Informazione
(english / italiano)
La eliminazione dei serbi dalla Croazia
1: Il ruolo attivo degli USA
A. Coverup at The Hague Tribunal - Mercenary Outfit on Contract to the
Pentagon behind 1995 Ethnic Massacres in the Krajina region of Croatia
(M. Chossudovski / Centre for Research on Globalisation / CBC Canada)
SULLO SPORCO LAVORO DELLA AGENZIA DI MERCENARI MPRI, AL SOLDO DEL
PENTAGONO, E SULLO SPORCHISSIMO LAVORO DI COPERTURA DA PARTE DEL
"TRIBUNALE" DELL'AIA
B. Was the US behind the single greatest act of ethnic cleansing in
Yugoslavia? (By Stephen Gowans)
ANALISI DEL RUOLO DEGLI USA NELLA EPURAZIONE ETNICA DELLA CROAZIA
C. U.S., Clinton accused of war atrocities (J.T. Kuhner, The Washington
Times 4/22/2002)
IL GENERALE GOTOVINA CHIAMA IN CORREITA' CLINTON PER LA EPURAZIONE
ETNICA DELLA CROAZIA
=== A ===
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO307D.html
www.globalresearch.ca
Centre for Research on Globalisation
Centre de recherche sur la mondialisation
Coverup at The Hague Tribunal
Mercenary Outfit on Contract to the Pentagon behind 1995 Ethnic
Massacres in the Krajina region of Croatia
www.globalresearch.ca July 2003
The URL of this article is:
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO307D.html
The Hague Tribunal (ICTY) has asked:
"to interview retired [Croatian] general Mirko Norac as a suspect over
two military operations during the 1991-95 war, a government statement
said.
Norac, 34, was sentenced in March by a Croatian court to a 12 years in
jail for organizing the executions of at least 50 ethnic Serbs
civilians in October 1991 near the central town of Gospic.
He is the highest ranking Croatian officer to be sentenced by a local
court for war crimes committed during the 1991-95 war with
Belgrade-backed rebel Serbs, who opposed Croatia's independence from
the former Yugoslavia.
The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) wants
to interview Norac about a 1993 operation in the so-called Medak
pocket, in central Croatia, and a 1995 operation -- dubbed Storm --
which practically ended the conflict." AFP, 19 July, 2003).
On 21 July, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) acknowledged
the role of MPRI, a US mercenary Outfit on contract to the Pentagon in
Operation Storm, the 1995 ethnic massacres in the Krajina region of
Serbia. Since the 1990s, both the ICTY and the media have been involved
in a coverup of the role of the US military in the 1993 Medak pocket
and 1995 Operation Storm ethnic massacres.
Below you will find the following texts:
1. Transcript of CBS New Story: Croatian Atrocities being forgotten:
http://www.cbc.ca/MRL/clips/ram-audio/dyer1_wr030721.ram
2. Part of a text by Michel Chossudovsky on the role of MPRI, in
Krajina first published in 1999 as part of a larger study entitled NATO
has Installed a Reign of Terror in Kosovo, (
http://www.iacenter.org/warcrime/chossu.htm or
http://www.softmakers.com/fry/docs/chossudovsky.htm )
--- Croatian Atrocities being forgotten ---
CBC Report
21 Jul 2003 9:32:11 OTTAWA
Canadian officers say they are frustrated by inaction over a 1995
ethnic cleansing operation by Croatians against Serbs – one in which
the Croats may have had western help.
They documented numerous atrocities during Operation Storm, which was a
four-day campaign by the Croats to recover land held in central and
southern Croatia for four years by Serbian militias.
However, not one person has been arrested and brought before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
More than 200,000 Serbs were expelled, and thousands were killed.
"Just amazing. You can see the holes in the back of the head," said
Capt. Gerry Carron, showing pictures he took to document the killings.
"We found people in wells," he said. "There was an old lady we found
head-first in a well. Why did they do that?"
Some top military officers said the expertise required to plan and
execute Operation Storm meant it couldn't have been done by the Croats
alone.
Croatia's American consultant
Fingers have been pointed at Military Professional Resources Inc.
(MPRI), a U.S. consulting company based in Alexandria, Virginia.
The company's Web site points to an article in which the Croatian
government praised the job MPRI has done for it – although MPRI has
denied involvement in Operation Storm.
"I don't think it was the Croats themselves that did that," said
Maj.-Gen. Alain Fourand, who commanded UN forces in the area of
Operation Storm, adding he suspected it was MPRI.
Maj.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, who will be going to Afghanistan to command
Canadian troops, also said he doubts the Croats themselves pulled off
Operation Storm.
"That was done by people who really knew what they were doing," he
said, adding he didn't think the Croats had the expertise.
Croatia was getting assistance in other ways. Argentina supplied
artillery used in Operation Storm – despite a UN ban and even though
their own soldiers were working there as peacekeepers.
Looking back, Carron said peacekeepers may have made things worse by
disarming the Serbs while the Croats re-armed.
Canadian officers say the involvement of the West could explain the
foot-dragging on prosecution, although the tribunal said the case is
largely circumstantial.
The Canadians also believe the Croatian commander of Operation Storm is
being protected by supporters in Croatia's government, and that not
enough diplomatic pressure is being exerted.
Written by CBC News Online staff
--- The Role of the MPRI in the Krajina Massacres ---
by Michel Chossudovsky
31 July 1999
This following excerpt was part of a text presented to the Independent
Commission of Inquiry to Investigate U.S./NATO War Crimes Against The
People of Yugoslavia, International Action Center, New York, July 31,
1999. The full text entitled: NATO has installed a Reign of Terror in
Kosovo, can be consulted at
http://www.iacenter.org/warcrime/chossu.htm or
http://www.softmakers.com/fry/docs/chossudovsky.htm
According to the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights,
Operation Storm resulted in the massacre of at least 410 civilians in
the course of a three day operation (4 to 7 August 1995).22 An internal
report of The Hague War Crimes Tribunal (leaked to the New York Times),
confirmed that the Croatian Army had been responsible for carrying out:
"summary executions, indiscriminate shelling of civilian populations
and "ethnic cleansing" in the Krajina region of Croatia...."23
In a section of the report entitled "The Indictment. Operation Storm, A
Prima Facie Case.", the ICTY report confirms that:
"During the course of the military offensive, the Croatian armed forces
and special police committed numerous violations of international
humanitarian law, including but not limited to, shelling of Knin and
other cities... During, and in the 100 days following the military
offensive, at least 150 Serb civilians were summarily executed, and
many hundreds disappeared. ...In a widespread and systematic manner,
Croatian troops committed murder and other inhumane acts upon and
against Croatian Serbs." 24
US `GENERALS FOR HIRE'
The internal 150 page report concluded that it has "sufficient material
to establish that the three [Croatian] generals who commanded the
military operation" could be held accountable under international
law.25 The individuals named had been directly involved in the military
operation "in theatre". Those involved in "the planning of Operation
Storm" were not mentioned:
"The identity of the "American general" referred to by Fenrick [a
Tribunal staff member] is not known. The tribunal would not allow
Williamson or Fenrick to be interviewed. But Ms. Arbour, the tribunal's
chief prosecutor, suggested in a telephone interview last week that
Fenrick's comment had been `a joking observation'. Ms. Arbour had not
been present during the meeting, and that is not how it was viewed by
some who were there. Several people who were at the meeting assumed
that Fenrick was referring to one of the retired U.S. generals who
worked for Military Professional Resources Inc. ... Questions remain
about the full extent of U.S. involvement. In the course of the three
yearinvestigation into the assault, the United States has failed to
provide critical evidence requested by the tribunal, according to
tribunal documents and officials, adding to suspicion among some there
that Washington is uneasy about the investigation...
The Pentagon, however, has argued through U.S. lawyers at the tribunal
that the shelling was a legitimate military activity, according to
tribunal documents and officials".26
The Tribunal was attempting to hide what had already been revealed in
several press reports published in the wake of Operation Storm.
According to a US State Department spokesman, MPRI had been helping the
Croatians "avoid excesses or atrocities in military operations."27
Fifteen senior US military advisers headed by retired two star General
Richard Griffitts had been dispatched to Croatia barely seven months
before Operation Storm. 28 According to one report, MPRI executive
director General Carl E. Vuono: "held a secret top-level meeting at
Brioni Island, off the coast of Croatia, with Gen. Varimar Cervenko,
the architect of the Krajina campaign. In the five days preceding the
attack, at least ten meetings were held between General Vuono and
officers involved in the campaign..."29
According to Ed Soyster, a senior MPRI executive and former head of the
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA):
"MPRI's role in Croatia is limited to classroom instruction on
military-civil relations and doesn't involve training in tactics or
weapons. Other U.S. military men say whatever MPRI did for the Croats
and many suspect more than classroom instruction was involved it was
worth every penny." Carl Vuono and Butch [Crosbie] Saint are hired guns
and in it for the money," says Charles Boyd, a recently retired four
star Air Force general who was the Pentagon's No. 2 man in Europe until
July [1995]. "They did a very good job for the Croats, and I have no
doubt they'll do a good job in Bosnia."30
THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL'S COVER UP
The untimely leaking of the ICTY's internal report on the Krajina
massacres barely a few days before the onslaught of NATO's air raids on
Yugoslavia was the source of some embarrassment to the Tribunal's Chief
Prosecutor Louise Arbour. The Tribunal (ICTY) attempted to cover up the
matter and trivialise the report's findings (including the alleged role
of the US military officers on contract with the Croatian Armed
Forces). Several Tribunal officials including American Lawyer Clint
Williamson sought to discredit the Canadian Peacekeeping officers'
testimony who witnessed the Krajina massacres in 1995.31
Williamson, who described the shelling of Knin as a "minor incident,"
said that the Pentagon had told him that Knin was a legitimate military
target... The [Tribunal's] review concluded by voting not to include
the shelling of Knin in any indictment, a conclusion that stunned and
angered many at the tribunal"...32
The findings of the Tribunal contained in the leaked ICTY documents
were downplayed, their relevance was casually dismissed as
"expressions of opinion, arguments and hypotheses from various staff
members of the OTP during the investigative process".33
According to the Tribunal's spokesperson "the documents do not
represent in any way the concluded decisions of the Prosecutor." 34
The internal 150 page report has not been released. The staff member
who had leaked the documents is (according to a Croatian TV report) no
longer working for the Tribunal. During the press Conference, the
Tribunal's spokesman was asked: "about the consequences for the person
who leaked the information", Blewitt [the ICTY spokesman] replied that
he did not want to go into that.
He said that the OTP would strengthen the existing procedures to
prevent this from happening again, however he added that you could not
stop people from talking".35
THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CROATIA
The massacres conducted under Operation Storm "set the stage" for the
"ethnic cleansing" of at least 180,000 Krajina Serbs (according to
estimates of the Croatian Helsinki Committee and Amnesty
International). According to other sources, the number of victims of
ethnic cleansing in Krajina was much larger.
Moreover, there are indications that chemical weapons may have been
used in the Yugoslav civil war (1991-95).36 Although there is no firm
evidence of the use of chemical weapons against Croatian Serbs, an
ongoing enquiry by the Canadian Minister of Defence (launched in July
1999) points to the possibility of toxic poisoning of Canadian
Peacekeepers while on service in Croatia between 1993 and 1995:
"There was a smell of blood in the air during the past week as the
media sensed they had a major scandal unfolding within the Department
of National Defense over the medical files of those Canadians who
served in Croatia in 1993. Allegations of destroyed documents, a
coverup, and a defensive minister and senior officers..."37
The official release of the Department of National Defence (DND) refers
to possibility of toxic "soil contamination" in Medak Pocket in 1993
(see below). Was it "soil contamination" or something far more serious?
The criminal investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
refers to the shredding of medical files of former Canadian
peacekeepers by the DND. In other words did the DND have something to
hide? The issue remains as to what types of shells and ammunitions were
used by the Croatian Armed Forces ie. were chemical weapons used
against Serb civilians?
OPERATION STORM: THE ACCOUNT OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN REGIMENT
Prior to the onslaught, Croatian radio had previously broadcasted a
message by president Franjo Tudjman, calling upon "Croatian citizens of
Serbian ethnicity... to remain in their homes and not to fear the
Croatian authorities, which will respect their minority rights."38
Canadian peacekeepers of the Second Battalion of the Royal 22nd
Regiment witnessed the atrocities committed by Croatian troops in the
Krajina offensive in September 1995:
"Any Serb who had failed to evacuate their property were systematically
"cleansed" by roving death squads. Every abandoned animal was
slaughtered and any Serb household was ransacked and torched".39
Also confirmed by Canadian peacekeepers was the participation of German
mercenaries in Operation Storm:
"Immediately behind the frontline Croatian combat troops and German
mercenaries, a large number of hardline extremists had pushed into the
Krajina. ...Many of these atrocities were carried out within the
Canadian Sector, but as the peacekeepers were soon informed by the
Croat authorities, the UN no longer had any formal authority in the
region."40
How the Germans mercenaries were recruited was never officially
revealed. An investigation by the United Nations Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC) confirmed the that foreign mercenaries in Croatia
had in some cases "been paid [and presumably recruited] outside Croatia
and by third parties."41
THE 1993 MEDAK POCKET MASSACRE
According to Jane Defence Weekly (10 June 1999), Brigadier General Agim
Ceku (now in charge of the KLA) also "masterminded the successful HV
[Croatian Army] offensive at Medak" in September 1993. In Medak, the
combat operation was entitled "Scorched Earth" resulting in the total
destruction of the Serbian villages of Divoselo, Pocitelj and Citluk,
and the massacre of over 100 civilians.42
These massacres were also witnessed by Canadian peacekeepers under UN
mandate:
"As the sun rose over the horizon, it revealed a Medak Valley engulfed
in smoke and flames. As the frustrated soldiers of 2PPCLI waited for
the order to move forward into the pocket, shots and screams still rang
out as the ethnic cleansing continued. ...About 20 members of the
international press had tagged along, anxious to see the Medak
battleground. Calvin [a Canadian officer] called an informal press
conference at the head of the column and loudly accused the Croats of
trying to hide war crimes against the Serb inhabitants. The Croats
started withdrawing back to their old lines, taking with them whatever
loot they hadn't destroyed. All livestock had been killed and houses
torched. French reconnaissance troops and the Canadian command element
pushed up the valley and soon began to find bodies of Serb civilians,
some already decomposing, others freshly slaughtered. ...Finally, on
the drizzly morning of Sept. 17, teams of UN civilian police arrived to
probe the smouldering ruins for murder victims. Rotting corpses lying
out in the open were catalogued, then turned over to the peacekeepers
for burial."43
The massacres were reported to the Canadian Minister of Defence and to
the United Nations:
"Senior defence bureaucrats back in Ottawa had no way of predicting the
outcome of the engagement in terms of political fallout. To them, there
was no point in calling media attention to a situation that might
easily backfire. ...So Medak was relegated to the memory hole no
publicity, no recriminations, no official record. Except for those
soldiers involved, Canada's most lively military action since the
Korean War simply never happened."44
Notes
23. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops
Cleansed the Serbs, New York Times, 21 March 1999).
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Raymond Bonner, op cit.
27. Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War", The Nation, New York, 27 July
1997.
28. See Mark Thompson et al, "Generals for Hire", Time Magazine, 15
January 1996, p. 34.
29. Quoted in Silverstein, op cit.
30. Mark Thompson et al, op cit.
31. Raymond Bonner, op cit.
32. Ibid.
33. ICTY Weekly Press Briefing, 24 March 1999).
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. See inter alia Reuters dispatch, 21 October 1993 on the use of
chemical grenades, a New York Times report on 31 October 1992 on the
use of poisoned gas).
37. Lewis MacKenzie, "Giving our soldiers the benefit of the doubt",
National Post, 2 August 1999.
38. Slobodna Dalmacija, Split, Croatia, August 5 1996.
39. Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan, The Sunday Sun, Toronto, 2 November
1998.
40. Ibid.
41. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-first session,
Item 9 of the provisional agenda, Geneva, 21 December 1994).
42. (See Memorandum on the Violation of the Human and Civil Rights of
the Serbian People in the Republic of Croatia,
http://serbianlinks.freehosting.net/memorandum.htm
43. Excerpts from the book of Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan published in
the Toronto Sun, 1 November 1998.
44. Ibid.
© Copyright CBC 2003 For fair use only/ pour usage équitable seulement
.
=== B ===
What's Left
July 21, 2003
Was the US behind the single greatest act of ethnic cleansing in
Yugoslavia?
By Stephen Gowans
It was one of those peeks into what really happened that are
occasionally glimpsed long after anyone cares, like finding out after
the invasion of Iraq that the US and Britain had already begun aerial
operations to pick apart Iraq's defenses long before the invasion had
begun, at a time both countries were denying they had already made a
decision to go to war ("U.S.
Moved Early for Air Supremacy: Airstrips on Iraqi Defenses Began Long
Before Invasion, General Says," The Washington Post, July 20, 2003).
Those who saw the news reports may have raised their eyebrows, but the
reports were too obscure to have flitted, even briefly, across the
consciousness of most (even ardent) newspaper readers. The secret,
though technically out, remained a secret, lost in the deluge of other
news, bereft of any urgency for being about an event that had happened
months before.
So who's going to care about something that happened almost eight years
ago?
"In early August 1995," writes researcher Gregory Elich, "the Croatian
invasion of Serbian Krajina precipitated the worst refugee crisis of
the Yugoslav civil war. Within days, more than two hundred thousand
Serbs, virtually the entire population of Krajina, fled their homes,
and 14,000 Serbian civilians lost their lives." ("The invasion of
Serbian Krajina," NATO in the Balkans: Voices of Opposition,
International Action Center, New York, 1998.)
This was Operation Storm, "the largest single act of ethnic cleansing
of the Yugoslav civil war," according to Even Dyer, a journalist with
CBC Radio. "And yet not one person has been arrested and brought before
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia"
("Croatian atrocities being forgotten: Cdn. Officers," CBC News, July
21, 2003.)
The popular mythology about the Yugoslav civil war is that it was the
Serbs, led by Slobodan Milosevic, who embarked on a program of ethnic
cleansing to create a greater Serbia. Milosevic is on trial at the
Hague Tribunal, facing genocide charges.
So it should strike a dissonant chord that:
the single greatest act of ethnic cleansing does not have the Serb's
signature on it (they were the victims); and the Hague Tribunal, which
professes to be impartial, has done nothing to
bring the authors of the atrocity to book.
The Tribunal says the evidence is circumstantial, but senior Canadian
soldiers, including a general who commanded peacekeeping forces in the
area of Operation Storm, say they suspect the real reason for the
Tribunal's inaction is that Western governments were in the background
pulling the strings.
For example, Argentina provided artillery to the Croats, despite a UN
embargo on supplying materiel and even though their own troops were in
Croatia as peacekeepers.
And a private US military contractor, Military Professional Resources
Inc (MPRI), headed by a former US Army Chief of Staff, likely planned
the operation.
Canada's Major-General Andrew Leslie says he doubts the Croats could
have pulled off Operation Storm themselves. "That was done by people
who really knew what they were doing."
Leslie's colleague, Major-General Alain Fourand, agrees. He says he
suspects it was MPRI that was behind the operation.
The MPRI Web site, according to CBC news, "points to an article in
which the Croatian government praised the job MPRI has done for it."
There is much that is misunderstood about the Yugoslav civil war, and
the Hague Tribunal.
For one, the Croats were a lot closer to the image of Nazis than the
Serbs were, though it was Serbs who were portrayed, for propaganda
reasons, as successors of Hitler's fascists. After the breakaway Croat
republic violently seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991, Franjo Tudjman, the
country's president, began to resurrect symbols of Croatia's Nazi
puppet state past.
According to Elich, "the Croatian fascist(s) murdered as many as one
million Serbs, Jews and Romani" during WWII.
And the Tribunal is funded in part by billionaire financier George
Soros, who has a long history of underwriting programs to destabilize
countries whose markets are closed, or partly closed, to Western
investment. Once a renitent government is ousted, and a Western
friendly regime is installed, Soros swoops in to buy up state assets at
fire sale prices. Soros is said to have his eyes on the massive Trepca
mining complex in Kosovo, worth an estimated $5 billion. The Hungarian
émigré spent $100 million to oust Milosevic, who presided over a
largely socially owned economy ("The billionaire trader has become
Eastern Europe's uncrowned king and the prophet of an 'open society."
But open to what?" New Statesman, June 2, 2003.)
The US and Germany began supporting secessionist forces in Yugoslavia
after the collapse of Communism in the former Soviet Union, when the
Yugoslav federation refused to be brought wholly into the Western
orbit. Former Communist countries were undergoing a spate of
privatization. But, according to Neil Clark, "Over 700,000 Yugoslav
enterprises remained in social ownership and most were still controlled
by employee-management committees, with only 5% of capital privately
owned." ("The quisling of Belgrade," The Guardian (UK), March 14,
2003.) The West aligned itself with Alija
Izetbegovic in Bosnia, who wanted to makeover the multi-ethnic republic
as an Islamic religious state, though Bosnia had a large non-Muslim,
including Serb, population. And Tudjman, the West's favorite in
Croatia, reeked to heaven of fascism and anti-Serb fanaticism. But both
were useful as instruments to tear apart the federation and deliver it,
piece by piece, into the hands of the West, and its corporate sector.
Later, secessionist in Kosovo would be encouraged, trained, and
bankrolled by the West, sparking a civil war that furnished NATO with a
pretext to launch a "humanitarian" war, and ultimately, the ouster of
Milosevic, working through its proxy, the Democratic Opposition of
Serbia.
The atrocities of August 1995 are now largely forgotten in the West,
and while they seem to be old news, they do shed light of recurrent
patterns that can be glimpsed today. The West's penchant for
precipitating crises that can be used as pretexts for intervention in
countries that seek to pursue an independent course hasn't abated. And
it's all too common for victims of Western-backed aggressions to be
portrayed as the aggressors themselves. North Korea, for example, is
now widely understood to be a hostile nation, even though it is the US
that shows every indication of being hell-bent on resuming a war with
the impoverished country it has never entirely renounced. Cuba,
Belarus, Zimbabwe, part of a complement of nations George W. Bush has
designated "captive nations," along with North Korea ("Bush blacklists
Zimbabwe, Cuba," news24.com, July 19, 2003) are portrayed as brutal,
repressive, regimes, though the reason they're demonized has
everything to do with their inhospitable orientation to the global
capitalist economy dominated by the United States.
That too was the Serb's offense, in the eyes of the West, which is why
there ever was an Operation Storm, why there's a Star Chamber at the
Hague, and why MPRI won't soon be facing war crimes charges.
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What's Left
http://www3.sympatico.ca/sr.gowans/ethnic.html
=== C ===
http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:pTYCXOMXiDoC:www.washtimes.com/
world/20020422-7801660.htm+operation+storm+croatia+us&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
U.S., Clinton accused of war atrocities
Jeffrey T. Kuhner
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published 4/22/2002
The lawyer for a Croatian general indicted by the
war crimes tribunal in The Hague says his client's
case opens the possibility that former President
Clinton will be charged with crimes against humanity
for authorizing a Croatian military offensive in 1995
that recaptured territory from rebel Serbs.
"According to the unjust indictment brought
against my client, there is a basis for an
investigation and indictment of high-ranking Clinton
administration officials who oversaw Operation Storm,"
said Luka Misetic, the defense attorney for Gen. Ante
Gotovina.
The high-ranking Croatian general was indicted in
June 2001 by the prosecutor's office at the U.N. War
Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague
on charges that he exercised "command responsibility"
over the military campaign in which 150 Serbian
civilians were killed.
Secretly supported by the Clinton
administration, Croatian forces launched a three-day
massive military offensive — known as "Operation
Storm" — on Aug. 5, 1995 in which Croatia recovered
territories occupied by rebel Serbs following
Croatia's bloody drive for independence from
Yugoslavia in 1991.
Gen. Gotovina was the military commander of
Sector South of the operation, which was responsible
for the capture of the rebel-held city of Knin. He is
also accused of overseeing the ethnic cleansing of
150,000 Serbs who fled from Croatia during the
military offensive.
The United States provided military and technical
assistance to Operation Storm in order to block
then-Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's goal of
forging an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia."
The Clinton administration viewed Croatia's
military campaign as pivotal to tilting the strategic
balance of power in the region against Serbian forces,
paving the way for the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords that
ended the war in neighboring Bosnia.
However, Mr. Misetic said U.S. support and
approval for the military offensive means the
indictment against Gen. Gotovina could lead to the
prosecution by The Hague tribunal of Mr. Clinton and
other high-ranking U.S. officials on charges of having
command responsibility for war crimes that were
committed during the operation.
"The theory against Gotovina can now be brought
against Clinton, [Assistant Secretary of State
Richard] Holbrooke and all the way down the U.S. chain
of command. On the prosecution's logic, they should be
indicted as well. They knew the attack was coming and
gave it the green light," Mr. Misetic said.
"The prosecutor's office is punting on an issue
that is clearly there. They are claiming that ethnic
cleansing took place during this operation. They are
claiming that by virtue of his position, Gotovina had
knowledge of war crimes. His knowledge was shared and
given to him by the Pentagon," he said.
Florence Hartmann, spokeswoman for chief
prosecutor Carla del Ponte, said the tribunal is not
challenging the legitimacy of Croatia's military
offensive but individual atrocities carried out by
Croatian soldiers whose actions fell under the
responsibility of Gen. Gotovina.
"It is not Operation Storm that is being
indicted, but the crimes that were committed during
and afterward," Mrs. Hartmann said.
U.S. support for the operation "has to be
established," she said. "I don't know that the
[Clinton] administration was involved."
Asked whether the prosecutor's office was
planning to issue indictments against either Mr.
Clinton or other administation officials, Mrs.
Hartmann said: "We have no comment because there is no
evidence to substantiate the charges of Gen.
Gotovina's lawyers. They can make their case with
evidence to the court."
Mr. Misetic dismissed Mrs. Hartmann's comments as
"blatant hypocrisy."
La eliminazione dei serbi dalla Croazia
1: Il ruolo attivo degli USA
A. Coverup at The Hague Tribunal - Mercenary Outfit on Contract to the
Pentagon behind 1995 Ethnic Massacres in the Krajina region of Croatia
(M. Chossudovski / Centre for Research on Globalisation / CBC Canada)
SULLO SPORCO LAVORO DELLA AGENZIA DI MERCENARI MPRI, AL SOLDO DEL
PENTAGONO, E SULLO SPORCHISSIMO LAVORO DI COPERTURA DA PARTE DEL
"TRIBUNALE" DELL'AIA
B. Was the US behind the single greatest act of ethnic cleansing in
Yugoslavia? (By Stephen Gowans)
ANALISI DEL RUOLO DEGLI USA NELLA EPURAZIONE ETNICA DELLA CROAZIA
C. U.S., Clinton accused of war atrocities (J.T. Kuhner, The Washington
Times 4/22/2002)
IL GENERALE GOTOVINA CHIAMA IN CORREITA' CLINTON PER LA EPURAZIONE
ETNICA DELLA CROAZIA
=== A ===
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO307D.html
www.globalresearch.ca
Centre for Research on Globalisation
Centre de recherche sur la mondialisation
Coverup at The Hague Tribunal
Mercenary Outfit on Contract to the Pentagon behind 1995 Ethnic
Massacres in the Krajina region of Croatia
www.globalresearch.ca July 2003
The URL of this article is:
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO307D.html
The Hague Tribunal (ICTY) has asked:
"to interview retired [Croatian] general Mirko Norac as a suspect over
two military operations during the 1991-95 war, a government statement
said.
Norac, 34, was sentenced in March by a Croatian court to a 12 years in
jail for organizing the executions of at least 50 ethnic Serbs
civilians in October 1991 near the central town of Gospic.
He is the highest ranking Croatian officer to be sentenced by a local
court for war crimes committed during the 1991-95 war with
Belgrade-backed rebel Serbs, who opposed Croatia's independence from
the former Yugoslavia.
The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) wants
to interview Norac about a 1993 operation in the so-called Medak
pocket, in central Croatia, and a 1995 operation -- dubbed Storm --
which practically ended the conflict." AFP, 19 July, 2003).
On 21 July, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) acknowledged
the role of MPRI, a US mercenary Outfit on contract to the Pentagon in
Operation Storm, the 1995 ethnic massacres in the Krajina region of
Serbia. Since the 1990s, both the ICTY and the media have been involved
in a coverup of the role of the US military in the 1993 Medak pocket
and 1995 Operation Storm ethnic massacres.
Below you will find the following texts:
1. Transcript of CBS New Story: Croatian Atrocities being forgotten:
http://www.cbc.ca/MRL/clips/ram-audio/dyer1_wr030721.ram
2. Part of a text by Michel Chossudovsky on the role of MPRI, in
Krajina first published in 1999 as part of a larger study entitled NATO
has Installed a Reign of Terror in Kosovo, (
http://www.iacenter.org/warcrime/chossu.htm or
http://www.softmakers.com/fry/docs/chossudovsky.htm )
--- Croatian Atrocities being forgotten ---
CBC Report
21 Jul 2003 9:32:11 OTTAWA
Canadian officers say they are frustrated by inaction over a 1995
ethnic cleansing operation by Croatians against Serbs – one in which
the Croats may have had western help.
They documented numerous atrocities during Operation Storm, which was a
four-day campaign by the Croats to recover land held in central and
southern Croatia for four years by Serbian militias.
However, not one person has been arrested and brought before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
More than 200,000 Serbs were expelled, and thousands were killed.
"Just amazing. You can see the holes in the back of the head," said
Capt. Gerry Carron, showing pictures he took to document the killings.
"We found people in wells," he said. "There was an old lady we found
head-first in a well. Why did they do that?"
Some top military officers said the expertise required to plan and
execute Operation Storm meant it couldn't have been done by the Croats
alone.
Croatia's American consultant
Fingers have been pointed at Military Professional Resources Inc.
(MPRI), a U.S. consulting company based in Alexandria, Virginia.
The company's Web site points to an article in which the Croatian
government praised the job MPRI has done for it – although MPRI has
denied involvement in Operation Storm.
"I don't think it was the Croats themselves that did that," said
Maj.-Gen. Alain Fourand, who commanded UN forces in the area of
Operation Storm, adding he suspected it was MPRI.
Maj.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, who will be going to Afghanistan to command
Canadian troops, also said he doubts the Croats themselves pulled off
Operation Storm.
"That was done by people who really knew what they were doing," he
said, adding he didn't think the Croats had the expertise.
Croatia was getting assistance in other ways. Argentina supplied
artillery used in Operation Storm – despite a UN ban and even though
their own soldiers were working there as peacekeepers.
Looking back, Carron said peacekeepers may have made things worse by
disarming the Serbs while the Croats re-armed.
Canadian officers say the involvement of the West could explain the
foot-dragging on prosecution, although the tribunal said the case is
largely circumstantial.
The Canadians also believe the Croatian commander of Operation Storm is
being protected by supporters in Croatia's government, and that not
enough diplomatic pressure is being exerted.
Written by CBC News Online staff
--- The Role of the MPRI in the Krajina Massacres ---
by Michel Chossudovsky
31 July 1999
This following excerpt was part of a text presented to the Independent
Commission of Inquiry to Investigate U.S./NATO War Crimes Against The
People of Yugoslavia, International Action Center, New York, July 31,
1999. The full text entitled: NATO has installed a Reign of Terror in
Kosovo, can be consulted at
http://www.iacenter.org/warcrime/chossu.htm or
http://www.softmakers.com/fry/docs/chossudovsky.htm
According to the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights,
Operation Storm resulted in the massacre of at least 410 civilians in
the course of a three day operation (4 to 7 August 1995).22 An internal
report of The Hague War Crimes Tribunal (leaked to the New York Times),
confirmed that the Croatian Army had been responsible for carrying out:
"summary executions, indiscriminate shelling of civilian populations
and "ethnic cleansing" in the Krajina region of Croatia...."23
In a section of the report entitled "The Indictment. Operation Storm, A
Prima Facie Case.", the ICTY report confirms that:
"During the course of the military offensive, the Croatian armed forces
and special police committed numerous violations of international
humanitarian law, including but not limited to, shelling of Knin and
other cities... During, and in the 100 days following the military
offensive, at least 150 Serb civilians were summarily executed, and
many hundreds disappeared. ...In a widespread and systematic manner,
Croatian troops committed murder and other inhumane acts upon and
against Croatian Serbs." 24
US `GENERALS FOR HIRE'
The internal 150 page report concluded that it has "sufficient material
to establish that the three [Croatian] generals who commanded the
military operation" could be held accountable under international
law.25 The individuals named had been directly involved in the military
operation "in theatre". Those involved in "the planning of Operation
Storm" were not mentioned:
"The identity of the "American general" referred to by Fenrick [a
Tribunal staff member] is not known. The tribunal would not allow
Williamson or Fenrick to be interviewed. But Ms. Arbour, the tribunal's
chief prosecutor, suggested in a telephone interview last week that
Fenrick's comment had been `a joking observation'. Ms. Arbour had not
been present during the meeting, and that is not how it was viewed by
some who were there. Several people who were at the meeting assumed
that Fenrick was referring to one of the retired U.S. generals who
worked for Military Professional Resources Inc. ... Questions remain
about the full extent of U.S. involvement. In the course of the three
yearinvestigation into the assault, the United States has failed to
provide critical evidence requested by the tribunal, according to
tribunal documents and officials, adding to suspicion among some there
that Washington is uneasy about the investigation...
The Pentagon, however, has argued through U.S. lawyers at the tribunal
that the shelling was a legitimate military activity, according to
tribunal documents and officials".26
The Tribunal was attempting to hide what had already been revealed in
several press reports published in the wake of Operation Storm.
According to a US State Department spokesman, MPRI had been helping the
Croatians "avoid excesses or atrocities in military operations."27
Fifteen senior US military advisers headed by retired two star General
Richard Griffitts had been dispatched to Croatia barely seven months
before Operation Storm. 28 According to one report, MPRI executive
director General Carl E. Vuono: "held a secret top-level meeting at
Brioni Island, off the coast of Croatia, with Gen. Varimar Cervenko,
the architect of the Krajina campaign. In the five days preceding the
attack, at least ten meetings were held between General Vuono and
officers involved in the campaign..."29
According to Ed Soyster, a senior MPRI executive and former head of the
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA):
"MPRI's role in Croatia is limited to classroom instruction on
military-civil relations and doesn't involve training in tactics or
weapons. Other U.S. military men say whatever MPRI did for the Croats
and many suspect more than classroom instruction was involved it was
worth every penny." Carl Vuono and Butch [Crosbie] Saint are hired guns
and in it for the money," says Charles Boyd, a recently retired four
star Air Force general who was the Pentagon's No. 2 man in Europe until
July [1995]. "They did a very good job for the Croats, and I have no
doubt they'll do a good job in Bosnia."30
THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL'S COVER UP
The untimely leaking of the ICTY's internal report on the Krajina
massacres barely a few days before the onslaught of NATO's air raids on
Yugoslavia was the source of some embarrassment to the Tribunal's Chief
Prosecutor Louise Arbour. The Tribunal (ICTY) attempted to cover up the
matter and trivialise the report's findings (including the alleged role
of the US military officers on contract with the Croatian Armed
Forces). Several Tribunal officials including American Lawyer Clint
Williamson sought to discredit the Canadian Peacekeeping officers'
testimony who witnessed the Krajina massacres in 1995.31
Williamson, who described the shelling of Knin as a "minor incident,"
said that the Pentagon had told him that Knin was a legitimate military
target... The [Tribunal's] review concluded by voting not to include
the shelling of Knin in any indictment, a conclusion that stunned and
angered many at the tribunal"...32
The findings of the Tribunal contained in the leaked ICTY documents
were downplayed, their relevance was casually dismissed as
"expressions of opinion, arguments and hypotheses from various staff
members of the OTP during the investigative process".33
According to the Tribunal's spokesperson "the documents do not
represent in any way the concluded decisions of the Prosecutor." 34
The internal 150 page report has not been released. The staff member
who had leaked the documents is (according to a Croatian TV report) no
longer working for the Tribunal. During the press Conference, the
Tribunal's spokesman was asked: "about the consequences for the person
who leaked the information", Blewitt [the ICTY spokesman] replied that
he did not want to go into that.
He said that the OTP would strengthen the existing procedures to
prevent this from happening again, however he added that you could not
stop people from talking".35
THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CROATIA
The massacres conducted under Operation Storm "set the stage" for the
"ethnic cleansing" of at least 180,000 Krajina Serbs (according to
estimates of the Croatian Helsinki Committee and Amnesty
International). According to other sources, the number of victims of
ethnic cleansing in Krajina was much larger.
Moreover, there are indications that chemical weapons may have been
used in the Yugoslav civil war (1991-95).36 Although there is no firm
evidence of the use of chemical weapons against Croatian Serbs, an
ongoing enquiry by the Canadian Minister of Defence (launched in July
1999) points to the possibility of toxic poisoning of Canadian
Peacekeepers while on service in Croatia between 1993 and 1995:
"There was a smell of blood in the air during the past week as the
media sensed they had a major scandal unfolding within the Department
of National Defense over the medical files of those Canadians who
served in Croatia in 1993. Allegations of destroyed documents, a
coverup, and a defensive minister and senior officers..."37
The official release of the Department of National Defence (DND) refers
to possibility of toxic "soil contamination" in Medak Pocket in 1993
(see below). Was it "soil contamination" or something far more serious?
The criminal investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
refers to the shredding of medical files of former Canadian
peacekeepers by the DND. In other words did the DND have something to
hide? The issue remains as to what types of shells and ammunitions were
used by the Croatian Armed Forces ie. were chemical weapons used
against Serb civilians?
OPERATION STORM: THE ACCOUNT OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN REGIMENT
Prior to the onslaught, Croatian radio had previously broadcasted a
message by president Franjo Tudjman, calling upon "Croatian citizens of
Serbian ethnicity... to remain in their homes and not to fear the
Croatian authorities, which will respect their minority rights."38
Canadian peacekeepers of the Second Battalion of the Royal 22nd
Regiment witnessed the atrocities committed by Croatian troops in the
Krajina offensive in September 1995:
"Any Serb who had failed to evacuate their property were systematically
"cleansed" by roving death squads. Every abandoned animal was
slaughtered and any Serb household was ransacked and torched".39
Also confirmed by Canadian peacekeepers was the participation of German
mercenaries in Operation Storm:
"Immediately behind the frontline Croatian combat troops and German
mercenaries, a large number of hardline extremists had pushed into the
Krajina. ...Many of these atrocities were carried out within the
Canadian Sector, but as the peacekeepers were soon informed by the
Croat authorities, the UN no longer had any formal authority in the
region."40
How the Germans mercenaries were recruited was never officially
revealed. An investigation by the United Nations Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC) confirmed the that foreign mercenaries in Croatia
had in some cases "been paid [and presumably recruited] outside Croatia
and by third parties."41
THE 1993 MEDAK POCKET MASSACRE
According to Jane Defence Weekly (10 June 1999), Brigadier General Agim
Ceku (now in charge of the KLA) also "masterminded the successful HV
[Croatian Army] offensive at Medak" in September 1993. In Medak, the
combat operation was entitled "Scorched Earth" resulting in the total
destruction of the Serbian villages of Divoselo, Pocitelj and Citluk,
and the massacre of over 100 civilians.42
These massacres were also witnessed by Canadian peacekeepers under UN
mandate:
"As the sun rose over the horizon, it revealed a Medak Valley engulfed
in smoke and flames. As the frustrated soldiers of 2PPCLI waited for
the order to move forward into the pocket, shots and screams still rang
out as the ethnic cleansing continued. ...About 20 members of the
international press had tagged along, anxious to see the Medak
battleground. Calvin [a Canadian officer] called an informal press
conference at the head of the column and loudly accused the Croats of
trying to hide war crimes against the Serb inhabitants. The Croats
started withdrawing back to their old lines, taking with them whatever
loot they hadn't destroyed. All livestock had been killed and houses
torched. French reconnaissance troops and the Canadian command element
pushed up the valley and soon began to find bodies of Serb civilians,
some already decomposing, others freshly slaughtered. ...Finally, on
the drizzly morning of Sept. 17, teams of UN civilian police arrived to
probe the smouldering ruins for murder victims. Rotting corpses lying
out in the open were catalogued, then turned over to the peacekeepers
for burial."43
The massacres were reported to the Canadian Minister of Defence and to
the United Nations:
"Senior defence bureaucrats back in Ottawa had no way of predicting the
outcome of the engagement in terms of political fallout. To them, there
was no point in calling media attention to a situation that might
easily backfire. ...So Medak was relegated to the memory hole no
publicity, no recriminations, no official record. Except for those
soldiers involved, Canada's most lively military action since the
Korean War simply never happened."44
Notes
23. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops
Cleansed the Serbs, New York Times, 21 March 1999).
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Raymond Bonner, op cit.
27. Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War", The Nation, New York, 27 July
1997.
28. See Mark Thompson et al, "Generals for Hire", Time Magazine, 15
January 1996, p. 34.
29. Quoted in Silverstein, op cit.
30. Mark Thompson et al, op cit.
31. Raymond Bonner, op cit.
32. Ibid.
33. ICTY Weekly Press Briefing, 24 March 1999).
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. See inter alia Reuters dispatch, 21 October 1993 on the use of
chemical grenades, a New York Times report on 31 October 1992 on the
use of poisoned gas).
37. Lewis MacKenzie, "Giving our soldiers the benefit of the doubt",
National Post, 2 August 1999.
38. Slobodna Dalmacija, Split, Croatia, August 5 1996.
39. Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan, The Sunday Sun, Toronto, 2 November
1998.
40. Ibid.
41. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-first session,
Item 9 of the provisional agenda, Geneva, 21 December 1994).
42. (See Memorandum on the Violation of the Human and Civil Rights of
the Serbian People in the Republic of Croatia,
http://serbianlinks.freehosting.net/memorandum.htm
43. Excerpts from the book of Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan published in
the Toronto Sun, 1 November 1998.
44. Ibid.
© Copyright CBC 2003 For fair use only/ pour usage équitable seulement
.
=== B ===
What's Left
July 21, 2003
Was the US behind the single greatest act of ethnic cleansing in
Yugoslavia?
By Stephen Gowans
It was one of those peeks into what really happened that are
occasionally glimpsed long after anyone cares, like finding out after
the invasion of Iraq that the US and Britain had already begun aerial
operations to pick apart Iraq's defenses long before the invasion had
begun, at a time both countries were denying they had already made a
decision to go to war ("U.S.
Moved Early for Air Supremacy: Airstrips on Iraqi Defenses Began Long
Before Invasion, General Says," The Washington Post, July 20, 2003).
Those who saw the news reports may have raised their eyebrows, but the
reports were too obscure to have flitted, even briefly, across the
consciousness of most (even ardent) newspaper readers. The secret,
though technically out, remained a secret, lost in the deluge of other
news, bereft of any urgency for being about an event that had happened
months before.
So who's going to care about something that happened almost eight years
ago?
"In early August 1995," writes researcher Gregory Elich, "the Croatian
invasion of Serbian Krajina precipitated the worst refugee crisis of
the Yugoslav civil war. Within days, more than two hundred thousand
Serbs, virtually the entire population of Krajina, fled their homes,
and 14,000 Serbian civilians lost their lives." ("The invasion of
Serbian Krajina," NATO in the Balkans: Voices of Opposition,
International Action Center, New York, 1998.)
This was Operation Storm, "the largest single act of ethnic cleansing
of the Yugoslav civil war," according to Even Dyer, a journalist with
CBC Radio. "And yet not one person has been arrested and brought before
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia"
("Croatian atrocities being forgotten: Cdn. Officers," CBC News, July
21, 2003.)
The popular mythology about the Yugoslav civil war is that it was the
Serbs, led by Slobodan Milosevic, who embarked on a program of ethnic
cleansing to create a greater Serbia. Milosevic is on trial at the
Hague Tribunal, facing genocide charges.
So it should strike a dissonant chord that:
the single greatest act of ethnic cleansing does not have the Serb's
signature on it (they were the victims); and the Hague Tribunal, which
professes to be impartial, has done nothing to
bring the authors of the atrocity to book.
The Tribunal says the evidence is circumstantial, but senior Canadian
soldiers, including a general who commanded peacekeeping forces in the
area of Operation Storm, say they suspect the real reason for the
Tribunal's inaction is that Western governments were in the background
pulling the strings.
For example, Argentina provided artillery to the Croats, despite a UN
embargo on supplying materiel and even though their own troops were in
Croatia as peacekeepers.
And a private US military contractor, Military Professional Resources
Inc (MPRI), headed by a former US Army Chief of Staff, likely planned
the operation.
Canada's Major-General Andrew Leslie says he doubts the Croats could
have pulled off Operation Storm themselves. "That was done by people
who really knew what they were doing."
Leslie's colleague, Major-General Alain Fourand, agrees. He says he
suspects it was MPRI that was behind the operation.
The MPRI Web site, according to CBC news, "points to an article in
which the Croatian government praised the job MPRI has done for it."
There is much that is misunderstood about the Yugoslav civil war, and
the Hague Tribunal.
For one, the Croats were a lot closer to the image of Nazis than the
Serbs were, though it was Serbs who were portrayed, for propaganda
reasons, as successors of Hitler's fascists. After the breakaway Croat
republic violently seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991, Franjo Tudjman, the
country's president, began to resurrect symbols of Croatia's Nazi
puppet state past.
According to Elich, "the Croatian fascist(s) murdered as many as one
million Serbs, Jews and Romani" during WWII.
And the Tribunal is funded in part by billionaire financier George
Soros, who has a long history of underwriting programs to destabilize
countries whose markets are closed, or partly closed, to Western
investment. Once a renitent government is ousted, and a Western
friendly regime is installed, Soros swoops in to buy up state assets at
fire sale prices. Soros is said to have his eyes on the massive Trepca
mining complex in Kosovo, worth an estimated $5 billion. The Hungarian
émigré spent $100 million to oust Milosevic, who presided over a
largely socially owned economy ("The billionaire trader has become
Eastern Europe's uncrowned king and the prophet of an 'open society."
But open to what?" New Statesman, June 2, 2003.)
The US and Germany began supporting secessionist forces in Yugoslavia
after the collapse of Communism in the former Soviet Union, when the
Yugoslav federation refused to be brought wholly into the Western
orbit. Former Communist countries were undergoing a spate of
privatization. But, according to Neil Clark, "Over 700,000 Yugoslav
enterprises remained in social ownership and most were still controlled
by employee-management committees, with only 5% of capital privately
owned." ("The quisling of Belgrade," The Guardian (UK), March 14,
2003.) The West aligned itself with Alija
Izetbegovic in Bosnia, who wanted to makeover the multi-ethnic republic
as an Islamic religious state, though Bosnia had a large non-Muslim,
including Serb, population. And Tudjman, the West's favorite in
Croatia, reeked to heaven of fascism and anti-Serb fanaticism. But both
were useful as instruments to tear apart the federation and deliver it,
piece by piece, into the hands of the West, and its corporate sector.
Later, secessionist in Kosovo would be encouraged, trained, and
bankrolled by the West, sparking a civil war that furnished NATO with a
pretext to launch a "humanitarian" war, and ultimately, the ouster of
Milosevic, working through its proxy, the Democratic Opposition of
Serbia.
The atrocities of August 1995 are now largely forgotten in the West,
and while they seem to be old news, they do shed light of recurrent
patterns that can be glimpsed today. The West's penchant for
precipitating crises that can be used as pretexts for intervention in
countries that seek to pursue an independent course hasn't abated. And
it's all too common for victims of Western-backed aggressions to be
portrayed as the aggressors themselves. North Korea, for example, is
now widely understood to be a hostile nation, even though it is the US
that shows every indication of being hell-bent on resuming a war with
the impoverished country it has never entirely renounced. Cuba,
Belarus, Zimbabwe, part of a complement of nations George W. Bush has
designated "captive nations," along with North Korea ("Bush blacklists
Zimbabwe, Cuba," news24.com, July 19, 2003) are portrayed as brutal,
repressive, regimes, though the reason they're demonized has
everything to do with their inhospitable orientation to the global
capitalist economy dominated by the United States.
That too was the Serb's offense, in the eyes of the West, which is why
there ever was an Operation Storm, why there's a Star Chamber at the
Hague, and why MPRI won't soon be facing war crimes charges.
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What's Left
http://www3.sympatico.ca/sr.gowans/ethnic.html
=== C ===
http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:pTYCXOMXiDoC:www.washtimes.com/
world/20020422-7801660.htm+operation+storm+croatia+us&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
U.S., Clinton accused of war atrocities
Jeffrey T. Kuhner
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published 4/22/2002
The lawyer for a Croatian general indicted by the
war crimes tribunal in The Hague says his client's
case opens the possibility that former President
Clinton will be charged with crimes against humanity
for authorizing a Croatian military offensive in 1995
that recaptured territory from rebel Serbs.
"According to the unjust indictment brought
against my client, there is a basis for an
investigation and indictment of high-ranking Clinton
administration officials who oversaw Operation Storm,"
said Luka Misetic, the defense attorney for Gen. Ante
Gotovina.
The high-ranking Croatian general was indicted in
June 2001 by the prosecutor's office at the U.N. War
Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague
on charges that he exercised "command responsibility"
over the military campaign in which 150 Serbian
civilians were killed.
Secretly supported by the Clinton
administration, Croatian forces launched a three-day
massive military offensive — known as "Operation
Storm" — on Aug. 5, 1995 in which Croatia recovered
territories occupied by rebel Serbs following
Croatia's bloody drive for independence from
Yugoslavia in 1991.
Gen. Gotovina was the military commander of
Sector South of the operation, which was responsible
for the capture of the rebel-held city of Knin. He is
also accused of overseeing the ethnic cleansing of
150,000 Serbs who fled from Croatia during the
military offensive.
The United States provided military and technical
assistance to Operation Storm in order to block
then-Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's goal of
forging an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia."
The Clinton administration viewed Croatia's
military campaign as pivotal to tilting the strategic
balance of power in the region against Serbian forces,
paving the way for the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords that
ended the war in neighboring Bosnia.
However, Mr. Misetic said U.S. support and
approval for the military offensive means the
indictment against Gen. Gotovina could lead to the
prosecution by The Hague tribunal of Mr. Clinton and
other high-ranking U.S. officials on charges of having
command responsibility for war crimes that were
committed during the operation.
"The theory against Gotovina can now be brought
against Clinton, [Assistant Secretary of State
Richard] Holbrooke and all the way down the U.S. chain
of command. On the prosecution's logic, they should be
indicted as well. They knew the attack was coming and
gave it the green light," Mr. Misetic said.
"The prosecutor's office is punting on an issue
that is clearly there. They are claiming that ethnic
cleansing took place during this operation. They are
claiming that by virtue of his position, Gotovina had
knowledge of war crimes. His knowledge was shared and
given to him by the Pentagon," he said.
Florence Hartmann, spokeswoman for chief
prosecutor Carla del Ponte, said the tribunal is not
challenging the legitimacy of Croatia's military
offensive but individual atrocities carried out by
Croatian soldiers whose actions fell under the
responsibility of Gen. Gotovina.
"It is not Operation Storm that is being
indicted, but the crimes that were committed during
and afterward," Mrs. Hartmann said.
U.S. support for the operation "has to be
established," she said. "I don't know that the
[Clinton] administration was involved."
Asked whether the prosecutor's office was
planning to issue indictments against either Mr.
Clinton or other administation officials, Mrs.
Hartmann said: "We have no comment because there is no
evidence to substantiate the charges of Gen.
Gotovina's lawyers. They can make their case with
evidence to the court."
Mr. Misetic dismissed Mrs. Hartmann's comments as
"blatant hypocrisy."
http://www.ilmanifesto.it/
il manifesto - 22 Luglio 2003
MASS MEDIA E GUERRA
Jugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq: l'agonia del quarto potere
GIULIETTO CHIESA
Le tre guerre dell'Impero - Jugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq - sono state
precedute, accompagnate, sostenute da possenti campagne, dove tutti i
principali media, quale con più eleganza «pluralistica», quale con più
protervia mentitrice, hanno partecipato stando dalla parte della guerra
e dei suoi organizzatori. Nel primo e nel secondo caso, proclamata la
vittoria di guerre che Franco Cardini ha sferzantemente definito
«saggiamente vili», i media hanno, come si suol dire, «gabbato lo
santo» e si sono dedicati ad altro. Magari a preparare con solerzia la
prossima guerra.
Chi volesse divertirsi a raccogliere gli articoli già pubblicati dai
media italiani sulle armi atomiche «presto in possesso» dell'Iran
scoprirebbe che volumi di sciocchezze, sicuramente preparati in qualche
luminoso ufficio adibito alla disinformazione mondiale, sono già stati
ripresi e pubblicati da decine di giornali, mentre le relative e
manipolate immagini volavano via etere e cavo nelle case di milioni di
ignari telespettatori. Ignari e impossibilitati a difendersi.
Il fenomeno è mondiale. In Italia lo stato dell'informazione e della
comunicazione - salvo, lo ripeto, eccezioni - è sceso a tali livelli di
indecenza che le stesse cose che, negli Stati uniti, Paul Krugman
denuncia con accenti di tragedia, da noi possono essere trattate solo
come una farsa. Che però non fa ridere.
Stiamo assistendo a uno straordinario fenomeno: la fine del «quarto
potere». Consumata con la complicità dei suoi più augusti tenutari,
sempre impegnati a proclamare la loro funzione di servizio nei
confronti di lettori e telespettatori.
Nel caso iracheno la frittata è stata troppo grande e ha finito per
uscire dalla padella. Pezzi di verità hanno cominciato ad emergere.
Perché è vero che i direttori sono stati ammaestrati, magari
partecipando agl'incontri Bilderberg, a dire quello che devono, ma
esistono ancora giornalisti che hanno dignità e bagaglio professionale
a sufficienza per aggirarne i divieti.
E poi, diciamocelo francamente, anche le balle hanno dei limiti
invalicabili. E pensare che tutti non si fossero accorti che le statue
di Saddam Hussein non le avevano buttate giù gli iracheni festanti, ma
i carri armati occupanti non è cosa realistica. Figurarsi poi le armi
di distruzione di massa, che hanno motivato la guerra e che non
c'erano. E l'uranio che Saddam avrebbe comprato, o stava per comprare,
e che finisce nei discorsi ufficiali sullo Stato dell'unione, o
all'ombra del Big Ben, si scopre che era già stato cestinato da tutti
quelli che avevano dato un'occhiata anche sommaria ai documenti falsi.
Falsificati così male, del resto, che l'ultimo dei cronisti, magari un
praticante alle prime armi, mandato sul luogo, avrebbe potuto
accorgersene da solo.
Per cui sorge adesso, imperiosa, una domanda: ma quei media che hanno
raccolto e accolto come vere tutte queste castronerie; quei giornalisti
che le hanno scritte senza nemmeno provare a verificarle; quei
commentatori che ne hanno tratto conclusioni epocali, sulla base delle
quali hanno controfirmato le guerre «giuste»; quegli inviati embedded ,
che raccontavano i minimi dettagli dei cespugli in cui s'imbattevano
appena scesi dai carri armati invasori, ma che non ci dicevano che non
erano in grado di vedere la foresta. Tutti costoro cosa ci dovrebbero
dire, adesso? Adesso, intendo dire, dopo la morte di Kelly?
Ci aspetteremmo un'autocritica. Sarebbe una prova che la decenza,
almeno quella, non è andata del tutto perduta.
Invece no. Abbiamo di fronte a noi uno dei pochi esempi di una
televisione - pubblica - che ha fatto il suo mestiere, il suo dovere.
Parlo ovviamente della Bbc, che si erge da sola a difendere l'onore
britannico, infangato dal suo governo. E' andata alla ricerca della
verità. Ha trovato una fonte assolutamente al di sopra di ogni
sospetto. Chi poteva sapere meglio di Kelly lo stato degli armamenti
iracheni? Chi poteva sapere, meglio di Kelly, che Tony Blair stava di
nuovo facendo il gioco delle tre tavolette, dopo le famose «prove»,
esibite nell'ottobre 2001, della colpevolezza di Osama bin Laden? (A
proposito: che fine hanno fatto quelle prove? Chi le ha viste? E perché
adesso non le rendono pubbliche? Non vorranno raccontarci mica che, a
due anni da quella splendida vittoria, c'è ancora bisogno di tenere il
segreto? E, infine, proposta a qualcuno dei grandi giornali e delle
grandi televisioni: perché non aprire un bel lavoro d'indagine
giornalistica su quelle prove, e sull'11 settembre, tanto per non
dimenticare che tutto, a quanto pare, viene da lì?)
La Bbc ha rispettato i suoi spettatori e non ha guardato in faccia al
potere. Ecco un «quarto potere» che funziona. Ma - sopresa - invece di
lodare lo sforzo, ecco che i bugiardi che hanno sostenuto la guerra,
cercano di confondere le acque, magari cercando di far pensare a
lettori e telespettatori che la colpa della morte di Kelly è di chi ha
fatto un ottimo lavoro giornalistico, non di chi ha ingannato milioni
di elettori inglesi.
Così ecco la chiusura del cerchio. Adesso i due bugiardi principali,
George Bush e Tony Blair, trovano schierati a loro difesa tutti i
bugiardi di rimessa, cioè tutti coloro che hanno loro tenuto bordone,
che li hanno aiutati a diffondere menzogne, a uccidere e storpiare
innocenti, a cancellare governi, a bombardare i palazzi
dell'informazione dei nemici. Che adesso scopriamo con inquietudine non
essere peggiore di quella che informa i vincitori, ma che nessuno potrà
mai bombardare. Media di regime. Col che diventa inevitabile porre
un'altra domanda ai farisei del tempio: di quale democrazia andate
cianciando? Non può esserci democrazia se la gente è privata della
possibilità di sapere.
il manifesto - 22 Luglio 2003
MASS MEDIA E GUERRA
Jugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq: l'agonia del quarto potere
GIULIETTO CHIESA
Le tre guerre dell'Impero - Jugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq - sono state
precedute, accompagnate, sostenute da possenti campagne, dove tutti i
principali media, quale con più eleganza «pluralistica», quale con più
protervia mentitrice, hanno partecipato stando dalla parte della guerra
e dei suoi organizzatori. Nel primo e nel secondo caso, proclamata la
vittoria di guerre che Franco Cardini ha sferzantemente definito
«saggiamente vili», i media hanno, come si suol dire, «gabbato lo
santo» e si sono dedicati ad altro. Magari a preparare con solerzia la
prossima guerra.
Chi volesse divertirsi a raccogliere gli articoli già pubblicati dai
media italiani sulle armi atomiche «presto in possesso» dell'Iran
scoprirebbe che volumi di sciocchezze, sicuramente preparati in qualche
luminoso ufficio adibito alla disinformazione mondiale, sono già stati
ripresi e pubblicati da decine di giornali, mentre le relative e
manipolate immagini volavano via etere e cavo nelle case di milioni di
ignari telespettatori. Ignari e impossibilitati a difendersi.
Il fenomeno è mondiale. In Italia lo stato dell'informazione e della
comunicazione - salvo, lo ripeto, eccezioni - è sceso a tali livelli di
indecenza che le stesse cose che, negli Stati uniti, Paul Krugman
denuncia con accenti di tragedia, da noi possono essere trattate solo
come una farsa. Che però non fa ridere.
Stiamo assistendo a uno straordinario fenomeno: la fine del «quarto
potere». Consumata con la complicità dei suoi più augusti tenutari,
sempre impegnati a proclamare la loro funzione di servizio nei
confronti di lettori e telespettatori.
Nel caso iracheno la frittata è stata troppo grande e ha finito per
uscire dalla padella. Pezzi di verità hanno cominciato ad emergere.
Perché è vero che i direttori sono stati ammaestrati, magari
partecipando agl'incontri Bilderberg, a dire quello che devono, ma
esistono ancora giornalisti che hanno dignità e bagaglio professionale
a sufficienza per aggirarne i divieti.
E poi, diciamocelo francamente, anche le balle hanno dei limiti
invalicabili. E pensare che tutti non si fossero accorti che le statue
di Saddam Hussein non le avevano buttate giù gli iracheni festanti, ma
i carri armati occupanti non è cosa realistica. Figurarsi poi le armi
di distruzione di massa, che hanno motivato la guerra e che non
c'erano. E l'uranio che Saddam avrebbe comprato, o stava per comprare,
e che finisce nei discorsi ufficiali sullo Stato dell'unione, o
all'ombra del Big Ben, si scopre che era già stato cestinato da tutti
quelli che avevano dato un'occhiata anche sommaria ai documenti falsi.
Falsificati così male, del resto, che l'ultimo dei cronisti, magari un
praticante alle prime armi, mandato sul luogo, avrebbe potuto
accorgersene da solo.
Per cui sorge adesso, imperiosa, una domanda: ma quei media che hanno
raccolto e accolto come vere tutte queste castronerie; quei giornalisti
che le hanno scritte senza nemmeno provare a verificarle; quei
commentatori che ne hanno tratto conclusioni epocali, sulla base delle
quali hanno controfirmato le guerre «giuste»; quegli inviati embedded ,
che raccontavano i minimi dettagli dei cespugli in cui s'imbattevano
appena scesi dai carri armati invasori, ma che non ci dicevano che non
erano in grado di vedere la foresta. Tutti costoro cosa ci dovrebbero
dire, adesso? Adesso, intendo dire, dopo la morte di Kelly?
Ci aspetteremmo un'autocritica. Sarebbe una prova che la decenza,
almeno quella, non è andata del tutto perduta.
Invece no. Abbiamo di fronte a noi uno dei pochi esempi di una
televisione - pubblica - che ha fatto il suo mestiere, il suo dovere.
Parlo ovviamente della Bbc, che si erge da sola a difendere l'onore
britannico, infangato dal suo governo. E' andata alla ricerca della
verità. Ha trovato una fonte assolutamente al di sopra di ogni
sospetto. Chi poteva sapere meglio di Kelly lo stato degli armamenti
iracheni? Chi poteva sapere, meglio di Kelly, che Tony Blair stava di
nuovo facendo il gioco delle tre tavolette, dopo le famose «prove»,
esibite nell'ottobre 2001, della colpevolezza di Osama bin Laden? (A
proposito: che fine hanno fatto quelle prove? Chi le ha viste? E perché
adesso non le rendono pubbliche? Non vorranno raccontarci mica che, a
due anni da quella splendida vittoria, c'è ancora bisogno di tenere il
segreto? E, infine, proposta a qualcuno dei grandi giornali e delle
grandi televisioni: perché non aprire un bel lavoro d'indagine
giornalistica su quelle prove, e sull'11 settembre, tanto per non
dimenticare che tutto, a quanto pare, viene da lì?)
La Bbc ha rispettato i suoi spettatori e non ha guardato in faccia al
potere. Ecco un «quarto potere» che funziona. Ma - sopresa - invece di
lodare lo sforzo, ecco che i bugiardi che hanno sostenuto la guerra,
cercano di confondere le acque, magari cercando di far pensare a
lettori e telespettatori che la colpa della morte di Kelly è di chi ha
fatto un ottimo lavoro giornalistico, non di chi ha ingannato milioni
di elettori inglesi.
Così ecco la chiusura del cerchio. Adesso i due bugiardi principali,
George Bush e Tony Blair, trovano schierati a loro difesa tutti i
bugiardi di rimessa, cioè tutti coloro che hanno loro tenuto bordone,
che li hanno aiutati a diffondere menzogne, a uccidere e storpiare
innocenti, a cancellare governi, a bombardare i palazzi
dell'informazione dei nemici. Che adesso scopriamo con inquietudine non
essere peggiore di quella che informa i vincitori, ma che nessuno potrà
mai bombardare. Media di regime. Col che diventa inevitabile porre
un'altra domanda ai farisei del tempio: di quale democrazia andate
cianciando? Non può esserci democrazia se la gente è privata della
possibilità di sapere.
Srbija i Crna Gora (7--12)
7. SAVEZ SAMOSTALNIH SINDIKATA SRBIJE "OBJAVIO RAT" VLADI SRBIJE - DO
KONACNE POBEDE... (B. Urosevic / Artel, 5.6.2003)
8. PREZIVLJAVANJE (M. Belosevic / Artel, 1.5.2003)
9. STRATEGIJA RAZVOJA U OTEZANIM USLOVIMA (M. Markovic / Artel,
15.4.2003)
10. KAKO ZIVIMO (M. Belosevic / Artel, 12.4.2003)
11. SIVO TRŽIŠTE (M. Belosevic / Artel, 5.4.2003)
12. AUKCIJE (M. Belosevic / Artel, 21.3.2003)
=== 7 ===
SAVEZ SAMOSTALNIH SINDIKATA SRBIJE
"OBJAVIO RAT" VLADI SRBIJE - DO KONACNE POBEDE...
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/izbor/jugoslavija/2003-06-06_2.html
infograf@...
Borivoje Uroševic
Beograd, 5. juni 2003. godine
Na konferenciji za štampu, održanoj 20. maja 2003. godine predsednik
Sindikata Srbije Milenko Smiljanic je objavio generalni protest radnika
u Srbiji sledecom recenicom : ''Ne možemo više da cekamo da oni na
vlasti i dalje upravljaju našim životima i zbog toga krecemo u akciju''.
Zahtevi kojima se Sindikat obraca Vladi i od kojih nece odustati su
sledeci:
" Da se zaustavi dalje otpuštanje radnika;
" Da se donese program kojim bi se obezbedilo zapošljavanje velikog
broja nezaposlenih;
" Da se hitno utvrdi strategija razvoja Srbije, usvoje socijalni
programi i uspostavi pravi sicijalni dijalog;
" Da se, izmenama modela privatizacije, iz nje iskljuce svi koji
sumnjivim kapitalom peru pare;
" Da se sva prava zaposlenih koja proisticu iz rada regulišu iskljucivo
kolektivnim ugovorima;
" Da se izmire sva dugovanja prema zaposlenima i izvrši povezivanje
njihovog radnog staža;
" Da se odustane od svih povecanja cena koje su u nadležnosti Vlade i
organa lokalne samouprave.
Ukoliko Vlada Srbije u roku od 30 dana ne postigne odgovarajuci
sporazum u dijalogu sa Savezom samostalnih sindikata Srbije i ne uvaži
iznete zahteve, Sindikat ce tražiti njenu ostavku, odnosno smenu i
raspisivanje prevremenih parlamentarnih izbora.
Scenario protesta zamišljen je tako što ce obustave rada i protesti
biti održani po svim vecim gradovima Srbije u odredjene dane a glavni
protest, na kome ce ucestvovati predstavnici radnika iz cele Srbije i
Beograda, održace se 25. juna 2003. godine u Beogradu.
Lepo zamišljeno, ali bojim se, teško ostvarivo.Suviše dugo se cekalo da
se stvori ''kriticna masa'' i da se izadje na ulice. Privreda više ne
radi, radnici su izgubili nadu i samopouzdanje i dok totalna glad i
nemaština ne zahvati veliku vecinu stanovništva Srbije, teško da ce se
nešto bitno pokrenuti. Samo, tada nece trebati sndikati da ih
organizuju.
Vanredno stanje, koje je u Srbiji bilo uvedeno posle ubistva premijera,
i represija vlasti prema desetinama hiljada privedenih i uhapšenih, da
bi konacno sudjenje bilo odredjeno za njih oko 40 - tak, stvorilo je
strah i nepoverenje kod gradjana. Teško ih je sada pokrenuti jer oni
koji imaju nešto ( a i to nešto je ustvari ništa ) boje se da ce ostati
i bez toga i ne bi da se javno konfrontiraju.
Ne želim da budem prorok, izaci cu na protest, ali se bojim da cemo
proci kao prilikom protesta oko Zakona o radu. A sve je, ustvari, od
toga pocelo da ide nizbrdo.
Vizija rukovodstva Sindikata Srbije i predsednika Milenka Smiljanica za
buducnost radnickog pokreta je skoro osnivanje ''Nacionalnog radnickog
konzorcijuma sa ciljem da se u privatizaciji, putem insajderske
prodaje, spreci da preduzeca odlaze u bezcenje i da ih kupuje sumnjivi
kapital. Ocekuje se da ce Konzorcijumu pristupiti sto hiljada radnika
koji ce u narednih šest godina uplatiti od 100 do 3000 evra
pojedinacno, cime ce stvoriti kapital od 50 do 100 miliona evra''.
U situaciji kada porodice radnika u Srbiji ''žive'' od mesecnih
primanja od oko 100 evra, utopija je ocekivati da ce imati da odvoje
planiranu sumu od 100 do 3000 evra, mada je ideja dobra, ali je za sada
na ''dugom štapu''.
Parola pod kojom ce se održavati protesti je : ''Za spas radništva i
privrede Srbije''.
Nasuprot analizama Sindikata i ponižavajuceg stanja velike vecine
porodica u Srbiji, zvanican izveštaj Saveznog zavoda za statistiku
govori : NEZNATNA POSKUPLJENJA U MAJU 2003. GODINE.
''Cene na malo u maju više su za 0,5 odsto od aprilskih a za 13,4 odsto
više u odnosu na maj 2002. godine''. Iz ovog izveštaja takodje vidimo
da su troškovi života u odnosu na april 2003. povecani za smo 0,4 odsto
a u poredjanju sa decembrom 2002. godine za 2,6 odsto.
Dalje se kaže da su najviše poskupeli poljoprivredni proizvodi (
ishrana ) pice i industrijski neprehrambeni proizvodi. Statistika dalje
kaže da su cene indusrijsko-prehrembenih proizvoda u maju, cak, bile
niže za 0,2 odsto u odnosu na april i da su tome doprinele niže cene
svežeg mesa i pojedinih mesnih preradjevina kao i svežeg preradjenog
mleka i masnoca.
A šta statistika ne kaže, a šta se ustvari dogodilo ?! Prekomernim
uvozom mesa, mesnih preradjevina i mleka ''ubijena'' je cena domacih
proizvoda, desetkovan je stocni fond, poskupeo je kukuruz, suša
najavljuje loš prinos ove jeseni i šta nas ceka u buducnosti ? Bez
stocnog fonda nema ni mesa, ni mleka, ni mesnih preradjevina...
Ministar poljoprivrede je podneo ostavku, ali ne zbog loše vodjene
politike u agraru ( što je bilo evidentno odavno ) vec zbog tragicnog
saobracajnog incidenta u sred Beograda, u kome je ucestvovalo njegovo
vozilo i vozac i kome je i on prisustvovao.
Statistika je zaboravila još da nam kaže da nisu možda drasticno
pojeftinile u maju mesecu lokomotive, turbine za elektrane i slicno, pa
nam je prosek tako dobar i za hvaljenje.
Šta li nas još ceka od ove ekspertske Vlade ?
I za kraj, ili umesto zakljucka, koji ostavljam Vama koji cete ovo
citati, želim da kažem da iskreno podržavam proteste u koje krecemo
ovog juna. Nešto mora ozbiljno da se dogodi da bi se promenilo na
bolje. Hoce li to biti ovoga puta vodecemo uskoro.
=== 8 ===
Mirela Beloševic: Prezivljavanje
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/izbor/jugoslavija/2003-05-02.html
infograf@...
Beograd, 1. maj 2003. godine
Kada su Milicu Petrovic pitali kako spaja kraj s krajem uz primanja od
5000 dinara jednostavno je odgovorila da ne zna. Mnogo je onih cija
primanja su tolika da se zapitate kako ti ljudi uspevaju da potroše
makar i samo deset hiljada dinara za hranu, plate racune, kupe lekove.
Snalaze se, a to znaci po dva posla, bar jedan u domenu sivog trzista i
možda neka pomoc sa sela. Živi se u zejdnickim domacinstvima u kojima
roditelji pomažu decu a cesto i deca roditelje. To je život ili tacnije
preživljavanje. Medjutim statisticari bi to okarakterisali kao
subjektivni utisak. Kažu, teško je od prosecnog coveka ocekivati da
realno proceni da li živi bolje ili lošije nego pre godinu dana jer to
zavisi i od ocekivanja i uporedjivanja da li su drugi u ovom periodu
materijalno bolje prošli. Analize trgovaca pokazuju da se dnevno troši
170 do 190 dinara, ili oko 2 ipo evra, a pri tom treba imati u vidu da
naši ljudi niti mogu, niti imaju naviku da idu u velike mesecne
nabavke. Ako se posmatraju mesecni troškovi, u aprilu smo recimo mogli
da kupimo pola kilograma viršli više nego u martu a to baš i nije u
skladu sa našim ocekivanjima. Zvanicna statistika kasni i prema
njihovim podacima neto plata u Srbiji bila je manja u martu za 2,3
odsto u odnosu na februar, a smanjenje zarada uticace i da penzije budu
manje za drugo tromesecje ove godine.
Prema istraživanjima Stratedžik Marketinga jedna trecina stanovništva
pokazuje veliko nezadovoljstvo ali to su subjektivne procene koje se ne
uzimaju u obzir u pravljenju strategije borbe protiv siromaštva, ali bi
ih trebalo uzeti u obzir u strategiji politickog nastupa. Objektivni
pokazatelji ukazuju da ima 10 odsto siromacnih. Pri tom ima mnogo
ugroženih a granica izmedju ove dve kategorije je tanka pa bi ovaj
procenat mogao biti i veci. U svim zemljama u tranziciji osnovni
zadatak je rad na strategiji borbe protiv siromaštva, s tim što u
principu postoje dva puta. Jedan je da se tacno definiše ko ne može bez
pomoci države i da im se onda pomaže, ali uz povratnu informaciju da li
je pomoc otišla u prave ruke. Druga mogucnost zahteva više novca za
ulaganje u privredni razvoj i time se naravno postiže dugorocno bolji
efekat. Koji put ce izabrati naši stratezi još ne znamo.
Sa rastom industrijske proizvodnje se baš ne mozemo pohvaliti. Fizicki
obim industrijske proizvodnje u martu veci je nego u februaru za 7,4
odsto ali je lošiji od prošlogodisnjeg martovskog bilansa. Strani
analiticari imaju obicaj da kažu da koliko radimo-dobro i živimo. Prema
proizvodnji mi zasluzujemo platu manju i od 140 evra. Kada dodju kod
nas i pogledaju pokazatelje proizvodnje zakljuce da je naša ekonomija
mrtva a onda s druge strane, kad izadju na ulicu i vide 5000 kafana u
Beogradu koje su pune tokom celog dana ostaju u najmanju ruku šokirani.
U odnosu na druge evropske gradove, gde su saobracajne gužve u vreme
dolaska i odlaska sa posla, kod nas je gužva uvek. Narod se negde
krece, obavlja neke poslove, snalazi se. Kada je onemogucen rad na
crnom trzistu cigareta i nafte 100000 ljudi koji su se time bavili se
odjednom preselilo u neke druge sektore i niko ne zna gde. U sferi
crnog tržista još radi 700000 ljudi. Mnogo je medju njima onih koji se
bave svim i svacim da bi preziveli jer izgubiti posao kod nas ne znaci
i brzo naci drugi.
Srednji sloj, koji su cinili polticki uticajni intelektualci, nestao je
devedestih godina. Cinilo ga je 15 do 20 odsto stanovnistva. Sada se
takodje oformio srednji sloj u istom procentu ali to više nisu
intelektualci. U Srbiji ima 60 do 80 hiljada registrovanih preduzeca i
200000 zanatskih radnji a oni koji žive od njihovog privredjivanja sada
cine srednji sloj.
Osecamo se siromašni i zato što pored sebe gledamo one koji su se
obogatili, u najmanju ruku, na cudne nacine. Zato bi borba sa
privrednim kriminalom znacila bar u psihološkom smislu, da ne gledaš
lopova pored sebe. Dugorocno, znacilo bi to i povratak investiranja u
Srbiju. Medjutim ne treba se zavaravati da ce borba biti laka. Manje
opasna možda, ali jednostavna ni malo. Oni koji su najviše zaradili
imali su i finansijske mogucnosti da plate najbolje knjigovodje tako da
prema njihovim poslovnim knjigama sve može izgledati po zakonu.
Nedostaju nam i instrumenti borbe. Poreski broj smo skoro uveli,
fiskalne kase tek pocinju da se primenjuju a još nemamo porez na dodanu
vrednost. Ocekivanja u narodu su vec porasla zbog obecanja politicara,
ali ne treba se mnogo nadati. Pomak u borbi sa privrednim kriminalom bi
medjutim bio važan, kao što rekosmo ako ni zbog cega drugog onda zbog
psiholoških razloga.
KAKO SACUVATI PROIZVODNJU OD PREKOMERNOG UVOZA
Mlekare u poslednje vreme ne otkupljuju mleko jedan ili dva dana u
nedelji. Takodje prave selekciju i otkupljuju ga uglavnom od velikih,
takozvanih robnih proizvodjaca. Bilo bi lako slegnuti ramenima uz
komentar da su to cudi trzišta, odnosno ponude i potražnje. Da li su
jedino mali proizvodjaci zabrinuti zato što im mleko nije otkupljeno
ili i sve ostale treba da brine što ce posledica verovatno biti manje
krava muzara. Sada ih umesto milion, koliko ih je donedavno bilo, ima
oko 700000. Uobicajeno je da se višak mleka javlja leti pa zato i
pitanje zašto je ove godine višak "poranio". U magacinima ima 680 tona
mleka u prahu, 670 tona maslaca i oko 435 tona sireva. Kako proizvodnja
nije povecana, utisak je da je višak nastao zbog preteranog uvoza.
Prošlogodisnji uvoz mleka i mlecnih preradjevina bio je u vrednosti od
desetak miliona dolara a u prva dva meseca ove godine vrednost uvoza je
milion dolara. Dobra vest je da je iz ministarstva poljoprivrede i
trgovine stigao predlog da se povecaju uvozne takse za mleko i mlecne
proizvode od 20 do 100 odsto. U ministarstvu trgovine kažu da ce se o
tome odlucivati ovih dana. Višak mleka za sad robne rezerve nece
otkupljivati pa bi rešenje bilo povecana potrošnja, ili izvoz. Naša
komisija obišla je mlekare i utvrdila da su najbliži zahtevima Evropske
Unije, Imlek i Suboticka mlekara. Predlozi se šalju, pa onda dolazi
komisija Evropske Unije i to može biti za nedelju ali i za godinu dana.
Do tad naša trzišta su Hrvatska, Bosna i Hercegovina i Makedonija.
Povecanje potrošnje na domacem trzištu kažu proizvodjaci ne moze se
ocekivati dok god je kilogram svinjskog buta jeftiniji od kilograma
sira. Zato je potrebno da se ukine porez na promet tvrdih sireva.
MONOPOLIZACIJA TRGOVINE U BEOGRADU
U Beogradu su do nedavno bile dva velika trgovinska lanca sa
prehrambenom robom C market i Pekabeta. Sad je jedan od tih lanaca
kupio vlasnik Delte, a pri tom je i direktoru drugog lanca predložio da
se udruže u jedan nacionalni lanac. Kako nije naišao na razumevanje
druge strane, kupovao je lokacije i otvarao prodavnice uz vec
razradjene prodavnice konkurencije.Vodi se bitka u kojoj se novinari
pitaju kako ce nastupiti država kada bude prodavala svoje akcije u C
marketu. Ako vlasnik Delte kupi i deonice C marketa doci ce do
monopolizacije trgovine i do smanjenja kokurencije što nikako nije
dobro.Taman smo kao potrošaci poceli da osecamo blagodeti konkurencije
i sad bi to moglo biti uskraceno. No, o tome cemo opširnije pisati
nekom drugom prilikom.
=== 9 ===
Mirela Belosevic: Kako zivimo
http://www.artel.co.yu/glavni_sr/izbor/Jugoslavija/2003-04-13_4.html
infograf@...
Beograd, 12. april 2003. godine
Poslovna klima u nasoj zemlji je u februaru i pocetkom marta ove godine
bila nesto povoljnija u odnosu na prethodni period, ali jos nije
povoljna za inteziviranje privrednih aktivnosti, ocenjeno je u
Institutu za trzisna istrazivanja. U narednom periodu poboljsanju
uslova za privredjivanje u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori doprinece prijem u Savet
Evrope, borba protiv organizovanog kriminala i znacajan pomak u procesu
privatizacije, rekao je direktor IZIT-a Jova Todorovic.
Poboljsanju poslovne klime u februaru i pocetkom marta doprinelo je
blago povecanje industrijske proizvodnje, porast neto zarada,
poboljsanje priliva domacih i stranih porudzbina, jacanje ugovaranja
gradjevinskih poslova, smanjenje spoljnotrgovinskog deficita. Medjutim,
istovremeno je doslo do povecanja broja nezaposlenih. Broj lica koja
traze zaposlenje za 1,6 odsto je veci nego u januaru a 17,9 odsto veci
nego u februaru prosle godine, dok 17 odsto radnika, kojima je
obracunata neto zarada, nisu primili plate. U februaru je zabelezeno
poboljsanje kupovne moci. Prosecna neto zarada u februaru je iznosila
10.367 dinara ili 167 evra, pa su zaposleni imali 16,6 odsto vecu
kupovnu moc nego prosle godine. Prosecna penzija je u februaru iznosila
7.243 dinara ili 117 evra, ali je realna kupovna moc penzionera bila
0,5 odsto manja nego u januaru ove godine i 0,4 odsto manja nego u
februaru prosle godine.
Analiza Ekonomskog instituta pokazuje, na osnovu ankete u 350
privrednih preduzeca da je prisutan optimizam, ali je to obicno tako
posle januarskog pada proizvodnje. Anketa je radjena pre ubistva
premijera i pokazuje da je rasla iskoriscenost kapaciteta a zalihe bile
optimalne za normalnu proizvodnju. Najveca ogranicenja bila su:
nedostatak sirovina, slaba traznja i manjak kredita. Makroekonomsku
sliku pored vec navedenog u Institutu za trzisna istrazivanja, cinila
je stabilnost cena i monetarna restrikcija.
Cene na malo u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori su u martu u odnosu na februar
povecane za 0,4 odsto, dok su troskovi zivota porasli za 0,3 odsto.
Ukoliko ne dodje do poskupljenja nafte i naftinih derivata kretanje
maloprodajnih cena ukazuje da ce godisnja inflacija biti ispod deset
odsto, zakljucili su u Saveznom zavodu za statistiku.
U prvom tromesecju ove godine vrednost dinara je, prema evru, opala za
2,6 odsto, kazu u Institutu ekonomskih nauka. Ukoliko bi se zadrzao taj
tempo na kraju godine dinar bi depresirao 10 odsto, a rast cena bi bio
veci od planiranog ekomskom poltikom, predvidjaju analiticari ovog
instituta. Takvo kretanje bi zadovoljilo izvoznike ali, dugorocno
gledano, time se ne bi obezbedio privredni rast a javili bi se i
problemi otplate spoljnog duga posle 2007. godine.
VECI IZVOZ
Ostvaren je dobar rezultat u izvozu gvozdja, celika i secera pa bi to
mogli da budu glavni domaci artikli za izvoz. Kod izvoza secera jedna
afera bi mogla da ugrozi dobre izvozne rezultate. Naime, mi smo prosle
godine izvezli sav visak secera zato sto smo dobili izuzetno povoljne
uslove od Evropske Unije. Pred kraj prosle godine i sada, striglo je
upozorenje iz Evropske Unije da nisu zadovoljni kontrolom izvoza iz
nase zemlje. Pojavila se sumnja da je neka od nasih fabrika prepakivala
uvezen secer od trske i prodavala kao secer od secerne repe, ili je
neka od susednih zemalja dosla do nase ambalaze i iskoristila nase
povoljnosti za izvoz. Osnovana je nasa komisija koja bi trebalo u roku
od mesec dana da utvrdi da li je bilo zloupotrebe a takodje i komisija
Evropske Unije ce se baviti ovim problemom. Ono sto je dobro, ovaj
slucaj inicirao je promenu propisa u toj oblasti i vise nece moci
secerane same sebi da daju potvrdu o kvalitetu secera.
JEDAN SASVIM OBICAN PRIMER IZ ZIVOTA
U svim satsitikckim pracenjima zivota obicnih ljudi primecuje se da
ipak najteze spajaju kraj s krajem ljudi sa skolskom decom. Kod nas je,
recimo, obicaj da se kraj srednje, pa i osnovne skole, obelezava tako
sto se u hotelima organizuju maturske veceri. Najjeftinija vecara uz
jedno pice i muziku po osnovcu kosta 535 dinara dok recimo u hotelu
"Hajat" srednjoskolci po osobi moraju da izdvoje od 30 do 35 evra.
Pored toga treba izdvojiti povecu sumu novca za odecu za tu priliku,
frizure i dzeparac.
PRIVATIZACIJA
Pocetkom aprila konzorcijum od 550 zaposlenih kupio je svoje preduzece
po paprenoj ceni. Najvisa cena do sada postignuta na aukcijama,
ostvarena je prilikom aukcije preduzeca "Hidrotehnika
-hidroinzinjering" Beograd. Za ovu graditeljsku firmu koja sada gradi
tri velike brane : kod Valjeva,Vranja i Kursumlije, izlicitirana je
cena od dve milijarde i trista miliona dinara ili oko 38 miliona evra.
Pocetna cena uvecana je 38 puta ali radnici nisu odustali zeleci da
sacuvaju preduzece koje su razvijali vise od pet decenija.
Skupstina akcionara Beogradske industrije piva donela je odluku da
ponudi drzavi da se dug od milijardu i cetirstotine miliona dinara
pretvori u akcije drzave. Ako bi vlada to prihvatila, drzava bi postala
vecinski vlasnik, mogla bi da trazi strateskog partnera i obezbedi
socijalni program. U Srbiji i Crnoj Gori radi 15 pivara sto je previse
za ovako malo trziste, pogotovo sto ima mnogo i uvoznog piva. Zbog
sankcija BIP ima zastarelu tehnologiju. Prosle godine ulozili su sedam
miliona evra u razvoj ali im je potrebno jos 15, pa tako ne postoji
drugi nacin za saniranje njihovih dugova drzavi, osim naravno da odu u
stecaj. Potencijalni investitori zadovoljni su njihovom lokacijom blizu
poslovnog centra Beograda ali otezavajuca okolnost je sto BIP ima vise
programa na razlicitim lokacijama: za proizvodnju slada, vode, sokova
pa im nece probleme resiti samo jedan kupac.
USKLADJIVANJE PROPISA
U toku je uskladjivanje carinskih propisa Srbije i Crne Gore. Jedan od
ciljeva harmonizacije je sprecavanje sive ekonomije. Do sada se
desavalo da se proizvodi uvoze preko Crne Gore gde je niska carinska
tarifa a prodaju u Srbiji sa visom carinskom terifom i tako stice
zarada u domenu sive ekonomije. Najvaznije za nase fabrike je da se
smanji do 5 odsto carinska stopa za repromaterijal. Uskladjivanje
obavljaju eksperti u okviru odredjenih grupacija. Tako je za tekstil to
vec obavljeno a sada se harmonizuju carinske stope za hemiju: lekove,
kozmetiku, djubrivo. Uskladjivanje ne ide bas lako, jer je 95 odsto
industrijske proizvodnje u Srbiji, zato Crnogorci imaju mnogo manje
razloga da visokim carinskim stopama stite svoje finalne proizvode.
DELEGACIJE SRBIJE I CRNE GORE NA ZASEDANJU SVETSKE BANKE I MMF
Prvi put je delegacija drzavne zajednice Srbije i Crne Gore i
delegacija iz dve clanice zajednice, otisla na sastanak Svetske banke i
Medjunarodnog monetarnog fonda . U toku su pregovori o kreditima za
podrsku privatizacije nasih preduzeca i reformu finansijskog i
bankarskog sektora. Rec je o novih 80 miliona dolara kredita u okviru
ranije odobrene sume od 540 miliona dolara na period od tri godine.
Ocekuje se da bord direktora do kraja maja ili pocetkom juna usvoji
kredit. To bi bio snazan signal podrske i verovatno bi zastoj u prilivu
stranih investicija, koji se ocekivao posle ubistva premijera, bio
kraci.
UMESTO ZAKLJUCKA
Ispitivanja javnosti pokazala su veliku podrsku borbi protiv
kriminala.Ono sto obican narod ocekuje jeste i borba protiv privrednog
kriminala. Neslaganja i optuzivanja kao sto je izjava premijera da
Narodna banka Srbije ne postoji dok se ne donese zakon, uznemiravaju ne
samo obicne ljude vec verovatno i strane investitore. Napetost na
liniji Vlada-Narodna banka Srbije pocela je da popusta nakon razgovora
premijera i guvernera Centralne banke. Iako nije bilo zvanicnog
saopstenja , niti komentara Zivkovica i Dinkica, javnost je saznala da
je dogovorena dalja saradnja Vlade i Narodne banke Srbije. Da li
politicari znaju koliko narod prizeljkuje da stranacki interesi ostanu
po strani, dok je zemlja u ovako teskoj situaciji kao sto je nasa?
=== 10 ===
Prof. dr Mihajlo Marković:
Strategija razvoja u otežanim uslovima
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/gost/2003-06-09.html
BEOGRADSKI FORUM ZA SVET RAVNOPRAVNIH
Izlaganje Prof. dr MIHAILA MARKOVIĆA, akademika, člana SANU na okruglom
stlu na temu "Strategija razvoja u otežanim uslovima"
Beograd, 15. aprila 2003. godine
Ja bi se ograničio na temu o ciljevima društvenog razvoja. Pošto svaka
strategija podrazumeva odredjenu koncepciju o ciljevima. Pokušao bih da
pokažem kako se do jedne objektivne i široko prihvaćene koncepcije
ciljeva može doći na osnovu analize nekih medjunarodnih dokumenata, a
onda bih pokazao da je naša sadašnja situacija u potpunoj
protivrečnosti sa svim tim pretpostavkama koje su izložene u
medjunarodnim dokumentima i prema tome mi u ovom času teško možemo
govoriti o strategiji ovog našeg sadašnjeg društva. Možemo govoriti o
teorijskim pitanjima, možemo isto tako govoriti i o strateškim
pitanjima s obzirom na neke pretpostavke koje realno ne postoje kod
nas, ali praktično svaki taj naš razgovor, svaki naš pokušaj ukazivanja
na neku moguću strategiju ovog sadašnjeg društva, pre nego {šo dodje do
nekih bitnih promena, jednostavno nije moguć.
Pre svega bih istakao da strateško mišljenje ne može da se zasniva na
ekstrapolacijama nekih postojećih tendencija i kretanja. Prosto,
automatsko, stihijno, produžavanje nekih datih trendova neumno je i
nedostojno slobodnog mislećeg bića. Ono pogotovo ne dolazi u obzir onda
kada u društvenim procesima ima mnogo regresivnih tendencija. Takvo
projektovanje bi samo učvrstilo kretanje od zla na još gore. Prema
tome, svaka strategija podrazumeva neki vrednosni izbor, drugim rečima,
neku koncepciju o ciljevima društvenog razvoja. Ti ciljevi mogu biti
subjektivni pristrasni, mogu izražavati egoističke interese pojedinaca,
ili posebnih društvenih grupa. Takvi će biti ugradjeni u strategiji
pojedinih vlastodržaca, posebnih društvenih grupa i političkih partija.
Svaka od tih strategija će biti različita i neprihvatljiva za pojedince
iz društvenih grupa koje imaju različite interese. Problem je kako doći
do koncepcije ciljeva koji bi bili objektivni i po mogućstvu
opšte-ljudski? Teorijski gledano, izbor bi mogao biti u formulisanju
nekih etičkih principa, koji po definiciji treba da imaju univerzalno
ljudski karakter. Pošto je etičko ono što je već po pretpostavci
univerzalno ljudsko.
Filozofija treba da bude u stanju da formuliše takve principe, ali
filozofija ima raznih. Svaka posebna filozofska škola, svaki pravac
imaće svoju teoriju etike i bar za nijansu različite formulacije tih
etičkih principa. Naravno, da bi medjusobno te razne škole i pravci
mogli da imaju dijalog i putem tog dijaloga doći do istine o onim
etičkim principima koji su zaista objektivni i univerzalni. To je tako
- teorijski gledano. Praktički gledano, moglo bi se poći od dijaloga
koji su već obavljeni i od saglasnosti koja je već postignuta u
načelima koja treba da regulišu društveni život. S te strane je
dragoceno postojanje Povelje o ljudskim pravima organizacije UN iz
1948. godine, dve konvencije o ljudskim pravima iz 1966. g., od kojih
je jedna politička a druga socijalnoekonomska. Tu je obavljen veoma
ozbiljan dijalog medju stranama različitih ideologija, različitih
političkih shvatanja koji su došli do saglasnosti oko osnovnih ljudskih
prava, ljudskih potreba.
Naravno, koncepcija ljudskih prava nosi u sebi univerzalne ljudske
vrednosti iz kojih slede etički principi, a samim tim objektivni
sveopšti ciljevi društvenog razvoja.
Već u preambuli Povelje, kaže se da je najviša težnja svakog čoveka -
stvaranje sveta u kome će ljudsko biće uživati slobodu govora i
uverenja kao i slobodu od straha i nestašice. U prvom članu Povelje
kaže se da se sva ljudska bića radjaju slobodna, jednaka u dostojanstvu
i pravima. Član drugi utvrdjuje da ne sme biti nikakve diskriminacije u
pogledu rase, boje kože, pola, jezika, religije, političkog ili drugog
mišljenja, nacionalnog ili drugog porekla, rodjenja itd. Zatim se u
članovima 9, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27 precizira o kojim vrstama
slobode je reč. Garantuje se sloboda kretanja, stanovanja, sloboda
mišljenja i izražavanja, sloboda mirnog zbora i udruživanja, sloboda
učestvovanja u upravljanju svojom zemljom. Garantuje se, zatim, sloboda
biranja svojih predstavnika, sloboda izbora zaposlenja, pravo na rad,
sloboda učešća u kulturnom životu zajednice, sloboda razvoja svoje
ličnosti. U svim ovim članovima Povelje, prisutna je sloboda kao
temeljna ljudska vrednost i kao etički princip, i to sloboda u daleko
širem smislu nego što je usko liberalistički shvaćena politička
sloboda, predstavnička demokratija kao društveni cilj. Reč je i o
ekonomskoj slobodi. Garantuje se pravo na rad, pravo na izbor
zanimanja, na posedovanje imovine, učešće u upravljanju. Tu je reč i o
kulturnoj slobodi, slobodi uverenja, slobodi saopštavanja svojih ideja,
pravu na školovanje, pravu na slobodno učestvovanje u kulturnom životu
zajednice. U osnovi svih tih sloboda nalazi se svestrana emancipacija
ličnosti.
Prema tome, u ovako bogatom, višedimenzionalnom smislu termina sloboda,
temeljni cilj društvenog razvoja jeste svestrani, slobodni razvoj
svakog čoveka.
Druga bitna univerzalna vrednost koja prožima celu Povelju je
jednakost, razume se ne u vulgarnom smislu jednakih stomaka ili
jednakih zarada za sve. Član prvi govori o jednakosti u dostojanstvima
i pravima. Ćlan sedmi o jednakosti pred zakonom, o podjednakoj zaštiti
protiv bilo kakve diskriminacije, o jednakom pravu na socijalnu
sigurnost, daleko šire nego jednakost u pravu na rad.. Garantuju se
pravični i povoljni uslovi rada i pravo na jednaku platu za jednak rad,
pravo na osiguranje u slučaju nesposobnosti, bolesti ili
onesposobljenja. Dalje, pravo na pravičnu nagradu koja radniku i
njegovoj porodici obezbedjuje egzistenciju koja odgovara ljudskom
dostojanstvu. Najzad, potvrdjuje se pravo na socijalnu zaštitu.
Prema tome, druga osnovna vrednost i univerzalni etnički princip jeste
jednakost koja ne treba da bude shvaćena kao apsolutno identifikovanje
nesumnjivo različitih pojedinaca, već kao jednakost pred zakonom i
jednakost nekih bitnih preduslova života, već prema dostignutom stepenu
razvoja zajednice.
Prema tome, ciljevi društvenog razvoja moraju biti i društvena pravda,
solidarnost, socijalna sigurnost, odnosno obezbedjenje nekog minimalnog
nivoa zadovoljavanja materijalnih i kulturnih potreba svih članova
zajednice, što naravno, ne negira mogućnost da neki posebno sposobni,
posebno kreativni pojedinci mogu da se uzdignu iznad tog nivoa.
U odnosu na ove temeljne vrednosti, nalaze se instrumentalne vrednosti,
posebno ekonomske, političke, kulturne. U tom smislu su recimo
ekonomski ciljevi: zadovoljavajući privredni rast, porast životnog
standarda, efikasna organizacija proizvodnje, pravična raspodela
proizvoda, puna zaposlenost, zaštita prirodne sredine, smanjenje dužine
radnog vremena. U Povelji o ljudskim pravima izričito piše da se mora
ograničavati dužina radnog vremena, a po meri povećanja produktivnosti
rada i smanjivati. Posebni politički ciljevi društvenog razvoja jesu
državna suverenost, vladavina prava, razvoj demokratskih institucija,
ravnopravnost političkih organizacija, podela vlasti, sloboda medija
javne komunikacije. Posebni kulturni ciljevi jesu maksimalno moguća
društvena podrška obrazovanju naučnom i kulturnom stvaralaštvu,
održanje ravnoteže nacionalne tradicije i globalne modernizacije,
svestrano razvijanje kulturnih institucija, ograničenje odliva mozgova
odgovarajućim materijalnim i kulturnim stimullansima itd.
Većina ovih ciljeva društvenog razvoja, nespojiva je sa politikom koja
se u našoj zemlji vodi poslednjih godina, bilo pod pritiskom
spoljašnjih činilaca, ili usled domaćih ideoloških zabluda. Tako pre
svega, nije moguća emancipacija ličnosti i demokratizacija javnog
života, ako, pre svega, postoji monopol moći jedne posebne političke
grupacije što je bila situacija i pre 2000.-te godine, a još gore, još
drastičnije, u poslednje vreme.
Drugo, ne postoji mogućnost neke demokratizacije ako se ne poštuje
izborna volja gradjana, bilo kradjom izbora ili ovim što se u poslednje
vreme dogadja; nasilnim oduzimanjem mandata jednim političkim partijama
i davanjem tih mandata drugim. Zatim, nemoguća je neka dalja
demokratizacija ako izvršna vlast dominira nad zakonodavnom i sudskom,
umesto da se one zadrže u neophodnoj ravnoteži u podeli vlasti. Zatim
nemoguća je dalja demokratizacija ako bilo koja organizacija ima
monopol na masovne medije. Isto tako, ako se na čelu mnogih preduzeća i
ustanova nalaze nekompetentni ljudi, postavljeni spoljnim, političkim
pritiskom (preko tzv. kriznih štabova), ili ako se tzv. "lustracijom"
(koja se ne samo sprema, već i sprovodi i koja je slična nekadašnjim
merilima moralno političke podobnosti) uklanjaju iz javnog života
pripadnici protivničkih političkih grupacija.
Nemoguće je kretati se ka nekoj demokratiji, ako se promenom krivičnih
zakona daju prevelika ovlašćenja policiji i tužilaštvu, tako se
politički produžava vanredno stanje i onda kada ono bude formalno
ukinuto i na taj način borba protiv organizovanog kriminala se pretvara
u obračun s političkom opozicijom.
S druge strane, u strategiju društvenog razvoja sadašnje vlasti,
sadašnjeg našeg društva, ne može biti ugradjen ni drugi temeljni cilj,
ostvarenje društvene pravde, solidarnosti i socijalne sigurnosti, jer
svi procesi idu u suprotnom pravcu. Prvo drastično se povećavaju
socijalne razlike, jer rastu razlike u prihodima pojedinaca i pojedinih
grupa gradjana. Rasprodajom društvene imovine ekspropišu se radnici
koji su je svojim radom stvorili dok se na drugoj strani stvara sloj
krupnih profitera, po modelu ranog kapitalizma 19 veka. Povećava se
nezaposlenost uz nedovoljne mere socijalne zaštite. Zatim, kao u
kapitalizmu od pre jednog veka, vlada ne preuzima nikakvu odgovornost
za proizvodnju i za njen stabilni rast. To, navodno, uopšte nije njen
posao. Privreda je u alarmantnoj stagnaciji, a nema uopšte vidljivih
napora da se ta stagnacija prevazidje.
Zatim, raste jaz izmedju uvoza i izvoza, zemlja se sve više zadužuje,
iako je imala vrlo loše iskustva sa preteranim stranim kreditima. Ranih
80-tih godina je po izjavi tadašnjeg predsednika Savezne vlade Mikulića
zemlja uzela 22 milijarde dolara kredita, platila za kamate 30
milijardi i ostalo joj je duga 20 milijardi. Za 30 milijardi kamata je
smanjila dug za dve milijarde.
I što je najtragičnije, zemlja je izgubila veliki deo državnog
suvereniteta i ne postoji mogućnost da se povede bilo kakva samostalna
razvojna politika koja bi pokušala da demobiliše sopstvene snage za
izlaz iz ogromnih rastućih teškoća.
Naše društvo svojim zakonima i svojom praksom protivreči osnovnim
principima koji su uloženi u Povelju o qudskim pravima Organizacije UN.
U takvoj situaciji može se raspravljati o teoriji razvoja, može se
praviti strategija razvoja o pretpostavkama koje realno kod nas sada ne
postoje, ali je iluzorno razgovarati o strategiji razvoja društva
onakvog kakvo postoji u Srbiji, aprila 2003. godine.
=== 11 ===
Mirela Beloševic: SIVO TRŽIŠTE
infograf@...
Beograd, 5. april 2003. godine
U Srbiji 800 000 ljudi "jedva sastavlja kraj s krajem cesto na racun
neredovne ishrane" izjavila ja Gordana Matkovic srpski ministar za
socijalna pitanja na konferenciji "Politika smanjenja siromaštva" koji
je u Centru "Sava" organizovao Centar za liberalno-demokratske studije.
Ako bi se granica u odredjivanju siromaštva pomerila za 10 odsto
naviše, sa sadšnjih 4.500 dinara mesecno po odraslom clanu domacinstva
taj broj bi porastao na milion i 600 000 gradjana. Socijalnu pomoc na
osnovu zakona prima 35 000 porodica, a 15 000 porodica dobija pomoc
koja je obezbedjena donacijama i sama ministarka je ocenila da je to
"veoma mali broj ljudi". Deciji dodatak prima 500 000 dece odnosno
svako trece dete u Srbiji. Deset odsto gradjana je ekstremno siromašno.
Narodne kuhinje funkcionisace do 31 marta na osnovu pomoci
medjunarodnog crvenog krsta a onda cemo morati da se oslonimo na
sopstvene snage, što znaci da ce morati da se ukljuce lokalni donatori.
Ministarka je ocenila da je u sistemu socijalne zaštite loše što je taj
sistem koncipiran tako da se pomoc vezuje za prosek zarada u opštinama,
pa je zbog toga u siromašnim opštinama socijalna pomoc manja nego u
onim bogatijim. Od 2000 - te godine smanjeni su zaostaci u socijalnim
davanjima. Ministarka je najavila je da ce se usvajanjem strategije za
borbu protiv siromaštva rešiti nepovezanost izmedju delova sistema za
socijalnu zaštitu.Boško Mijatovic iz Centra za liberalno-demokratske
studije predložio je da se socijalna pomoc i deciji dodatak objedine u
"porodicni dodatak". Po njegovim recima država bi ubuduce trebalo da
pomaže samo one koji nisu u stanju da se brinu o sebi. Boris Begovic,
potpredsednik Centra za liberalno-demokratske studije je rekao da bi
zakonima trebalo smanjiti socijalne zahteve investitorima , jer takvi
zahtevi usporavaju proces privatizacije.
Na sve ove brojeve i konstatcije treba dodati da 30 odsto ljudi u
Srbiji živi iskljucivo od sivog tržišta.
Prema recima Tomislava Milenkovica iz Instituta za tržišna
istraživanja, u Srbiji 60 odsto zaposlenih prima plate manje od
republickog proseka (za januar 9.468 dinara). Taj sloj ne može da
podmiri potrebe ni egzistencijalnog minumuma cetvoroclanog domacinstva
koji je u januaru bio 13 000 dinara. Ako se ima u vidu da više ljudi
ostaje bez posla, pa u porodici više nisu zaposlena 2 vec samo jedan
clan, jasno je da je više onih koji pokušavaju da se snadju na sivom
tržištu. U januaru je bilo nezaposleno 923 000 lica dok od ukupnog
broja zaposlenih u Srbiji, plate nije primilo oko 262 000 ljudi (25
odsto zaposlenih). Ukoliko se zbroje svi koji žive bez prihoda, iz samo
dve pomenute kategorije, dolazi se do podtaka da je oko 1,2 miliona
ljudi upuceno na bilo kakav rad da bi opstali. Ko danas dobro živi, bez
materijalnih trzavica? Ratnih profitera nema u statistici ali zato
statistika kaže da 9,8 odsto od ukupnog broja zaposlenih ima zarade
koje premašuju 17.795 dinara, 24,4 odsto ima primanja od 11 800 do 17
800 i kad se to sabere jedna trecina stanovništva ne kuburi sa
podmirivanjem troškova. 10 odsto živi u teškom siromaštvu i potrebna im
je pomoc države. Pokazalo se da je ispravljanje cenovnih dispariteta
ipak bilo udar na standard. Skica za sliku tranzicionog pregrupisavanja
našeg društva: bogati ne pitaju koliko šta košta, porodice sa školskom
decom se dovijaju da prežive a penzioneri uredno placaju racune, kupuju
hleb i mleko.
Analiza ekonomskog instituta koja je radjena na osnovu ankete u 350
preduzeca, pre ubistva premijera, pokazuje optimizam privrednika a na
osnovu toga sto raste iskorišcenost kapaciteta i ima zaliha za
optimalno poslovanje. Kao najveci ogranicavajuci faktor privrednici su
naveli nedostatak sirovina, slabu tražnju i manjak kredita.
Makroekonomski sistem prema dr Neobojši Savicu karakterišu stabilne
cene, rast industrijske proizvodnje, monetarna restrikcija i rast plata.
Prema najnovijim podacima Ministarstva za trgovinu i turizam u Vladi
Srbije za pokrice minimalne potrošacke korpe u februaru trebalo je
izdvojiti 10.531 dinara, ili 1,02 prosecne zarade, a za prosecnu,
takozvanu proširenu korpu 17.010 dinara, odnosno 1,64 srpskih plata. U
poredjenju sa prethodnim mesecom, obe korpe ukazuju na neznatan porast
kupovne moci stanovništva, i to kod minimlne za 0,08 odsto ili 88
dinara, a prosecne za 0,15 odsto. Prosecna zarada zaposlenih u februaru
u Srbiji iznosila je 10.367 dinara i veca je za 9,5 odsto u odnosu na
januar, medjutim još je niža u odnosu na decembar prošle godine za 10,3
odsto. U prošlom mesecu povecan je broj isplacenih radnika u odnosu na
januar za 34 hiljade, a smanjen broj onih zaposlenih koji nisu primili
platu što se pozitivno odrazilo na standard. Oko 13,6 odsto radnika
primilo je polovinu prosecne zarade, 41,5 njih je dobilo izmedju 50 i
100 odsto plate, 33 odsto je dobilo do 150 procenata zarade a 11,9
odsto i vise od toga. Republicki ministar za trgovinu je na
konferenciji za novinare rekao da ostvarena kupovna moc pokazuje ponovo
povoljan trend, nakon odredjenog pogoršanja zbog januarskog pada
prosecne zarade.
U obe korpe izdaci za komunalije su veci za 67 dinara jer je nedavno
znacajno poskupela voda, otpadne vode i iznošenje smeca.
U minimalnoj korpi 63 odsto izdataka "ide" na hranu i pice, 27,5 odsto
na komunalije, PTT, saobracaj i struju a 9,4 odsto na neprehrambene
artikle.
Cene na malo posmatrano februar- januar u Srbiji porasle su za 0,6
odsto, koliko iznosi i rast troškova života, pri cemu ukupan rast cena
na malo od pocetka godine je 1,5 odsto, a troškovi života jedan odsto.
Poredjenjem kolicine proizvoda koju su gradjani mogli da kupe za
prosecnu platu februara 2002. i sada pokazuju da su im za recimo
frizider bile potrebne dve prosecne plate a sada 1,5. Kada je u pitanju
hrana, u isto vreme prošle godine za prosecnu platu moglo je da se
pazari 37 kilograma svinjetine a sada 52 kilograma.
Statistika je uporedjivala i zarade u 15 gradova Srbije. Više od
proseka zabeleženo je u Pancevu, Novom Sadu, Beogradu, Subotici, dok su
najslabije zarade registrovane u Uzicu, Smederevu, Valjevu...
=== 12 ===
Mirela Beloševic: AUKCIJE
infograf@...
Beograd, 21. mart 2003. god.
Od prodaje na aukciji u Privrednoj komori Srbije i Crne Gore državna
kasa prihodovace 458,737.000 dinara pod uslovom da svi kupci ispune
svoje obaveze i plate iznose koje su preuzeli. Po pocetnoj ceni prodato
je devet preduzeca. Najvišu cenu dostigao je ''Jugoagent'' iz Beograda
koji je za 151 milion dinara prodat konzorcijumu iz dijaspore, a
pocetna cena je bila 15,8 miliona dinara. Za clanove ovog konzorcijuma
je, kako kažu, narocito povoljna organizacija transporta sada kad je
Dunav otvoren za plovidbu. Za ovu firmu nadmetalo se 6 ucesnika.
Preduzece ima 113 zaposlenih i oko 1.000 kvadratnih metara prostora.
Protest zbog prodaje ovog preduzeca uložili su predstavnici sindikata i
penzionera te firme. Prema njihovim recima , prodajom ove firme nije
priznat kapital ranijih akcionara pošto je ova kompanija postala
akcionarsko društvo 1998. godine. Ova grupa predstavnika sindikata
istce da "Jugoagent" ima mnogo vrednije nekretnine u inostranstvu i
republikama bivše SFRJ.
Preduzece ''Seme'' iz Beograda prodato je za 132,000.000 dinara firmi
Astra simit, koje je u sastavu Kompanije "Braca Karic". U konkurenciji
dva ucesnika pocetna cena od oko 59 miliona dinara uvecana je na 132
miliona dinara. "Seme" zapošljava132 radnika, a u vlasništvu ima
dvadesetak prodavnica u Beogradu, poslovnu zgradu i magacine. Medjutim,
zbog lošag poslovanja radnici nisu primali plate nekoliko meseci.
Vlasnik trgovinskog preduzeca ''Perper'', Slobodan Jankovic proširio je
svoje kapacitete kupovinom "Rul-a" iz Leskovca za 22,733.000 dinara.
"Rul" proizvodi lustere, punjace za akumulatore i drugo, zapošljava 330
radnika, ali ima gubitke od 4o miliona dinara. Prema recima novog
vlasnika ocekuju ih novi poslovi i saradnja sa poznatom firmom "Ikea".
"Sokogradnja" iz Sokobanje prodata je za 4,000.000 dinara dvoclanom
konzorcijumu iz unutrašnjosti dok je" Ineks-trešnjica" iz Požege , koja
u svom sastavu ima jedan hotel i dva restorana prodata za 7,665.000
dinara. Prodat je "Adriakop" iz Šapca,"Gaj" iz Panceva, preduzece koje
se bavi proizvodnjom madraca za 5,100.000. Firma" Prvi maj" iz Raške
koja se bavi prozvodnjom hleba i peciva dostigla je cenu 11,200.000
dinara a "Metalac" iz Beograd 16,600.000. Trgovinsko preduzece
"Elektronabava" iz Beograda prodato je za obveznice devizne štednje u
iznosu od 954.000 dinara-pocetna cena od 50.000 dinara uvecana je 128
puta. Restorani iz Vršca prodati su za 23,361.000 dinara firmi "Mladost
turist" za obveznice stare devizne štednje. Restorani su pripadali
preduzecu "Srbija" a za njih je bila zainteresovana samo direktorka
marketinga hotela "Mladost turist" koja je predstavljala konzorcijum od
oko stotinu radnika koji su se udružili i kupili hotel sa 80 soba,
cetiri restorana a sve ukupno na oko 10.000 kvadrata , sa 85
zaposlenih...
Najinteresantniji primer u ovoj, a moglo bi se reci i u svim dosadšnjim
prodajama, je slucaj Rodoljuba Cojica koji je kupio "Moravateks" iz
Žitkovca, a zajedno sa fabrikom za proizvodnju rublja za domacinstvo
dobio i nalazište mineralne vode. "Moravateks" je sagradjen na parceli
ispod koje je izvorište mineralne vode. Zbog toga je bio spreman da
fabriku plati mnogo više od procenjene vrednosti od 2,1 milion dinara,
ali je kao jedini kupac prihvatio pocetnu cenu. Prema recima novog
vlasnika, on ima svoju firmu koja se od 1983.godine bavi geološkim
istraživanjima, te je tako i otkrio ispod "Moravateksa" veliko
nalazište mineralne vode i to sa malim procentom minerala, što znaci da
ce moci da je piju i bebe. U avgustu 2002. godine od Ministarstva za
rudarstvo i energetiku dobio je dozvolu za eksploataciju. Logicno je
onda upitati se šta ce biti sa 47 radnika do sad zaposlenih u
"Moravateksu"? Novi vlasnik obecava da nece rušiti fabriku, bar ne u
naredne dve godine,na koliko je i zakonom obavezan, a toliko mu je
vreme i potrebno da bi postavio uredjaje za eksploataciju mineralne
vode. Za jedanaest preduzeca medju kojima je i Radio B 92 aukcija je
odložena. Nova aukcija zakazana je za 7.april, a po prvi put je ucešce
potencijalnih kupaca na aukciji uslovljeno time da se na licitaciji
mogu prijaviti samo pravna i fizicka lica iz iste branše.
Pre izvesnog vremena bila je neuspela prodaja preduzeca "Dragan
Markovic" iz Obrenovca. Niko nije bio zainteresovan a sama farma nema
mogucnosti da životinjama obezbedi hranu. Životinje su izgladnele,
krave daju samo deset litara mleka. Srecni su kada obezbede životinjama
hranu za taj dan i to po sistemu iz srednjeg veka, razmenjuju životinje
za hranu. Inace cena svinjskog mesa je opala i ocekuje se da Robne
rezerve otkupe izvesnu kolicinu mesa. Medjutim dok se obavi
administrativna procedura otkup ce biti prilicno zakasnela mera.
Nedavno je i fabrika smrznute hrane i sladoleda "Frikom" prodata
hrvatskom koncernu "Agrokoru" koji je raspisao oglas za sva direktorska
mesta i šefove prodajnih mesta. Domaci menadžeri na to nisu navikli.
Prema recima sadašnjeg direktora novi vlasnik je formirao novu
skupštinu i Upravni odbor pa želi da proveri da li je moguc izbor nove
menadžerske ekipe. Planiraju da ojacaju prodajnu mrežu zašta ranije
nije bilo para. Bice otvoreni i novi distributivni centri pa ce
povecati i broj zaposlenih. U oglasu za direktorska mesta navodi se da
kandidati "moraju biti skloni neprekidnom ucenju i usavršavanju".
Hrvatski vlasnik želi da proveri da li ce prijavljeni kandidati biti
kvalitetniji od nasledjenih. Kad bude izabran direktor , on ce birati
svoj tim. Po "Agrokorovoj" koncepciji menadžerski tim ce ciniti šest a
ne kao do sada pet direktora. Ovi poslovi bi najverovatnije trebalo da
budu gotovi do pocetka sezone. Sa "Agrokorom" je dogovoreno da naš
sladoled, pod našom robnom markom ide na hrvatsko tržište, kao i povrce
i lisnata testa, pa ce prvi kontigent robe u kome je povrce krenuti
uskoro u njihove trgovine. Na taj nacin ce se izbeci posrednici jer je
"Agrokor" vec kupovao robu za svoju maloprodajnu mrežu. "Frikom" ce od
ove hrvatske firme kupovati smrznutu ribu. Da potsetimo "Agrokor" je
kupujuci "Frikom" pristao da vrati dug koji potice od pre nekoliko
godina kada je "Frikom" investirao u novu hladnjacu i pozajmio novac od
Kapital banke i Beobanke. U toku su pregovori oko nacina vracanja ovih
para.
Srpski ministar za privredu i privatizaciju Aleksandar Vlahovic
potvrdio je da je vlasnik kanadske firme "Jukan" privremeno odustao od
investiranja u kragujevacku fabriku "Zastava". Za ulaganje u "Zastava
automobile" zainteresovan je i Malkom Briklin, vlasnik americke
kompanije "Njukarko" sa kojim je Vlada Srbije u oktobru prošle godine
potpisala pismo o namerama koje predvidja da konacni ugovor bude
potpisan od marta ove godine. Briklin radi na finalnoj pripremi
zaokruženja finansijske konstrukcije ugovora sa "Zastavom".
Povodom najave da ce americka kompanija "Ju Es Stil" potpisati ugovor
sa koncernom crne metalurgije "Sartidom", Vlahovic je rekao da to
zavisi od okoncanja stecajnog postupka u toj smederevskoj fabrici.
7. SAVEZ SAMOSTALNIH SINDIKATA SRBIJE "OBJAVIO RAT" VLADI SRBIJE - DO
KONACNE POBEDE... (B. Urosevic / Artel, 5.6.2003)
8. PREZIVLJAVANJE (M. Belosevic / Artel, 1.5.2003)
9. STRATEGIJA RAZVOJA U OTEZANIM USLOVIMA (M. Markovic / Artel,
15.4.2003)
10. KAKO ZIVIMO (M. Belosevic / Artel, 12.4.2003)
11. SIVO TRŽIŠTE (M. Belosevic / Artel, 5.4.2003)
12. AUKCIJE (M. Belosevic / Artel, 21.3.2003)
=== 7 ===
SAVEZ SAMOSTALNIH SINDIKATA SRBIJE
"OBJAVIO RAT" VLADI SRBIJE - DO KONACNE POBEDE...
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/izbor/jugoslavija/2003-06-06_2.html
infograf@...
Borivoje Uroševic
Beograd, 5. juni 2003. godine
Na konferenciji za štampu, održanoj 20. maja 2003. godine predsednik
Sindikata Srbije Milenko Smiljanic je objavio generalni protest radnika
u Srbiji sledecom recenicom : ''Ne možemo više da cekamo da oni na
vlasti i dalje upravljaju našim životima i zbog toga krecemo u akciju''.
Zahtevi kojima se Sindikat obraca Vladi i od kojih nece odustati su
sledeci:
" Da se zaustavi dalje otpuštanje radnika;
" Da se donese program kojim bi se obezbedilo zapošljavanje velikog
broja nezaposlenih;
" Da se hitno utvrdi strategija razvoja Srbije, usvoje socijalni
programi i uspostavi pravi sicijalni dijalog;
" Da se, izmenama modela privatizacije, iz nje iskljuce svi koji
sumnjivim kapitalom peru pare;
" Da se sva prava zaposlenih koja proisticu iz rada regulišu iskljucivo
kolektivnim ugovorima;
" Da se izmire sva dugovanja prema zaposlenima i izvrši povezivanje
njihovog radnog staža;
" Da se odustane od svih povecanja cena koje su u nadležnosti Vlade i
organa lokalne samouprave.
Ukoliko Vlada Srbije u roku od 30 dana ne postigne odgovarajuci
sporazum u dijalogu sa Savezom samostalnih sindikata Srbije i ne uvaži
iznete zahteve, Sindikat ce tražiti njenu ostavku, odnosno smenu i
raspisivanje prevremenih parlamentarnih izbora.
Scenario protesta zamišljen je tako što ce obustave rada i protesti
biti održani po svim vecim gradovima Srbije u odredjene dane a glavni
protest, na kome ce ucestvovati predstavnici radnika iz cele Srbije i
Beograda, održace se 25. juna 2003. godine u Beogradu.
Lepo zamišljeno, ali bojim se, teško ostvarivo.Suviše dugo se cekalo da
se stvori ''kriticna masa'' i da se izadje na ulice. Privreda više ne
radi, radnici su izgubili nadu i samopouzdanje i dok totalna glad i
nemaština ne zahvati veliku vecinu stanovništva Srbije, teško da ce se
nešto bitno pokrenuti. Samo, tada nece trebati sndikati da ih
organizuju.
Vanredno stanje, koje je u Srbiji bilo uvedeno posle ubistva premijera,
i represija vlasti prema desetinama hiljada privedenih i uhapšenih, da
bi konacno sudjenje bilo odredjeno za njih oko 40 - tak, stvorilo je
strah i nepoverenje kod gradjana. Teško ih je sada pokrenuti jer oni
koji imaju nešto ( a i to nešto je ustvari ništa ) boje se da ce ostati
i bez toga i ne bi da se javno konfrontiraju.
Ne želim da budem prorok, izaci cu na protest, ali se bojim da cemo
proci kao prilikom protesta oko Zakona o radu. A sve je, ustvari, od
toga pocelo da ide nizbrdo.
Vizija rukovodstva Sindikata Srbije i predsednika Milenka Smiljanica za
buducnost radnickog pokreta je skoro osnivanje ''Nacionalnog radnickog
konzorcijuma sa ciljem da se u privatizaciji, putem insajderske
prodaje, spreci da preduzeca odlaze u bezcenje i da ih kupuje sumnjivi
kapital. Ocekuje se da ce Konzorcijumu pristupiti sto hiljada radnika
koji ce u narednih šest godina uplatiti od 100 do 3000 evra
pojedinacno, cime ce stvoriti kapital od 50 do 100 miliona evra''.
U situaciji kada porodice radnika u Srbiji ''žive'' od mesecnih
primanja od oko 100 evra, utopija je ocekivati da ce imati da odvoje
planiranu sumu od 100 do 3000 evra, mada je ideja dobra, ali je za sada
na ''dugom štapu''.
Parola pod kojom ce se održavati protesti je : ''Za spas radništva i
privrede Srbije''.
Nasuprot analizama Sindikata i ponižavajuceg stanja velike vecine
porodica u Srbiji, zvanican izveštaj Saveznog zavoda za statistiku
govori : NEZNATNA POSKUPLJENJA U MAJU 2003. GODINE.
''Cene na malo u maju više su za 0,5 odsto od aprilskih a za 13,4 odsto
više u odnosu na maj 2002. godine''. Iz ovog izveštaja takodje vidimo
da su troškovi života u odnosu na april 2003. povecani za smo 0,4 odsto
a u poredjanju sa decembrom 2002. godine za 2,6 odsto.
Dalje se kaže da su najviše poskupeli poljoprivredni proizvodi (
ishrana ) pice i industrijski neprehrambeni proizvodi. Statistika dalje
kaže da su cene indusrijsko-prehrembenih proizvoda u maju, cak, bile
niže za 0,2 odsto u odnosu na april i da su tome doprinele niže cene
svežeg mesa i pojedinih mesnih preradjevina kao i svežeg preradjenog
mleka i masnoca.
A šta statistika ne kaže, a šta se ustvari dogodilo ?! Prekomernim
uvozom mesa, mesnih preradjevina i mleka ''ubijena'' je cena domacih
proizvoda, desetkovan je stocni fond, poskupeo je kukuruz, suša
najavljuje loš prinos ove jeseni i šta nas ceka u buducnosti ? Bez
stocnog fonda nema ni mesa, ni mleka, ni mesnih preradjevina...
Ministar poljoprivrede je podneo ostavku, ali ne zbog loše vodjene
politike u agraru ( što je bilo evidentno odavno ) vec zbog tragicnog
saobracajnog incidenta u sred Beograda, u kome je ucestvovalo njegovo
vozilo i vozac i kome je i on prisustvovao.
Statistika je zaboravila još da nam kaže da nisu možda drasticno
pojeftinile u maju mesecu lokomotive, turbine za elektrane i slicno, pa
nam je prosek tako dobar i za hvaljenje.
Šta li nas još ceka od ove ekspertske Vlade ?
I za kraj, ili umesto zakljucka, koji ostavljam Vama koji cete ovo
citati, želim da kažem da iskreno podržavam proteste u koje krecemo
ovog juna. Nešto mora ozbiljno da se dogodi da bi se promenilo na
bolje. Hoce li to biti ovoga puta vodecemo uskoro.
=== 8 ===
Mirela Beloševic: Prezivljavanje
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/izbor/jugoslavija/2003-05-02.html
infograf@...
Beograd, 1. maj 2003. godine
Kada su Milicu Petrovic pitali kako spaja kraj s krajem uz primanja od
5000 dinara jednostavno je odgovorila da ne zna. Mnogo je onih cija
primanja su tolika da se zapitate kako ti ljudi uspevaju da potroše
makar i samo deset hiljada dinara za hranu, plate racune, kupe lekove.
Snalaze se, a to znaci po dva posla, bar jedan u domenu sivog trzista i
možda neka pomoc sa sela. Živi se u zejdnickim domacinstvima u kojima
roditelji pomažu decu a cesto i deca roditelje. To je život ili tacnije
preživljavanje. Medjutim statisticari bi to okarakterisali kao
subjektivni utisak. Kažu, teško je od prosecnog coveka ocekivati da
realno proceni da li živi bolje ili lošije nego pre godinu dana jer to
zavisi i od ocekivanja i uporedjivanja da li su drugi u ovom periodu
materijalno bolje prošli. Analize trgovaca pokazuju da se dnevno troši
170 do 190 dinara, ili oko 2 ipo evra, a pri tom treba imati u vidu da
naši ljudi niti mogu, niti imaju naviku da idu u velike mesecne
nabavke. Ako se posmatraju mesecni troškovi, u aprilu smo recimo mogli
da kupimo pola kilograma viršli više nego u martu a to baš i nije u
skladu sa našim ocekivanjima. Zvanicna statistika kasni i prema
njihovim podacima neto plata u Srbiji bila je manja u martu za 2,3
odsto u odnosu na februar, a smanjenje zarada uticace i da penzije budu
manje za drugo tromesecje ove godine.
Prema istraživanjima Stratedžik Marketinga jedna trecina stanovništva
pokazuje veliko nezadovoljstvo ali to su subjektivne procene koje se ne
uzimaju u obzir u pravljenju strategije borbe protiv siromaštva, ali bi
ih trebalo uzeti u obzir u strategiji politickog nastupa. Objektivni
pokazatelji ukazuju da ima 10 odsto siromacnih. Pri tom ima mnogo
ugroženih a granica izmedju ove dve kategorije je tanka pa bi ovaj
procenat mogao biti i veci. U svim zemljama u tranziciji osnovni
zadatak je rad na strategiji borbe protiv siromaštva, s tim što u
principu postoje dva puta. Jedan je da se tacno definiše ko ne može bez
pomoci države i da im se onda pomaže, ali uz povratnu informaciju da li
je pomoc otišla u prave ruke. Druga mogucnost zahteva više novca za
ulaganje u privredni razvoj i time se naravno postiže dugorocno bolji
efekat. Koji put ce izabrati naši stratezi još ne znamo.
Sa rastom industrijske proizvodnje se baš ne mozemo pohvaliti. Fizicki
obim industrijske proizvodnje u martu veci je nego u februaru za 7,4
odsto ali je lošiji od prošlogodisnjeg martovskog bilansa. Strani
analiticari imaju obicaj da kažu da koliko radimo-dobro i živimo. Prema
proizvodnji mi zasluzujemo platu manju i od 140 evra. Kada dodju kod
nas i pogledaju pokazatelje proizvodnje zakljuce da je naša ekonomija
mrtva a onda s druge strane, kad izadju na ulicu i vide 5000 kafana u
Beogradu koje su pune tokom celog dana ostaju u najmanju ruku šokirani.
U odnosu na druge evropske gradove, gde su saobracajne gužve u vreme
dolaska i odlaska sa posla, kod nas je gužva uvek. Narod se negde
krece, obavlja neke poslove, snalazi se. Kada je onemogucen rad na
crnom trzistu cigareta i nafte 100000 ljudi koji su se time bavili se
odjednom preselilo u neke druge sektore i niko ne zna gde. U sferi
crnog tržista još radi 700000 ljudi. Mnogo je medju njima onih koji se
bave svim i svacim da bi preziveli jer izgubiti posao kod nas ne znaci
i brzo naci drugi.
Srednji sloj, koji su cinili polticki uticajni intelektualci, nestao je
devedestih godina. Cinilo ga je 15 do 20 odsto stanovnistva. Sada se
takodje oformio srednji sloj u istom procentu ali to više nisu
intelektualci. U Srbiji ima 60 do 80 hiljada registrovanih preduzeca i
200000 zanatskih radnji a oni koji žive od njihovog privredjivanja sada
cine srednji sloj.
Osecamo se siromašni i zato što pored sebe gledamo one koji su se
obogatili, u najmanju ruku, na cudne nacine. Zato bi borba sa
privrednim kriminalom znacila bar u psihološkom smislu, da ne gledaš
lopova pored sebe. Dugorocno, znacilo bi to i povratak investiranja u
Srbiju. Medjutim ne treba se zavaravati da ce borba biti laka. Manje
opasna možda, ali jednostavna ni malo. Oni koji su najviše zaradili
imali su i finansijske mogucnosti da plate najbolje knjigovodje tako da
prema njihovim poslovnim knjigama sve može izgledati po zakonu.
Nedostaju nam i instrumenti borbe. Poreski broj smo skoro uveli,
fiskalne kase tek pocinju da se primenjuju a još nemamo porez na dodanu
vrednost. Ocekivanja u narodu su vec porasla zbog obecanja politicara,
ali ne treba se mnogo nadati. Pomak u borbi sa privrednim kriminalom bi
medjutim bio važan, kao što rekosmo ako ni zbog cega drugog onda zbog
psiholoških razloga.
KAKO SACUVATI PROIZVODNJU OD PREKOMERNOG UVOZA
Mlekare u poslednje vreme ne otkupljuju mleko jedan ili dva dana u
nedelji. Takodje prave selekciju i otkupljuju ga uglavnom od velikih,
takozvanih robnih proizvodjaca. Bilo bi lako slegnuti ramenima uz
komentar da su to cudi trzišta, odnosno ponude i potražnje. Da li su
jedino mali proizvodjaci zabrinuti zato što im mleko nije otkupljeno
ili i sve ostale treba da brine što ce posledica verovatno biti manje
krava muzara. Sada ih umesto milion, koliko ih je donedavno bilo, ima
oko 700000. Uobicajeno je da se višak mleka javlja leti pa zato i
pitanje zašto je ove godine višak "poranio". U magacinima ima 680 tona
mleka u prahu, 670 tona maslaca i oko 435 tona sireva. Kako proizvodnja
nije povecana, utisak je da je višak nastao zbog preteranog uvoza.
Prošlogodisnji uvoz mleka i mlecnih preradjevina bio je u vrednosti od
desetak miliona dolara a u prva dva meseca ove godine vrednost uvoza je
milion dolara. Dobra vest je da je iz ministarstva poljoprivrede i
trgovine stigao predlog da se povecaju uvozne takse za mleko i mlecne
proizvode od 20 do 100 odsto. U ministarstvu trgovine kažu da ce se o
tome odlucivati ovih dana. Višak mleka za sad robne rezerve nece
otkupljivati pa bi rešenje bilo povecana potrošnja, ili izvoz. Naša
komisija obišla je mlekare i utvrdila da su najbliži zahtevima Evropske
Unije, Imlek i Suboticka mlekara. Predlozi se šalju, pa onda dolazi
komisija Evropske Unije i to može biti za nedelju ali i za godinu dana.
Do tad naša trzišta su Hrvatska, Bosna i Hercegovina i Makedonija.
Povecanje potrošnje na domacem trzištu kažu proizvodjaci ne moze se
ocekivati dok god je kilogram svinjskog buta jeftiniji od kilograma
sira. Zato je potrebno da se ukine porez na promet tvrdih sireva.
MONOPOLIZACIJA TRGOVINE U BEOGRADU
U Beogradu su do nedavno bile dva velika trgovinska lanca sa
prehrambenom robom C market i Pekabeta. Sad je jedan od tih lanaca
kupio vlasnik Delte, a pri tom je i direktoru drugog lanca predložio da
se udruže u jedan nacionalni lanac. Kako nije naišao na razumevanje
druge strane, kupovao je lokacije i otvarao prodavnice uz vec
razradjene prodavnice konkurencije.Vodi se bitka u kojoj se novinari
pitaju kako ce nastupiti država kada bude prodavala svoje akcije u C
marketu. Ako vlasnik Delte kupi i deonice C marketa doci ce do
monopolizacije trgovine i do smanjenja kokurencije što nikako nije
dobro.Taman smo kao potrošaci poceli da osecamo blagodeti konkurencije
i sad bi to moglo biti uskraceno. No, o tome cemo opširnije pisati
nekom drugom prilikom.
=== 9 ===
Mirela Belosevic: Kako zivimo
http://www.artel.co.yu/glavni_sr/izbor/Jugoslavija/2003-04-13_4.html
infograf@...
Beograd, 12. april 2003. godine
Poslovna klima u nasoj zemlji je u februaru i pocetkom marta ove godine
bila nesto povoljnija u odnosu na prethodni period, ali jos nije
povoljna za inteziviranje privrednih aktivnosti, ocenjeno je u
Institutu za trzisna istrazivanja. U narednom periodu poboljsanju
uslova za privredjivanje u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori doprinece prijem u Savet
Evrope, borba protiv organizovanog kriminala i znacajan pomak u procesu
privatizacije, rekao je direktor IZIT-a Jova Todorovic.
Poboljsanju poslovne klime u februaru i pocetkom marta doprinelo je
blago povecanje industrijske proizvodnje, porast neto zarada,
poboljsanje priliva domacih i stranih porudzbina, jacanje ugovaranja
gradjevinskih poslova, smanjenje spoljnotrgovinskog deficita. Medjutim,
istovremeno je doslo do povecanja broja nezaposlenih. Broj lica koja
traze zaposlenje za 1,6 odsto je veci nego u januaru a 17,9 odsto veci
nego u februaru prosle godine, dok 17 odsto radnika, kojima je
obracunata neto zarada, nisu primili plate. U februaru je zabelezeno
poboljsanje kupovne moci. Prosecna neto zarada u februaru je iznosila
10.367 dinara ili 167 evra, pa su zaposleni imali 16,6 odsto vecu
kupovnu moc nego prosle godine. Prosecna penzija je u februaru iznosila
7.243 dinara ili 117 evra, ali je realna kupovna moc penzionera bila
0,5 odsto manja nego u januaru ove godine i 0,4 odsto manja nego u
februaru prosle godine.
Analiza Ekonomskog instituta pokazuje, na osnovu ankete u 350
privrednih preduzeca da je prisutan optimizam, ali je to obicno tako
posle januarskog pada proizvodnje. Anketa je radjena pre ubistva
premijera i pokazuje da je rasla iskoriscenost kapaciteta a zalihe bile
optimalne za normalnu proizvodnju. Najveca ogranicenja bila su:
nedostatak sirovina, slaba traznja i manjak kredita. Makroekonomsku
sliku pored vec navedenog u Institutu za trzisna istrazivanja, cinila
je stabilnost cena i monetarna restrikcija.
Cene na malo u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori su u martu u odnosu na februar
povecane za 0,4 odsto, dok su troskovi zivota porasli za 0,3 odsto.
Ukoliko ne dodje do poskupljenja nafte i naftinih derivata kretanje
maloprodajnih cena ukazuje da ce godisnja inflacija biti ispod deset
odsto, zakljucili su u Saveznom zavodu za statistiku.
U prvom tromesecju ove godine vrednost dinara je, prema evru, opala za
2,6 odsto, kazu u Institutu ekonomskih nauka. Ukoliko bi se zadrzao taj
tempo na kraju godine dinar bi depresirao 10 odsto, a rast cena bi bio
veci od planiranog ekomskom poltikom, predvidjaju analiticari ovog
instituta. Takvo kretanje bi zadovoljilo izvoznike ali, dugorocno
gledano, time se ne bi obezbedio privredni rast a javili bi se i
problemi otplate spoljnog duga posle 2007. godine.
VECI IZVOZ
Ostvaren je dobar rezultat u izvozu gvozdja, celika i secera pa bi to
mogli da budu glavni domaci artikli za izvoz. Kod izvoza secera jedna
afera bi mogla da ugrozi dobre izvozne rezultate. Naime, mi smo prosle
godine izvezli sav visak secera zato sto smo dobili izuzetno povoljne
uslove od Evropske Unije. Pred kraj prosle godine i sada, striglo je
upozorenje iz Evropske Unije da nisu zadovoljni kontrolom izvoza iz
nase zemlje. Pojavila se sumnja da je neka od nasih fabrika prepakivala
uvezen secer od trske i prodavala kao secer od secerne repe, ili je
neka od susednih zemalja dosla do nase ambalaze i iskoristila nase
povoljnosti za izvoz. Osnovana je nasa komisija koja bi trebalo u roku
od mesec dana da utvrdi da li je bilo zloupotrebe a takodje i komisija
Evropske Unije ce se baviti ovim problemom. Ono sto je dobro, ovaj
slucaj inicirao je promenu propisa u toj oblasti i vise nece moci
secerane same sebi da daju potvrdu o kvalitetu secera.
JEDAN SASVIM OBICAN PRIMER IZ ZIVOTA
U svim satsitikckim pracenjima zivota obicnih ljudi primecuje se da
ipak najteze spajaju kraj s krajem ljudi sa skolskom decom. Kod nas je,
recimo, obicaj da se kraj srednje, pa i osnovne skole, obelezava tako
sto se u hotelima organizuju maturske veceri. Najjeftinija vecara uz
jedno pice i muziku po osnovcu kosta 535 dinara dok recimo u hotelu
"Hajat" srednjoskolci po osobi moraju da izdvoje od 30 do 35 evra.
Pored toga treba izdvojiti povecu sumu novca za odecu za tu priliku,
frizure i dzeparac.
PRIVATIZACIJA
Pocetkom aprila konzorcijum od 550 zaposlenih kupio je svoje preduzece
po paprenoj ceni. Najvisa cena do sada postignuta na aukcijama,
ostvarena je prilikom aukcije preduzeca "Hidrotehnika
-hidroinzinjering" Beograd. Za ovu graditeljsku firmu koja sada gradi
tri velike brane : kod Valjeva,Vranja i Kursumlije, izlicitirana je
cena od dve milijarde i trista miliona dinara ili oko 38 miliona evra.
Pocetna cena uvecana je 38 puta ali radnici nisu odustali zeleci da
sacuvaju preduzece koje su razvijali vise od pet decenija.
Skupstina akcionara Beogradske industrije piva donela je odluku da
ponudi drzavi da se dug od milijardu i cetirstotine miliona dinara
pretvori u akcije drzave. Ako bi vlada to prihvatila, drzava bi postala
vecinski vlasnik, mogla bi da trazi strateskog partnera i obezbedi
socijalni program. U Srbiji i Crnoj Gori radi 15 pivara sto je previse
za ovako malo trziste, pogotovo sto ima mnogo i uvoznog piva. Zbog
sankcija BIP ima zastarelu tehnologiju. Prosle godine ulozili su sedam
miliona evra u razvoj ali im je potrebno jos 15, pa tako ne postoji
drugi nacin za saniranje njihovih dugova drzavi, osim naravno da odu u
stecaj. Potencijalni investitori zadovoljni su njihovom lokacijom blizu
poslovnog centra Beograda ali otezavajuca okolnost je sto BIP ima vise
programa na razlicitim lokacijama: za proizvodnju slada, vode, sokova
pa im nece probleme resiti samo jedan kupac.
USKLADJIVANJE PROPISA
U toku je uskladjivanje carinskih propisa Srbije i Crne Gore. Jedan od
ciljeva harmonizacije je sprecavanje sive ekonomije. Do sada se
desavalo da se proizvodi uvoze preko Crne Gore gde je niska carinska
tarifa a prodaju u Srbiji sa visom carinskom terifom i tako stice
zarada u domenu sive ekonomije. Najvaznije za nase fabrike je da se
smanji do 5 odsto carinska stopa za repromaterijal. Uskladjivanje
obavljaju eksperti u okviru odredjenih grupacija. Tako je za tekstil to
vec obavljeno a sada se harmonizuju carinske stope za hemiju: lekove,
kozmetiku, djubrivo. Uskladjivanje ne ide bas lako, jer je 95 odsto
industrijske proizvodnje u Srbiji, zato Crnogorci imaju mnogo manje
razloga da visokim carinskim stopama stite svoje finalne proizvode.
DELEGACIJE SRBIJE I CRNE GORE NA ZASEDANJU SVETSKE BANKE I MMF
Prvi put je delegacija drzavne zajednice Srbije i Crne Gore i
delegacija iz dve clanice zajednice, otisla na sastanak Svetske banke i
Medjunarodnog monetarnog fonda . U toku su pregovori o kreditima za
podrsku privatizacije nasih preduzeca i reformu finansijskog i
bankarskog sektora. Rec je o novih 80 miliona dolara kredita u okviru
ranije odobrene sume od 540 miliona dolara na period od tri godine.
Ocekuje se da bord direktora do kraja maja ili pocetkom juna usvoji
kredit. To bi bio snazan signal podrske i verovatno bi zastoj u prilivu
stranih investicija, koji se ocekivao posle ubistva premijera, bio
kraci.
UMESTO ZAKLJUCKA
Ispitivanja javnosti pokazala su veliku podrsku borbi protiv
kriminala.Ono sto obican narod ocekuje jeste i borba protiv privrednog
kriminala. Neslaganja i optuzivanja kao sto je izjava premijera da
Narodna banka Srbije ne postoji dok se ne donese zakon, uznemiravaju ne
samo obicne ljude vec verovatno i strane investitore. Napetost na
liniji Vlada-Narodna banka Srbije pocela je da popusta nakon razgovora
premijera i guvernera Centralne banke. Iako nije bilo zvanicnog
saopstenja , niti komentara Zivkovica i Dinkica, javnost je saznala da
je dogovorena dalja saradnja Vlade i Narodne banke Srbije. Da li
politicari znaju koliko narod prizeljkuje da stranacki interesi ostanu
po strani, dok je zemlja u ovako teskoj situaciji kao sto je nasa?
=== 10 ===
Prof. dr Mihajlo Marković:
Strategija razvoja u otežanim uslovima
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/gost/2003-06-09.html
BEOGRADSKI FORUM ZA SVET RAVNOPRAVNIH
Izlaganje Prof. dr MIHAILA MARKOVIĆA, akademika, člana SANU na okruglom
stlu na temu "Strategija razvoja u otežanim uslovima"
Beograd, 15. aprila 2003. godine
Ja bi se ograničio na temu o ciljevima društvenog razvoja. Pošto svaka
strategija podrazumeva odredjenu koncepciju o ciljevima. Pokušao bih da
pokažem kako se do jedne objektivne i široko prihvaćene koncepcije
ciljeva može doći na osnovu analize nekih medjunarodnih dokumenata, a
onda bih pokazao da je naša sadašnja situacija u potpunoj
protivrečnosti sa svim tim pretpostavkama koje su izložene u
medjunarodnim dokumentima i prema tome mi u ovom času teško možemo
govoriti o strategiji ovog našeg sadašnjeg društva. Možemo govoriti o
teorijskim pitanjima, možemo isto tako govoriti i o strateškim
pitanjima s obzirom na neke pretpostavke koje realno ne postoje kod
nas, ali praktično svaki taj naš razgovor, svaki naš pokušaj ukazivanja
na neku moguću strategiju ovog sadašnjeg društva, pre nego {šo dodje do
nekih bitnih promena, jednostavno nije moguć.
Pre svega bih istakao da strateško mišljenje ne može da se zasniva na
ekstrapolacijama nekih postojećih tendencija i kretanja. Prosto,
automatsko, stihijno, produžavanje nekih datih trendova neumno je i
nedostojno slobodnog mislećeg bića. Ono pogotovo ne dolazi u obzir onda
kada u društvenim procesima ima mnogo regresivnih tendencija. Takvo
projektovanje bi samo učvrstilo kretanje od zla na još gore. Prema
tome, svaka strategija podrazumeva neki vrednosni izbor, drugim rečima,
neku koncepciju o ciljevima društvenog razvoja. Ti ciljevi mogu biti
subjektivni pristrasni, mogu izražavati egoističke interese pojedinaca,
ili posebnih društvenih grupa. Takvi će biti ugradjeni u strategiji
pojedinih vlastodržaca, posebnih društvenih grupa i političkih partija.
Svaka od tih strategija će biti različita i neprihvatljiva za pojedince
iz društvenih grupa koje imaju različite interese. Problem je kako doći
do koncepcije ciljeva koji bi bili objektivni i po mogućstvu
opšte-ljudski? Teorijski gledano, izbor bi mogao biti u formulisanju
nekih etičkih principa, koji po definiciji treba da imaju univerzalno
ljudski karakter. Pošto je etičko ono što je već po pretpostavci
univerzalno ljudsko.
Filozofija treba da bude u stanju da formuliše takve principe, ali
filozofija ima raznih. Svaka posebna filozofska škola, svaki pravac
imaće svoju teoriju etike i bar za nijansu različite formulacije tih
etičkih principa. Naravno, da bi medjusobno te razne škole i pravci
mogli da imaju dijalog i putem tog dijaloga doći do istine o onim
etičkim principima koji su zaista objektivni i univerzalni. To je tako
- teorijski gledano. Praktički gledano, moglo bi se poći od dijaloga
koji su već obavljeni i od saglasnosti koja je već postignuta u
načelima koja treba da regulišu društveni život. S te strane je
dragoceno postojanje Povelje o ljudskim pravima organizacije UN iz
1948. godine, dve konvencije o ljudskim pravima iz 1966. g., od kojih
je jedna politička a druga socijalnoekonomska. Tu je obavljen veoma
ozbiljan dijalog medju stranama različitih ideologija, različitih
političkih shvatanja koji su došli do saglasnosti oko osnovnih ljudskih
prava, ljudskih potreba.
Naravno, koncepcija ljudskih prava nosi u sebi univerzalne ljudske
vrednosti iz kojih slede etički principi, a samim tim objektivni
sveopšti ciljevi društvenog razvoja.
Već u preambuli Povelje, kaže se da je najviša težnja svakog čoveka -
stvaranje sveta u kome će ljudsko biće uživati slobodu govora i
uverenja kao i slobodu od straha i nestašice. U prvom članu Povelje
kaže se da se sva ljudska bića radjaju slobodna, jednaka u dostojanstvu
i pravima. Član drugi utvrdjuje da ne sme biti nikakve diskriminacije u
pogledu rase, boje kože, pola, jezika, religije, političkog ili drugog
mišljenja, nacionalnog ili drugog porekla, rodjenja itd. Zatim se u
članovima 9, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27 precizira o kojim vrstama
slobode je reč. Garantuje se sloboda kretanja, stanovanja, sloboda
mišljenja i izražavanja, sloboda mirnog zbora i udruživanja, sloboda
učestvovanja u upravljanju svojom zemljom. Garantuje se, zatim, sloboda
biranja svojih predstavnika, sloboda izbora zaposlenja, pravo na rad,
sloboda učešća u kulturnom životu zajednice, sloboda razvoja svoje
ličnosti. U svim ovim članovima Povelje, prisutna je sloboda kao
temeljna ljudska vrednost i kao etički princip, i to sloboda u daleko
širem smislu nego što je usko liberalistički shvaćena politička
sloboda, predstavnička demokratija kao društveni cilj. Reč je i o
ekonomskoj slobodi. Garantuje se pravo na rad, pravo na izbor
zanimanja, na posedovanje imovine, učešće u upravljanju. Tu je reč i o
kulturnoj slobodi, slobodi uverenja, slobodi saopštavanja svojih ideja,
pravu na školovanje, pravu na slobodno učestvovanje u kulturnom životu
zajednice. U osnovi svih tih sloboda nalazi se svestrana emancipacija
ličnosti.
Prema tome, u ovako bogatom, višedimenzionalnom smislu termina sloboda,
temeljni cilj društvenog razvoja jeste svestrani, slobodni razvoj
svakog čoveka.
Druga bitna univerzalna vrednost koja prožima celu Povelju je
jednakost, razume se ne u vulgarnom smislu jednakih stomaka ili
jednakih zarada za sve. Član prvi govori o jednakosti u dostojanstvima
i pravima. Ćlan sedmi o jednakosti pred zakonom, o podjednakoj zaštiti
protiv bilo kakve diskriminacije, o jednakom pravu na socijalnu
sigurnost, daleko šire nego jednakost u pravu na rad.. Garantuju se
pravični i povoljni uslovi rada i pravo na jednaku platu za jednak rad,
pravo na osiguranje u slučaju nesposobnosti, bolesti ili
onesposobljenja. Dalje, pravo na pravičnu nagradu koja radniku i
njegovoj porodici obezbedjuje egzistenciju koja odgovara ljudskom
dostojanstvu. Najzad, potvrdjuje se pravo na socijalnu zaštitu.
Prema tome, druga osnovna vrednost i univerzalni etnički princip jeste
jednakost koja ne treba da bude shvaćena kao apsolutno identifikovanje
nesumnjivo različitih pojedinaca, već kao jednakost pred zakonom i
jednakost nekih bitnih preduslova života, već prema dostignutom stepenu
razvoja zajednice.
Prema tome, ciljevi društvenog razvoja moraju biti i društvena pravda,
solidarnost, socijalna sigurnost, odnosno obezbedjenje nekog minimalnog
nivoa zadovoljavanja materijalnih i kulturnih potreba svih članova
zajednice, što naravno, ne negira mogućnost da neki posebno sposobni,
posebno kreativni pojedinci mogu da se uzdignu iznad tog nivoa.
U odnosu na ove temeljne vrednosti, nalaze se instrumentalne vrednosti,
posebno ekonomske, političke, kulturne. U tom smislu su recimo
ekonomski ciljevi: zadovoljavajući privredni rast, porast životnog
standarda, efikasna organizacija proizvodnje, pravična raspodela
proizvoda, puna zaposlenost, zaštita prirodne sredine, smanjenje dužine
radnog vremena. U Povelji o ljudskim pravima izričito piše da se mora
ograničavati dužina radnog vremena, a po meri povećanja produktivnosti
rada i smanjivati. Posebni politički ciljevi društvenog razvoja jesu
državna suverenost, vladavina prava, razvoj demokratskih institucija,
ravnopravnost političkih organizacija, podela vlasti, sloboda medija
javne komunikacije. Posebni kulturni ciljevi jesu maksimalno moguća
društvena podrška obrazovanju naučnom i kulturnom stvaralaštvu,
održanje ravnoteže nacionalne tradicije i globalne modernizacije,
svestrano razvijanje kulturnih institucija, ograničenje odliva mozgova
odgovarajućim materijalnim i kulturnim stimullansima itd.
Većina ovih ciljeva društvenog razvoja, nespojiva je sa politikom koja
se u našoj zemlji vodi poslednjih godina, bilo pod pritiskom
spoljašnjih činilaca, ili usled domaćih ideoloških zabluda. Tako pre
svega, nije moguća emancipacija ličnosti i demokratizacija javnog
života, ako, pre svega, postoji monopol moći jedne posebne političke
grupacije što je bila situacija i pre 2000.-te godine, a još gore, još
drastičnije, u poslednje vreme.
Drugo, ne postoji mogućnost neke demokratizacije ako se ne poštuje
izborna volja gradjana, bilo kradjom izbora ili ovim što se u poslednje
vreme dogadja; nasilnim oduzimanjem mandata jednim političkim partijama
i davanjem tih mandata drugim. Zatim, nemoguća je neka dalja
demokratizacija ako izvršna vlast dominira nad zakonodavnom i sudskom,
umesto da se one zadrže u neophodnoj ravnoteži u podeli vlasti. Zatim
nemoguća je dalja demokratizacija ako bilo koja organizacija ima
monopol na masovne medije. Isto tako, ako se na čelu mnogih preduzeća i
ustanova nalaze nekompetentni ljudi, postavljeni spoljnim, političkim
pritiskom (preko tzv. kriznih štabova), ili ako se tzv. "lustracijom"
(koja se ne samo sprema, već i sprovodi i koja je slična nekadašnjim
merilima moralno političke podobnosti) uklanjaju iz javnog života
pripadnici protivničkih političkih grupacija.
Nemoguće je kretati se ka nekoj demokratiji, ako se promenom krivičnih
zakona daju prevelika ovlašćenja policiji i tužilaštvu, tako se
politički produžava vanredno stanje i onda kada ono bude formalno
ukinuto i na taj način borba protiv organizovanog kriminala se pretvara
u obračun s političkom opozicijom.
S druge strane, u strategiju društvenog razvoja sadašnje vlasti,
sadašnjeg našeg društva, ne može biti ugradjen ni drugi temeljni cilj,
ostvarenje društvene pravde, solidarnosti i socijalne sigurnosti, jer
svi procesi idu u suprotnom pravcu. Prvo drastično se povećavaju
socijalne razlike, jer rastu razlike u prihodima pojedinaca i pojedinih
grupa gradjana. Rasprodajom društvene imovine ekspropišu se radnici
koji su je svojim radom stvorili dok se na drugoj strani stvara sloj
krupnih profitera, po modelu ranog kapitalizma 19 veka. Povećava se
nezaposlenost uz nedovoljne mere socijalne zaštite. Zatim, kao u
kapitalizmu od pre jednog veka, vlada ne preuzima nikakvu odgovornost
za proizvodnju i za njen stabilni rast. To, navodno, uopšte nije njen
posao. Privreda je u alarmantnoj stagnaciji, a nema uopšte vidljivih
napora da se ta stagnacija prevazidje.
Zatim, raste jaz izmedju uvoza i izvoza, zemlja se sve više zadužuje,
iako je imala vrlo loše iskustva sa preteranim stranim kreditima. Ranih
80-tih godina je po izjavi tadašnjeg predsednika Savezne vlade Mikulića
zemlja uzela 22 milijarde dolara kredita, platila za kamate 30
milijardi i ostalo joj je duga 20 milijardi. Za 30 milijardi kamata je
smanjila dug za dve milijarde.
I što je najtragičnije, zemlja je izgubila veliki deo državnog
suvereniteta i ne postoji mogućnost da se povede bilo kakva samostalna
razvojna politika koja bi pokušala da demobiliše sopstvene snage za
izlaz iz ogromnih rastućih teškoća.
Naše društvo svojim zakonima i svojom praksom protivreči osnovnim
principima koji su uloženi u Povelju o qudskim pravima Organizacije UN.
U takvoj situaciji može se raspravljati o teoriji razvoja, može se
praviti strategija razvoja o pretpostavkama koje realno kod nas sada ne
postoje, ali je iluzorno razgovarati o strategiji razvoja društva
onakvog kakvo postoji u Srbiji, aprila 2003. godine.
=== 11 ===
Mirela Beloševic: SIVO TRŽIŠTE
infograf@...
Beograd, 5. april 2003. godine
U Srbiji 800 000 ljudi "jedva sastavlja kraj s krajem cesto na racun
neredovne ishrane" izjavila ja Gordana Matkovic srpski ministar za
socijalna pitanja na konferenciji "Politika smanjenja siromaštva" koji
je u Centru "Sava" organizovao Centar za liberalno-demokratske studije.
Ako bi se granica u odredjivanju siromaštva pomerila za 10 odsto
naviše, sa sadšnjih 4.500 dinara mesecno po odraslom clanu domacinstva
taj broj bi porastao na milion i 600 000 gradjana. Socijalnu pomoc na
osnovu zakona prima 35 000 porodica, a 15 000 porodica dobija pomoc
koja je obezbedjena donacijama i sama ministarka je ocenila da je to
"veoma mali broj ljudi". Deciji dodatak prima 500 000 dece odnosno
svako trece dete u Srbiji. Deset odsto gradjana je ekstremno siromašno.
Narodne kuhinje funkcionisace do 31 marta na osnovu pomoci
medjunarodnog crvenog krsta a onda cemo morati da se oslonimo na
sopstvene snage, što znaci da ce morati da se ukljuce lokalni donatori.
Ministarka je ocenila da je u sistemu socijalne zaštite loše što je taj
sistem koncipiran tako da se pomoc vezuje za prosek zarada u opštinama,
pa je zbog toga u siromašnim opštinama socijalna pomoc manja nego u
onim bogatijim. Od 2000 - te godine smanjeni su zaostaci u socijalnim
davanjima. Ministarka je najavila je da ce se usvajanjem strategije za
borbu protiv siromaštva rešiti nepovezanost izmedju delova sistema za
socijalnu zaštitu.Boško Mijatovic iz Centra za liberalno-demokratske
studije predložio je da se socijalna pomoc i deciji dodatak objedine u
"porodicni dodatak". Po njegovim recima država bi ubuduce trebalo da
pomaže samo one koji nisu u stanju da se brinu o sebi. Boris Begovic,
potpredsednik Centra za liberalno-demokratske studije je rekao da bi
zakonima trebalo smanjiti socijalne zahteve investitorima , jer takvi
zahtevi usporavaju proces privatizacije.
Na sve ove brojeve i konstatcije treba dodati da 30 odsto ljudi u
Srbiji živi iskljucivo od sivog tržišta.
Prema recima Tomislava Milenkovica iz Instituta za tržišna
istraživanja, u Srbiji 60 odsto zaposlenih prima plate manje od
republickog proseka (za januar 9.468 dinara). Taj sloj ne može da
podmiri potrebe ni egzistencijalnog minumuma cetvoroclanog domacinstva
koji je u januaru bio 13 000 dinara. Ako se ima u vidu da više ljudi
ostaje bez posla, pa u porodici više nisu zaposlena 2 vec samo jedan
clan, jasno je da je više onih koji pokušavaju da se snadju na sivom
tržištu. U januaru je bilo nezaposleno 923 000 lica dok od ukupnog
broja zaposlenih u Srbiji, plate nije primilo oko 262 000 ljudi (25
odsto zaposlenih). Ukoliko se zbroje svi koji žive bez prihoda, iz samo
dve pomenute kategorije, dolazi se do podtaka da je oko 1,2 miliona
ljudi upuceno na bilo kakav rad da bi opstali. Ko danas dobro živi, bez
materijalnih trzavica? Ratnih profitera nema u statistici ali zato
statistika kaže da 9,8 odsto od ukupnog broja zaposlenih ima zarade
koje premašuju 17.795 dinara, 24,4 odsto ima primanja od 11 800 do 17
800 i kad se to sabere jedna trecina stanovništva ne kuburi sa
podmirivanjem troškova. 10 odsto živi u teškom siromaštvu i potrebna im
je pomoc države. Pokazalo se da je ispravljanje cenovnih dispariteta
ipak bilo udar na standard. Skica za sliku tranzicionog pregrupisavanja
našeg društva: bogati ne pitaju koliko šta košta, porodice sa školskom
decom se dovijaju da prežive a penzioneri uredno placaju racune, kupuju
hleb i mleko.
Analiza ekonomskog instituta koja je radjena na osnovu ankete u 350
preduzeca, pre ubistva premijera, pokazuje optimizam privrednika a na
osnovu toga sto raste iskorišcenost kapaciteta i ima zaliha za
optimalno poslovanje. Kao najveci ogranicavajuci faktor privrednici su
naveli nedostatak sirovina, slabu tražnju i manjak kredita.
Makroekonomski sistem prema dr Neobojši Savicu karakterišu stabilne
cene, rast industrijske proizvodnje, monetarna restrikcija i rast plata.
Prema najnovijim podacima Ministarstva za trgovinu i turizam u Vladi
Srbije za pokrice minimalne potrošacke korpe u februaru trebalo je
izdvojiti 10.531 dinara, ili 1,02 prosecne zarade, a za prosecnu,
takozvanu proširenu korpu 17.010 dinara, odnosno 1,64 srpskih plata. U
poredjenju sa prethodnim mesecom, obe korpe ukazuju na neznatan porast
kupovne moci stanovništva, i to kod minimlne za 0,08 odsto ili 88
dinara, a prosecne za 0,15 odsto. Prosecna zarada zaposlenih u februaru
u Srbiji iznosila je 10.367 dinara i veca je za 9,5 odsto u odnosu na
januar, medjutim još je niža u odnosu na decembar prošle godine za 10,3
odsto. U prošlom mesecu povecan je broj isplacenih radnika u odnosu na
januar za 34 hiljade, a smanjen broj onih zaposlenih koji nisu primili
platu što se pozitivno odrazilo na standard. Oko 13,6 odsto radnika
primilo je polovinu prosecne zarade, 41,5 njih je dobilo izmedju 50 i
100 odsto plate, 33 odsto je dobilo do 150 procenata zarade a 11,9
odsto i vise od toga. Republicki ministar za trgovinu je na
konferenciji za novinare rekao da ostvarena kupovna moc pokazuje ponovo
povoljan trend, nakon odredjenog pogoršanja zbog januarskog pada
prosecne zarade.
U obe korpe izdaci za komunalije su veci za 67 dinara jer je nedavno
znacajno poskupela voda, otpadne vode i iznošenje smeca.
U minimalnoj korpi 63 odsto izdataka "ide" na hranu i pice, 27,5 odsto
na komunalije, PTT, saobracaj i struju a 9,4 odsto na neprehrambene
artikle.
Cene na malo posmatrano februar- januar u Srbiji porasle su za 0,6
odsto, koliko iznosi i rast troškova života, pri cemu ukupan rast cena
na malo od pocetka godine je 1,5 odsto, a troškovi života jedan odsto.
Poredjenjem kolicine proizvoda koju su gradjani mogli da kupe za
prosecnu platu februara 2002. i sada pokazuju da su im za recimo
frizider bile potrebne dve prosecne plate a sada 1,5. Kada je u pitanju
hrana, u isto vreme prošle godine za prosecnu platu moglo je da se
pazari 37 kilograma svinjetine a sada 52 kilograma.
Statistika je uporedjivala i zarade u 15 gradova Srbije. Više od
proseka zabeleženo je u Pancevu, Novom Sadu, Beogradu, Subotici, dok su
najslabije zarade registrovane u Uzicu, Smederevu, Valjevu...
=== 12 ===
Mirela Beloševic: AUKCIJE
infograf@...
Beograd, 21. mart 2003. god.
Od prodaje na aukciji u Privrednoj komori Srbije i Crne Gore državna
kasa prihodovace 458,737.000 dinara pod uslovom da svi kupci ispune
svoje obaveze i plate iznose koje su preuzeli. Po pocetnoj ceni prodato
je devet preduzeca. Najvišu cenu dostigao je ''Jugoagent'' iz Beograda
koji je za 151 milion dinara prodat konzorcijumu iz dijaspore, a
pocetna cena je bila 15,8 miliona dinara. Za clanove ovog konzorcijuma
je, kako kažu, narocito povoljna organizacija transporta sada kad je
Dunav otvoren za plovidbu. Za ovu firmu nadmetalo se 6 ucesnika.
Preduzece ima 113 zaposlenih i oko 1.000 kvadratnih metara prostora.
Protest zbog prodaje ovog preduzeca uložili su predstavnici sindikata i
penzionera te firme. Prema njihovim recima , prodajom ove firme nije
priznat kapital ranijih akcionara pošto je ova kompanija postala
akcionarsko društvo 1998. godine. Ova grupa predstavnika sindikata
istce da "Jugoagent" ima mnogo vrednije nekretnine u inostranstvu i
republikama bivše SFRJ.
Preduzece ''Seme'' iz Beograda prodato je za 132,000.000 dinara firmi
Astra simit, koje je u sastavu Kompanije "Braca Karic". U konkurenciji
dva ucesnika pocetna cena od oko 59 miliona dinara uvecana je na 132
miliona dinara. "Seme" zapošljava132 radnika, a u vlasništvu ima
dvadesetak prodavnica u Beogradu, poslovnu zgradu i magacine. Medjutim,
zbog lošag poslovanja radnici nisu primali plate nekoliko meseci.
Vlasnik trgovinskog preduzeca ''Perper'', Slobodan Jankovic proširio je
svoje kapacitete kupovinom "Rul-a" iz Leskovca za 22,733.000 dinara.
"Rul" proizvodi lustere, punjace za akumulatore i drugo, zapošljava 330
radnika, ali ima gubitke od 4o miliona dinara. Prema recima novog
vlasnika ocekuju ih novi poslovi i saradnja sa poznatom firmom "Ikea".
"Sokogradnja" iz Sokobanje prodata je za 4,000.000 dinara dvoclanom
konzorcijumu iz unutrašnjosti dok je" Ineks-trešnjica" iz Požege , koja
u svom sastavu ima jedan hotel i dva restorana prodata za 7,665.000
dinara. Prodat je "Adriakop" iz Šapca,"Gaj" iz Panceva, preduzece koje
se bavi proizvodnjom madraca za 5,100.000. Firma" Prvi maj" iz Raške
koja se bavi prozvodnjom hleba i peciva dostigla je cenu 11,200.000
dinara a "Metalac" iz Beograd 16,600.000. Trgovinsko preduzece
"Elektronabava" iz Beograda prodato je za obveznice devizne štednje u
iznosu od 954.000 dinara-pocetna cena od 50.000 dinara uvecana je 128
puta. Restorani iz Vršca prodati su za 23,361.000 dinara firmi "Mladost
turist" za obveznice stare devizne štednje. Restorani su pripadali
preduzecu "Srbija" a za njih je bila zainteresovana samo direktorka
marketinga hotela "Mladost turist" koja je predstavljala konzorcijum od
oko stotinu radnika koji su se udružili i kupili hotel sa 80 soba,
cetiri restorana a sve ukupno na oko 10.000 kvadrata , sa 85
zaposlenih...
Najinteresantniji primer u ovoj, a moglo bi se reci i u svim dosadšnjim
prodajama, je slucaj Rodoljuba Cojica koji je kupio "Moravateks" iz
Žitkovca, a zajedno sa fabrikom za proizvodnju rublja za domacinstvo
dobio i nalazište mineralne vode. "Moravateks" je sagradjen na parceli
ispod koje je izvorište mineralne vode. Zbog toga je bio spreman da
fabriku plati mnogo više od procenjene vrednosti od 2,1 milion dinara,
ali je kao jedini kupac prihvatio pocetnu cenu. Prema recima novog
vlasnika, on ima svoju firmu koja se od 1983.godine bavi geološkim
istraživanjima, te je tako i otkrio ispod "Moravateksa" veliko
nalazište mineralne vode i to sa malim procentom minerala, što znaci da
ce moci da je piju i bebe. U avgustu 2002. godine od Ministarstva za
rudarstvo i energetiku dobio je dozvolu za eksploataciju. Logicno je
onda upitati se šta ce biti sa 47 radnika do sad zaposlenih u
"Moravateksu"? Novi vlasnik obecava da nece rušiti fabriku, bar ne u
naredne dve godine,na koliko je i zakonom obavezan, a toliko mu je
vreme i potrebno da bi postavio uredjaje za eksploataciju mineralne
vode. Za jedanaest preduzeca medju kojima je i Radio B 92 aukcija je
odložena. Nova aukcija zakazana je za 7.april, a po prvi put je ucešce
potencijalnih kupaca na aukciji uslovljeno time da se na licitaciji
mogu prijaviti samo pravna i fizicka lica iz iste branše.
Pre izvesnog vremena bila je neuspela prodaja preduzeca "Dragan
Markovic" iz Obrenovca. Niko nije bio zainteresovan a sama farma nema
mogucnosti da životinjama obezbedi hranu. Životinje su izgladnele,
krave daju samo deset litara mleka. Srecni su kada obezbede životinjama
hranu za taj dan i to po sistemu iz srednjeg veka, razmenjuju životinje
za hranu. Inace cena svinjskog mesa je opala i ocekuje se da Robne
rezerve otkupe izvesnu kolicinu mesa. Medjutim dok se obavi
administrativna procedura otkup ce biti prilicno zakasnela mera.
Nedavno je i fabrika smrznute hrane i sladoleda "Frikom" prodata
hrvatskom koncernu "Agrokoru" koji je raspisao oglas za sva direktorska
mesta i šefove prodajnih mesta. Domaci menadžeri na to nisu navikli.
Prema recima sadašnjeg direktora novi vlasnik je formirao novu
skupštinu i Upravni odbor pa želi da proveri da li je moguc izbor nove
menadžerske ekipe. Planiraju da ojacaju prodajnu mrežu zašta ranije
nije bilo para. Bice otvoreni i novi distributivni centri pa ce
povecati i broj zaposlenih. U oglasu za direktorska mesta navodi se da
kandidati "moraju biti skloni neprekidnom ucenju i usavršavanju".
Hrvatski vlasnik želi da proveri da li ce prijavljeni kandidati biti
kvalitetniji od nasledjenih. Kad bude izabran direktor , on ce birati
svoj tim. Po "Agrokorovoj" koncepciji menadžerski tim ce ciniti šest a
ne kao do sada pet direktora. Ovi poslovi bi najverovatnije trebalo da
budu gotovi do pocetka sezone. Sa "Agrokorom" je dogovoreno da naš
sladoled, pod našom robnom markom ide na hrvatsko tržište, kao i povrce
i lisnata testa, pa ce prvi kontigent robe u kome je povrce krenuti
uskoro u njihove trgovine. Na taj nacin ce se izbeci posrednici jer je
"Agrokor" vec kupovao robu za svoju maloprodajnu mrežu. "Frikom" ce od
ove hrvatske firme kupovati smrznutu ribu. Da potsetimo "Agrokor" je
kupujuci "Frikom" pristao da vrati dug koji potice od pre nekoliko
godina kada je "Frikom" investirao u novu hladnjacu i pozajmio novac od
Kapital banke i Beobanke. U toku su pregovori oko nacina vracanja ovih
para.
Srpski ministar za privredu i privatizaciju Aleksandar Vlahovic
potvrdio je da je vlasnik kanadske firme "Jukan" privremeno odustao od
investiranja u kragujevacku fabriku "Zastava". Za ulaganje u "Zastava
automobile" zainteresovan je i Malkom Briklin, vlasnik americke
kompanije "Njukarko" sa kojim je Vlada Srbije u oktobru prošle godine
potpisala pismo o namerama koje predvidja da konacni ugovor bude
potpisan od marta ove godine. Briklin radi na finalnoj pripremi
zaokruženja finansijske konstrukcije ugovora sa "Zastavom".
Povodom najave da ce americka kompanija "Ju Es Stil" potpisati ugovor
sa koncernom crne metalurgije "Sartidom", Vlahovic je rekao da to
zavisi od okoncanja stecajnog postupka u toj smederevskoj fabrici.
1. Covic: Basic guidelines for resolving the Kosmet crisis
2. RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th
meeting, on 10 June 1999
=== 1 ===
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:49:01 -0300
From: "decani3"
To: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Subject: ERP KIM COVIC: BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE
KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part 1/2), JULY 24
July 24, 2003
ERP KIM Newsletter 24-07-03b(1)
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part
1/2)
The text is available in MS Word format (87 Kb) at:
http://www.kosovo.com/covic_guidelines.doc
Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Dr. Neboisa Covic,
Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia and
President of the Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro
and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Belgrade, July 22, 2003
The Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija][1] crisis, like all
controversial issues of Serbs, Albanians and other peoples in the
region, represents the basis of the BALKAN CRISIS. Instead of
constantly dwelling on the past we must turn toward the future in the
hope that one day the Balkan peoples will establish ties and become
integrated. It is essential to achieve good and stable relations among
the countries in the region.
It is necessary for us to jointly arrive at European and world
standards, and free ourselves of the misconception that the Balkan
peoples of Europe are second-class peoples and that they are in
constant need of tutors.
The "standards before status" approach presupposes a liberal
democracy, individual rights and freedoms, the rule of law, religious
pluralism, market competitiveness... Europe is offering us membership
in exchange for conquering the past, and it does not want a game for a
political entity surrounded by those whose leaders do not accept that
conquering one's own past is liberating its future freedom. Freedom
from the past and turning toward the future does not mean the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija if we want a sustainably stable
region. The countries in this region need to build a network of mutual
ties in all domains. This approach will reduce the importance and
frustrations regarding borders and thus contribute to the concept of
multiethnicity.
A positive foundation for the constitutional and legal status of
Kosmet within Serbia in UN Security Council Resolution 1244, whose
implementation must be analogous to similar processes in the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement [Dayton-Paris Peace Accords] in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the Erdut Agreement in Croatia in order to
avoid the trap of "double standards." It is not good that some
international decision makers are interpreting certain documents
however they see fit, and this approach does not contribute to
resolving problems. This is the same logic used by those who hastily
and frequently force the topic of "the final status of Kosovo," using
the following approaches:
''Without the final status of Kosovo there can be no advance in
reforms";
''Without the final status of Kosovo nationalism and xenophobia
are being fanned in Belgrade";
''Without the final status of Kosovo Belgrade will have problems
with respect to its own priorities: reconstruction, the economy, and
gradual integration into the international community"; and
''Serbia cannot become a fully democratic country until the
status of its southern province is resolved."
in the attempt to realize some partial geopolitical interest,
contrary to the process of consistent implementation of UNSC Res. 1244.
Occasionally the topic of "final status" is artfully substituted with
talk about "standards" more concerned with prejudicing status that with
standards themselves. The criteria of enclaves and ghettoes must yield
before global and European standards of normal life. Lack of success in
respecting the "standards before status" approach would be lack of
success in the implementation of UNSC Res. 1244, and therefore a
failure on the part of the international community. It is manifestly
clear that without the return of internally displaced persons and
refugees there can be no multiethnic life and therefore no progress in
Kosmet.
Not only is the number of returnees insignificant but the number
of desperate people who will not, dare not and cannot return to the
territory of Kosovo and Metohija has grown immensely. If the
international community continues to content itself with political
rhetoric about rights and the necessity of Serb returns to Kosmet
without the same kind of energetic measures undertaken in Bosnia to
force the conflicting sides to enable returns to displaced people and
refugees, if territories where they once lived are not provided for the
Serbs with appropriate social and political institutions, if something
does not change radically by the end of the year in the position of the
international community and UNMIK in Kosovo and Metohija, then only a
few desperate people will return to Kosmet. To date their number does
not exceed two percent of the displaced population.
In many areas in Kosmet the situation is more difficult for the
Serbs and other non-Albanians than it was at the end of the twentieth
century despite the efforts of the international community and the
proclaimed declarations of Albanian leaders. We must understand that
something is very wrong in Kosmet and that a prolific future demands
political initiative. If the domestic and international public, as well
as the majority of Kosmet Albanians do not begin to understand the
necessity of holding Albanian leaders to their word, political
responsibility will remain a completely foreign concept, and the great
majority of displaced persons will not return to their homes.
Albanian political leaders must demonstrate the readiness to risk
their lives by speaking the truth and thus toppling the idols of their
destructive nationalism. This is the only way we can avoid "having the
future turn its back on us because we failed to conquer our past."
Issues relating to the prosperity of the citizens and peoples of
the Balkans cannot be resolved solely by insisting on historical and
national categories but also on cooperation and integration, equality
and multiethnicity. The principles of national self-determination are
the principles of a war-time, not a peace-time organization of European
states, and therefore, of Balkan states, too. All those who insist only
on these principles in Kosmet are losers from the start - Serbs guided
by the principle of historic origin and Albanians with the principle of
national self-determination.
In conditions of distinct multiethnicity the principle of
national self-determination is not a democratic but a discriminatory
and war principles. It cannot be implemented for several reasons. If
the right to national self-determination is made possible for the
Albanians as a universal, positive international principle, then it
must be implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. If it is used an
exclusive principle only for the Albanians, it would represent
discrimination toward all other Balkan peoples. The demand that an
ethnically pure state be formed in the Balkans does not differ, in
essence, from the demand that a state be formed exclusively of
ideological or religious like-minded persons.
The Albanians are completely homogenous in their demand for the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija. Albanians in Kosmet are sabotaging
cooperation with UNMIK in accordance with UNSC Res. 1244. It is now
manifestly clear that they are insincere. The status of human rights,
security, and freedom of movement for the Serbian national community
and other non-Albanian communities is exceptionally low.
The former regime used Kosovo and Metohija to draw attention away
from everyday problems and its own failed policies. Among political
organizations in Serbia there is no homogenous position regarding the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet. The fate of Kosovo and Metohija is
viewed with an incredible indifference, among individuals in the ruling
coalition and even in the approach to the principle regarding the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet.
We must find the right balance between our goal and strategy
toward Kosovo and Metohija and the political and other dependence of
Serbia on international decision makers among whom some or openly or
covertly sympathizers and supporters of Albanian separatist goals.
There are attempts to consciously and purposely undermine UNSC
Res. 1244 with regard to the sovereignty of Serbia-Montenegro in Kosovo
and Metohija through the following:
a.. speeding up the solution of the final status of Kosovo
and Metohija;
b.. evident violations of UNSC Res. 1244 by international
decision makers with the constant interpretation of same that
everything is being done according to the Resolution. The problem is
who interprets and arbitrates with regard to the Resolution and its
implementation?
c.. tempting political and material offers being made toward
Serbia with the goal of convincing her to give up her southern province
in exchange for easier and faster ascension to the EU and NATO.
It is impermissible for a serious and responsible government to
find ourselves in the situation of A EUROPEAN STATE GIVING UP A
SIGNIFICANT PART OF ITS TERRITORY in order to satisfy international
expectations and pressures.
Expectations exist among some international subjects that within
Serbia a consciousness will crystallize regarding acceptance and
shaping of a political and legal framework that would ease and enable a
decision on separating Kosovo and Metohija from Kosovo. The creation of
a loose union between Serbia and Montenegro serves to support such a
thesis.
There is a danger that the separation of Kosmet from Serbia will
be carried out by a skillful political maneuver used to circumvent the
formal violation of the principle of further unchangeability of borders
and thus satisfy the demand of the Kosmet Albanians for independence
from Serbia.
Kosovo and Metohija are rapidly being furnished with the
necessary state attributes. Parallel to this, attempts exist to prepare
Serbia, its public and Government, to give up on its legitimate and
internationally recognized right to Kosmet. This would be disguised by
the supposed joining of the state of Kosovo to the present sate union
of Serbia and Montenegro. It is assumed that Serbia will be unable to
immediately concur with the independence of Kosovo and Metohija;
however, this could be carried out through appropriate compensation in
the form of quick ascension to Euro-Atlantic organizations and large
investments. The plan is to carry this out in two phases to avoid
destabilization of Daytonian Bosnia and Herzegovina and faltering
Macedonia[2], as well as some other European countries. Momentous
preparations are already in the works for the implementation of this
strategy through the activities of various U.S. and European NGOs,
analytical centers and lobbyist groups openly advocating the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija, that is, the self-determination of
Albanians in that province. Unacceptable are approaches to blackmail
Serbia advocated by certain lobbyists who propose the following very
dangerous theses:
"Discussion regarding practical matters should take place
parallel to the process of decision-making regarding the final status
of the province, with appropriate compensation for Serbia."
"No agreement between Belgrade and the Albanian leaders in Kosovo
should be implemented until the independence of the province is
proclaimed."
"The Serbian pain resulting from the loss of Kosovo can be
compensated by practical gains in the economic and social spheres."
"If Serbia wants certain issues to be resolved, she must accept
the independence of Kosovo."
"Finally, the resolution of the status of Kosovo should be the
precondition for the ascension of Serbia to the EU. 'Status before
integration' would be an appropriate motto for the region."
No one from the international community will oppose independence
as the solution for Kosovo and Metohija if Serbia agrees to it.
Serbia's acquiescence to the amputation of Kosmet would end the
international community's (U.S. and EU's) problems in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Macedonia because there would be no further question of
the rewarding of separatism but an agreed upon separation of Kosmet
from Serbia. This represents a great danger for Serbia if state
organizations accept it indifferently.
The entire strategy consists of the following: The Serb public
and official government need to be convinced that it is in Serbia's own
best interest to get rid of the burden of Kosovo and Metohija as soon
as possible in order to join Euro-Atlantic organizations more easily
and quickly.
/continued/
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
[1] The official name of the southern Serbia's Province is used
throughout the text. Kosovo and Metohija (pronounced as Kossovo and
Metóchya) is often abbreviated as KOSMET.
[2] Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 11:01:37 -0300
From: "decani3"
To: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Subject: ERP KIM COVIC: BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE
KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part 2/2), JULY 24
July 24, 2003
ERP KIM Newsletter 24-07-03b(2)
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part
2/2)
The text is available in MS Word format (87 Kb) at:
http://www.kosovo.com/covic_guidelines.doc
Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Belgrade, July 22, 2003
/continued/
The basic position of the Serbian state and its organizations
should be based on the following guidelines and principles:
(i) Serbia must not give up Kosovo and Metohija at any price and
no politician in Serbia has a right to take this approach. Everything
that is done with Kosmet from now on without the acquiescence of Serbia
would be illegal and represent extortion.
(ii) Firm and clear insistence on UNSC Res. 1244[3]. State
sovereignty has priority over the separatist aspirations of a minority
ethnic community living in it. Not one international document
acknowledges the right to secession of minority ethnic communities. The
break up of the territorial integrity of Serbia must not be permitted.
(iii) The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe in Helsinki guarantees the inviolability of external border
of member countries, except in the case of their concurrence; these
principles were confirmed at an international conference in The Hague,
and the adoption of the findings of the Badinter Arbitration
Commission[4].
By voting to accept the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) as a member, the UN General Assembly ratified the
position of the Badinter Commission with respect to the sovereignty of
Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija, as the province is located within her
AVNOJ[5] borders.
Full respect for the London Agreement of 1913, the Versailles
Peace Treaty of 1919 and the Paris Peace Agreement of 1947 where the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija is confirmed.
At the same time, it is well to keep in mind situations where the
international community can interpret these documents to suit itself
when the need arises. Hence these documents do not give absolute
protection and support if there is no consensus regarding these issues
in Belgrade.
(iv) The new constitution of Serbia, in addition to the part on
the inviolability of her territory, should include a special provision
prohibiting the renouncement of Kosmet, and this provision should be
confirmed and emphasized for the benefit of all international decision
makers, particularly the UN (Security Council and General Assembly),
the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(v) A clear and categorical position that the ascension of
Serbia-Montenegro to the Council of Europe, the European Union, the
World Trade Organization or Partnership for Peace/NATO is only possible
within the AVNOJ borders of Serbia-Montenegro.
(vi) Constantly insist before international decision makers that
our country is not asking for anything more than what other former
Yugoslav republics and Eastern European countries already have: namely,
guaranteed territorial integrity and external borders, equal treatment
and intact national and state dignity.
(vii) That legal protection be sought from the permanent
International Court of Justice in The Hague with respect to the
privatization of Serbian state-owned property in Kosovo and Metohija.
(viii) Our program for the final status of Kosovo and Metohija is
based on the sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet and this is
non-negotiable; everything else can be a topic of negotiation and
agreement. Sovereignty and democracy are not opposing values and
represent a sufficient broad and flexible framework within which the
final status of Kosovo and Metohija can be found recognizing the
legitimate interests of both sides.
(ix) Insistence on the broadest autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija,
with international guarantees and supervision, as a framework within
which the Albanian national community can be offered a high level of
independence with respect to its mother state of Serbia. By so doing
Kosovo and Metohija are provided with all the advantages of faster
progress in a broader community, with the goal of integration into
Balkan and Euro-Atlantic organizations.
(x) It is essential to make it easier for the Albanian community
to understand that an independent Kosovo and Metohija is unrealistic
and dangerous as a factor of permanent instability in the region. All
citizens of Kosmet and the region must face the European reality that
does not permit the forcible change of borders. The province of Kosovo
and Metohija may become an entity with more than autonomy but less than
statehood within the framework of Serbia. Within the framework of such
an entity the Serbian community would receive territorial and cultural
autonomy. After the ascension of the state union to the EU, which is
expected in the near future, the psychological crowding upon the
suggested final status of Kosmet would be less apparent. All citizens
would become members of a broad Balkan and European family where
national and state borders no longer have the significance they had in
the past.
(xi) It is essential that Serbia firmly and consistently, without
regard for changes in the government organization, uphold its position
on its sovereignty in Kosmet. No government in Serbia has the right to
renounce the land deeds in the province of Kosovo and Metohija or to
transfer them to others in whole or in part. Renouncing Kosmet would
mean giving up the national and state rights of Serbia, and toying with
the fate of her southern province.
(xii) Serbia must act very responsibly and decisively to prevent
certain international decision makers in supporting the independence of
Kosovo and Metohija. The position of all relevant subjects of Serbia
must be clear: If the international community, or one of its parts,
proclaims the independence of Kosmet without the acquiescence of
Serbia, this will mean forcible extortion of the a part of Serbian
territory outside the norms of international law and the risk that this
forcible precedent may be turned against the international community.
(xiii) Serbia has no alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration;
however, the haste for Serbia-Montenegro's ascension to Euro-Atlantic
organizations must be carried out at the right speed and with a sense
of balance. It must occur that the impression is made that Serbia and
the state union do not care about Kosmet, and that they might consider
some solution less than the sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo and
Metohija.
(xiv) It is impermissible for any representative of the official
government to issue official or unofficial statements where it is
possible to discern doubt with respect to the maintenance of the
present borders of Serbia, or to allow the possibility of exchanging
Kosovo and Metohija, or even abandoning the entire province if it is
left without a Serbian population.
(xv) Kosovo and Metohija must not be viewed as an obstacle or a
burden to be rid of in order to achieve the ascension of the state
union to the EU and NATO as soon as possible. No active politician on
the Serbian scene today has the right to this approach, regardless of
whether he is part of the government or the opposition.
(xvi) It is necessary to protect the cultural and historic
identity of the Serbian people preserved in Orthodox Christian
monasteries, churches, and cemeteries.[6] Long-term measures are
essential to protect our cultural and historic treasures located in
Kosmet through the following:
a.. Selection and categorization of cultural and religious
monuments
b.. Establishment of protective zones around the most important
cultural monuments (patrimonial sites)
c.. Implementation of a model of preservation for cultural and
historic monuments
(xvii) Insistence on the beginning of dialog between Belgrade and
Pristina in the presence of all relevant international decision makers;
upon the arrival of the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General [head of UNMIK] this will include respecting the mechanism of
the high task group defined in the joint document signed between
Belgrade and Pristina (November 5, 2001). [7] In addition to UNSC Res.
1244, the Kumanovo Military-Technical Agreement[8] and the
Constitutional Framework[9], there is also an Agreement on Cooperation
between Yugoslavia and UNMIK that is internationally recognized to
which we must adhere.
(xviii) Insistence that the Hague tribunal continue issuing
indictments against war criminals who unquestionably committed
genocidal crimes in Kosmet, including those among the ranks of the
Albanians. Serbia must energetically, through all international forums
and the Hague tribunal, demand the trial of Albanian war criminals
because she has also begun to try her own Serbian war criminals. If the
Hague tribunal does not undertake more significant action with respect
to these issues, it will be a sign that permanent terrorism and
extremist by Albanian extremist groups is free to continue unpunished
in Kosmet.
(xix) It is essential to carry out the operationalization of
standards in such a way that it is exactly known who is responsible for
what, by when it must be implemented and by when a certain level of
standards is to be achieved. It is necessary to establish a mechanism
for following progress in the attainment of a certain level of
standards. It is unacceptable to allow the SRSG himself to assess
whether a result has been achieved or not. For that very reason, the
Contact Group, together with Belgrade and UNMIK, should follow progress
toward achievement of standards on a monthly basis, and submit a
quarterly report regarding same to the UN Security Council and
Secretary-General.
(xx) There can be no discussion regarding the status of Kosmet
until all provisions of UNSC Res. 1244 are implemented, and full
respect for the Military-Technical Agreement, the Constitutional
Framework and the Agreement on Cooperation between Yugoslavia and UNMIK
are ensured.
We cannot discuss the final status of Kosovo and Metohija until
appropriate standards of multiethnic life are achieved, and this is to
a great extent dependent on the conscience of the citizens and
politicians leading them. What is important to us is constant tracking
of the actual situation and progress so that meeting of certain
criteria is realized by a date when it will be possible to discuss a
date for the beginning of dialog on the status of Kosmet.
It is essential that all subjects understand that it is very
dangerous to force any type of solution for the final status of Kosovo
and Metohija. No matter how absurd it may sound, time the great
protector of us all. Otherwise, we will divide everything and draw new
borders only to find ourselves once again drawn into new dangerous and
bloody conflicts that bring destruction, not integration and progress.
It is time for the Serbs and the Albanians, as well as the
Macedonians and all other peoples in the Balkans, to think a little bit
on their possible future fate on the basis of their experience in the
recent past. The basic experience is that no annexation of territory,
no change of border have resulted in greater economic power or progress
but in destruction, devastation, enormous human and material losses,
and poverty. The accent of our future should be within the framework of
solutions based on the integrative processes of the Western Balkans.
After all UNSC Res. 1244 and the international troops are here
partially due to future integrations and the control of that process.
Otherwise there is a danger that the leaders of the majority
population in Kosmet will not allow a large number of displaced and
expelled persons to return there, to their own land and their own
homes. If that is the case, it will turn out that the prerequisite for
the new Kosovo was the crime of ethnic cleansing. I am convinced that
the international community will not support leaders and residents who
reject the norms of the civilization that waged war for them.
(The text was presented by Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Nebojsa
Covic at the press conference in Belgrade, July 22, 2003)
Translation: S. Lazovic
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
[3] UNSC Resolution 1244:
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm
[4] Badinter Commission, a group of European jurists set up in
1991 by the European Union to arbitrate disputes and establish criteria
for recognition of independence for the former Yugoslav republics. The
Arbitration Commission became known as the Badinter Commission after
the name of the French lawyer (Robert Badinter) appointed as its
president. Badinter Commission's report [at the time of the collapse of
former Yugoslavia] says that Serbia should remain within its [legal]
boundaries, i.e. including Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomous provinces.
[5] AVNOJ: Antifasisticko Vijece Narodnog Oslobodjenja
Jugoslavije (Anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of
Yugoslavia), the government body of Tito's partisans that in 1943
declared formation of the new Yugoslavia and in 1945 determined borders
of the republics within that are now, with exception of Montenegro,
considered international borders. According to this mapping Kosovo and
Metohija Province was an integral part of Republic of Serbia, and not a
separate Republic. Although the Province, according to the 1974
Constitution was allowed to have direct representatives in the Federal
Parliament too, Kosovo nevertheless remained a province of Serbia and
never became a separate Republic.
[6] See UNSC Resolution 1244, Annex 2, 6
[7] So called "Haekkerup-Covic Agreement", signed on November 5,
2001
http://www.serbia.sr.gov.yu/news/2001-11/14/320901.html
[8] Military-Technical Agreement:
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm
[9] Constitutional Framework, May 15, 2001:
http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm
Footnotes supplied by ERP KIM Info-service
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
ERP KIM Info-Service is the official Information Service of the
Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren and works with the
blessing of His Grace Bishop Artemije.
Our Information Service is distributing news on Kosovo related
issues. The main focus of the Info-Service is the life of the Serbian
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Copyright 2003, ERP KIM Info-Service
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
=== 2 ===
Resolution 1244 (1999)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting,
on 10 June 1999
The Security Council,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council
for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of
23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14
May 1999,
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the
requirements of these resolutions,
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well
as all terrorist acts by any party,
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999,
expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return
to their homes in safety,
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo
crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution)
and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in
Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and
annex 2,
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy
and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security,
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel
and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under
the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be
based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in
the principles and other required elements in annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the
principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1
above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and
begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all
military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security
presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and
Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to
Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices,
of international civil and security presences, with appropriate
equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the
implementation of the international civil presence, and further
requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative
to coordinate closely with the international security presence to
ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a
mutually supportive manner;
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to
establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in
point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its
responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective
international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that
the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security
presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the
return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and
paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed
Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced
persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can
operate, a transitional administration can be established, and
humanitarian aid can be delivered;
d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil
presence can take responsibility for this task;
e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work
of the international civil presence;
g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international organizations;
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant
international organizations, to establish an international civil
presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of
Kosovo;
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil
presence will include:
a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account
of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long
as required;
c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a
political settlement, including the holding of elections;
d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its
administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the
consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other
peace-building activities;
e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's
future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's
provisional institutions to institutions established under a political
settlement;
g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other
economic reconstruction;
h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian
organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police
forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police
personnel to serve in Kosovo;
j. Protecting and promoting human rights;
k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced
persons to their homes in Kosovo;
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations,
and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such
organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of
international aid;
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to
contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe
return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this
context the importance of convening an international donors'
conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g)
above, at the earliest possible date;
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the
international security presence, with the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia;
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end
immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for
demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security
presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General;
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution
1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of
the international civil and security presences;
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other
international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the
economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the
Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to
further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and
regional cooperation;
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the
implementation of all aspects of this resolution;
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are
established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter
unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular
intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports
from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences,
the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of
this resolution;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex 1
Statement by the Chairman
on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers
held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on
the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by
the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political
framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the KLA;
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of
the crisis region.
Annex 2
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards
a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and
paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective
international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided
under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the
achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic
Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified
command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for
all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes
of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of
the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The
interim administration to provide transitional administration while
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel
will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
Liaison with the international civil mission and the international
security presence;
Marking/clearing minefields;
Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the
supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations.
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim
political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government
for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a
settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic
self-governing institutions.
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and
stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the
implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy,
economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance
of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement
to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified
in the footnote below.( 1) A military-technical agreement will then be
rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional
modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb
personnel in Kosovo:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and
delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be
withdrawn;
Returning personnel
Equipment associated with returning personnel;
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
Timetable for their return;
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
Rules governing their relationship to the international security
presence and the international civil mission.
Notes
Other required elements:
A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven
days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a
25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;
Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be
under the supervision of the international security presence and will
be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);
Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of
verifiable withdrawals;
The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall
not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.
2. RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th
meeting, on 10 June 1999
=== 1 ===
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:49:01 -0300
From: "decani3"
To: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Subject: ERP KIM COVIC: BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE
KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part 1/2), JULY 24
July 24, 2003
ERP KIM Newsletter 24-07-03b(1)
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part
1/2)
The text is available in MS Word format (87 Kb) at:
http://www.kosovo.com/covic_guidelines.doc
Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Dr. Neboisa Covic,
Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia and
President of the Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro
and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Belgrade, July 22, 2003
The Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija][1] crisis, like all
controversial issues of Serbs, Albanians and other peoples in the
region, represents the basis of the BALKAN CRISIS. Instead of
constantly dwelling on the past we must turn toward the future in the
hope that one day the Balkan peoples will establish ties and become
integrated. It is essential to achieve good and stable relations among
the countries in the region.
It is necessary for us to jointly arrive at European and world
standards, and free ourselves of the misconception that the Balkan
peoples of Europe are second-class peoples and that they are in
constant need of tutors.
The "standards before status" approach presupposes a liberal
democracy, individual rights and freedoms, the rule of law, religious
pluralism, market competitiveness... Europe is offering us membership
in exchange for conquering the past, and it does not want a game for a
political entity surrounded by those whose leaders do not accept that
conquering one's own past is liberating its future freedom. Freedom
from the past and turning toward the future does not mean the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija if we want a sustainably stable
region. The countries in this region need to build a network of mutual
ties in all domains. This approach will reduce the importance and
frustrations regarding borders and thus contribute to the concept of
multiethnicity.
A positive foundation for the constitutional and legal status of
Kosmet within Serbia in UN Security Council Resolution 1244, whose
implementation must be analogous to similar processes in the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement [Dayton-Paris Peace Accords] in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the Erdut Agreement in Croatia in order to
avoid the trap of "double standards." It is not good that some
international decision makers are interpreting certain documents
however they see fit, and this approach does not contribute to
resolving problems. This is the same logic used by those who hastily
and frequently force the topic of "the final status of Kosovo," using
the following approaches:
''Without the final status of Kosovo there can be no advance in
reforms";
''Without the final status of Kosovo nationalism and xenophobia
are being fanned in Belgrade";
''Without the final status of Kosovo Belgrade will have problems
with respect to its own priorities: reconstruction, the economy, and
gradual integration into the international community"; and
''Serbia cannot become a fully democratic country until the
status of its southern province is resolved."
in the attempt to realize some partial geopolitical interest,
contrary to the process of consistent implementation of UNSC Res. 1244.
Occasionally the topic of "final status" is artfully substituted with
talk about "standards" more concerned with prejudicing status that with
standards themselves. The criteria of enclaves and ghettoes must yield
before global and European standards of normal life. Lack of success in
respecting the "standards before status" approach would be lack of
success in the implementation of UNSC Res. 1244, and therefore a
failure on the part of the international community. It is manifestly
clear that without the return of internally displaced persons and
refugees there can be no multiethnic life and therefore no progress in
Kosmet.
Not only is the number of returnees insignificant but the number
of desperate people who will not, dare not and cannot return to the
territory of Kosovo and Metohija has grown immensely. If the
international community continues to content itself with political
rhetoric about rights and the necessity of Serb returns to Kosmet
without the same kind of energetic measures undertaken in Bosnia to
force the conflicting sides to enable returns to displaced people and
refugees, if territories where they once lived are not provided for the
Serbs with appropriate social and political institutions, if something
does not change radically by the end of the year in the position of the
international community and UNMIK in Kosovo and Metohija, then only a
few desperate people will return to Kosmet. To date their number does
not exceed two percent of the displaced population.
In many areas in Kosmet the situation is more difficult for the
Serbs and other non-Albanians than it was at the end of the twentieth
century despite the efforts of the international community and the
proclaimed declarations of Albanian leaders. We must understand that
something is very wrong in Kosmet and that a prolific future demands
political initiative. If the domestic and international public, as well
as the majority of Kosmet Albanians do not begin to understand the
necessity of holding Albanian leaders to their word, political
responsibility will remain a completely foreign concept, and the great
majority of displaced persons will not return to their homes.
Albanian political leaders must demonstrate the readiness to risk
their lives by speaking the truth and thus toppling the idols of their
destructive nationalism. This is the only way we can avoid "having the
future turn its back on us because we failed to conquer our past."
Issues relating to the prosperity of the citizens and peoples of
the Balkans cannot be resolved solely by insisting on historical and
national categories but also on cooperation and integration, equality
and multiethnicity. The principles of national self-determination are
the principles of a war-time, not a peace-time organization of European
states, and therefore, of Balkan states, too. All those who insist only
on these principles in Kosmet are losers from the start - Serbs guided
by the principle of historic origin and Albanians with the principle of
national self-determination.
In conditions of distinct multiethnicity the principle of
national self-determination is not a democratic but a discriminatory
and war principles. It cannot be implemented for several reasons. If
the right to national self-determination is made possible for the
Albanians as a universal, positive international principle, then it
must be implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. If it is used an
exclusive principle only for the Albanians, it would represent
discrimination toward all other Balkan peoples. The demand that an
ethnically pure state be formed in the Balkans does not differ, in
essence, from the demand that a state be formed exclusively of
ideological or religious like-minded persons.
The Albanians are completely homogenous in their demand for the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija. Albanians in Kosmet are sabotaging
cooperation with UNMIK in accordance with UNSC Res. 1244. It is now
manifestly clear that they are insincere. The status of human rights,
security, and freedom of movement for the Serbian national community
and other non-Albanian communities is exceptionally low.
The former regime used Kosovo and Metohija to draw attention away
from everyday problems and its own failed policies. Among political
organizations in Serbia there is no homogenous position regarding the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet. The fate of Kosovo and Metohija is
viewed with an incredible indifference, among individuals in the ruling
coalition and even in the approach to the principle regarding the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet.
We must find the right balance between our goal and strategy
toward Kosovo and Metohija and the political and other dependence of
Serbia on international decision makers among whom some or openly or
covertly sympathizers and supporters of Albanian separatist goals.
There are attempts to consciously and purposely undermine UNSC
Res. 1244 with regard to the sovereignty of Serbia-Montenegro in Kosovo
and Metohija through the following:
a.. speeding up the solution of the final status of Kosovo
and Metohija;
b.. evident violations of UNSC Res. 1244 by international
decision makers with the constant interpretation of same that
everything is being done according to the Resolution. The problem is
who interprets and arbitrates with regard to the Resolution and its
implementation?
c.. tempting political and material offers being made toward
Serbia with the goal of convincing her to give up her southern province
in exchange for easier and faster ascension to the EU and NATO.
It is impermissible for a serious and responsible government to
find ourselves in the situation of A EUROPEAN STATE GIVING UP A
SIGNIFICANT PART OF ITS TERRITORY in order to satisfy international
expectations and pressures.
Expectations exist among some international subjects that within
Serbia a consciousness will crystallize regarding acceptance and
shaping of a political and legal framework that would ease and enable a
decision on separating Kosovo and Metohija from Kosovo. The creation of
a loose union between Serbia and Montenegro serves to support such a
thesis.
There is a danger that the separation of Kosmet from Serbia will
be carried out by a skillful political maneuver used to circumvent the
formal violation of the principle of further unchangeability of borders
and thus satisfy the demand of the Kosmet Albanians for independence
from Serbia.
Kosovo and Metohija are rapidly being furnished with the
necessary state attributes. Parallel to this, attempts exist to prepare
Serbia, its public and Government, to give up on its legitimate and
internationally recognized right to Kosmet. This would be disguised by
the supposed joining of the state of Kosovo to the present sate union
of Serbia and Montenegro. It is assumed that Serbia will be unable to
immediately concur with the independence of Kosovo and Metohija;
however, this could be carried out through appropriate compensation in
the form of quick ascension to Euro-Atlantic organizations and large
investments. The plan is to carry this out in two phases to avoid
destabilization of Daytonian Bosnia and Herzegovina and faltering
Macedonia[2], as well as some other European countries. Momentous
preparations are already in the works for the implementation of this
strategy through the activities of various U.S. and European NGOs,
analytical centers and lobbyist groups openly advocating the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija, that is, the self-determination of
Albanians in that province. Unacceptable are approaches to blackmail
Serbia advocated by certain lobbyists who propose the following very
dangerous theses:
"Discussion regarding practical matters should take place
parallel to the process of decision-making regarding the final status
of the province, with appropriate compensation for Serbia."
"No agreement between Belgrade and the Albanian leaders in Kosovo
should be implemented until the independence of the province is
proclaimed."
"The Serbian pain resulting from the loss of Kosovo can be
compensated by practical gains in the economic and social spheres."
"If Serbia wants certain issues to be resolved, she must accept
the independence of Kosovo."
"Finally, the resolution of the status of Kosovo should be the
precondition for the ascension of Serbia to the EU. 'Status before
integration' would be an appropriate motto for the region."
No one from the international community will oppose independence
as the solution for Kosovo and Metohija if Serbia agrees to it.
Serbia's acquiescence to the amputation of Kosmet would end the
international community's (U.S. and EU's) problems in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Macedonia because there would be no further question of
the rewarding of separatism but an agreed upon separation of Kosmet
from Serbia. This represents a great danger for Serbia if state
organizations accept it indifferently.
The entire strategy consists of the following: The Serb public
and official government need to be convinced that it is in Serbia's own
best interest to get rid of the burden of Kosovo and Metohija as soon
as possible in order to join Euro-Atlantic organizations more easily
and quickly.
/continued/
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
[1] The official name of the southern Serbia's Province is used
throughout the text. Kosovo and Metohija (pronounced as Kossovo and
Metóchya) is often abbreviated as KOSMET.
[2] Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 11:01:37 -0300
From: "decani3"
To: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Subject: ERP KIM COVIC: BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE
KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part 2/2), JULY 24
July 24, 2003
ERP KIM Newsletter 24-07-03b(2)
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part
2/2)
The text is available in MS Word format (87 Kb) at:
http://www.kosovo.com/covic_guidelines.doc
Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Belgrade, July 22, 2003
/continued/
The basic position of the Serbian state and its organizations
should be based on the following guidelines and principles:
(i) Serbia must not give up Kosovo and Metohija at any price and
no politician in Serbia has a right to take this approach. Everything
that is done with Kosmet from now on without the acquiescence of Serbia
would be illegal and represent extortion.
(ii) Firm and clear insistence on UNSC Res. 1244[3]. State
sovereignty has priority over the separatist aspirations of a minority
ethnic community living in it. Not one international document
acknowledges the right to secession of minority ethnic communities. The
break up of the territorial integrity of Serbia must not be permitted.
(iii) The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe in Helsinki guarantees the inviolability of external border
of member countries, except in the case of their concurrence; these
principles were confirmed at an international conference in The Hague,
and the adoption of the findings of the Badinter Arbitration
Commission[4].
By voting to accept the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) as a member, the UN General Assembly ratified the
position of the Badinter Commission with respect to the sovereignty of
Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija, as the province is located within her
AVNOJ[5] borders.
Full respect for the London Agreement of 1913, the Versailles
Peace Treaty of 1919 and the Paris Peace Agreement of 1947 where the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija is confirmed.
At the same time, it is well to keep in mind situations where the
international community can interpret these documents to suit itself
when the need arises. Hence these documents do not give absolute
protection and support if there is no consensus regarding these issues
in Belgrade.
(iv) The new constitution of Serbia, in addition to the part on
the inviolability of her territory, should include a special provision
prohibiting the renouncement of Kosmet, and this provision should be
confirmed and emphasized for the benefit of all international decision
makers, particularly the UN (Security Council and General Assembly),
the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(v) A clear and categorical position that the ascension of
Serbia-Montenegro to the Council of Europe, the European Union, the
World Trade Organization or Partnership for Peace/NATO is only possible
within the AVNOJ borders of Serbia-Montenegro.
(vi) Constantly insist before international decision makers that
our country is not asking for anything more than what other former
Yugoslav republics and Eastern European countries already have: namely,
guaranteed territorial integrity and external borders, equal treatment
and intact national and state dignity.
(vii) That legal protection be sought from the permanent
International Court of Justice in The Hague with respect to the
privatization of Serbian state-owned property in Kosovo and Metohija.
(viii) Our program for the final status of Kosovo and Metohija is
based on the sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet and this is
non-negotiable; everything else can be a topic of negotiation and
agreement. Sovereignty and democracy are not opposing values and
represent a sufficient broad and flexible framework within which the
final status of Kosovo and Metohija can be found recognizing the
legitimate interests of both sides.
(ix) Insistence on the broadest autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija,
with international guarantees and supervision, as a framework within
which the Albanian national community can be offered a high level of
independence with respect to its mother state of Serbia. By so doing
Kosovo and Metohija are provided with all the advantages of faster
progress in a broader community, with the goal of integration into
Balkan and Euro-Atlantic organizations.
(x) It is essential to make it easier for the Albanian community
to understand that an independent Kosovo and Metohija is unrealistic
and dangerous as a factor of permanent instability in the region. All
citizens of Kosmet and the region must face the European reality that
does not permit the forcible change of borders. The province of Kosovo
and Metohija may become an entity with more than autonomy but less than
statehood within the framework of Serbia. Within the framework of such
an entity the Serbian community would receive territorial and cultural
autonomy. After the ascension of the state union to the EU, which is
expected in the near future, the psychological crowding upon the
suggested final status of Kosmet would be less apparent. All citizens
would become members of a broad Balkan and European family where
national and state borders no longer have the significance they had in
the past.
(xi) It is essential that Serbia firmly and consistently, without
regard for changes in the government organization, uphold its position
on its sovereignty in Kosmet. No government in Serbia has the right to
renounce the land deeds in the province of Kosovo and Metohija or to
transfer them to others in whole or in part. Renouncing Kosmet would
mean giving up the national and state rights of Serbia, and toying with
the fate of her southern province.
(xii) Serbia must act very responsibly and decisively to prevent
certain international decision makers in supporting the independence of
Kosovo and Metohija. The position of all relevant subjects of Serbia
must be clear: If the international community, or one of its parts,
proclaims the independence of Kosmet without the acquiescence of
Serbia, this will mean forcible extortion of the a part of Serbian
territory outside the norms of international law and the risk that this
forcible precedent may be turned against the international community.
(xiii) Serbia has no alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration;
however, the haste for Serbia-Montenegro's ascension to Euro-Atlantic
organizations must be carried out at the right speed and with a sense
of balance. It must occur that the impression is made that Serbia and
the state union do not care about Kosmet, and that they might consider
some solution less than the sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo and
Metohija.
(xiv) It is impermissible for any representative of the official
government to issue official or unofficial statements where it is
possible to discern doubt with respect to the maintenance of the
present borders of Serbia, or to allow the possibility of exchanging
Kosovo and Metohija, or even abandoning the entire province if it is
left without a Serbian population.
(xv) Kosovo and Metohija must not be viewed as an obstacle or a
burden to be rid of in order to achieve the ascension of the state
union to the EU and NATO as soon as possible. No active politician on
the Serbian scene today has the right to this approach, regardless of
whether he is part of the government or the opposition.
(xvi) It is necessary to protect the cultural and historic
identity of the Serbian people preserved in Orthodox Christian
monasteries, churches, and cemeteries.[6] Long-term measures are
essential to protect our cultural and historic treasures located in
Kosmet through the following:
a.. Selection and categorization of cultural and religious
monuments
b.. Establishment of protective zones around the most important
cultural monuments (patrimonial sites)
c.. Implementation of a model of preservation for cultural and
historic monuments
(xvii) Insistence on the beginning of dialog between Belgrade and
Pristina in the presence of all relevant international decision makers;
upon the arrival of the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General [head of UNMIK] this will include respecting the mechanism of
the high task group defined in the joint document signed between
Belgrade and Pristina (November 5, 2001). [7] In addition to UNSC Res.
1244, the Kumanovo Military-Technical Agreement[8] and the
Constitutional Framework[9], there is also an Agreement on Cooperation
between Yugoslavia and UNMIK that is internationally recognized to
which we must adhere.
(xviii) Insistence that the Hague tribunal continue issuing
indictments against war criminals who unquestionably committed
genocidal crimes in Kosmet, including those among the ranks of the
Albanians. Serbia must energetically, through all international forums
and the Hague tribunal, demand the trial of Albanian war criminals
because she has also begun to try her own Serbian war criminals. If the
Hague tribunal does not undertake more significant action with respect
to these issues, it will be a sign that permanent terrorism and
extremist by Albanian extremist groups is free to continue unpunished
in Kosmet.
(xix) It is essential to carry out the operationalization of
standards in such a way that it is exactly known who is responsible for
what, by when it must be implemented and by when a certain level of
standards is to be achieved. It is necessary to establish a mechanism
for following progress in the attainment of a certain level of
standards. It is unacceptable to allow the SRSG himself to assess
whether a result has been achieved or not. For that very reason, the
Contact Group, together with Belgrade and UNMIK, should follow progress
toward achievement of standards on a monthly basis, and submit a
quarterly report regarding same to the UN Security Council and
Secretary-General.
(xx) There can be no discussion regarding the status of Kosmet
until all provisions of UNSC Res. 1244 are implemented, and full
respect for the Military-Technical Agreement, the Constitutional
Framework and the Agreement on Cooperation between Yugoslavia and UNMIK
are ensured.
We cannot discuss the final status of Kosovo and Metohija until
appropriate standards of multiethnic life are achieved, and this is to
a great extent dependent on the conscience of the citizens and
politicians leading them. What is important to us is constant tracking
of the actual situation and progress so that meeting of certain
criteria is realized by a date when it will be possible to discuss a
date for the beginning of dialog on the status of Kosmet.
It is essential that all subjects understand that it is very
dangerous to force any type of solution for the final status of Kosovo
and Metohija. No matter how absurd it may sound, time the great
protector of us all. Otherwise, we will divide everything and draw new
borders only to find ourselves once again drawn into new dangerous and
bloody conflicts that bring destruction, not integration and progress.
It is time for the Serbs and the Albanians, as well as the
Macedonians and all other peoples in the Balkans, to think a little bit
on their possible future fate on the basis of their experience in the
recent past. The basic experience is that no annexation of territory,
no change of border have resulted in greater economic power or progress
but in destruction, devastation, enormous human and material losses,
and poverty. The accent of our future should be within the framework of
solutions based on the integrative processes of the Western Balkans.
After all UNSC Res. 1244 and the international troops are here
partially due to future integrations and the control of that process.
Otherwise there is a danger that the leaders of the majority
population in Kosmet will not allow a large number of displaced and
expelled persons to return there, to their own land and their own
homes. If that is the case, it will turn out that the prerequisite for
the new Kosovo was the crime of ethnic cleansing. I am convinced that
the international community will not support leaders and residents who
reject the norms of the civilization that waged war for them.
(The text was presented by Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Nebojsa
Covic at the press conference in Belgrade, July 22, 2003)
Translation: S. Lazovic
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
[3] UNSC Resolution 1244:
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm
[4] Badinter Commission, a group of European jurists set up in
1991 by the European Union to arbitrate disputes and establish criteria
for recognition of independence for the former Yugoslav republics. The
Arbitration Commission became known as the Badinter Commission after
the name of the French lawyer (Robert Badinter) appointed as its
president. Badinter Commission's report [at the time of the collapse of
former Yugoslavia] says that Serbia should remain within its [legal]
boundaries, i.e. including Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomous provinces.
[5] AVNOJ: Antifasisticko Vijece Narodnog Oslobodjenja
Jugoslavije (Anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of
Yugoslavia), the government body of Tito's partisans that in 1943
declared formation of the new Yugoslavia and in 1945 determined borders
of the republics within that are now, with exception of Montenegro,
considered international borders. According to this mapping Kosovo and
Metohija Province was an integral part of Republic of Serbia, and not a
separate Republic. Although the Province, according to the 1974
Constitution was allowed to have direct representatives in the Federal
Parliament too, Kosovo nevertheless remained a province of Serbia and
never became a separate Republic.
[6] See UNSC Resolution 1244, Annex 2, 6
[7] So called "Haekkerup-Covic Agreement", signed on November 5,
2001
http://www.serbia.sr.gov.yu/news/2001-11/14/320901.html
[8] Military-Technical Agreement:
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm
[9] Constitutional Framework, May 15, 2001:
http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm
Footnotes supplied by ERP KIM Info-service
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--
ERP KIM Info-Service is the official Information Service of the
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
=== 2 ===
Resolution 1244 (1999)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting,
on 10 June 1999
The Security Council,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council
for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of
23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14
May 1999,
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the
requirements of these resolutions,
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well
as all terrorist acts by any party,
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999,
expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return
to their homes in safety,
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo
crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution)
and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in
Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and
annex 2,
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy
and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security,
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel
and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under
the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be
based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in
the principles and other required elements in annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the
principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1
above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and
begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all
military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security
presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and
Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to
Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices,
of international civil and security presences, with appropriate
equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the
implementation of the international civil presence, and further
requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative
to coordinate closely with the international security presence to
ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a
mutually supportive manner;
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to
establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in
point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its
responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective
international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that
the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security
presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the
return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and
paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed
Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced
persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can
operate, a transitional administration can be established, and
humanitarian aid can be delivered;
d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil
presence can take responsibility for this task;
e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work
of the international civil presence;
g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international organizations;
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant
international organizations, to establish an international civil
presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of
Kosovo;
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil
presence will include:
a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account
of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long
as required;
c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a
political settlement, including the holding of elections;
d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its
administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the
consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other
peace-building activities;
e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's
future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's
provisional institutions to institutions established under a political
settlement;
g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other
economic reconstruction;
h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian
organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police
forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police
personnel to serve in Kosovo;
j. Protecting and promoting human rights;
k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced
persons to their homes in Kosovo;
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations,
and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such
organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of
international aid;
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to
contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe
return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this
context the importance of convening an international donors'
conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g)
above, at the earliest possible date;
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the
international security presence, with the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia;
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end
immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for
demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security
presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General;
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution
1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of
the international civil and security presences;
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other
international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the
economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the
Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to
further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and
regional cooperation;
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the
implementation of all aspects of this resolution;
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are
established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter
unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular
intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports
from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences,
the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of
this resolution;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex 1
Statement by the Chairman
on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers
held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on
the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by
the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political
framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the KLA;
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of
the crisis region.
Annex 2
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards
a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and
paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective
international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided
under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the
achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic
Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified
command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for
all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes
of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of
the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The
interim administration to provide transitional administration while
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel
will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
Liaison with the international civil mission and the international
security presence;
Marking/clearing minefields;
Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the
supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations.
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim
political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government
for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a
settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic
self-governing institutions.
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and
stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the
implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy,
economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance
of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement
to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified
in the footnote below.( 1) A military-technical agreement will then be
rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional
modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb
personnel in Kosovo:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and
delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be
withdrawn;
Returning personnel
Equipment associated with returning personnel;
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
Timetable for their return;
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
Rules governing their relationship to the international security
presence and the international civil mission.
Notes
Other required elements:
A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven
days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a
25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;
Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be
under the supervision of the international security presence and will
be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);
Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of
verifiable withdrawals;
The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall
not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.
