (London), November 26, 1999.

9) "Lt. Testifies at Milosevic Trial," Associated Press, April 26, 2000.

10) Aleksandar Vasovic, "4 Accused of Milosevic Death Plot," Associated
Press, July 31, 2000.
"Dutchmen Arrested, Accused of Plotting Against Milosevic," Agence
France-Presse, July 31, 2000.
Email correspondence from Herman de Tollenaere, quoting from
NRC-Business Paper of August 1
"Arrested Dutchmen Admitted Plans to Kill, Kidnap Milosevic," BETA
(Belgrade), August 17, 2000.
"Dutch Espionage Terrorist Gang Arrested in Yugoslavia - Minister,"
Tanjug (Belgrade), July 31, 2000
"Yugoslav Information Minister Says U.S. Behind Dutch 'Mercenaries',"
BBC Monitoring Service, August 1, 2000.

11) "NDI Activities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia-Montenegro)," NDI Worldwide Activities, www.ndi.org

12) "Britain Trains New Elite for Post-Milosevic Era," The Independent
(London), May 3, 2000.
The New Serbia Forum, http://ds.dial.pipex.com/town/way/glj77/Serbia.htm

13) "Final Text of Stability Pact for Southeast Europe," June 10, 1999.
"Southeast Europe Equity Fund Launched July 26," U.S. Embassy, Skopje,
Macedonia, July 27, 2000.
"The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe: One Year Later," White House
Fact Sheet, July 27, 2000.

14) Michael Dobbs, "U.S. Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition,"
Washington Post, December 11, 2000.

15) "Federal Foreign Ministry Sends Memorandum to UN Security Council,"
Tanjug (Belgrade), October 4, 2000.
"US Anti-Yugoslav Office Opens in Budapest," Tanjug (Belgrade), August
21, 2000.

16) "CIA Training Resistance Members in Sofia, Bucharest," Tanjug
(Belgrade), August 25, 2000.

17) Elena Staridolska, "Daynov Academy Trains Serbian Opposition,"
Standart News (Sofia), August 29, 2000. Konstantin Chugunov, "We Report
the Details: Our Little Brothers Have Bent in the Face of NATO,"
Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), August 23, 2000.

18) "Bulgaria - Press Review" BTA (Sofia), August 12, 2000
"Bulgaria - Us CIA Director's Visit," BTA (Sofia), August 15, 2000
"CIA Did Not Tell Us the Most Important Thing," Trud (Sofia), August
16, 2000
"Bulgaria - Press Review," BTA (Sofia), August 14, 2000
"Bulgaria - Press Review," BTA (Sofia), August 16, 2000

19) Mila Avramova, "Italians Lease Training Ground for 400,000 Leva,"
Trud (Sofia), August 9, 2000
Michael Evans, "Balkans Watch for 'Invincible'," The Times (London),
August 26, 2000.

20) "U.S. Forces Travel to Croatia for Amphibious Exercise," Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), September 12, 2000.
"U.S. War Game in Adriatic, U.K. Navy in Mediterranean," Reuters,
September 16, 2000.

21) Ljubinka Cagorovic, "Montenegro Assembly Scraps Socially-Owned
Property," Reuters, November 13, 1999.
"Montenegrin Government Prepares to Privatise Economy," Tanjug
(Belgrade), December 25, 1999.

22) Central and Eastern Europe Business Information Center,
"Southeastern Europe Business Brief," February 3, 2000.
Central and Eastern Europe Business Information Center, "Southeastern
Europe Business Brief," April 27, 2000.
Anne Swardson, "West Grows Close to Montenegro," Washington Post, May
24, 2000.

23) Petar Ivanovic, "Montenegro: Laying the Foundation of
Entrepreneurship," Center for International Private Enterprise.

24) Statement by Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, "Important Step
in Opening New Perspectives For Montenegrin State Policy," Pobjeda
(Podgorica), June 22, 1999.

25) "Albright Renews Montenegro Support," Associated Press, July 13,
2000.
"Montenegro Wants to Join NATO and the EU," Agence France-Presse, July
10, 2000.
Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, "Secretary of State
Madeleine K. Albright and Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic," Press
Stakeout at Excelsior Hotel, Rome, Italy, August 1, 2000.

26) "Montenegro Ahead of Elections: Boycott and Threats," BETA
(Belgrade), August 9, 2000.
"Montenegro and Elections - Boycott Becomes Official," BETA (Belgrade),
August 17, 2000.
Phil Reese, "We Have the Heart for Battle, Says Montenegrin Trained by
SAS," The Independent (London), July 30, 2000.
"Yugoslav Information Minister Says U.S. Behind Dutch 'Mercenaries',"
BBC Monitoring Service, August 1, 2000.
"Yugoslavia Says British SAS Trains Montenegrins," Reuters, August 1,
2000.
"Information Minister Sees Montenegrin Arms Purchases, Croatian
Assistance," BETA (Belgrade), July 31, 2000.
"Foreign 'Dogs of War' Training Montenegrin Police to Attack Army,"
Tanjug (Belgrade), August 9, 2000.
"Montenegro: Camouflaged Military Vehicles Seized in Ancona," ANSA
(Rome), August 21, 2000.
"Montenegro: Traffic in Camouflaged Armored Vehicles: Investigation
into Documentation," ANSA (Rome), August 22, 2000.
"SAS Training Montenegrin Police," The Sunday Times (London), October
1, 2000.

27) Richard J. Newman, "Balkan Brinkmanship," US News and World Report,
November 15, 1999.

28) "Clinton Warns Milosevic 'Remains a Threat to Peace," Agence
France-Presse, July 29, 2000.

29) "NATO's Robertson Warns Milosevic on Montenegro," Reuters, July 27,
2000.

30) Borislav Komad, "At Albright's Signal," Vecernje Novosti
(Belgrade), May 18, 2000.

31) George Jahn, "U.S. Funding Yugoslavian Reformers," Associated
Press, September 29, 2000.
Jane Perlez, "U.S. Anti-Milosevic Plan Faces Major Test at Polls," New
York Times, September 23, 2000.
"U.S., EU Generous to Foes of Milosevic," Associated Press, October 1,
2000.

32) Steven Erlanger, "Milosevic, Trailing in Polls, Rails Against
NATO," New York Times, September 20, 2000.

33) "U.S. House Votes to Fund Yugoslavia's Opposition Movement," CNN,
September 25, 2000.

34) Roger Cohen, "Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?" New York Times
Magazine, November 26, 2000.

35) Geoff Meade, "Cook Backs EU Over Oust Milosevic Message," London
Press Association, September 18, 2000.

36) Roger Cohen, "Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?" New York Times
Magazine, November 26, 2000.

37) "DOS Claims Kostunica Leading Milosevic with 54.66 to 35.01 Percent
of Vote," BETA (Belgrade), September 26, 2000.
"DOS Announces Kostunica Clear Winner with 98.72 Percent Data
Processed," BETA (Belgrade), September 27, 2000.
"Federal Electoral Commission - DOS Election Staff Misinformed Public,"
Tanjug (Belgrade), October 3, 2000.
"Who Lies Kostunica?" statement by the Socialist Party of Serbia,
October 11, 2000.

38) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia web site, www.gov.yu "Total Election
Results," and "The Federal Elections Commission Statement." Both
statements were removed following the coup.
"Final Results of FRY Presidential Election," Tanjug (Belgrade),
September 28, 2000.

39) "Yugoslav Constitutional Court Holds Public Debate on DOS Appeal,"
Tanjug (Belgrade), October 4, 2000.
"DOS Requests Annulment of 142,000 Kosovo Votes," BETA (Belgrade),
September 29, 2000.

40) "Contrary to EU Claims, Yugoslav Elections a Success: Greece,"
Agence France-Presse, September 26, 2000.
"210 Observers from 53 States Commend FRY Elections," Tanjug
(Belgrade), September 27, 2000.
"Foreign Observers Say Elections Democratic and Regular," Tanjug
(Belgrade), September 25, 2000.
"Yugoslav Elections - a Lesson in Outside Interference," Socialist
Labour Party statement.
Broadcast, Mayak Radio (Moscow), October 2, 2000.
"'A Fair and Free Election,' International Observers Say," statement by
international observers.

41) Misha Savic, "Milosevic Will Take Part in Runoff," Associated
Press, October 5, 2000.

42) Richard Boudreaux, "A Mayor's Conspiracy Helped Topple Milosevic,"
Los Angeles Times, October 10, 2000.
"Cacak Mayor Says He Led Assault on Yugoslav Parliament," Agence
France-Presse, October 8, 2000. Jonathan Steele, Tim Judah, John
Sweeney, Gillian Sandford, Rory Carroll, Peter Beaumont, "An Outrage
Too Far," The Observer (London), October 8, 2000.
Gillian Sandford, "Army Units Claim Credit for Uprising," The Guardian
(London), October 9, 2000.

43) "Information for the Public," statement by the Socialist Party of
Serbia, October 7, 2000.
"Group of Demonstrators Demolished the House of the District Head,"
BETA (Belgrade), October 6, 2000.

44) "Protesters Storm Yugoslav Parliament," Associated Press, October
5, 2000.
"Good Evening, Liberated Serbia," The Times (London), October 6, 2000.
"Milosevic's Party HQ Ransacked by Protesters," Agence France-Presse,
October 5, 2000.

45) Jelena Radulovic, "Yugoslavia's Kostunica Sets Economic Goals for
New Government," Bloomberg, October 7, 2000.
"Brains Behind Kostunica Have a Plan," Sydney Morning Herald, October
2, 2000.
Stefan Racin, "Yugoslavia's Opposition Outlines Economic Plans," UPI,
September 27, 2000.

46) "Yugoslav President Milosevic Addresses the Nation," Tanjug
(Belgrade), October 3, 2000.

47) Beti Bilandzic, "Serbia Eyes New Privatization Law by April,"
Reuters, January 28, 2001.


Gregory Elich has published dozens of articles on the Balkans and East
Asia in the US, Canada and Europe, in such publications as Covert
Action Quarterly, Politika, Der Junge Welt, Dagbladet Arbejderen,
Science&Society, Swans, and other publications. His research findings
on CIA intervention in Yugoslavia was the subject of articles in
newspapers in Germany, Norway and Italy, including Il Manifesto. He has
been involved in peace activities since the Vietnam War, and was
coordinator of the Committee for Peace in Yugoslavia. He was a member
of a US delegation visiting Yugoslavia after the NATO war, and a member
of the Margarita Papendreou delegation, the first to fly on a Western
national airline to Baghdad in challenge to the sanctions.

Scharping's Lies Won't Last

http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/yu_kriza/2003-10-02_2.html

By Thomas Deichmann
Translated from German by Matthias Gockel.
April 1999


Thomas Deichmann is editor of Novo magazine (www.novo-magazin.de) and a
free lance journalist based in Frankfurt. He is co-editor with Klaus
Bittermann of 'Wie Dr. Joseph Fischer lernte, die Bombe zu lieben'
(Edition Tiamat, Berlin 1999) and editor of 'Noch einmal für
Jugoslawien: Peter Handke' (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 1999).
Deichmann's article 'The picture that fooled the world' about a
misleading TV image from Trnopolje camp was printed in Ramsey Clark et
al: 'NATO in the Balkans. Voices of Opposition', International Action
Centre, New York 1998. Deichmann's study of Roy Gutman's war reporting
appeared under the title 'The Pulitzer Price and Croatian Propaganda'
in 'War Lies & Videotape. How Media Monopoly stifles truth',
International Action Centre, New York 2000.
Deichmann can be contacted at: Thomas.Deichmann@....


For the German political elite, the war against Yugoslavia signaled an
important break with the past, since moral and political renunciation
of militarism had characterized political culture in Germany for more
than half a century since the end of World War II. Accepting a call to
arms still was no routine occurance, especially since the attack was
directed against a country that had suffered immensely from the brutal
onslaught of German fascism 60 years ago. That this military campaign
took place in violation of international law and the German
constitution, both regulative foundations formulated in response to the
crimes of Nazism, complicated matters even further. Moreover, the first
marching orders for German soldiers came from parties commonly
identified with the liberal traditions of the Federal Republic of
Germany. The Social Democrat Rudolf Scharping and Green Party Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer took on the task of justifying German
participation in this war of aggression. During the Bosnian war,
Fischer, while still in the opposition, had argued against sending
German troops into the Balkans, precisely by reference to the Holocaust.
The German Socialdemocratic Party (SPD) had fewer problems with
pacifist attitudes in its ranks. It faced a different problem. After
the German general elections in fall 1998, when the SPD and the Green
Party (Buendnis'90/Die Gruenen) were setting out with their new
coalition government, they were under harsh criticism. It became clear
soon that the hype of the election campaign in 1998 had concealed a
rather fumbling bunch of Chancelor Gerhard Schroerder's new government
leaders. The war against Yugoslavia offered the government an ideal
opportunity to leave its domestic problems behind and emerge with a new
image. Certainly, the decision to enter the war was not made just with
this goal in mind, but the disastrous condition of Schroeder's team was
an important underlying consideration during the deliberations about
the deployment of the Bundeswehr.
This background led to overreactions that often not merely bordered
fanaticism. The rhetoric of the Holocaust was deployed in Germany more
than any other western country to endow the NATO attack on Serbia and
German participation in it with moral legitimacy. Scharping followed up
with one horror-story with the next and constructed countless analogies
between Serbia and the Third Reich.

LIE MACHINE

A massive public relations campaign prepared and accompanied the German
armed forces' participation in the NATO campaign. German Defense
Minister Scharping became the tireless prime mover of this German war
propaganda. His book 'Wir duerfen nicht wegsehen. Der Kosovo-Krieg und
Europa' ['We can not look away. The Kosovo War and Europe'] (Berlin
1999), which was published a few months after the conflict, quite
openly discloses the scale of the lies and deception Scharping employed
to justify the military campaign against Yugoslavia. For example, we
find the following account in Scharping's 270-page work:

'Shall we overlook all the slaughter that is happening there? Are all
the stories that people tell us no more than invention and propaganda:
that corpses are destroyed with baseball-bats and that their limbs or
heads are cut off? … it seems that human beings in a frenzy can commit
any bestiality, playing soccer with heads that were cut off, tearing
apart corpses, cutting fetuses out of the womb of women who were
killed.' (p.125)

Many reports Scharping presented in this context even during the war
could not stand up to scrutiny. Many allegations were, sooner or later,
unmasked either as misrepresentation or attempts at manipulation - yet
they are included in his book without the slightest amendment or
qualification.

1. Concentration Camps in Pristina

'Allegedly, Albanians are held in the stadium of Pristina. Parts of the
stadium have a basement. There are several small shops below the
spectator stands, which offer space for several thousand people. The
first Albanians were reportedly brought into the stadium on April 1.'
(Entry of April 19, 1999, p.128)

At the outset of the war, Scharping mentions 'serious evidence of
concentration camps in Kosovo'. He adds: 'I say concentration camp on
purpose'. Scharping believes that the soccer-stadium of Pristina was
converted into a Serb-run concentration camp holding 100,000 people.
This claim originated from the KLA (as did the report that influential
Kosovo-Albanian intellectuals were systematically killed by the Serb
military). Scharping nonetheless treated it as though it were
indisputable fact. Yet some days later, several persons who had
allegedly been killed, reappeared. Pictures taken from German
surveillance planes refute the claim that a concentration camp existed
in the stadium of Pristina. Still, there were no retractions, and
concentration camp stories continued to circulate.

2. Operation Horseshoe

'From Joschka [J. Fischer, German Foreign Minister] I receive a paper
that stems from intelligence sources and proves that 'Operation
Horseshoe' was prepared and executed by the Yugoslav Army... An
evaluation of the operation-plan 'Horseshoe' exists. Now we have proof
that a systematic cleansing of Kosovo and the deportation of the
Kosovo-Albanians were already planned in December 1998.' (Entries of
April 5 and 7, 1999, pp.102 & 107)

While other German politicians showed some restraint in using the term
'genocide' in relation to events in Kosovo, Scharping continues to
repeat his thesis that a genocide in Kosovo was 'not only prepared',
but systematically planned, and 'in fact is already happening' (p.84).
To support these claims, he presents dubious documents about an
operation-plan allegedly named 'Horseshoe' in early April, claiming
that operation maps would prove that genocidal plans for the ethnic
cleansing of Kosovo already existed in 1998 and were now awaiting final
execution.
Some months later it was revealed that these documents were false.
According to press reports they came from the German and the Austrian
Secret Services. It is striking that Scharping's propaganda experts
used the Croatian translation of the word 'horseshoe', which is
Potkova, instead of its Serbian translation Potkovica.
Yet in spring 2000 Mr. Scharping still insists on the authenticity of
the documents in question and proudly explains to the press that he
passed all evidence in his possession to the United Nations
International War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY) in The Hague for use by the
prosecution. But the ICTY stated in response to media inquiries that it
would not allow Mr. Scharping's 'Operation Horseshoe' documents as
evidence, because of their unclear sources.

3. Killing Fields and Mountains of Corpses

'The brutality escalates, the refugees literally walk along mountains
of corpses. An old fear comes to my mind: This criminal wants a
cease-fire in the graveyard.' (Entry of April 29, 1999, p.141)

The warring NATO-countries justify the ongoing bombing campaign with
the claim that it would stop 'ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo. NATO speaker
Jamie Shea compares Kosovo with the 'Killing Fields' of Cambodia, and
Mr. Scharping speaks of 'mountains of corpses'. Estimates of the
numbers of Kosovo-Albanians allegedly killed and buried in mass graves
by Serbian soldiers increases continuously. In early April, the
US-State Department puts out the figure of 500,000. On April 18, David
Scheffer, US-Ambassador for War Crimes, says that possibly up to
100,000 Albanians were killed. On the next day, Jamie Rubin, the
speaker of the State Department, repeats this speculative number:
'Based on past practice, it is chilling to think where those 100,000
men are.' One month later, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen guesses:
'We've now seen about 100.000 military-aged men missing... They may
have been murdered' (Washington Post, May 17, 1999). At the end of the
war, in early June, the number of alleged Kosovo-Albanian victims
killed is drastically reduced to 10,000.
Immediately after NATO occupied Kosovo, approximately 20 teams with
experts from 15 countries enter Kosovo on the orders of the UN Criminal
Tribunal to search for mass graves. The teams numbered 500 experts
altogether, including some FBI officials. Indeed, hundreds of corpses
are exhumed in a few weeks. This seems to affirm the horrific
expectations of genocide on a mass scale. Yet the 'success stories'
come to an end soon. The FBI investigates in the British sector and
finds no more than 200 corpses.
Finally, in the fall of 1999, a first report from the Chief Prosecutor
of the UN-Tribunal, Carla Del Ponte, reveals that the numbers given by
Western governments were gross exaggerations. The accusation that the
Serb military executed genocide now appears to be sheer war propaganda.
Of the 529 locations, where mass graves were suspected (according to
witnesses), 195 were investigated between June and October 1999. The
inspectors were ordered to start in those where the investigations
promised to be most successful. But by October, only 2108 corpses were
exhumed - they were mainly found in individual graves. The
UN-investigators did not offer any information about age, sex,
nationality, or probable time of death of these persons, among whom one
suspects Kosovo-Albanian and Serb fighters as well as civilians from
both sides. How many of these dead may have been killed by the NATO
bombings was also not addressed. Del Ponte maintains, however, that
many presumed gravesites were tampered with, and she speculates that
there may still be as many as 10,000 victims. Further investigations
during the year 2000 are supposed to prove this. But again this remains
pure propaganda.

4. Mass Graves

'Our inquiry teams had learned that up to 200 persons were killed in
the village of Izbica and buried. Soon afterwards, we had pictures that
clearly showed fresh grave sites in Izbica as well as in the
neighboring village of Krasnika.' (Entry of May 25, 1999, p.182f)

Scharping's claim is based on a report of the US State Department,
published on May 10, 1999, with the title 'Erasing History: Ethnic
Cleansing in Kosovo'. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright says during
its presentation that it proves 'without any doubt' the existence of 'a
horrible system of war crimes and crimes against humanity', including
'systematic executions' and 'organized rape'. The report says that
approximately 90 percent of Kosovo-Albanians were driven from their
homes, a claim that was later exposed as a blatant lie. Moreover, it is
said that approximately 150 Albanians were killed in Izbica. Satellite
images, which are designed to prove a change in the surface of the
soil, are presented and put onto the Internet. After the war ended, UN
investigators find no corpses at the presumed grave-site near Izbica
(The Spectator, November 20, 1999). However, they find evidence that
allegedly points to the removal of signs of a mass grave by Serb
security forces.
While it remains unclear whether there ever was a mass grave on the
field near Izbica, other investigations at other sites have shown that
similar claims were pure war propaganda. Immediately after the war,
NATO officials referred to Ljubenic near Pec as the site of one of the
largest mass graves. They state that retreating Serb units had buried
350 corpses there in a hurry. UN investigators go to the place and find
exactly seven corpses (Toronto Sun, November 18, 1999). Moreover, the
KLA also reports a huge mass grave in the Trepca mines, claiming that
in one oven up to 100 persons were buried daily and the ashes thrown
into the mine corridors. Approximately 6,000 Kosovo-Albanians allegedly
lost their lives in the process. After the war ended, investigators
expected to find at least the remains of 700 persons in the mine. In
October, Kelly Moore, a speaker of the UN-Tribunal, reports that the
investigators had 'found absolutely nothing' (New York Times, October
13, 1999).
Emilio Perez Pujol, member of a Spanish team of pathologists, already
made the following skeptical comments in September: 'I calculate that
the final figure of dead in Kosovo will be 2,500 at the most. This
includes lots of strange deaths that can't be blamed on anyone in
particular.' The Spanish team was warned that it went into the 'worst
zone of Kosovo', Istok. But at the end of their investigations, the
pathologists had found 187 bodies. They do not find mass graves (El
Pais, September 23, 1999).

5. Systematic Rape

'Satellite images show mass graves; women report to the OSCE about
systematic rape; the UNHCR receives information about young women and
men who are abused as human shields for an ammunition depot in
Prizren.' (Entry of April 27, 1999, p.137).

Scharping and his colleagues repeatedly mention reports of mass rape in
Kosovo. Pictures of refugee convoys and comments by refugees are shown
or presented almost daily, in order to create moral concern among the
population and to drown out discussion about the goals and legitimacy
of the NATO war. Certainly, atrocities occurred during the war, but it
is equally clear that corresponding information and speculation is used
for propaganda purposes. The situation in the camps is also described
with distortions. Reinhard Munz, a German physician who worked in the
Macedonian refugee camp Stenkovac, concludes in an interview: 'The
refugees were used for political reasons.' He points out that 'men of
fighting age were the majority in our camp.' This contradicts
allegations by Scharping and others that children, women, and elderly
lived in the camps, whereas masses of potential male fighters were
victims of Serb soldiers. In reply to a question about the evidence of
rape, Munz says: 'During the whole time, we encountered no single case
of a women who was raped. And we looked at 60,000 persons in Stenkovac
I and II, as well as two smaller camps. Due to the rumors about
systematic rape, we wondered in advance what to do about the raped
women, but this situation did not arise. We have heard of no cases of
rape, which of course does not mean that there were none at all' (Die
Welt, June 18, 1999).

6. Massacre in Rogovo

'I feel sick when I look at these pictures... During the daily press
conference I announce: 'We will present to you pictures of a massacre
that had already occurred on January 29, 1999 ... I advise you,
however, to come well prepared, since these are original photographs
taken by an OSCE observer ... You will clearly see what was going on
already in January'.' (Entry April 25 and 26, 1999, pp.132 and 136)

During a press conference On April 27, Scharping presents photographs
of corpses to substantiate his claim that the Serbs had already
committed massacres of civilians and begun systematic deportations of
Kosovo-Albanians in January 1999. But journalists immediately
recognized the pictures and replied that OSCE inspectors had already
used them to refer, not to a massacre, but to combat between Serb
soldiers and the KLA. When Scharping is confronted with these facts
again during in a TV-broadcast, he takes recourse to further
speculation - allegedly, the skulls of the corpses were demolished with
baseball bats (Bericht aus Berlin, April 30, 1999). Highly indignant,
Scharping rejects all criticism of his behavior.

7. Collateral Damage

The Serb media immediately use these tragic mistakes for their own
propaganda, as proof of wanton destruction and deliberate attacks on
the civilian population. Our media also spread these reports.' (Entry
April 6, 1999, p.192)

This is Scharping's entry, after a rocket had exploded in a residential
neighborhood in the town of Aleksinac on April 5. Seventeen people had
died. Later, 'deliberate attacks' against civilians occur, for example,
when the Radio- and TV-Station RTS, the Chinese Embassy, and the town
of Korisa are attacked: On May 14, NATO airplanes fire 10 bombs into
the village Korisa in Kosovo, killing at least 87 civilians. On the
same day, NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea announces on BBC: 'We have
reports that soldiers died as well, not only civilians.' During a press
conference the following day, the German NATO General Walter Jertz
insists that Korisa was a legitimate target, since there had also been
military installations there.
Western information strategists manipulated so-called 'collateral
damage' evidence for their own propaganda, too. This becomes clear
after a rocket-attack on April 12: During two subsequent sorties, a
NATO fighter fired a rocket against a train, when the latter crossed a
bridge near Grdelica. Two carriages are hit, at least 12 people die,
and many more are wounded. On April 13, General Wesley Clark, the NATO
Supreme Commander in Europe, speaks of a 'freakish coincidence'. At the
end of the conference, he presents the cockpit-video of the plane, in
order to emphasize that the pilot allegedly had no choice: 'Look
carefully at the target, concentrate on it, and you can see, if you
focus like a pilot, that suddenly this train appeared'.
In January 2000, it is revealed in Germany that NATO experts
manipulated the tape before it was shown and thus deceived the
international public: The tape was running five times faster than the
real events, which confirmed the impression that the train raced toward
the bridge and could not be detected by the pilot (Frankfurter
Rundschau, January 20, 2000). NATO-speakers excused this as a
'technical problem'.

8. Rockets Hit Refugees

'A convoy is hit near Djakovica, many people are killed. It remains
uncertain for days whether it was a civilian or a military convoy,
whether the Serb military abused a civilian convoy as a shield, and
whether it was a NATO attack at all ... The probability that NATO
pilots tragically mistook a group of refugees for a military convoy was
another sad example that war without sacrifices among the civilian
population does not exist.' (Entry of April 14, 1999, p.121)

The rocket attack on the refugee convoy near Djakovica occurs on April
14. More than 70 people are killed. For days, Defense Minister
Scharping and NATO speakers cast doubts on the NATO origin of the
attack. Later, the event is excused with the high altitude of the plane
and the pilot's confusion of 'tractor-like vehicles' with Serb military
vehicles. A few weeks later, the U.S.-based International Strategic
Studies Association publishes the voice traffic between the USAF F-16
strike aircraft and his EC-130 Hercules AWACS:

'Pilot: Charlie Bravo to Mother. I am coming out of the clouds, still
nothing in sight.
AWACS: Mother to Charlie Bravo. Continue to the north, course 280.
Pilot: Charlie Bravo to Mother. I am keeping 3,000 feet. Under me
columns of cars, some kind of tractors. What is it? Requesting
instructions.
AWACS: Mother to Charlie Bravo. Do you see tanks? Repeat, where are the
tanks?
Pilot: Charlie Bravo to Mother. I see tractors. I suppose the Reds did
not camouflage tanks as tractors.
AWACS: Mother to Charlie Bravo. What kind of strange convoy is this?
What, civilians? Damn, this is all the Serb's doing. Destroy the target.
Pilot: Charlie Bravo to Mother. What should I destroy? Tractors?
Ordinary cars? Repeat, I don't see any tanks. Request additional
instructions.
AWACS: Mother to Charlie Bravo. This is a military target, a completely
legitimate military target. Destroy the target. Repeat, destroy the
target.
Pilot: Charlie Bravo to Mother. OK, copy. Launching.'
(Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 3/1999)

The authenticity of this transcript of the mission radio traffic
remains a matter of debate. But the statement of a Spanish F-18 pilot
after he returned from the war at the end of May is clear proof that
civilians were targeted deliberately. The pilot claims that he and his
colleagues repeatedly received orders to attack civilian installations:
'Our colonel went to his NATO heads several times and protested against
the choice of targets that were not of a military nature ... Once we
received an encoded order from U.S. military officials to drop
anti-personnel bombs over the towns of Pristina and Nis. Our colonel
refused the order, and a few days later he was deposed' (Articulo 20,
June 14, 1999).
The facts speak for themselves. During the war, thousands of
anti-personnel bombs - so-called cluster-bombs against 'soft targets' -
were dropped on military as well as civilian installations in Serbia.
For example, on May 7, two of them explode in Nis, killing 13 civilians
and wounding 29, some of them critically.

9. The bombing of RTS in Belgrad

'I am not satisfied with NATO's information policy. The information
itself is reliable, but it comes much too late and allows too much time
in between for speculation and disinformation. Why is it not possible
to disseminate information in Brussels early in the morning, in order
to counter images of Yugoslav TV?' (Entry of April 4, 1999, p.99)

Evidently, other NATO officials shared Scharping's displeasure and did
something about it. In the early morning hours of April 23, the central
station of the Serb TV station RTS, located in the city center of
Belgrad, is attacked. Sixteen journalists and technicians are torn to
pieces, many more are wounded. At the same time, bombing raids on
antennas and transmitter stations in the whole of Serbia increase from
mid-April onwards, and in May satellite broadcasting by Yugoslav
stations to Western Europe is interrupted. After the war, it is
revealed that the attack on RTS was planned long in advance. During the
'NewsWorld' media-conference in Barcelona in October 1999, the head of
CNN International, Easton Jordan, explains that he was informed about
the imminent attack. He protested, and the NATO jets hence veered away
during their first sortie (Daily Telegraph, November 7, 1999). Two days
later, the attack is carried out, at a time when there were no foreign
journalists in the RTS building and the CNN crew had removed its
equipment to safety. Before the attack, the Serbian minister of
information, Aleksandar Vucic, is invited into the RTS building for an
interview during the live broadcast of a U.S. station. According to his
own remarks, he escaped the attack only because he was late (Le Monde
Diplomatique, August 13, 1999).

10. The Targeting of the Chinese Embassy

'What a terrible disaster ... It will create great political
difficulties, not only in terms of public opinion and growing
impatience and uncertainties; this terrible mistake also threatens to
ruin our political efforts.' (Entry of May 8, 1999, p.154)

Mr. Scharping is worried after three rockets had hit the Chinese
Embassy in the center of Belgrad on May 7. Three Chinese journalists
are killed, and many officials are wounded severely. Scharping talks
about 'imprecise target coordination' and 'deficiencies of the
information provided by intelligence services'. Months later, it is
revealed that the CIA was responsible for the targeting process and
that the building was not mistakenly hit. It is presumed that the
embassy building was used to communicate intelligence information to
the Serb military and that this was the reason for NATO's attack (Der
Spiegel, 2/2000).

11. Defense of Human Rights

'Finally, we are not the aggressors, as we were so often before 1945,
but we defend human rights. For the first time, the Germans are acting
in cooperation with all Europeans, instead of against them. For the
first time, the goal is not subjugation but human rights and their
enforcement.' (Entry of April 11, 1999, p.114)

Scharping's heroic justification of the German military campaign
between March and June 1999 reiterates the delusion that motivated him
before and during the war. On the eve of March 24, 1999, the opposite
of Scharping's promise becomes reality within hours. With the start of
the bombing campaign, the situation dramatically worsens - also for
Kosovo-Albanian civilians. Members of aid organizations note that the
NATO bombings led to the massive exodus from Kosovo. In the wake of the
bombings, the conflict between Serb soldiers and the KLA escalates.
Moreover, thousands of people from all ethnic groups flee their homes,
because the on-going air-strikes make them fear for their life. An
OSCE-report entitled 'Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As told', published on
December 6, 1999, indicates that attacks against Kosovo-Albanians do
occur, but the vast majority of them took place only after the NATO war
began. Thanks to the NATO war, the basis for a peaceful life of the
different groups in Kosovo, which was weak and previously damaged
anyway, is destroyed for years, if not decades.

Luca Casarini ed i suoi squadristi contro la Jugoslavia partigiana ed a
favore del revisionismo neoirredentista


In merito all'aggressione a militanti del Prc di Venezia ad opera dei
Disobbedienti vicini a Luca Casarini sono comparsi alcuni comunicati di
condanna (si veda ad es. Liberazione del 1/10/2003, a pag.17, vedi
anche: http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/2830 ).
Da questi tuttavia non si capiscono bene ne' la dinamica della
aggressione, ne' tantomeno i motivi del contrasto. Rivelatori in questo
senso sono i lanci dell'agenzia Ansa, contenenti fra l'altro una
dichiarazione pubblica di Casarini che aiuta a capire veramente la
gravità politica di ciò che è accaduto. La manifestazione di Prc,
Cobas, Rete Antirazzista e Verdi non-violenti è stata a tutti gli
effetti caricata dal servizio d'ordine dei centri sociali "Pedro" e
"Rivolta", trasformatosi in tutore del revisionismo neoirredentista che
mira a cancellare ed infamare la Guerra di Liberazione. (i.s.)


FOIBE:CONTESTAZIONI PER CAMBIO NOME DI UNA PIAZZA A MARGHERA

(ANSA) - VENEZIA, 28 SET - Momenti di tensione si sono
registrati oggi prima della cerimonia di inaugurazione ai
Martiri Giuliano Dalmati delle Foibe dell'ex piazzale Nicolo'
Tommaseo di Marghera, uno slargo alberato a ridosso delle
fabbriche, proprio sotto al Petrolchimico.
Una quarantina di Disobbedienti del centro sociale Rivolta di
Marghera ha infatti impedito il sit-in di una ventina di
esponenti di Rifondazione Comunista, Cobas-Scuola, Rete
Antirazzista, Verdi Non Violenti, programmato per contestare la
nuova intitolazione del piazzale.
Dopo un intervento lieve della polizia e allontanatisi i
Disobbedienti, i dissenzienti hanno potuto aprire uno striscione
con la scritta ''Vergogna'', indossando cartelli con frasi quali
''la toponomastica non cancellera' l'antifascismo'' e ''adesso
sappiamo come i nostri amministratori spendono i nostri soldi e
il loro tempo''.
Sul palco sono poi giunti il sindaco di Venezia Paolo Costa
(Margherita) e il prosindaco di Mestre Gianfranco Bettin
(Verdi), e, tra gli altri, il consigliere regionale Bruno
Cannella (An), oltre al presidente dell'Associazione degli Esuli
Giuliani e Dalmati, Lucio Toth, che aveva chiesto con forza
l'intitolazione della piazza.
''In tutta Italia c'e' stato confronto sul tema dei martiri
delle foibe, con la presenza delle associazioni partigiane,
Marghera e' anche quella della gente giuliana e dalmata che e'
venuta qui a vivere e lavorare'', ha detto Bettin, ricordando
che nelle foibe sono state uccise persone di diverse
appartenenze politiche.
Anche Toth ha fatto osservare che ''nelle foibe sono finiti
fascisti e antifascisti; giuliani e dalmati hanno pagato in modo
molto piu' pesante di altri l'esito della guerra''.
Il sindaco Costa, infine, ha fatto riferimento tra l'altro
''alla prossima entrata della Slovenia in Europa e a quella piu'
lontana della Serbia'', dicendo che ''non si possono eliminare i
problemi nascondendoli'' e affermando di essere ''orgoglioso di
intitolare la piazza ai martiri delle foibe''.
Nel piazzale erano presenti anche picchetti d'onore del
comitato che interviene alle cerimonie pubbliche su invito
dell'amministrazione comunale, con, tra gli altri,
rappresentanti dell'Associazione nazionale carabinieri, di
diversi corpi dell'esercito, tra i quali alpini e bersaglieri,
con le relative insegne. Non presenti, invece, le associazioni
partigiane.
(ANSA). BE 28-SET-03 19:28 NNNN


FOIBE: PIAZZA MARGHERA; CASARINI, IMPEDITO RISORGERE IDEOLOGIE

(ANSA) - VENEZIA, 30 SET - ''Abbiamo come antifascisti
impedito il risorgere di ideologie che puntano alla restrizione
delle liberta' e dei diritti, che fanno apologia di un passato
tragico e gia' sconfitto dalla storia''. Lo ha affermato Luca
Casarini, in una conferenza stampa svoltasi oggi al centro
sociale Rivolta di Marghera, in merito agli scontri avvenuti a
Marghera tra Disobbedienti e Azione Giovani prima della
cerimonia per piazza Martiri Giuliano Dalmati delle Foibe.
''Ci costera' caro, ma noi - ha proseguito - non siamo
disposti a barattare tranquillita' con ipocrisia, noi non siamo
ipocriti come tanti rivoluzionari da salotto''.
''Noi - ha proseguito Casarini - personalmente approviamo la
nuova intitolazione della piazza, perche' ci sembra importante
non solo tornare in maniera critica su una delle pagine piu'
tragiche della storia del '900 nel nostro paese, ma anche per
togliere alla destra fascista qualsiasi alibi e vittimismo
legato a questa vicenda''. ''I militanti dei Disobbedienti e del
Rivolta - ha spiegato Casarini - si sono organizzati per
impedire la strumentalizzazione della cerimonia da parte dei
fascisti organizzati, che con tanto di bastoni e bandiere di An
si stavano recando nella piazza per stravolgere l'iniziativa e
utilizzarla per i loro fini di propaganda e apologia del
fascismo''.
In merito invece agli scontri avvenuti con esponenti della
sinistra, Casarini dice che ''tutto parte dall'approvazione in
giunta comunale, con il voto favorevole anche di Paolo Cacciari,
segretario regionale di Rifondazione Comunista, della nuova intolazione
della piazza''. Secondo il rappresentante dei centri sociali, ''risulta
evidente che dentro Rifondazione si annidano alcuni personaggi
nostalgici che hanno organizzato per il giorno della commemorazione
una presenza in piazza per contestarla, indetta da un volantino firmato
Prc, Cobas-Scuola di Venezia, Rete Antirazzista e Verdi Non Violenti''.
''Noi - conclude Casarini - siamo contro lo stalinismo e il fascismo''.
(ANSA). BE 30-SET-03 21:07 NNNN