Adesione alla Manifestazione per Cuba

Il Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia (CNJ) aderisce ed invita
tutti/e ad aderire alla Manifestazione Nazionale in sostegno a Cuba,
che si terra' il prossimo 28 giugno a Roma.

Pur ritenendo la data forse poco propizia - vista la concomitanza con
manifestazioni importanti a livello nazionale (Giornata dell'orgoglio
gay) ed internazionale (nel caso della Jugoslavia, il 28 giugno e' la
giornata di San Vito, e si terra' una manifestazione all'Aia contro il
"Tribunale ad hoc") - riteniamo fondamentale esprimere vicinanza e
solidarieta' con Cuba in un momento in cui l'aggressivita'
statunitense verso quel paese fa presagire per esso tempi molto
difficili.

La Jugoslavia ed i suoi abitanti conoscono alla perfezione, per averle
purtroppo sperimentate sulla propria pelle, le tecniche criminali
adottate dagli USA e dai loro alleati per soggiogare i paesi ed i
governi a sgraditi; tecniche tra le quali, invariabilmente, e'
assegnato un posto centrale alla diffamazione ed alla disinformazione
strategica, purtroppo con l'appoggio di settori conniventi delle
"sinistre" occidentali.

Facciamo che a Cuba non si ripeta la tragedia che e' toccata alla
Jugoslavia ed a tanti altri paesi dall'Ottantanove in poi!

QUE VIVA CUBA


--- In Ova adresa el. pošte je zaštićena od spambotova. Omogućite JavaScript da biste je videli., Radio Città Aperta
<segreteria@...> ha scritto:

DIFENDIAMO CUBA
Manifestazione nazionale Roma, Sabato 28 Giugno 2003 Piazza Farnese
ore 17.00

No al blocco e all'aggressione USA
No alle complicita' italiane
Si alla sovranita' dei popoli
Liberta' per i 5 patrioti cubani detenuti nelle carceri USA

CUBA HA BISOGNO DELLA NOSTRA SOLIDARIETA'
L'IDEA DI UN ALTRO MONDO POSSIBILE HA BISOGNO ANCHE DI CUBA.

DOMENICA 8 GIUGNO ore 9.30
Roma-Via Giolitti, 231
RIUNIONE NAZIONALE
(sono disponibili manifesti e volantini)
info: cuba28giugno@...

Comitato promotore e prime adesioni nazionali ed internazionali:
Assoc. Nazionale Italia-Cuba; Assoc. Nazionale di solidarieta' con
Cuba "La Villetta"; Assoc. Intern. di Amicizia e Solidarieta' con i
popoli; Radio Citta' Aperta; TeleAmbiente; Fondazione Che Guevara;
Villaggio Globale; Assoc. Vecchio Mattatoio; Casa della Pace; Societa'
Sportiva "Tor di Quinto"; Polis. Popolare Roma 6 Villa Gordiani;
Promocaraibi; Assoc. "Si Por Cuba; Assoc. Corvialmente; Assoc. Punto
Critico; Assoc. Libero Pensiero; Assoc. Granma, Assoc. Zona Rossa;
Comitato Carlos Fonseca; Cestes/Nuestra America; Casa dei popoli di
Roma; UISP Sport e Solidarieta' viale Irpinia; Democrazia Popolare;
Collettivo studenti Accademia Belle Arti; Forum Giovani Sermoneta;
Forum Giovani Sezze Romano, Underground assoc. "Lo Zoo di Berlino";
SACS Societa' degli Artisti dello Spettacolo; Assoc. Culturale "Il
Puntino; Teatro dell'Esistenza; Coop. Lavoro Culturale; Coop. La
Spirale; Assoc. Onda d'Urto Service; Assoc. "Art anda Art.; Rete
Assoc. Popolari; Blond Records; Comitato in solidarieta' con il
Chiapas; Progetto "acqua in Somalia"; Enrico Diodati assoc.
"Oltreconfine onlus"; Assoc. sostegno "movimento per la moratia
-Brasile"; Rivista inter. "La Comune"; Assoc. "Articolo 1"; ANA;
Avamposto degli Incompatibili; Circolo Agora' Pisa; CPA Firenze;
Movimento Antagonista Mantova; PRC Iglesias; Fausto Sorini- Direzione
PRC; Mariangela Nasi Marengo-Direttivo Uni-Cuba Torino; Rete dei
Comunisti; Gianfranco Ginestri-Archivio CubaSi Bologna; Giancarlo
Alonzo PRC-Pineto; Graciela Zolezzi, Mercedes Alifano Benitez, Hector
Celano-Argentina; Graciela Ramirez-Espana; Lucy Ramirez, Mayra Godoy,
Percy Alvarado Godoy-Guatemala; Maria Del Rosario Valenzuela-Bolivia;
Bassel Ismail Salem-Palestina; German Lombana-Colombia; Roman
Sprinter, Alfonso Gonzalez Pena-Cuba; Equipe do Cepis-San Paulo
Brasile; International Action Center; Patricio Aguilar-Cile; Partido
Comunista de Colombia; Cristina Castello, Graciela
Rosenblum-Argentina; Marilia Guimaraes-Brasile; Cesar Pellicer, Alonso
Cortina Gutierrez, Simon Ashook, Cesar Ashook, Gabriel Obando, Pedro
Blas Julio, Nilva Cabarcas, Martin Salas, Franklin Howward, Fidel
Alejandro Leoteau, Nilda Melendez, Eduardo Garcia, Jackeline De La
Vega, Berta Acevedo, Juan Montes Farah ..........

SITO: http://www.radiocittaperta.it
MAIL: segreteria@...

--- Fine messaggio inoltrato ---


Difendiamo Cuba

Manifestazione Nazionale 28 giugno 2003 Roma
Dalle ore 17.00 - 23.00 Piazza Farnese

L'offensiva avviata dall'amministrazione Bush sta addensando nubi
minacciose anche su Cuba. Le autoritÎ statunitensi non fanno mistero
di voler strangolare economicamente e rovesciare politicamente il
governo cubano.

Si sta manifestando concretamente il pericolo che l'Italia si renda
complice del blocco economico e del progetto di destabilizzazione
contro Cuba.

Dall'America Latina, dall'Europa e da tutta Italia e' venuta
crescendo l'esigenza di fermare questa escalation contro Cuba e di
riaffermare la simpatia e la solidarieta' dei popoli verso
l'esperienza di progresso sociale, indipendenza, dignita' e sovranita'
rappresentata da Cuba e dalla sua rivoluzione.

Il 28 giugno a Roma, decine e decine di associazioni e comitati di
solidarieta', circoli culturali, intellettuali, lavoratori, forze
politiche e sindacali, dall'Italia e dal Mondo (gia' sono giunte circa
90 adesioni a livello internazionale), hanno deciso di dare vita ad
una manifestazione nazionale in difesa di Cuba che chiedera':

1.. La cessazione del bloqueo e dell'aggressione statunitense
2.. La fine della complicita' dell'Italia con questa politica
contro Cuba
3.. Il rispetto del diritto alla sovranita' e all'indipendenza di
Cuba e di tutti i popoli
4.. La liberazione dei cinque patrioti cubani illegalmente
imprigionati negli Stati Uniti

Sappiamo che l'esperienza politica di Cuba ha suscitato e continua a
suscitare dibattito, perplessita' o simpatia. Riteniamo che questo sia
il momento in cui dare priorita' alla solidarieta' con questo paese,
per quello che rappresenta nella storia, nel futuro e nelle speranze
di una America Latina oggi nuovamente minacciata dagli USA.

Invitiamo a partecipare in ogni citta' in ogni regione la
partecipazione alla manifestazione nazionale del 28 giugno costituendo
appositi coordinamenti che lavorino in modo unitario e sappiano
sviluppare la necessaria discussione in tutti gli ambiti.

CUBA HA BISOGNO DELLA NOSTRA SOLIDARIETA'

L'IDEA DI UN ALTRO MONDO E' POSSIBILE HA BISOGNO ANCHE DI CUBA

23 maggio

Il comitato promotore

Associazione Nazionale Italia-Cuba; Associazione Nazionale di
solidarieta' con Cuba,"La Villetta" Associazione Internazionale di
Amicizia e Solidarieta' con i Popoli; Radio Citta' Aperta;
TeleAmbiente; Fondazione Che Guevara; Villaggio Globale; Associazione
Vecchio Mattatoio; Casa della Pace; Societa' Sportiva "Tor di Quinto";
Polisportiva Popolare Roma 6 Villa Gordiani; Promocaraibi;
Associazione "SI POR CUBA"; Associazione Corvialmente; Cestes/Nuestra
America; Associazione Punto Critico; Associazione Libero Pensiero;
Associazione Granma; Associazione Zona Rossa; Comitato Carlos Fonseca
........

Some articles on the shameful situation in Kosovo-Metohija:

1. Dateline: Kosovo in perspective - an anti-communist crusade
(by Richard Ziegler)

2. Peacekeepers return from Kosovo
(By Eva Munk for The Prague Post)

3. Inter-ethnic hostility remains in Kosovo almost four years after
the war
(by Jean-Eudes Barbier for AFP)

4. Lies and Consequences
(by William Norman Grigg)


MORE LINKS:

*** KOSOVO AND METOHIJA: PROPAGANDA AND TRUTH
by Rade Drobac
http://www.artel.co.yu/en/reakcije_citalaca/2003-04-22_1.html ***


Serbs build, others destroy (by Piotr Bein)
http://www.apisgroup.org/article.html?id=1263

Suicide Rate Up in Kosovo Since War (by Natan Dotan)
http://www.balkantimes.com/default3.asp?lang=english&page=process_print&article_id=19044

Baghdad, Belgrade, and borders (by John Zavales)
http://www.kosovo.com/erpkim23may03b.html

Children Bought and Sold (by Altin Raxhimi)
http://www.tol.cz/look/BRR/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=9&NrIssue=1&NrSection=1&NrArticle=9290

Occupation by Bad Example (by Christopher Deliso)
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/deliso75.html

SNC KIM: Kosovo Parliament legalizes crimes committed by Albanian
extremists
http://www.kosovo.com/erpkim16may03.html#9

German interior ministers demand speedy deportations. Refugees from
Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo targetted (By Elisabeth Zimmermann)
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jun2003/germ-j03_prn.shtml


TWO IMPORTANT SITES:

*** UNMIK Police: Daily News Updates, Crime statistics, 24-hour Daily
Incident Report

http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol/

*** KOSOVO.COM

http://www.kosovo.com/


=== 1 ===


http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/jugoslavija/2003-05-28_4.html

Kosovo in perspective - an anti-communist crusade

NATO intervened in Kosovo not because one side was
losing but because the wrong side was losing

Dateline: Monday, May 26, 2003

by Richard Ziegler

It is almost four years since the NATO attack on Yugoslavia ended and
we now have a better understanding of what was not the cause of the
war. The justification by NATO leaders and supporters was that the
Belgrade authorities were committing genocide against the ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo and that NATO intervened in order to stop massive
human rights violations. However, the tales of missing thousands,
mass graves replete with Albanians, etc., have shown to be little
more than tales. There has been no evidence to support the
oft-repeated claims that the Serbs had committed genocide before the
bombing began, were committing genocide during the bombings, or had
plans to commit genocide that were supposedly thwarted by the
bombings. The amount of people killed in the conflict in the year
before the NATO attack commenced was comparable to or less than the
fatalities that occurred in other civil wars that were raging in the
late 1990s. NATO did not intervene because it had an alleged moral
imperative to interfere in a conflict where one side was clearly
losing; NATO was indifferent when the Croat offensive overwhelmed the
Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia in August 1995 producing many
civilian deaths and a massive exodus of Serbs into Bosnia. NATO
intervened in Kosovo not because one side was losing but because the
wrong side was losing.

Yet if the ethnic conflict in Kosovo was at best, a partial
explanation for intervention, and at worst, an outright pretext, then
what were the other motives for NATO's actions? The NATO intervention
was indeed on behalf of human rights, but not the ones claimed by
NATO. Ever since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
West had been using the allegations of human rights violations in the
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries as a means to undermine
communism. The West was very selective about which human rights it
wanted to see implemented in the Eastern bloc countries, and these
rights were almost invariably civil and political rights, not social
and economic rights. The West called for the implementation of the
right to vote in multiparty elections, freedom of religion, freedom
of association, not the right to employment, to shelter, or to a
minimal standard of living. The West also advocated, by extension,
the type of society that favors civil and political rights over social
and economic rights, i.e. capitalism, and the two
most cherished rights of capitalist societies, the unqualified rights
to wealth and property.

The pressure of the West on the Soviet Union and its allies to
convert to capitalist democracies that favored civil and political
rights from communist societies which gave precedence to social and
economic rights was combined with Western support for the internal
forces in these countries that were the heirs of those who never
accepted the 1917 revolution and those governments imposed or
supported by the Soviet Union following the end of World War II. By
the early 1990s only one Eastern European country remained that had
not overthrown socialism and restored capitalism, Yugoslavia, and for
this the country would pay dearly. Historically, the Balkans have
been segmented and dominated by the great powers. But the dominant
Western view holds that the breakup of Yugoslavia was different from
that historical pattern in that the genesis for the collapse
originated from within. The main Western explanation for the
disintegration of Yugoslavia was the rise of Serb nationalism and a
desire for Serb dominance in the constituent republics and autonomous
provinces of Yugoslavia; this ascent is alleged to have begun with
the speech made by Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo in 1989. The
resultant interventions by the West are widely interpreted in the
West as reactions to Serb aggression. There was certainly a rise in
Serb nationalism, but there was also an accompanying rise in the
nationalism of other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, particularly in
Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo where Serbs had valid historical reasons
to dread being reduced to minority status if these regions became
independent. The nationalism of the Croats, Bosnian Muslims and
Albanians was combined with their desire to get rid of the vestiges
of socialism and establish a market economy. The breakup of
Yugoslavia did not deviate from the pattern of great power
involvement. Those primarily responsible for the Balkanization of
Yugoslavia were the Western governments that encouraged the
secessionist movements, provided them with financial and military
assistance, afforded them premature diplomatic recognition, and
finally intervened militarily with the attacks on the Serbs in Bosnia
and later throughout Yugoslavia during the NATO attack.

The Western attempt to foster capitalism in Yugoslavia was already
occurring in the 1980s through the Western-dominated IMF which loaned
funds to the indebted nation on condition that privatizations were to
be undertaken and whose effect was to exacerbate ethnic tensions. The
NATO ultimatum rejected by Yugoslavia at Rambouillet, France,
contained two revealing articles attesting to NATO's self-serving
motives: "The economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance with
free-market principles," and "There shall be no impediments to the
free movement of persons, goods, services and capital to and from
Kosovo."

It would be erroneous to assert that anticommunism was the only
driving force behind Western intervention in the former Yugoslavia.
There were other motives. The Germans had their own historical
reasons and the NATO ultimatum to Yugoslavia was the third one by
Germany to the Serbs in the last century. The support given by the
USA for the Bosnian Muslims, and to a lesser extent, the Albanians in
Kosovo, was partially motivated by the wish to reap the political
rewards of demonstrating to the Muslim countries, particularly the
oil- producing ones, that the USA could be pro-Muslim. Furthermore,
NATO used the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo as
opportunities to justify its continued existence after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The anticommunist motive, however,
was a main reason shared by all the interveners and also
paradoxically explains why many progressives, social democrats and
socialists in the West supported the bombing because the rightwing
drift of Western leftist parties had reached such a point that any
attempt to weaken or sweep away the remaining socialist system in
Europe was welcomed. The Western attack on Yugoslavia was a
continuation of the Cold War and its transformation into a real war
which was made possible by a weakened Russia that was unable and
unwilling to come to the defense of its Slavic ally.

Richard Ziegler Ottawa Copyright 2003


Richard Ziegler worked as a political researcher with the federal
government's Immigration and Refugee Board from 1994 to 2002. He
analyzed allegations of human rights violations of people who were
claiming refugee status in Canada and who had originated in Eastern
Europe and the countries arising from the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. He writes: "I am familiar with the history and politics of
Yugoslavia and am aware of how Western governments use selective
human rights in order to engage in overt and covert regime change. I
was also an acitivist with the Ottawa-based group C- SWAY, Coalition
to Stop the War Against Yugoslavia. My article gives a different and
insightful perspective that the mainstream media will not consider."


=== 2 ===


http://www.praguepost.com/P03/2003/Art/0501/news4.php

The Prague Post
May 4, 2003

Peacekeepers return from Kosovo

By Eva Munk
For The Prague Post
PODUJEVO, KOSOVO


-"You just don't know what's out there," explained
Battalion Commander Petr Prochazka. "This area was
full of partisan [KLA] supply routes, and NATO
peppered it with live rounds with no system
whatsoever. It's just not worth the risk to stray off
the paths."
-The battalion's main mission is to ensure a safe
environment for all the ethnic groups in its area of
operations -- a moot point these days, as the region
is almost "ethnically clean." Aside from pockets of
Roma, or gypsies, it consists entirely of ethnic
Albanians. Of the fairly large Serb population that
once occupied the area, only 28 old-timers remain in
the mountain hamlet of Sekirac.
-"They've been here since the battle of Kosovo Polje
in 1389," said press officer Pavel Loeffler. "Now the
locals are trying wipe out all evidence they were ever
here. The Swedish unit, which was here before us,
stopped guarding two churches near Podujevo. They were
blown up within a week."
-Many of those who did not join the recently formed
Kosovo Protection Corps -- a legitimate military force
created for the defense of Kosovo -- have joined the
ranks of the mafia instead....
-Less than a month ago, UN units discovered a mass
grave in the area, and the bodies of several dozen
victims were brought to the battalion's outpost at the
village of Gazela.
"The relatives had a chance to identify them by the
clothes, which were put in a separate tent. The smell
is not something I would like to endure again,"
Loeffler said. "We didn't have much luck. Two busloads
of Serbians came in, but only a few were able to
identify some family members."
He said he thought there were many more such graves in
the territory, but the chances of finding them are
slim.
"The locals aren't going to lead us to them," he said.
"It would hurt their image as the only victims."


For 180 days, the 300 soldiers of the 43rd Airborne
Battalion from Chrudim, east Bohemia and the First
Motorized Company from Martin, central Slovakia,
cloistered in stark barracks on a hilltop. They were
stationed in a dusty burg called Podujevo, 30
kilometers (19 miles) from the nearest town.

Except for patrolling the 120 kilometers of ABL
(administrative boundary line -- the Serbs do not
accept the use of the term border) and the
885-square-kilometer (354-square-mile) area northwest
of Pristina, the troops were not allowed to leave the
base.

Worse, they had no beer. Since arriving in Kosovo last
Sept. 28, the soldiers did not taste alcohol. They
even hailed the New Year with nonalcoholic champagne.
Neither could they resort to that beloved Czech
activity of picking mushrooms in the surrounding
hills.

"You just don't know what's out there," explained
Battalion Commander Petr Prochazka. "This area was
full of partisan supply routes, and NATO peppered it
with live rounds with no system whatsoever. It's just
not worth the risk to stray off the paths."

After six months of guarding the Kosovo-Serbia
boundary, the 2nd Czech-Slovak KFOR (Kosovo Force)
Battalion headed home April 23, as part of its normal
rotation schedule.

Soldiers say they have witnessed deprivation, ethnic
hatred and the frustrating aftermath of the 1998 war
in Kosovo, in which Serbian-Albanian tensions resulted
in mass graves and permanent distrust.

The troops, however, live in relative comfort, with
hot showers, Czech TV channels and HBO beamed in by
satellite, and regular communication with their
families via cell phone. The headquarters company even
had a "saloon," complete with swinging doors, a
bleached cow skull nailed to a post, a bar and a
fireplace with a grill between two narrow firing posts
punched into the 2-meter-thick (7-foot) perimeter wall
in case of a very real attack.

"We will defend our steaks to the last man," one
soldier joked.

Prefer to see action

Many brooded over the "luck" of buddies from Chrudim
who are accompanying the field hospital and
chemical-warfare unit in Iraq and Kuwait.

"I think a lot of the soldiers envy their chance to
see some action," Prochazka said. Although security
was tightened since the outbreak of the war in Iraq,
there have not been any displays of violence in the
area.

The battalion's main mission is to ensure a safe
environment for all the ethnic groups in its area of
operations -- a moot point these days, as the region
is almost "ethnically clean." Aside from pockets of
Roma, or gypsies, it consists entirely of ethnic
Albanians. Of the fairly large Serb population that
once occupied the area, only 28 old-timers remain in
the mountain hamlet of Sekirac. A Czech-Slovak
"observation post" nearby ensures their safety.

A handful of old Serb Orthodox churches, surrounded by
barbed wire and guarded by KFOR, testify that Serbs
had lived in the area for a long time.

"They've been here since the battle of Kosovo Polje in
1389," said press officer Pavel Loeffler. "Now the
locals are trying wipe out all evidence they were ever
here. The Swedish unit, which was here before us,
stopped guarding two churches near Podujevo. They were
blown up within a week."

Occasionally the soldiers are sent to disarm a
leftover pocket of KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army)
partisans who didn't turn in their arms after the 1998
war. The raids sometimes lead to hostility among the
inhabitants.

"Of course they're not friendly when we come into
their houses in the morning without warning. You've
got to keep in mind that these guys are still local
heroes," Prochazka said.

The partisans now present the biggest threat in the
area, he said. Many of those who did not join the
recently formed Kosovo Protection Corps -- a
legitimate military force created for the defense of
Kosovo -- have joined the ranks of the mafia instead,
according to Prochazka. This situation is yet another
reason for KFOR to create a secure environment as soon
as possible.

"We have to establish confidence in the legitimate
government among the local population; otherwise they
will be fair game for the mafia," Prochazka said. To
this end, KFOR soldiers try to improve the conditions
by using military technology to rebuild roads, put up
power lines and repair damaged facilities. Mostly, the
Czechs have concentrated on rebuilding schools.

"We want to target the youngsters who are going to be
running things soon. There's not much chance we'll be
able to budge the older ones," Prochazka said, not
bothering to hide his exasperation. "They've just
gotten too used to living from handouts."

Of course, he said, life is not easy for the ethnic
Albanians. Many families survive on a pension of about
60 euros (1,890 Kc/$65) per month per adult male. Most
have houses built of bright-red UN bricks, but they
have little left over for electricity or heating.
Although these houses are two or three stories high,
the families crowd into two ground-floor rooms heated
by wood-burning stoves.

"The NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] gave
refugees who lost their houses material for new ones
as incentive for them to come back, but there wasn't
enough left over for things like insulation,"
Prochazka says.

This situation indirectly leads to friction with the
Serb patrols on the boundary line.

"Wood is the main source of heating, which is why you
won't find a mature tree on this side of the border,"
he said. "So the locals just hitch a horse to a cart
and go to the Serbian side. Then we get a panic call
saying that the Serbian police have kidnapped an
Albanian and dragged him over to their side. But when
we get there and find a chain saw still hot on the
Serbian side, it's fairly obvious [what has
happened]."

Some Czech and Slovak KFOR soldiers have changed their
attitudes toward the situation in their area of Kosovo.

Finding the way out of poverty

"When you get here and see the poverty, you really
want to help. But many people here are happy to live
with less, as long as they don't have to exert
themselves to get more," said Lieutenant Pavel Mraz,
who is in charge of the battalion's civil-military
cooperation unit. "I've realized that the best way to
help is to reduce their dependence on outside help."

Occasionally, however, something does remind them that
a real tragedy happened here.

Less than a month ago, UN units discovered a mass
grave in the area, and the bodies of several dozen
victims were brought to the battalion's outpost at the
village of Gazela.

"The relatives had a chance to identify them by the
clothes, which were put in a separate tent. The smell
is not something I would like to endure again,"
Loeffler said. "We didn't have much luck. Two busloads
of Serbians came in, but only a few were able to
identify some family members."

He said he thought there were many more such graves in
the territory, but the chances of finding them are
slim.

"The locals aren't going to lead us to them," he said.

"It would hurt their image as the only victims."


Eva Munk can be reached at news@...


=== 3 ===


http://www.ptd.net/webnews/wed/bl/Qserbia-montenegro-kosovo.Rbv1_DAK.html

Inter-ethnic hostility remains in Kosovo almost four years after the
war

Jean-Eudes Barbier

-"Steiner's opinion was based on statistics that the
tension between the communities has been significantly
reduced, but he is not the one living with it every
day, as we do."
-Serbs have also given up driving or even having
private cars. There is no access for them to the
parking lot in front of their building, while their
cars in the past have often been damaged by Albanian
extremists.
-Those who have remained in Kosovo, some 80,000 living
mostly in the enclaves, wait and hope that the
international community will finally become interested
in their fate.


PRISTINA, Serbia and Montenegro, April 20 (AFP) -
Almost four years after the United Nations established
its mission in Kosovo, inter-ethnic hostility is still
widespread and the few Serbs remaining in the capital
Pristina are afraid to circulate freely in the city.

Surrounded by the ethnic Albanian majority, many of
whom would like to see them thrown out of Kosovo, the
Serbs in Pristina are pessimistic about their future.

Some 45,000 Serbs lived in the Kosovo capital, which
was home to some 125, 000 people before the 1998-99
war in the southern Serbian province. The war ended
with the withdrawal of Belgrade forces under pressure
of a NATO bombing campaign.

Since 1999, the population of Pristina has increased
to more than 500,000, but only around 200 of them are
Serbs.

The Pristina Serbs, grouped for security reasons in
one building in the city's Ulpiana district, have been
exposed to numerous insults, while often pelted with
stones from windows of neighboring buildings.

"The psychological pressure is enormous. Our life is
worse than in a prison, " one of them, Jelena, told
AFP.

Jelena, who refused to give her last name, said daily
life has gotten worse since members of the NATO-led
peacekeeping force (KFOR), deployed throughout the
province since 1999, left the neighbourhood last
October.

The removal of many checkpoints was ordered by UN
administrator Michael Steiner, who believed that the
security situation has improved sufficiently.

The checkpoints in the nearby Serb enclaves have
disappeared, but KFOR has also increased its patrols
in return.

However, without the permanent presence of KFOR
troops, Serbs in Ulpiana today feel almost abandoned.

"Steiner's opinion was based on statistics that the
tension between the communities has been significantly
reduced, but he is not the one living with it every
day, as we do," Milan said.

The Serb families in the neighbourhood have only one
shop, poorly supplied, without fresh vegetables and
fruit. The goods are brought to the shop by a tiny UN
van coming from the Serb enclave of Gracanica, near
Pristina.

"The UN (officials) believe we can go shopping by
public buses, but this is absurd, as we would all be
beaten up," Tanja said.

Serbs have also given up driving or even having
private cars. There is no access for them to the
parking lot in front of their building, while their
cars in the past have often been damaged by Albanian
extremists.

Around 20 Serb pupils are still escorted by KFOR
soldiers to the school in a Serb village, some 20
kilometers (12 miles) from Pristina.

The community's resources are very low. Only 15 of
them are employed. They receive financial support from
Belgrade, but consider it insufficient. Sometimes,
they can find a temporary job, but for the lowest
wages.

As there are no cafes in the neighbourhood, some of
the Serbs gather in the shop to talk and encourage or
support each other.

In the evening, they continue their discussions by
candlelight, as power cuts are common in Kosovo. The
dispensary and billiard room are then deserted, as
well as a small yard where children usually play ball.

Serbs from Pristina have refused to go to the
"collective centers" in Serbia and Montenegro where
some 200,000 other Serbs now live after fleeing their
homes in Kosovo.

Those who have remained in Kosovo, some 80,000 living
mostly in the enclaves, wait and hope that the
international community will finally become interested
in their fate.

"If Kosovo gets independence, as the Albanians have
demanded, the Serb enclaves in the province will
create their defensive units and fight. We will all
leave Pristina to join them," Milan said.


=== 4 ===


http://www.jbs.org/visitor/rotnol/030525_transcript.htm

Review of the News, Week of May 25, 2003

Lies and Consequences

MP3 Format - 2.9 meg
Low Bandwidth RealAudio
High Bandwidth RealAudio

Hello and welcome to Review of the News Online. I'm William Norman
Grigg, Senior Editor for The New American magazine -- an affiliated
publication of The John Birch Society.

David Hicks, a 27-year-old Australian expatriate, is among the
captured Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters detained at Camp X-Ray in Cuba.
Like John Walker Lindh, the so-called "American Taliban," Hicks is a
disaffected western youth who became enchanted with Islam, and was
caught in a revolutionary undertow that took him first to Pakistan and
then to Afghanistan. Hicks' case is particularly interesting because
the first stop in his revolutionary odyssey was the Balkans, where he
joined the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (or KLA).

During the U.S.-led NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, Hicks was one of
several thousand international recruits who traveled to Kosovo to
fight on behalf of the KLA. Most of those volunteers were seduced by
the romantic image of the KLA as a hardy band of idealistic freedom
fighters seeking to save Kosovo's besieged Albanian Muslims from a
Nazi-like campaign of "ethnic cleansing."

The unappetizing truth about the KLA, as The New American reported
prior to the 1999 NATO campaign, was that the group "is a terrorist
criminal syndicate, Maoist in its ideological bent, hard-wired into
the international heroin trade, and tightly allied with Osama bin
Laden." That description was based on European press and intelligence
reports and information compiled by our own government.

During the 78-day NATO bombing of Serbia, KLA forces seized control
of key sectors in Kosovo. Today, that one-time Serbian province is now
a UN protectorate ruled by the KLA. Once Kosovo was placed in the
KLA's hands, it became a staging area for international narcotics
trafficking, the European sex slave trade, and terrorism. The illicit
profits generated by the KLA's narcotics and sex trade helped fund
the al-Qaeda network, with lethal consequences for Americans. As
demonstrated by the recent al-Qaeda attack against Americans in Saudi
Arabia, our nation is still paying a price in blood for our alliance
with the KLA.

Writing in the September 21, 2000 New York Review of Books, foreign
affairs correspondent Timothy Garton Ash expressed amazement that the
KLA, "a bunch of farmyard Albanian ex-Marxist-Leninist terrorists[,]
managed to enlist the United States to win their battles for them."
The most important weapon in the arsenal of the KLA and its allies,
Ash pointed out, was the global media, which inundated the public
with lurid atrocity tales. Thus conditioned, much of the public viewed
Serbian ruler Slobodan Milosevic as the reincarnation of Hitler, bent
on committing genocide against Kosovo Albanians. Accordingly, many
Americans supported NATO's terror bombing of Serbia as a justified
exercise in "humanitarian intervention."

At one point, as NATO warplanes battered civilian targets in Belgrade,
Bill Clinton claimed that as many as 600,000 ethnic Albanians were
"lying in mass graves [or] starving and too frightened to go home."
Speaking to NATO combat pilots in Aviano, Italy on April 8, 1999,
Secretary of Defense William Cohen raised the bid, accusing Serb
forces of "engaging in rape, pillage, and mass murder on a scale that
we have not seen since the end of World War II.... They have pushed
over a million people onto a highway of hell that is littered with
depravation and suffering that is almost unimaginable."

On another occasion, State Department spokesman James Rubin declared
that 100,000 Albanians were being held at the municipal stadium in
Pristina, Kosovo's provincial capital. As American media outlets
breathlessly reported this claim as a fact, France's AFP wire service
sent a reporter to Pristina to verify the story. That reporter found
that the stadium was "deserted and showing no signs of recent
occupation." The story about a makeshift concentration camp, it turns
out, was fed to Rubin by KLA leader Hashim Thaci, and retailed to an
uncritical media without being confirmed.

Following the so-called Kosovo War, as the KLA consolidated its
control over the province, the Wall Street Journal ran an expose
headlined: "War in Kosovo Was Cruel, Bitter, Savage; Genocide it
Wasn't: Tales of Mass Atrocity Arose and Were Passed Along, Often with
Little Proof." One co-author of that December 31, 1999 story was
Danny Pearl, who was later the victim of a hideous, videotaped murder
by al-Qaeda terrorists. Pearl's supposed offense, in the eyes of the
subhuman wretches who killed him, was to be an American and a Jew. But
the murder may also have been, at least in part, payback for Pearl's
efforts to expose the KLA's campaign of deception during the Kosovo
conflict.

In the Journal expose, Pearl and co-author Robert Block described the
propaganda efforts of KLA functionary Halit Barani, "a former actor
with a Karl Marx beard who summarizes Serb war crimes by showing a
photo of a baby with a smashed skull. [He] spent the war moving from
village to village with his manual typewriter, calling in reports to
foreign radio services and diplomats with his daily allotment of
three minutes on a KLA satellite phone."

Barani's fertile mind and antique typewriter were the primary source
for many of the lurid atrocity accounts cited by official sources
during NATO's assault on Yugoslavia. When Pearl and Block asked about
the reliability of his stories, Barani replied: "I told everybody it
was supposition, it was not confirmed information.... For the Serbs,
anything is possible." Significantly, Barani has been tapped to serve
as an "expert" witness for the prosecution in the UN's war crimes
trial of former Serbian ruler Slobodan Milosevic.

After the Serbs surrendered and allowed NATO and UN forces to occupy
Kosovo, forensic investigators from the UN and the FBI were
dispatched to collect evidence of genocide. Curiously, however, the
mass graves that figured so prominently in NATO's war propaganda
failed to materialize.

The U.S. and British governments insisted that "ethnic cleansing" had
claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent Kosovo
Albanians. However, Spanish forensic surgeon Emilio Perez Pujol, who
was sent by the UN's war crimes Tribunal to unearth evidence of
genocide, found that the identifiable remains of civilian victims in
Kosovo are numbered in the hundreds. This is what one would expect in
a brutal civil war - rather than thousands or tens of thousands of
casualties resulting from a campaign of genocide. In an interview
published by The Times of London on October 31, 1999, Pujol described
the notion that "mass graves" exist in Kosovo as "a semantic pirouette
by the war propaganda machines, because we did not find one - not one
- mass grave."

Kosovo's vanishing "mass graves" in 1999 eerily prefigured Iraq's
disappearing "weapons of mass destruction" (or WMDs) in 2003. The
Washington Post reported on May 11th that U.S. arms inspectors
combing Iraq for WMDs "[are] winding down operations without finding
proof that ... Saddam Hussein kept clandestine stocks of outlawed
arms...."

The May 17th edition of The Spectator of London reports: "All but a
handful of the list of sites drawn up by U.S. and British intelligence
[have] been thoroughly searched, and nothing [of consequence] ....
[has] been found." Comments Colonel Richard McPhee, a member of the
U.S. military's WMD task force in Iraq: "We came to bear country, we
came loaded for bear and we found out the bear wasn't there."

Just as forensic investigators in Kosovo found traces of a brutal and
bloody civil war, rather than genocide, U.S. weapons inspectors in
Iraq have found evidence that Saddam's regime had pursued WMDs, but
had not developed them. "We've found a lot of little pieces,"
commented U.S. arms inspector Lt.-Col. Brian Clark. "We need to put
it all together to make up the whole jigsaw."

This contrasts sharply with the apocalyptic statements of President
Bush and his subordinates regarding the supposed threat posed by Iraq
to the United States.
"The security of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein now,"
insisted the president two days before the U.S.-led attack. In a March
6th press conference, Mr. Bush declared: "I will not leave the
American people at the mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons."

But there were no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction -- a fact now
admitted by Bush administration spokesmen. "The Bush administration
has admitted that Saddam Hussein probably had no weapons of mass
destruction," reported the London Sunday Herald on May 4th. "Senior
administration officials have admitted that they would be `amazed' if
weapons of mass destruction ... were found in Iraq."

In other words, the Bush administration lied us into war in Iraq, just
as the Clinton administration lied us into war in Kosovo.

Our most recent enemy was a one-time ally who built his war machine
with the material and political support of Washington. The perfect
symbol of that relationship is the notorious photograph of
then-presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam
Hussein during a December 1983 visit to Baghdad. David Hicks, who
faces indefinite detention in Camp X-Ray as an "unlawful combatant,"
is a living symbol of a similar relationship between Washington and
al-Qaeda -- a much deadlier menace to Americans than Saddam ever was.

How much longer will Americans permit our rulers to create foreign
enemies -- and then passively swallow the lies our rulers tell us to
manipulate us into useless, senseless, destructive foreign wars?

Thank you for listening. Please join us again next time.

This has been Review of the News Online from The John Birch Society.
For more information about what you can do to preserve our freedoms,
call: 1-800-JBS-USA1.

LA DOMANDA DA UN MILIONE DI DOLLARI

"Per quale motivo la integrita' territoriale per voi non contava
quando si trattava di approvare lo smembramento della Jugoslavia e
l'unificazione tedesca?"

(Eduard Kokoyty, presidente della Repubblica dell'Ossezia del Sud, che
chiede l'indipendenza dalla Repubblica di Georgia a sua volta frutto
della secessione dall'URSS)


Subject: Quote Of The Day, From President Of South Ossetia
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2003 10:21:46 -0700 (PDT)
From: Rick Rozoff

http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/06/2-TCA/tca-030603.asp

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
June 3, 2003

SOUTH OSSETIAN PRESIDENT ACCUSES OSCE OF BIAS, DOUBLE
STANDARDS

-"Why did you not take into account [the paramount
need to preserve] territorial integrity when you
approved the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the
unification of Germany?"


Eduard Kokoyty, who is president of the unrecognized
Republic of South Ossetia, has accused the OSCE of
siding with Georgia in the dispute between the
Georgian government and the breakaway republic,
Caucasus Press reported on 3 June. He said the OSCE is
exceeding its mandate in trying to pressure South
Ossetia into accepting the status of an autonomous
republic within Georgia. "Why did you not take into
account [the paramount need to preserve] territorial
integrity when you approved the dismemberment of
Yugoslavia and the unification of Germany?" Kokoyty
asked. LF


ABKHAZIA ANTICIPATES NEW DESTABILIZATION

The Abkhaz leadership possesses reliable information
that the Georgian authorities are planning to
instigate unrest in Abkhazia's southernmost Gali Raion
in order to create a pretext for introducing a
nationwide state of emergency, Caucasus Press on 3
June quoted Abkhaz First Deputy Premier Astamur Tarba
as saying. LF

Justice for Yugoslavia!
Four years after the end of NATO "humanitarian" bombings...


1. Important links:
http://www.justiceyugoslavia.org/ - and more

2. When bombs fell on Belgrade
(Reprinted from the April 3, 2003, issue of Workers World newspaper)

3. A PARADOX?... Why Germany Voted 'Yes' To Invade Yugoslavia But 'No'
To Iraq (by Claus Häcking, Deutsche Welle)


=== 1 ===


LINKS:

A summary of NATO destructions, with many photos:
http://www.sramota.com/nato/

24/3: On the Day a Tragic Era Started (by Milos Markovic)
http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/jugoslavija/2003-04-07_1.html

March 24, 1999: NATO's Humanitarian Trigger (by Diana Johnstone)
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Kosovo-controversies16.html


=== http://www.justiceyugoslavia.org


Subject: Highly Recommended Web Site: Justice Yugoslavia
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2003 09:36:13 -0700 (PDT)
From: Rick Rozoff


Please find the time to visit (and revisit) the
updated Web site of the Campaign for Justice for the
Peoples of Yugoslavia at the address listed below.
It's run by David Roberts in Britain and is
consistently characterized by the insight and
integrity that are the hallmarks of David himself.
Yours for peace and justice,
Rick Rozoff


3 June

Dear Friends,

My http://www.justiceyugoslavia.org web site is now
functioning. It offers an alternative view of the
"humanitarian bombing".

It has a Nuremberg Prosecutor's damning criticism of
the NATO bombing and my own investigation called "NATO
on Trial - The Deceptions, Illegality, and Tragedy
of the Bombing of Yugoslavia: The manipulation of
public opinion, the media and politicians."

I hope you may find it interesting.

If you can publicise the site widely I'd be grateful.

Best wishes,
David


=== 2 ===


http://www.workers.org/ww/2003/edit0403.php


EDITORIAL
When bombs fell on Belgrade

As U.S. missiles pouring into Baghdad murder the very people Bush is
claiming to "liberate," the world should recall a similar aggression
by U.S. imperialism just four years ago. On March 24, 1999, the
Pentagon opened a bombing campaign on Yugoslavia that lasted 78
days. Washington sold that war with the big lie that it was a noble
venture, a "humanitarian" intervention. It was supposed to rescue
Kosovo and especially its ethnic Albanian population from alleged Serb
repression.

Washington then had closer collaboration from its NATO allies. The big
powers submerged their rivalry in order to smash independent
Yugoslavia.

Western politicians and the ruling class media got public support for
the war through an intensive campaign of demonization of the Yugoslav
leader Slobodan Milosevic, just as they do Saddam Hussein today. But
the assault on Yugoslavia had as little to do with Milosevic as the
war on Iraq today has to do with Hussein--except that neither
leader was ready to prostrate his country and submit to the interests
of Western imperialism.

The goal of the 78 days of brutal bombing--preceded by 10 years of
subversion, the fomenting of civil war and economic sanctions--was to
remove the one remaining independent country in Eastern Europe that
had kept some of the gains of its socialist revolution. Its people,
resources, industry and strategic location were to be taken over to
serve imperialist interests.

Taking stock today of the region that was once, and may again someday
be Yugoslavia, one can see clearly just what imperialist
"humanitarian" intervention has brought.

Four dependent mini-states, two imperialist protectorates and a Serbia
in chains have replaced an independent state of southern Slavs that
had 24 million people.

U.S. and NATO military bases dominate the territory. German and U.S.
capital dominate the economy.

Kosovo has become an apartheid state run by organized crime, a center
of drugs and prostitution based on the kidnapping of women. The
right-wing KLA gangs have driven out Serbs, Jews and other minority
people who lived there.

Whatever Yugoslav industry is potentially profitable, especially in
Serbia, has been sold at dirt-cheap prices to Western imperialism. The
rest has been closed, creating 30-50 percent unemployment and reducing
two-thirds of people in Serbia to official poverty.

The imperialist takeover has failed even to bring order. The recent
assassination of NATO-stooge Zoran Djindjic, Serbia's prime minister,
brought that failure home.

Anyone studying developments in the region following the U.S.-NATO
takeover of Yugoslavia might get a hint as to why the Iraqis are
fighting so hard to prevent the U.S.-British imper ialist gang from
seizing their country.

- END -

Reprinted from the April 3, 2003, issue of Workers World newspaper
(Copyright Workers World Service: Everyone is permitted to copy and
distribute verbatim copies of this document, but changing it is not
allowed. For more information contact Workers World, 55 W. 17 St., NY,
NY 10011; via email: ww@....
Subscribe wwnews-on@....
Unsubscribe wwnews-off@.... Support independent news
http://www.workers.org/orders/donate.php)


=== 3 ===


PARADOXES...
Why Germany Voted 'Yes' To Invade Yugoslavia But 'No' To Iraq

http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,7489_A_811834_1_A,00.html

19.03.2003

Why Germany Voted 'Yes' To Invade Yugoslavia But 'No' To Iraq
=

NATO strikes in Belgrade: Germany's first military deployment since
World War II

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has ruled out German military
participation in an Iraq war. But four years ago the Bundeswehr took
part in NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia without a U.N. mandate. So why
then and not now?

Chancellor Schroeder somberly addressed the nation on March 24, 1999,
shortly after NATO began bombing Yugoslavia. He announced that his
government had made a difficult decision.

"After all, this is the first time since World War II that German
soldiers have been deployed in combat," he said. "We are not waging a
war, but we must bring about a peaceful solution in Kosovo, even
if that requires the use of military force." [1]

Schroeder explained that this was the reason why the German government
had decided to take part in the military campaign against Slobodan
Milosevic's regime.

Today, the same governing coalition of Social Democrats and Greens has
rejected involvement in a war against Iraq, arguing that military
intervention would only serve to further destabilize the Middle East.
In 1999, the government used the opposite argument, maintaining
that the Balkans would be in greater danger if Germany did not act.

Explaining the contradiction

"In Kosovo, we had a situation of ongoing danger," [2] Social
Democratic Party foreign policy spokeswoman Ute Zapf told
Deutsche Welle in an interview. "It was about ethnic expulsion and
impending genocide. [3] Now, in Iraq, we have a potential threat
from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction [4] but no immediate danger."
Zapf insisted the problems were very different.

Germany's opposition parties hold a different view. Christoph Schmidt,
defense spokesman for the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian
sister party, the Christian Social Union, criticized the government
for committing itself too early to a "no" vote on participation in
order to assure Shroeder's autumn reelection bid last year. Now,
Schmidt says, Schroeder has no maneuvering room to change his
position.

"July 2002 was the point of departure," Schmidt explains. "Then
Schroeder tried to take advantage of the mood against military
intervention (in Iraq) for the election campaign. The price was that
other foreign policy options were abandoned. And now, getting out of
that without losing face is hard."

Political perspectives

Guenther Joetze believes that neither of these explanations is
sufficient. The former president of the Federal Academy for Security
Policy has written a book about Germany's role in the Kosovo conflict
and is working on a new book about its role in the Iraq crisis. Joetze
ascribes the German government's differing attitudes toward Kosovo and
Iraq to numerous motives. Above all, says Joetze, the government holds
different political perspectives for the two crisis regions.

In Kosovo, the international community was aiming to enforce
humanitarian and democratic standards [5], which cannot be transmitted
to Iraq as easily [6], Joetze maintains. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein
is not considered the only rogue [sic] in the region, which is why
the government does not believe that a war will improve the situation.

In the case of Kosovo, Joetze says, Germany's partners in NATO
expected that the German army, the Bundeswehr, would take part in
military operations [7]. The government had little choice but to say
"yes," Joetze maintains. Plus, the government had only been in office
for a short time and had to prove itself in the realm of foreign
policy. [sic]

"The Social Democrats didn't want to start their term in government
with discord in the coalition," Joetze insists. "Whereas, for Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer of the Green Party, the question was a
different one. It was made clear to him (as the junior partner
in the governing coalition) that he could only remain foreign
minister and a governing partner if he towed the same line."

International peacekeeping

Today, Joetze says the government is in a different position --
not just because it has been in office for four years, but also
because Germany is now the second-largest contributor of troops to
international peacekeeping operations [8] around the world.

"The defense minister and the chancellor say we continually prove
ourselves to be reliable partners," Joetze says. "We are prepared to
make our contribution. We can afford to have another opinion on one
particular question."

"(In 1999) the only international operation the Bundeswehr was
involved in was the air campaign against Yugoslavia. [9] There weren't
any German troops in Macedonia or Afghanistan yet. The issue was the
first NATO troop deployment."

Besides, the mood among the population has changed in the past four
years. Then, most Germans were in favor of a war against the Milosevic
regime. Today, the majority rejects a war against Saddam Hussein. [10]

In that light, Joetze defends Schroeder's firm position against an
Iraq war. Nor does he find the anti-war stance "reprehensible," as
some members of Germany's opposition government have. On the contrary,
he says, a major pillar of democratically elected representatives is
the idea of listening to the voice of the people and acting on those
wishes. [sic]

Claus Haecking


[NOTES by CNJ:
1. Compare with the terror and apartheid regime which has been
established in Kosovo since NATO bombings stopped.
2. Note that the true danger was initiated by the German BND support
to the UCK racially-motivated terrorists.
3. The expulsion of non-Albanians as well as democratic Albanians from
Kosovo has been successfully carried on after the NATO bombings.
4. This has been proved to be another big lie after the aggression
against Iraq was performed.
5. If this was the aim, then just have a look at the shameful results.
6. This is either racist or nonsense.
7. This is reasonable, due to the historical long-term colonial and
imperialistic role of Germany in the Balkans.
8. They use to call them like that.
9. Here, the bombings onto chemical plants and civilian
infrastructures, also by use of "depleted" uranium, are meant.
10. The desinformation and demonization campaign has been not
effective enough this time?]

1. VAPAJ SRPSKOG NARODA IZ VITINE

2. Polemika oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM


=== 1 ===

Informativna sluzba
Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve
30. maj 2003. godine

VAPAJ SRPSKOG NARODA IZ VITINE

Srpsko nacionalno vece Kosova i Metohije je poslalo tekst vapaja -
apela srpskog naroda iz Vitine u kome je popis nasilnickih dogadjaja
u Kosovskom Pomoravlju. Nakon porasta nasilja i pritisaka na srpsko
stanovnistvo ovog kraja, uz uporno negiranje pogorsanja bezbednosne
situacije od predstavnika americkog KFOR-a i UNMIK-a, narodu Kosovskog
Pomoravlja nije nista drugo preostalo nego da se javnim apelom obrati
srpskom narodu i vlastima u Beogradu i zatrazi njihovu pomoc.

VAPAJ PREOSTALOG SRPSKOG ZIVLJA NA TERITORIJI OPSTINE VITINA

Opet su nas po koji put ubili, opet smo po ko zna koji put postali
mete, tek sto smo se ponadali da je ubijanju kraj, da cemo moci barem
u svojim domovima, na svojim imanjima biti mirni. Ali mira i dalje
nema:

14. maja 2003. godine, na izlasku iz srpskog sela Vrbovac Albanci
pucnjevima zastrasuju zitelje tog sela.

15. maja 2003. godine u selu Mogila, inace mesovitog sastava,
uzvikivanjem antisrpskih parola po srpskim ulicama i klicanjem Ademu
Jasariju, Albanci provociraju Srbe i tokom noci su jednom Srbinu iz
pomenutog sela ukrali stoku.

16. maja 2003. godine albanski ucenici, dok slobodno prolaze kroz
srpsko selo Vrbovac, na albanskom jeziku pevaju provokativne pesme, u
smislu «Sve smo Srbe proterali i vas cemo uskoro». Vec istog dana od
strane Albanaca stizu glasine da ce ubiti sedmoro Srba iz ovih
krajeva.

17. maja 2003. godine, Albanci ostvaruju svoju pretnju ubivsi na
zverski nacin Zorana Mirkovica, starog 44 godine, pored njegovog tela
ostavljajuci poruku u kojoj stoji u naslovu: Albanska nacionalna
armija, a tekst pretece sadrzine potpisao je tzv. ''komandant Celi''.
Nastradali Zoran, profesor ruskog jezika, otac troje maloletne dece,
veliki covek i dobar domacin, krenuo je biciklom u obilazak svog
imanja. Ubivsi njega, ubili su jos jedan deo nase ranjene,
raskrvavljene i bespomocne duse.

19. maja 2003. godine, u srpskom selu Klokot pokusavaju da kidnapuju
Srbina iz tog sela, Stanka Misica, koji je takodje posao da obidje
svoje imanje u blizini sela, ali uspeva da se nekako izvuce, najvise
zahvaljujuci blizini crkve i punktu KFOR-a, gde je i pobegao.

21. maja 2003. godine, u Vitini, u sopstvenom dvoristu je pretucen
90-godisnjeg starac Slavko Stamenkovic, naocigled njegove zene kojoj
su rukom zatvorili usta kako ne bi dozivala u pomoc.

22. maja 2003. godine u selu Klokotu je pretucen ucenik drugog razreda
Srednje ekonomske skole Milan Pavic, u blizini svoje kuce, dok je na
autobuskoj stanici cekao skolski autobus.

25. maja 2003. godine u selu Klokot zapaljena je kuca Momcila Savica.

Skrhani bolom, kad nas beznadje i bespomocnost olicena u 45 nevino
ubijenih dusa i deset zivota za koje se neizvesnost sve vise pretvara
u strasnu izvesnost, bez potvrde, po ko zna koji put dizemo svoj glas.

Ne znamo da li da ove reci nazovemo apelom, jer smo apelima i Bogu
dosadili, ili protestom - protestom protiv sveopsteg zla koje na
ogromnu zalost lezi tu pored nas i oko nas, ali ga niko ne vidi, a
posebno oni koji su za to zaduzeni i za to placeni; i ne znamo dokle
cemo jos biti mete za odstrel, samo zato sto smo Srbi i sto jos uvek
zivimo u svojim ognjistima.

Svaka zrtva koju smo u koraku, u snu, u poslu, u strahu dali, rana je
koja nikada nece zaceliti. Od oko 11.000 koliko nas je bilo na
podrucju opstine Vitina, od dolaska KFOR-a ostalo nas je nekih 3.000,
u dva srpska sela, jedno koje je to bilo do pre godinu dana, od 15
mesovitih sela ostala su jos samo dva, a opstinski centar Vitina od 70
procenata srpskog sastava postao je tamnica za stotinak staraca i onih
koji nemaju gde.

Zivot u tim getoiziranim mestima, gde je prividno sve u nekoj normali,
gde god da se nalazis, sa svakog drveta, iz svakog jarka, iz svakog
automobila, vreba te potencijalna opasnost, jer su se sva stradanja
desavala u slicnim situacijama, mucki, bez izazova i znanja. Takvo
stanje neminovno donosi pitanje - ko je sledeca zrtva?

I pored svakog napora da ostanemo prisebni i ubedimo ljude oko sebe da
postoji neko ko o nama misli, ne mozemo da ubedimo sebe, jer nas
stvarnost demantuje, pa smo postali sumnjicavi i na Boziju pomoc.

17. maja pala je poslednja zrtva, Boze daj! Nas veliki prijatelj i
veliki, veliki covek, s obzirom koliko smo mi mali i nejaki. Jos jedna
porodica je ostala ucveljena, bez hranioca, sa neizvesnom buducnoscu.

Necemo Vas kritikovati, jer Vas ne boli, i mozda ce ovo pismo biti tek
puki tekst koji ce zavrsiti u korpi, ali ako ste poceli, procitajte ga
do kraja, misleci na svoje porodice koje su, nadamo se, srecne i
daleko od zla koje je nasa svakodnevica, i koje nas unistava samo zato
sto smo pravoslavni Srbi.

OVO JE PROTEST NASE DUSE SVIMA KOJI SU ZA TO ODGOVORNI:

PROTIV UBIJANjA koje nas prati i preti nasem istrebljenju, jer se za
to ne bira ni mesto, niti vreme, ni oruzje, niti nacin, ni ime, niti
prezime, ni uzrast, niti starost, samo je bitno da je zrtva
pravoslavni Srbin i da je cilj ostvaren: jos jedan Srbin manje, jos
jedno oruzje koje ubija razloge opstajanja na rodnom ognjistu.

PROTIV FIZICKOG UGNjETAVANjA koje se svakodnevno manifestuje kroz
ranjavanja, prebijanja, kamenovanja, i druge vidove represija, sto
uslovljava strah za odrzavanjem golog zivota, strah za slobodnim
kretanjem i radom, a zavrsava najcesce napustanjem svojih vekovnih
ognjista i strahom za povratkom na njih.

PROTIV DUHOVNOG GENOCIDA koje se manifestuje kroz unistavanje
visevekovnog nasledja jednog naroda, kroz rusenje njegovih svetinja
(crkava i manastira), skrnavljenje grobalja i unistavanje tragova
postojanja i kulture jednog hriscanskog naroda koji se civilizacijski
izvorno identifikuje na podrucju Kosmeta.

PROTIV SVAKOG OBLIKA INSTITUCIONALNE DISKRIMINACIJE koja nazalost samo
zamenjuje fizicke oblike pritisaka i u kombinaciji s njima unistava
svaki vid perspektive za blisku, a jos vise za dalju buducnost
zajednickog zivljenja.

PROTIV MRZNjE I GOVORA ORUZJA UMESTO RAZUMA.

PROTIV NARUSAVANjA SVOJINSKIH PRAVA kroz razne oblike unistavanja,
prisvajanja, otudjivanja: kuca, stanova, zemljista, poljoprivredne
mehanizacije, stoke i ostalog. Za navedene pojave zaduzeni subjekti
medjunarodne zajednice imaju milione podataka i dokaza, ali problemi
vec cetiri godine ostaju nereseni, sto kod preostalih Srba radja
osecaj konstantne bespomocnosti i nezainteresovanosti za
institucionalnu borbu za ostvarivanje svojih prava.

PROTIV SOCIJALNE BEDE koja je uslovljena proterivanjem sa radnih mesta
hiljada radnika, cime je bez sredstava za egzistenciju ostao veliki
broj porodica, sto je dodatno uslovilo odlazak sa svojih ognjista.

PROTIV SMANjENjA PRISUSTVA SNAGA KFOR-A sto uslovljava i otvara siri
prostor za delovanje terorizma.

PROTIV DELOVANjA ALBANSKE TERORISTICKE ORGANIZACIJE «ANA» NA OVIM
PROSTORIMA

U IME BESPOMOCNIH SRBA OPSTINE VITINA
SRPSKO NACIONALNO VECE ZA KOSOVO I METOHIJU, OPSTINA VITINA
Slede potpisi clanova SNV KIM opstine Vitina

=== 2 ===

[O polemike oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM procitaj:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/2520 ]


Polemika oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM

http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/glas_dijaspore/2003-05-19_1.html

Slobodan R. Stojanovic
Brazil, 19. maja 2003. godine

Posstovana gospodo,

ZZelim da se ukljuccim u ovu diskusiju ne bih li
doprineo pojassnjavanju nekih vazznih taccaka.

Najvechi problem u ovom sluccaju je taj ssto su oba
sagovornika u pravu. I Emil Vlajki i SNV Kosova i
Metohije. Ipak postoje detalji koji su po meni vrlo
vazzni za sagledavanje problema. Evo o ccemu se radi:

Ako nekoga treba kriviti za MAZOHISTICKO SLUGANSTVO
onda to nisu organizacije Srba sa Kosova i Metohije,
vech vlada drzzave Srbije. Odgovornost te vlade za
buduchnost srpskog naroda, kako materijalnu tako i
duhovnu, neuporedivo je vecha od odgovornosti svih
organizacija Srba sa Kosova zajedno.

Ali ni to nije najvechi problem. Najvechi problem je
stav vechinskog dela srpskog naroda prema Kosovu i
Metohiji i svojih trenutnim nedachama. Jer ne traba da
gubimo iz vida da vlada jedne drzzave kako-tako ipak
predstavlja vechinu naroda. Dakle, pravo pitanje je:
Koja je to volja vechine srpskog naroda?

Na ovo pitanje odgovor smo dobili u visse navrata.

1. Neposredno po zakljuccenju primirja, kojim su
Kosovo i Metohija postali strani protektorat, u
Beogradu se mogao ccitati ccuveni grafit: "Imass
mostove, jebess Kosovo." Ljudi su se tada radovali
kraju rata, i nisu tugovali zbog gubitka Kosova.
Ustvari mnogi jesu, ali ono ssto je tada moglo da se
vidi, dakle ono ssto se nametalo kao vechina, bila je
radost i slavlje zbog kraja rata.

2. Iako je ta ista vechina sve vreme stajala uz svoga
vodju - najpre su mu na referendumu dali ovlasschenja
da brani Kosovo, a zatim su slavljenjem okonccanja
rata podrzzali njegov potpis kapitulacije -, ta ista
magarecha vechina ga je srussila s vlasti, vodjena i
navodjena ssargarepom od 70-90 miliona dolara. I ne
samo to. Da ne bi bilo nikakve sumnje na ccijoj su
strani, oni su na juriss zauzeli Narodnu Skupsstinu,
unusstili dokaze o prethodnim izborima, pokrali mnoge
vredne umetniccke predmete, unisstili mnoge koje nisu
mogli da ponesu, i ZAPALILI SKUPSSTINU.

Neki mogu da kazzu kako se nije radilo o vechini. Ali
ja o tim podacima sudim prema stvarnom efektu, a ne
prema teoretskim brojevima koje nismo u stanju da
utvrdimo. Jer u sluccaju vandalizma u Narodnoj
Skupsstini postoji joss jedan detalj: ni snage
bezbednosti, koje su bile znatna manjina u odnosu na
rulju koja je opkolila Skupsstinu, nisu zzelele da
brane drzzavnu imovinu.

3. Sramno izruccenje bivsseg predsednika zloccincima
koji su nas ubijali 1999. Joss jednom isto: vechina je
sve vreme bila uz bivsseg predsednika, ali kada
ssargarepa postane dovoljno velika i
neodoljiva("ulazak u Evropu" ili "zziveti kao sav
normalni svet")
magarci namerno brissu svoju memoriju, i okrechu novi
list (svoje istorije).

Naravno, ima tu i mnogih drugih detalja. Jer ne treba
zaboraviti ni to da se i bivssi predsednik savrsseno
uklapa u taj mozaik: ccak ni sina nije poslao na
Kosovo za koje se vodila bitka.

Sve ovo zajedno daje nam sliku o nama samima. Kako
posle svega toga mozzemo da bacamo krivicu na Srbe sa
Kosova i optuzzujemo ih za SLUGARENJE I MAZOHIZAM.
SRPSKU NACIJU KAO CELINU, nju treba optuzziti, a ne
jedan njen MAJUSSNI I ZANEMARLJIVI DELICH, koji
zapravo i nema drugog izbora; osim ukoliko KOLEKTIVNO
SAMOUBISTVO NE ISKLJUCCIMO iz arsenala moguchih
ressenja.

Subject: [yugoslaviainfo] Bosnia's Founding Stepfather
Date: Thu, 29 May 2003 07:21:30 +0200
From: "Darka"
To: <Ova adresa el. pošte je zaštićena od spambotova. Omogućite JavaScript da biste je videli.>




http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m052803.html

Antiwar.com
May 28, 2003

Bosnia's Founding Stepfather


How the US 'Ended' the Bosnian War

To End A War, by Richard Holbrooke
New York, Random House, June 1998, 432 pages (hardcover)

Few things have been as grossly misunderstood as the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, commonly known by its
birthplace as "Dayton." Agreed at the
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton,
Ohio and initialed in Paris, France on 21 November
1995, the Dayton Agreement finally established
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, after a three-year
interethnic war following its 1992 international
recognition. It also completely failed to resolve any of
issues that caused the war.

Instead, it was a feat of social engineering
unprecedented at the time, attempting through force
and bluster to forge a nation out of bitter enmities.
That should not have surprised anyone, given that
force and bluster were the main character traits of
Dayton's chief creator, rogue American diplomat
Richard Holbrooke.

Proud 'Peacemaker'

Holbrooke had a long and distinguished career in
foreign affairs, starting from his Foreign Service job
in Vietnam in 1962. He also edited the Foreign
Policyjournal (1972-76), served as Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
(1977-1981), US Ambassador to Germany (1993-94),
and Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (1994-96). It was in this last
capacity that he came to preside over the "peace
process" in Bosnia.

To End A War is an extraordinary book documenting
not just his endeavors in Bosnia, but the underlying
logic, emotions and politics behind them. For all his
failings - arrogance, ignorance and vanity easily
spring to mind - Holbrooke is also earnest. Though
his memoir is as self-serving as, say, Lord David
Owen's Balkan Odyssey, unlike Owen, Holbrooke is
not trying to make excuses: he is actually proud of his
actions, thoughts and opinions. There is not one hint
of modesty - false or otherwise - in Holbrooke, and
for that one must be grateful. For in chronicling his
efforts to badger, bully and beat the Bosnians into
ending their war - on American terms, of course - he
offers surprisingly clear insights into the U.S.
Balkans policy at the time, and his own role therein.

Reading Holbrooke's memoir, one needs to keep in
mind that this man is the chief creator of the current
Bosnian state, a paradox protectorate continuing to
exist in spite of itself.

'I Am The Empire'

Anyone who even slightly doubts the Official Truth
about the Balkans wars will be struck by Holbrooke's
cavalier dismissal of any pretense of civility when
dealing with the locals - especially the Serbs, for
whom he had only disdain dangerously bordering on
hatred. To him, prejudices, deceptions and
fabrications represent fully justified means to the
goal. Cautioned by his British colleague to treat Serbs
with some consideration, Holbrooke replied:

"The Serb view of history was their problem. ours
was to end a war." (110)

One is tempted to wonder if that was a royal "we."
Holbrooke not only represented the United States, he
literally made American policy concerning Bosnia,
often on the spot. He was no mere emissary, but an
avatar of the entire American government in the eyes
of the warring factions. When Secretary of State
Warren Christopher told him, "I'm not always sure
what you are doing, or why. but you always seem to
have a reason, and it seems to work," (239) it was
abundantly clear that Holbrooke had a carte blanche
from his superiors.

Bombs for Peace

One thing Holbrooke used this power for was to
orchestrate Imperial intervention and support certain
combatants in actions that would normally be
condemned as despicable and even atrocious. For
example, the greatest ethnic cleansing of the entire
war, the August 1995 Croat offensive against the
Serbian Krajina, is put into perspective in Chapter 6.
During one meeting with Croatian officials, Robert
Frasure, a senior US diplomat who soon thereafter
died on the road to Sarajevo, handed Holbrooke a
note:

Dick: We "hired" these guys to be our junkyard dogs
because we were desperate. We need to try to
"control" them. But it is no time to get squeamish
about things. (73)

Holbrooke's sympathies for the official Bosnian
Muslim cause (as opposed to the real cause) are
revealed as early as Chapter 3. In a 1992 policy
proposal to the Clinton administration, he advocated
"direct use of force against the Serbs," (52) something
he finally had a chance to do in 1995. After an
explosion in Sarajevo killed a dozen people in the
marketplace, NATO began bombing Bosnian Serb
targets determined months in advance (102).

The bombing helped establish NATO - and the
Americans - as the strongest party in the conflict.
Peace took a back seat to power: "It is now essential to
establish that we are negotiating from a position of
strength. if the air strikes resume and hurt the
negotiations, so be it." (119)

There was also no doubt as to whose side the US
supported: "It helped that Izetbegovic saw I was
fighting hard for something he desperately wanted -
the resumption of the bombing." (131)

Holbrooke's determination resulted in a plea to
Washington: "Give us bombs for peace." (132) And a
strategy was born.

Holbrooke and Milosevic

By the time the bombing, cajoling, badgering, and
"shuttle diplomacy" gathered the representatives of
three warring parties at the airbase near Dayton -
deliberately chosen as a display of American air
power (233) - Holbrooke was almost completely in
control of orchestrating the end the Bosnian War. His
greatest coup was managing to maneuver Serbian
president Milosevic into representing the Bosnian
Serbs, thus making it appear Belgrade was always
behind their actions - just what the Muslim and
western propaganda had alleged all along.

Those especially interested in better understanding
Milosevic can find much useful information in
Holbrooke's memoir. Even though he worked
relentlessly against the "Serb aggression," (42) and
tried to trick, bully and double-cross the Serbian
leader, Holbrooke cannot help but describe Milosevic
with a mixture of grudging admiration and respect:

"Watching Milosevic turn on his charm, Warren
Cristopher observed that had fate dealt him a
different birthplace and education, he would have
been a successful politician in a democratic country."
(235)

No wonder that Milosevic wants to call Holbrooke as
a defense witness before the Hague Inquisition.

Liar, Cheat and Bully

Holbrooke's own accounts of Dayton indicate that his
team was literally negotiating on behalf of the
Muslims, whose role was limited to petulantly
rejecting all solutions in the hope that better (i.e. more
favorable) ones would be produced next. At one point,
the Americans succeeded in securing 55% of the
territory for the Muslim-Croat Federation - until
Milosevic accidentally saw the charts aimed to
persuade the Muslims and angrily accused Holbrooke
of cheating him (295).

Realizing the Americans were not honest brokers,
Milosevic then tried to strike a deal with the Muslims
directly, and signed away territory after territory to
make that possible:

"It was clear: Milosevic wanted an agreement then
and there. But he insisted, at all times, to 51-49."
(299)

But even as Milosevic and Izetbegovic's foreign
minister Silajdzic agreed on a map (though with much
protestations from the Croats), Izetbegovic himself
refused to accept it! Here is Holbrooke's reaction:

"At 11:00 a.m., [EU envoy Carl] Bildt came to my
room to ask how we were doing. 'We are deeply
concerned,' I said, that even if Milosevic makes more
concessions, the Bosnians will simply raise the ante.'

'Do you think Izetbegovic even wants a deal?' Carl
asked. It was a question that Warren Christopher had
also been asking. 'I'm never quite sure,' I replied.
'Sometimes he seems to want revenge more than
peace - but he can't have both.' Chris Hill, normally
highly supportive of the Bosnians, exploded in
momentary anger and frustration. 'These people are
impossible to help,' he said. It was a telling statement
from a man who had devoted years of his life to the
search for ways to help create a Bosnian state." (302)

Note that "Bosnian" here is used interchangeably with
"Muslim." Policy was made based on such ignorant
assumptions. But were they ignorant, or deliberately
malicious? For Holbrooke himself uses the term
"Muslims" often enough. For example, when
discussing the status of Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo,
which both he and Izetbegovic insisted on reuniting
under Muslim rule:

"[Milosevic] still sought political equality among
ethnic groups in Sarajevo, a proposal we rejected
because it would disadvantage the Muslims, who
would be vulnerable to a Serb-Croat coalition or Serb
obstructionism." (259)

As a result, Sarajevo is over 90% Muslim today.

A Call to Empire

As a direct result of Dayton, Serbs and Croats in
Bosnia are again increasingly vulnerable to political
domination by the Muslims - the very issue which
sparked the war in 1992. But Holbrooke could care
less - when the Dayton agreement was signed, it
accomplished a much greater purpose than ending the
Bosnian War: "Suddenly, the war was over - and
America's role in post-Cold War Europe redefined."
(358)

Indeed, it was Holbrooke who most clearly articulated
the Imperial argument that intervention in the
Balkans helped shape the post-Cold War course of
U.S. foreign policy:

"Criticism of President Clinton as a weak leader
ended abruptly, especially in Europe and among the
Muslim nations. [.] [E]ven those who chafed at the
reassertion of American power conceded, at least
implicitly, its necessity. [.] After Dayton, American
foreign policy seemed more assertive, more muscular.
This may have been as much perception as reality, but
the perception mattered." (359)

It began with Bosnia, continued in Kosovo, and went
on to Afghanistan and Iraq, each intervention more
brazen than the one before, each accepted because of
the precedent of the one before. That Bush escalated
the policy initiated under Clinton only shows that
Empire transcends party lines.

Holbrooke concluded To End A War with a call to
Empire:

"There will be other Bosnias in our lives - areas
where early outside involvement can be decisive, and
American leadership will be required. The world's
richest nation, one that presumes to great moral
authority, cannot simply make worthy appeals to
conscience and call on others to carry the burden. The
world will look to Washington for more than rhetoric
the next time we face a challenge to peace." (369)

Even though he is no longer a major player, his call
has been heeded. So much for the "day everything
changed."

From Star to Footnote

Crafting the Dayton Accords may have been the
pinnacle of Holbrooke's career. After a two-year
stint as an investment banker, he re-entered
diplomatic waters with mixed results. In late 1998, he
tried to repeat his work in Bosnia by persuading
Yugoslav president Milosevic to surrender Kosovo.
But the same trick could not work on Milosevic
twice. Holbrooke returned home in defeat.

The following year, he was nominated as the US
Ambassador to the UN, but the appointment stalled
when he was accused of violating federal ethics
guidelines. He admitted no wrongdoing but paid the
fine. After the UN stint, he was tapped to become
Secretary of State in Gore's administration. The
scandal-ridden election of 2000 extinguished that
hope. Richard Holbrooke thus passed from the
diplomatic stage, and it is unclear whether he will
ever step into the limelight again. But even as he
becomes a footnote in American politics, the effects
of his 1995 campaign in Bosnia remain, lingering on
as a reminder of what one arrogant, unscrupulous man
can do with Imperial power.

And if that is not the best argument against the
existence of Imperial power, what is?

-Nebojsa Malic

Ciao,

desideriamo farti sapere che, nella sezione File del gruppo
crj-mailinglist, troverai un nuovo file appena caricato.

File : /BimbiXPace.jpg
Caricato da : jugocoord <jugocoord@...>
Descrizione : Iniziativa per Kragujevac al Teatro Stabile Sloveno di Trieste, 7 giugno 2003

Puoi accedere al file dal seguente indirizzo:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/BimbiXPace.jpg

Per ulteriori informazioni su come condividere i file con gli altri
iscritti al tuo gruppo, vai invece alla sezione di Aiuto al seguente
indirizzo:
http://help.yahoo.com/help/it/groups/files


Cordiali saluti,

jugocoord <jugocoord@...>

1. Il confronto con Kucan e lo stato di salute di Milosevic.
(Dispacci ANSA dal sito: http://www.ansa.it/balcani/)

2. EX-SLOVENIAN PRESIDENT MILAN KUCAN TESTIFIES AT THE HAGUE
Written By: Vera Martinovic - May 24, 2003 -
www.slobodan-milosevic.org

3. MILOSEVIC RECOVERS FROM ILLNESS: "TRIAL" TO RESUME THURSDAY
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - May 28, 2003


=== 1 ===


Dispacci ANSA dal sito: http://www.ansa.it/balcani/


TPI: MILOSEVIC; SOSPESO PROCESSO, SLOBO AMMALATO

(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 27 MAG - Nuova sospensione all'Aja del processo
contro Slobodan Milosevic per i problemi di salute dell'ex-uomo forte
dei Baslcani. La Corte giudicante ha annunciato questa mattina un
rinvio dell'udienza: Milosevic ''ha la febbre'' ha precisato un
portavoce del Tribunale Penale Internazionale. Il processo, iniziato
nel febbraio 2002, e' gia' stato sospeso otto volte a causa delle
precarie condizioni di salute dell'ex-presidente jugoslavo, che ha in
particolare problemi cardio-vascolari. Milosevic e' accusato di
presunti crimini di guerra e contro l'umanita' per le guerre in
Kosovo, Bosnia e Croazia. (ANSA). CEF 27/05/2003 10:55


MILOSEVIC: TPI, SCINTILLE A UDIENZA CON EX PRESIDENTE SLOVENO

(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 21 MAG - Slobodan Milosevic all'attacco
nell'udienza di oggi al processo all'Aja del Tpi: l'ex uomo forte di
Belgrado ha accusato l'ex presidente della Slovenia, Milan Kucan, di
essere responsabile della disintegrazione dell'ex Jugoslavia avvenuta
nel 1991. ''Perche' ha scelto la guerra? Per quale ragione ha
attaccato l'esercito federale jugoslavo in Slovenia?'', ha chiesto
Slobo nel suo controinterrogatorio a Kucan, che ha testimoniato contro
l'ex presidente durante l'udienza di oggi nel processo in corso al
Tribunale penale internazionale sull'ex Jugoslavia dell'Aja. Kucan ha
a sua volta ''rifiutato'' energicamente le dichiarazioni di Milosevic,
il cui ''messaggio'' di fronte all'implosione jugoslava - ha detto
l'ex capo dello stato sloveno - era che ''non avrebbe mai accettato
che i serbi residenti fuori dalla Serbia non rientrassero sotto
l'autorita' di Belgrado''. Kucan, 62 anni, e' stato dal 1986 capo del
partito comunista sloveno che si oppose alla politica del partito
serbo di Milosevic. Nel 1990 divenne presidente della Slovenia che un
anno dopo proclamo' l'indipendenza dalla federazione jugoslava.
Nell'estate del 1991 le forze armate jugoslave cercarono di prendere
il controllo della repubblica secessionista, ma si ritirarono dopo due
mesi di resistenza slovena. (ANSA) RIG 21/05/2003 16:04


MILOSEVIC: DUBBI SU MEDICINE DATEGLI IN CARCERE TPI, STAMPA

(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 23 NOV - Un quotidiano olandese ha oggi sollevato
dubbi sulla cura medica seguita in carcere all'Aja dall'ex-presidente
jugoslavo Slobodan Milosevic, il cui non buono stato di salute ha
costretto il tribunale dell'Onu a interrompere piu' volte il processo
dall'estate scorsa.
Stando a 'Nrc Handelsblad', che cita ''fonti del tribunale'',
a Milosevic, che soffre fra l'altro di ipertensione, sarebbero stati
somministrati negli ultimi tempi farmaci sbagliati, che avrebbero
provocato anzi un incremento dei problemi di pressione arteriosa.
Questa, secondo le fonti citate dal quotidiano, sarebbe stata la causa
del nuovo deterioramento della salute di Milosevic, il cui processo e'
stato interrotto per due settimane nell'ultimo mese a causa
dell'affaticamento eccessivo e di una crisi ipertensiva dell'imputato.
Slobo e' sotto processo all'Aja dal 2 febbraio scorso: e' accusato
davanti al Tpi di crimini di guerra, contro l'umanita' e genocidio per
le sue presunte responsabilita' nelle atrocita' perpetrate nelle
guerre in Bosnia, Croazia e Kosovo. Un portavoce del Tpi ha pero'
contestato questo pomeriggio le informazioni riportate dal quotidiano
olandese. ''Le medicine somministrate a Milosevic non sono
assolutamente cambiate negli ultimi mesi'' ha detto Christian
Chartier. Secondo il portavoce la cura seguita dall'ex-presidente
jugoslavo e' stata approvata anche dal cardiologo di famiglia
di Milosevic a Belgrado. ''Ci ha detto che non poteva seguire una cura
migliore'', ha affermato Chartier. Nei giorni scorsi due giuristi
internazionali che assistono il Tpi nel caso Milosevic hanno
consigliato alla Corte di disporre la scarcerazione dell'imputato per
ragioni di salute per un anno, in modo da consentirgli di seguire il
processo in migliori condizioni. Ma il procuratore capo del Tpi Carla
Del Ponte si e' opposta alla richiesta. (ANSA). CEF 23/11/2002 15:11


=== 2 ===


http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/martinovic052403.htm

EX-SLOVENIAN PRESIDENT MILAN KUCAN TESTIFIES AT THE HAGUE

Written By: Vera Martinovic - May 24, 2003


On Wednesday, May 21, 2003 former Slovenian President, Milan Kucan
testified at the so-called "trial" of Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague.

Milan Kucan, the former President of Slovenia, made a huge mistake by
testifying at the Hague Tribunal. The only excuse for him would be if
he was actually summoned, and therefore unable to refuse, but, if he
did volunteer, it was the wrong thing to do, because he contributed
nothing to the Prosecution's case and only brought the limelight onto
the 10-day 'war' in Slovenia.

Equally questionable were the motives of the Prosecution to have Kucan
as a witness at all: gaining nothing from him, and addressing by his
testimony a time-span and topics never covered by any of the ICTY
indictments.

Be that as it may, as Kucan testified, and contributed nothing, he
enabled Milosevic to shed light onto Slovenia's dirty little war with
its financial and political motives, and its own war crimes. The role
of Slovenia in the breaking up of Yugoslavia, aiding and abetting of
other separatisms, breaking the UN arms embargo etc. etc.

Kucan on the other hand did manage to tarnish his own personal
reputation of a well-spoken, well-informed politician.

Kucan proved insufficient, in spite of the dedicated work done by his
team of advisors, lawyers, and top members of the Slovenian military,
who all frantically worked to prepare their ex-president for his day
in The Hague. Kucan's advisers rehearsed all kinds of possible
questions with him, but the result was that the not-so-well-spoken
"Balkan ruffian", Milosevic, was wittier and far better informed.

All that Kucan managed to do was exude the exaggerated rhetoric of
'democratic community of peoples', 'democratization of life',
'European solutions' and 'different concepts' etc...

It was just as a Slovenian journalist in front of the Tribunal
building said when she was interviewed by the TV B92 correspondent the
morning before the trial transmission began: 'He's well prepared,
he'll explain why Slovenia went its own way, he's a good speaker, very
intelligent; if he comes across gentlemanly [gospodski], he'll show
that Slovenia has nothing to hide; but, all depends on what kind of
questions will Milosevic ask...'

Kucan did indeed behave like a gentleman, unfortunately he was an
ill-informed, and at times confused gentleman; surely regretting now
that he was involved in this at all.

True to form Milosevic asked the expected unpleasant and to-the-point
questions, but more significantly, he had all the possible information
and documents, unlike Kucan, who at times made some serious blunders.

Prosecutor Nice tried to press Kucan for the background of the
Yugoslav breakdown, and the "sinister role" that Milosevic played in
it, but all he managed to get was bits and pieces from two of
Milosevic's speeches, taken totally out of context. Some of the
excerpts he used were not even whole sentences, but parts of sentences
and even individual words that were highlighted with a marker on the
overhead projector. Then the prosecutor asked Kucan to comment on
those excerpts.

The case in point was the 'non-institutional means', which Kucan
interpreted as the 'non-constitutional means for changing things in
Yugoslavia'. However, it was obvious from the context that the excerpt
actually meant that the institutions in Kosovo in 1989 were not
responding to the problems, so the Serbs had to protest peacefully in
the streets against the abuses of the local Albanian government,
outside the institutions, forcing those the institutions to act, which
is the legitimate right of any citizen. It must have been embarrassing
for Kucan to be publicly instructed by Milosevic in his
cross-examination about the definitions of the words 'institutional'
and 'constitutional'.

Would you believe that Prosecutor Nice even pulled out that
unfortunate Kosovo Polje speech again, wanting Kucan to 'make a
connection', so Kucan joined the club of those who vaguely misquoted
and took out of context from that overly-misused speech.

Even May was sick of that threadbare 'trump card', so he quite rudely
interrupted Kucan, saying that the Chamber has already heard enough on
that speech from others.

Kucan got a bit offended, saying: 'Let me finish my thought' and
proceeded with his broad misquote: 'It was said that the Serb people
is not yet in armed battles, but that this could not be excluded and
that the changes will be made by any means.' (?!) That was NOT said
anywhere in this famous speech.

By the way, Kucan 'explained' that the speech was given at the 500th
anniversary of the Kosovo Polje Battle, missing it by only a 100 years
(the battle happened in 1389, the speech in 1989, so simple arithmetic
tells you that it was in fact the 600th anniversary).

Milosevic, of course, took the opportunity to quote whole paragraphs
from both speeches later on, demonstrating that the false
interpretations and misrepresentations made by the other side simply
don't stand.

The other tackle by Nice was to urge Kucan to give his opinions and
interpretations on the 'real' meaning of certain events. So, many of
his answers boiled to 'it actually means', 'Serbia actually opted
for', 'nobody believed that', 'this is how we understood that'. Again,
such interpretations were either exaggerated or totally opposite to
the true meaning. At times, he even went wild in his assumptions, like
when he read the intentions of 'the Serbs', who refused the Slovenian
'concept of dissolution' of Yugoslavia. 'This is how I understood it',
Kucan bravely plunged in: Since the Serbs thought the internal borders
of the republics to be merely administrative; they 'implied that the
borders could be altered by force'.

Quite a broad implication indeed, nobody said that, or wrote that
anywhere, yet Kucan knows that they actually meant that. Could it be
that they meant the administrative borders should be simply
renegotiated? No, those barbarians are incapable of such a gentlemanly
concept, so the gentleman assumed they actually implied violence.
Still, I don't understand how assumptions can constitute any sort of
evidence given by a witness at a trial.

Prosecutor Nice then resorted to his favorite illustration for
practically everything - the BBC documentary 'The Death of
Yugoslavia.' This time he played the video of that notorious 14th
Congress of the League of Communists from January 1990, when the
Slovenian delegation walked out of the meeting after 'almost
all' of their amendments were rejected 'because we had been outvoted.'
Kucan explained that had been deliberately done to oust them, and 'the
accused (Milosevic) was the first, or among those who first lifted his
voting card and the others followed'.

Kucan is aware that he's talking to Westerners here, who know zilch
about the Communist Party apparatus and could easily swallow such an
explanation. But, Kucan is an old Communist cadre, so he should know
better.

In brief: at the full meeting, the plenum, where all the Congress
delegates are present (3-4,000 of them), nothing was ever decided, and
nothing ever happened that was not previously prepared and agreed
upon. So, if the Slovenian delegation started, out of the blue, to put
to vote outrageous proposals, which were a surprise to everybody, not
discussed and agreed upon previously in the inner Party circles, this
could only mean that Slovenia deliberately organized such a coup
de theatre to force the unprepared delegates to vote against their
proposals and in that manner form a pretext for their walking out of
the meeting, thus signifying the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia.

Instead of such a perfectly logical explanation, consistent with the
functioning of the Party mechanism, Kucan concocted a
Westerner-friendly accusation against the Serbian leaders, who
allegedly, deliberately voted against the Slovenian proposals just to
force them out of the party and out of Yugoslavia.

But, how could they possibly vote for such proposals? One of the
proposals was 'to make the connections among the Federal units
different', as Kucan vaguely put it, in other words - confederation.

The other proposal was 'to introduce the political pluralism', or the
multiparty system. And all those 'tiny' changes were proposed in the
form of innocent little amendments to the Party Congress conclusions,
at the plenum, without being previously agreed upon at the top, as is
the Party practice.

AS IF the Slovenes needed to be "forced" to leave Yugoslavia! This was
their intention, and their plan. They were cunning enough and
supported enough to perform it and now they blame others when they did
exactly what they wanted to do in the first place!

Prosecutor Nice dwelled on that Party Congress footage with relish,
while Kucan interpreted, the BBC?s voice-over commentary - a real
testimony indeed.

The remaining 'issues' that Nice raised were even more feeble, or else
already chewed up by others. There were the amendments to the Serbian
Constitution, allegedly depriving Kosovo and Vojvodina of their
autonomy (Milosevic quoted the Constitution, proving that the autonomy
in fact was not revoked, and Kucan was forced to admit that).

Then, there was the grudge of Slovenia that the Slovenian language was
not 'used within the Army', as was allegedly promised them at the end
of World War II. When cross-examined, Kucan had to admit that it was
logical that the Army would need one command language, and it was OK
for them, but that they still wanted the Slovenian language to be used
in the Army somehow. I failed to understand the "well-spoken
gentleman," I have to admit. What other usage of language is there in
any Army, besides to issue commands? You can speak whichever language
you prefer while on your R&R, but when an officer speaks, one language
has to be accepted for everyone. Or, does Mr. Kucan think that the
Army should have hired interpreters?

Then, Nice quoted profusely from the book-journal written by the
former President of the Yugoslav Presidency, Borislav Jovic, asking
Kucan to comment certain highlighted passages. Again, the relevance
and the veracity of the excerpts was dubious, which even Kucan himself
couldn't deny, saying that the description of one meeting where both
he and Jovic were present was 'pretty accurate', but 'for the rest, I
cannot confirm it'.

Nevertheless, Nice continued to quote from the journal, skimming that
way through the tumultuous events in 1990, when the JNA confiscated
all of the weapons from the local TO units, the steps towards the
secession of Slovenia, their elections, referendum for independence,
6-month suspension of its implementation, negotiations between
Presidents of all republics, where Slovenia kept 'seriously' proposing
confederative status after they had already opted and voted for
independence!

The only piece of real testimony from Kucan was when he spoke of his
walk with Milosevic in the lull of one of these futile
traveling-circus meetings. According to Kucan, Milosevic told him that
if Slovenia wants to leave the Federation that Serbia could not and
would not prevent that, but there are some preconditions to be agreed
before that. Croatia is a bigger problem; there everything is an open
issue, even the borders.

Then, Nice skimmed further on through the declared independence of
Slovenia in June 1991 and said: 'We know that a short clash occurred.'

Whereupon Kucan corrected him: 'The aggression occurred, done by the
JNA.' He literally applied only 2-3 short sentences speaking of that
'aggression', stating that it happened 'right after the celebration,
at 2 or 3 a.m.', that the 'units came out of barracks and headed
towards the state border'. He offered a choice of descriptive nouns:
'That clash, aggression, war was ended on 7 July by the talks on the
Brioni Islands, with the participation of the Ministerial EC troika,
led by Van Den Bruck, who intervened in a certain way in that period
between 27 June and 7 July.'

So much about the 'war'. Eloquent and full of detail. Nice glided on
through the final retreat of the JNA from Slovenia on 26 October 1991.

The only remaining issue until the end of the examination-in-chief was
the book by the former JNA Chief of Staff, General Veljko Kadijevic,
again amply but selectively (mis)quoted.

Kucan appeared confused, asked Nice 'What do you mean by that? Yes,
I've read it... but which part of it do you have in mind?' Nice was
really desperate, trying to make Kucan confirm that Kadijevic meant to
divide Yugoslavia along the infamous line Karlobag-Virovitica, the
alleged quotation dragged along before with other witnesses and which
was simply a misquote, because the General wrote in this particular
paragraph about the lines of retreat for the JNA, after it was
attacked in Croatia, and after it had decided to pull out.

Kucan clumsily confirmed that 'this coincides with the borders of the
diminished Yugoslavia, without Slovenia and Croatia and that 'we had
such statements even before'. By whom? When? Which statements? A
precise testimony, indeed. And that was all the evidence Kucan gave,
believe it or not. But, then came the cross-examination and a lot more
was said.

When Milosevic started to cross-examine Kucan, the very first question
brought the 'witness' to stumble, loose voice and stamina to directly
and openly accuse the Accused according to the indictment. This was
how the exchange went. Milosevic mocked Kucan, saying he used three
different expressions, one after another, to describe what happened in
Slovenia: 'clash, aggression, war. Had Serbia anything to do with that
war in Slovenia?'

Instead of promptly repeating the mantra of how Serbia, i.e.
Milosevic, actually ruled the Army (as the indictment would have it),
Kucan got immediately confused, started to mumble, said that Slovenia
'was confronted with the JNA', and the other things 'will be decided
by the Court, there are documents and books... My present
conclusion...' And here Kucan completely stopped talking.

Milosevic prompted him: 'What is your present conclusion?'

May stepped in nervously: 'Please, do not enter into quarrels. His
conclusions are unimportant.' And this was the first sign of how
things would go: Milosevic aggressive and direct, while Kucan was
timid and evasive. But, it got worse.

Milosevic read out two sentences from the minutes of the meeting in
the Federal Government Building in August 1991, after the 10-day war:
Kucan talking to the Federal Prime Minister, arrogantly and
triumphantly, refusing to discuss the possibility that two Slovenian
representatives return to the Federal Government 'because that Federal
Government had attacked Slovenia' and 'there is nothing for me to talk
about with the Federal Prime Minister, who lost the war'.

Kucan had to confirm that he had said that.

Milosevic then turned to the reasons for the war that Slovenia fought
against the Federal Government: the revenues from customs duties.

Kucan denied it, saying that Slovenia was only reacting to being
attacked.

Milosevic then quoted Warren Zimmerman, the former US Ambassador to
Yugoslavia, from his lengthy article in a foreign affairs journal
where it was plainly and brutally written that 'contrary to the
beliefs, the Slovenes had started the war. There were no efforts to
negotiate.' Zimmerman proceeded to explain why: the customs duties
revenue generated from the only border crossings towards the Western
European countries, Italy and Austria, which were in Slovenia, gained
up to 75% of the overall federal budget. The Slovenes simply took over
the customs offices by force, changed the insignia, and started to
collect, depriving the rest of the country of that revenue without
negotiating first. The Federal Government had to react by sending few
light JNA columns to retake the customs offices and re-establish the
status quo ante. Then the JNA was attacked.

Kucan tried to minimize that by saying it is the opinion of the former
US Ambassador.

But, Robinson got interested and asked Kucan to comment on this piece
of information that 'one of the consequences of your declaration of
independence was the take-over of customs offices', so Kucan got mixed
up in a lengthy explanation of money flow, which came to saying that
Slovenia negotiated it at Brioni, but only after the fait accompli.

Milosevic then jumped in by asking: 'Brioni happened after the war.
Why have you opted for violence? Why did you not act like Slovakia
did? [in the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia] Why didn't you
take the issue to the federal bodies?'

Kucan tried to convince everybody that it was impossible, that 'as a
member of a small nation we would have been outvoted'.

Milosevic reminded him that one of the Parliament Chambers voted by
consensus, so there was no outvoting, and that Slovenia actually
prevented the Law on Secession from being enacted, 'and you could have
left peacefully'. He also reminded him that the federal Government
intervened not at the internal borders of republics, but at the
external border.

Kucan got very nervous, and started to answer not to Milosevic, but to
'Your Honours', pleading with them to understand how he 'had
discussions with the Accused over many years' and that 'there were no
reasons to defend the border', but Milosevic cut him short: 'We are
obviously switching the meanings here. I've quoted Zimmerman to you
and the reasons why you did what you did.'

Then, Milosevic pulled out the case of a live TV show in Slovenia a
few years into their independence, with illustrious guests from
Croatia (Mesic, General Spegelj, Tomac), where Kucan also participated
and they answered direct phone questions. Kucan tried to wiggle out,
saying his memory is not that good anymore, but confirmed he was
there. Milosevic proceeded to describe what happened in that show and
how in a celebrative mood Mesic got too relaxed and babbled about
Genscher [the then German Chancellor] and the Pope who crucially
contributed to the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

Kucan confirmed that was said, but he added: 'My experience with these
people was different.'

Milosevic: 'Which people - Genscher and the Pope?'

Kucan tried to play dumb, saying: 'I don't understand what do you want
from me.'

Milosevic then patiently explained: 'Mr. Kucan, for more than a half
of your testimony you have been talking about that book by Mr Jovic.
I'm asking you whether Mesic said that.'

May jumped in: 'He has agreed to that.'

Milosevic: 'Very good.' Then he proceeded to quote Mesic, who said
that 'Genscher and the Pope have given us a strong support in
demolishing Yugoslavia.'
Kucan reluctantly confirmed this was said.

May wanted to know whether these questions were put to Mesic during
his testimony, and Milosevic answered that he only got this
information recently, and so he's asking Kucan, who was there, to
confirm it.

Without the slightest pause and without a warning, Milosevic asked:
'Why did you attack the JNA, killing 44 and seriously wounding 184
soldiers?'
Kucan tried to give slightly smaller figures 'according to our data'
and miserably concluded that 'these are the sad consequences of war'.

Milosevic couldn't be stopped: he proceeded to describe war crimes
perpetrated by the Territorial Defence and the Police of Slovenia
against the JNA and their families (killings, maltreatments, unlawful
arrests, intimidations, expulsions, refusal of medical assistance
causing death, cutting of supplies etc. etc.), quoting from the White
Book made by the JNA, from which he submitted precise lists with
names, dates and descriptions. The Trial Chamber at first admitted one
list into evidence (for identification, as they call it, until
translated and decided upon), but when things became more and more
terrible, they refused to admit the lists anymore.

[For those who want to know a bit about these colorful events, I
managed to locate 2 Reports by the Federal Government submitted to the
UN Commission of Experts in pursuance of the UN Council Resolution No.
780. There were 7 such Reports covering the war crimes perpetrated on
the territory of the whole ex-YU, but these 2 from November 1992 and
May 1994 mention also the Slovenian pretty little war. Here are the
links:
http://www.balkanpeace.org/wcs/wct/wcts/wcts02.shtml
and
http://balkanpeace.org/wcs/wct/wcts/wcts04.shtml
These are lengthy reports, containing crimes also from other parts of
ex-YU, so my advice is to use [CTRL + F], and then type 'Slovenia', so
that you can search through these huge documents for the crimes
related to Slovenia. And they are ugly, believe me, and comprise
everything: inhumane treatment of civilians, killing and inhumane
treatment of wounded and sick persons, ethnic cleansing, willful
killing of civilians, willful killing of POWs, inhumane treatment of
POWs - complete with: names, dates, places, the works. And all that in
just 10 days; not bad for "civilized gentlemen" who refuse to be
denominated as a Balkan country.
Just imagine what they could have accomplished if the war had lasted
longer.
For those with even stronger stomach and thirst for info, visit the
site
http://www.balkanpeace.org,
then go to the top left under "WAR CRIMES SECTION", and click on
"WITNESS TESTIMONIES". There you will find all those Reports and
plenty of other stuff.]

Kucan was bombarded with questions about these atrocities perpetrated
by his forces, under his command responsibility, for which questions
he had been specially prepared, and what did he do? He failed
miserably. He first tried to deny: 'Ne, tega nismo storili. = No, we
didn't do that.' Then he admitted that 'perhaps it happened' that the
private trucks in transit had been taken, that 'some civilians had
been hurt'. Then he claimed 'I do not know about that', 'I have no
data about that'.

Milosevic retorted: "I have all the data about that.' When the
atrocities mentioned became more gruesome (killing of wounded and
sick, preventing medical help)

Kucan lost his composure and called the JNA report-book 'a propaganda
brochure' and started to rant: 'I claim that this did not happen. And
even if something like that did happen, it was in some extreme
situations. What happened later on, in Vukovar, Srebrenica,
Dubrovnik... it was a systematic thing...'

Milosevic paid no attention to Kucan anymore, simply leaving him to
let off steam, and spoke to May: 'Very well, Mr May, you do not want
to accept this last list. I have here also the list of 17 violations
of the proper treatment of POWs, I presume that you won't accept this
either'

Then, Milosevic turned to Kucan again, embarking upon the case of
execution of 3 POWs on 28 June 1991 at the Holmec border crossing.

Kucan said: 'If you're asking whether they have been captured and
shot, the answer is no.'

Milosevic then produced a thick swath of documents from the Slovenian
courts and some international NGOs pertaining to that case.

Kucan boldly stated that 'all this only goes to prove that Slovenia
behaved as the lawful state'. May ordered the documents to be given to
Kucan to read them, he briefly skimmed through some of it and timidly
said: 'I've claimed that these soldiers and civilians were not
executed as POWs, but it seems that they were.'
Wow! His advisors must have done a poor job preparing Mr. Kucan for
this. May then admitted the documents into evidence.

Milosevic then summed up: 'I have given only a few examples, but it's
obvious that in this so-called "attack by the JNA," many times more
JNA soldiers were killed than Slovenes. [44 as opposed to 8] Jovic
told you that if you want your independence, go on, but do not kill
our sons. Why was this war necessary to you?'

Kucan denied that Slovenia wanted the war.

Milosevic. insisted: 'Isn't it true that you could have left
Yugoslavia without a war and that you started it only to facilitate
the complete destruction of Yugoslavia?'

May tried to protect the hapless witness by saying he already answered
that.

Milosevic continued by reminding Kucan that Slovenia, while talking
about "legality and democracy" was actually making decisions contrary
to the Yugoslav Constitution. He said that they have promised to
proceed into independence legally, and the Constitutional Court would
be ultimately consulted, but then they acted against its rulings.
Milosevic submitted 27 such rulings of the Federal Constitutional
Court, pronouncing as unconstitutional various resolutions, laws and
Amendments to the Slovenian Constitution that had been passed by the
Slovenian legislature.

May woke up and wanted to know Kucan's opinion on this, and Kucan
tried to persuade him that these rulings were indeed stating these
acts of Slovenia to be incompatible with the Yugoslav Constitution,
but 'there were different opinions by the 2 judges who represented
Slovenia in that Court', and 'the same method of voting was applied'.
May inquired: 'When you say the same method, what do you mean by
that?'

Kucan answered: 'Well, as at the 14th Party Congress.'
May: 'It means, the Slovenes were in the minority?'
Kucan: 'Yes.'
May: 'Were they joined also by some other judges?'
Kucan couldn't confirm that, but he said that he would 'look it up'.
What that man does know? He was the President then, these were the
crucial issues and decisions, and he was supposedly well prepared for
his testimony.

Milosevic ridiculed that comparison of voting at the Party Congress
and at the Court and pointed out this is the common practice in all
courts in the world. He asked: 'Are you claiming that the
Constitutional Court made his rulings in violation of its
regulations?'

Kucan kept on with his lengthy whining of how Slovenia was always in
the minority, how the principle of 'one man, one vote' in the
Parliament could have been amended, but Milosevic insisted the
question being about the legal rulings of the Constitutional Court,
and that the Slovenes expressly said their changes will be done
according to the law and Constitution, offering the Constitutional
Court as a guarantee for that, and 'then you complain about your
rights being violated because the Constitutional Court made his
rulings'.

May admitted these 27 rulings into evidence.

If it was some real judge here, and not "Dick" May, I would be certain
that this legal exchange had reminded him of the recent ruling of the
Trial Chamber in which those 6 coded witnesses, whose trial
transcripts were admitted into the Milosevic trial evidence without
cross-examination, and the voting was 2 to 1, leaving poor Robinson in
the minority just like the poor Slovenes. He could have then cried
foul, taken the ball and gone home, just like the Slovenes did.

The next issue was illegal arms trade between Slovenia, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. When first generally asked about that by
Milosevic, Kucan denied it existed at all: 'No, as far as I'm aware.'

When Milosevic then produced documents, from Croatia, proving the
opposite Kucan changed his tune, saying that he couldn't see anything
contentious here, these were 'legal channels, with competent
authorities and you spoke of illegal trade.' To that, Milosevic
gently reminded him that at that time the UN arms embargo was in
effect.

Kucan then claimed that this was before the international recognition
of Slovenia, 'therefore it did not apply to us.' But then, he realized
the mistake, saying:
'Excuse me, it was in the period when both states were recognized;
therefore, we took necessary measures to protect ourselves.' [Wow! So,
the new statelets have the right to violate the UN embargo, just
because they need to be able to protect themselves. That is a creative
interpretation.]

When asked whether the embargo applied to Bosnia, Kucan said it only
applied to the arms sale. Milosevic then produced a second document,
this one being from Izetbegovic, proving exactly that.

Both documents were admitted. Milosevic concluded that Slovenia took
part in the arming of the Bosnian Muslims, to which Kucan said that it
is hard for him to accept such a claim and that it has to be seen
first whether the Bosnian Muslims were first capable of defending
themselves on their own.
He said: 'My answer is, why was it necessary?' [Great reasoning: you
do something illegal, and when asked why are you doing it, you answer:
Well, ask yourselves why it was necessary for me to do that?] Even
Milosevic was amused by that, smiling and muttering: 'Good, very
good.'

Milosevic further proved how well informed he is when he asked how
come the Parliamentary commission for investigating UN embargo
violations had been dissolved before reaching any conclusions.

Kucan confirmed they had done this, but claimed that 'this procedure
is still unfinished'. How many years passed - 10, 11, 12 years?
Indeed, a State of law and order.

[The arms trading affairs, with all its dirty political games and
enormous gains by various Slovenian politicians were all over the
Slovenian press at that time. If you want to check one example, here's
the link:
http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data/199805/80503-004-trae-lju.htm
This is the article called 'War Diplomacy - Controversial Armament
Trade' from 1998.
Also check what Kucan stated on the subject in 1996 at:
http://www.hri.org/news/Balkans/yds/96-07-03-yds.html#08
'Slovenian President Says European Union Played Big Role in Breaking
Former Yugoslavia'.
You'll be better able to assess how the politicians of Slovenia were
not at all squeamish to grab big bucks peddling arms, while at the
same time preaching to be so much more "civilized and democratic" than
those Balkan "barbarians" to whom they were selling the arms.]

The rest of the cross-examination went on debunking the games of Nice,
with misquoted speeches, which I already mentioned in the earlier.
There were a couple of highly amusing moments when Milosevic found in
the written summary of the talks that Kucan had with the OTP
investigators some incredible and preposterous constructions.

Kucan vehemently denied ever saying something like that. The thing is,
the investigators didn't give his full verbatim answers, but instead
prepared themselves a freely ad-libbed summary, which was at places so
free that after Milosevic quoted from it, Kucan had to say: 'This
claim is incredible, however, I never stated that.'

The first time, it was some minor stupidity, like 'the Serbs needed
Yugoslavia to be able to all live in one state, and the non-Serb
nations saw in Yugoslavia a country protecting its groups (?!).

Milosevic started to lead Kucan through questions about the control of
the Army in 1989, making him to confirm that the Federal Presidency
was in charge, and not Milosevic who was then merely a Party chief,
not even the President of Serbia yet.

Then Milosevic read the second incredible construction from the
Prosecution's summary, which was more sinister: the investigators
wrote that Kucan told them, speaking about the pre-war events in
Kosovo, when the miners went on strike that this was 'connected with
the use of the Army by Milosevic in the events around Stari Trg Mine'.

Kucan denied saying this, and again explicitly confirmed that the
Presidency commanded the Army, and that he 'never claimed otherwise or
that you (Milosevic) were the one to issue orders'.

Milosevic said he was happy that Kucan had said that 'just because of
the manipulations of this Other Side.'

Amicus Curiae, Tapuskovic practically gave up his questions, after
being allotted only 20 min. and warned by interpreters to slow down,
so May recommended that he put his questions in writing.

Kucan had to leave, he came only for one day. But, Tapuskovic
nevertheless managed to establish one important thing by asking Kucan,
and then warned the Chamber that among the following witnesses will be
one Ivan Kristan, who will pose as an expert on constitutional issues,
and this is no other than one of those two Slovenian judges from the
former Federal Constitutional Court who were outvoted regarding the
constitutionality of those 27 secession documents of Slovenia. That
should be one impartial "expert witness," no doubt.

Thus ended the ordeal of Milan Kucan. The only his attempt at repartee
was when he referred to the famous sentence given by Slobodan
Milosevic in front of the angry and frightened Serb peasants in
Kosovo, who had just been clubbed by the Albanian police, where
Milosevic told them that 'Nobody may beat you'.

Kucan said that Milosevic should have said instead: 'Nobody may beat
anyone in Kosovo'. Interesting - sounds a bit like something the UN
might say: 'The violence from both sides must stop.' And what if there
was no violence from both sides at that time, as it actually was the
case? So, the attempt at repartee by Kucan failed miserably, as did
his information management and his usefulness as a witness.


Vera Martinovic is an independent writer based in Belgrade,
Yugoslavia.


=== 3 ===


MILOSEVIC RECOVERS FROM ILLNESS: "TRIAL" TO RESUME THURSDAY
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - May 28, 2003

Former president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic became ill on
Tuesday. As a result the so-called "trial" had to be canceled on
Tuesday and Wednesday.

The so-called "trial" will resume on Thursday as The Hague Tribunal's
doctors now say that President Milosevic has recovered from his fever.

UNTER
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/aikor29.5.03.txt=

ZU LESEN:

*** JUGOSLAWIEN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAK
WELCHES LAND ALS NÄCHSTES? STOPPT DIE USA!
FREIHEIT FÜR SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC!
Internationale Demonstration in Den Haag,
Samstag, 28. Juni, 2003, Beginn: 14 Uhr

*** WARUM DEMONSTRIEREN SIE AM 28. JUNI IN DEN HAAG?
Cathrin Schütz sprach mit Klaus Hartmann,
Vizepräsident des Internationalen
Komitees für die Verteidigung von Slobodan Miloevic

*** GERECHTIGKEIT MADE IN USA
von Ralph Hartmann
Aus: Ossietzky 9/2003
http://www.sopos.org/aufsaetze/3eb2ac0a5184b/1.phtml

*** Nieder mit der NATO Mafia-Regierung in Belgrad!
Demonstration zum Vidovdan
Jugoslawisch-Österreichische Solidaritätsbewegung


DEMO-FLUGBLATT:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/HaagDemo-Flugi.d=
oc


FLUGBLAETTER U. WEITERES AUF ENGLISCH:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/


--- Flugblatt-Text:


JUGOSLAWIEN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAK - WER IST DER NÄCHSTE?

In immer schnellerer Folge wechseln die Kriegsschauplätze - viele
Friedensfreunde verlieren den Über-blick und übersehen die
Zusammenhänge. Wie der Überfall auf den Irak war die NATO-Aggression
1999 gegen Jugoslawien ein völkerrechtswidriger Angriffskrieg. Damals
wie heute ging es den USA um die Durchsetzung globaler
Weltmachtansprüche, die Kontrolle von Rohstoffquellen und
Transportwegen. Mit dem neuen strategischen NATO-Konzept von 1999
wurde die Aggression gegen Jugoslawien zum "Tür-öffnerkrieg", zum
entscheidenden Präzedenzfall für die Missachtung des absoluten
Gewaltverbots des Völkerrechts. Auf dem Balkan wurde die neue
Strategie der selektiven Aufhebung der Staatensouveräni-tät und des
Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker vorexerziert.

Als Symbol des Widerstandes gegen die neue Weltkriegsordnung soll
Slobodan Milosevic exempla-risch in einem Schauprozess abgeurteilt
werden - zur nachträglichen Legitimation der Aggression und
Kriegsverbrechen der NATO, und als warnendes Beipiel zur Abschreckung
aller "Unwilligen", Dissiden-ten und Abweichler, die nicht Vasallen
der neuen Weltordner sein wollen. Hierfür wurde ein
völker-rechtswidriges Sondergericht geschaffen, das keine Institution
des Rechts, sondern eine Kolonialbehörde darstellt. Deshalb ist die
Forderung nach Abschaffung des Haager "Tribunals" und nach Freiheit
für Slo-bodan Milosevic sowie alle politischen Gefangenen der NATO
unverzichtbares Element des Kampfes für eine andere Weltordnung. Dafür
demonstrieren wir in Den Haag:

28. Juni 2003
Auflösung des illegalen YU-Tribunals!
Freiheit für Slobo und alle politischen Gefangenen der NATO !

Nach dem "Regimewechsel" wurden auch in Belgrad willige Lakaien
eingesetzt, die das Land und seine Verteidiger für einen Judaslohn
verkaufen. Ausgerechnet am 28. Juni 2001, dem höchsten serbi-schen
Feiertag, der an die Schlacht auf dem Amselfeld 1389 erinnert, wurde
Slobodan Milosevic vom Djindjic-Regime nach Den Haag entführt.
Symbolträchtig wollten die Kidnapper deutlich machen, dass die
Besiegten nun die Geschichtsdeutung der Sieger zu übernehmen hätten.
Doch immer war und ist der 28. Juni - Tag des Verrats und der
Erniedrigung und zugleich Tag des Widerstandes gegen imperialistische
Fremdherrschaft

Heute agiert in Belgrad eine Marionettenregierung von Gnaden der USA
nach den Direktiven des CIA-Residenten und US-Botschafters William
Montgomery. In Komplizenschaft mit dem Haager Tribu-nal verweigern sie
den "Angeklagten" aus ihrem Land jede Unterstützung, inzwischen selbst
den Zugang zu Beweismitteln. Bisher hat die "Anklage" an jedem
Verhandlungstag ein Fiasko erlebt, trotz nachge-wiesener Versuche der
Zeugenbestechung und -bedrohung. Deshalb ist es nun ihre offenkundige
Absicht, Slobodan Milosevic, der als Ankläger der NATO auftritt,
physisch und psychisch zu brechen - eine "bio-logische Lösung" als
kalkulierter rettender Ausweg für die Veranstalter dieses
Justizverbrechens.

Deshalb demonstrieren wir unter der Losung
STOPPT DIE USA! FREIHEIT FÜR SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC!

Demo am Samstag, 28. Juni 2003, 14 Uhr
Congressgebäude Den Haag, Churchillplein 10

Internationales Komitee für die Verteidigung von Slobodan Milosevic -
ICDSM - URL: www.free-slobo.de
Klaus Hartmann, Schillstraße 7, 63067 Offenbach am Main,
Tel/Fax -69-835850, e-mail: vorstand@...

Serbi e tedeschi. Per rinfrescare la memoria
(ITALIANO, SRPSKOHRVATSKI, ENGLISH)


Per rinfrescare la memoria "alla vecchia Europa" ed anche ai vari
nostri professori intellettual-borghesi "ex", quelli a spasso nel
"democratico West".

Dedicato al mese di maggio, mese della vittoria contro il nazifascismo
in tutto il mondo e della fine della guerra di Liberazione della
Jugoslavia.

===

Maggio 1995, trasmissione radiofonica "Stasera insieme" di Radio
Belgrado, primo canale:

<<...In occasione del cinquantenario della vittoria sul nazifascismo,
il signor Maric dalla cittadina di Osnabrueck per gli ascoltatori di
Radio Belgrado ha trasmesso il seguente testo:

"Quando nel maggio 1945 sono stati liberati i prigionieri dal campo di
concentramento tedesco di Osnabrueck, il pastore protestante tedesco
Friedrich Hriesenberg ha recitato per i suoi fedeli una predica, che
sarebbe stata nel contempo anche la sua ultima, prima di andare in
pensione:

"Il nostro paese ha perso la guerra. Hanno vinto i russi, gli
americani, gli inglesi. Forse avevano migliori armi, più soldati,
migliori comandanti.
E' stata una vittoria materiale, quella che hanno conseguito. Ma qui
tra noi si trova un popolo, che ha conseguito un'altra vittoria, molto
più significativa. La vittoria dell'animo, la vittoria del cuore e
dell'onesta'. La vittoria della pace e dell'amore cristiano. Questo
popolo sono i serbi.
Noi prima li conoscevamo superficialmente, ma nello stesso tempo
sapevamo cosa stessimo facendo nella loro patria [vedi ALLEGATO]. Per
ogni nostro soldato morto, rappresentante il potere dell'occupatore,
ammazzavamo centinaia di serbi che difendevano la loro terra. Non
soltanto questo: sapevamo cosa stessero facendo contro i serbi da
tutte le parti i croati, gli arnauti [vecchio nome per gli schipetari,
ndT], gli italiani, gli ungheresi ed i bulgari... e tutto questo lo
approvavamo.
Sapevamo che qui tra di noi [nel campo di concentramento di
Osnabrueck, ndT] si trovavano 5000 ufficiali serbi, i quali una volta
rappresentavano l'elite sociale nel loro paese, e adesso sembravano
solo scheletri viventi, denutriti e malati. Ritenevamo che nei serbi
prevalesse il credo "chi non si vendica non viene consacrato ("Ko se
ne osveti, taj se ne posveti"). Avevamo veramente paura di questi
martiri serbi. Avevamo paura che essi, dopo la nostra capitolazione,
avrebbero fatto quello che noi abbiamo fatto a loro. Pensavamo davvero
a questa tragedia, e già vedevamo i corpi dei nostri figli galleggiare
nei canali, oppure essere bruciati nei forni. Immaginavamo il massacro
della nostra gente, gli stupri, le distruzioni delle nostre case
[dunque, proprio come in tempi recentissimi, questi signori vedevano
se stessi nello specchio ma indicavano i serbi!... ndT]
Invece cosa è successo?
Quando è stato spezzato il filo spinato, e quando i 5000 scheletri
viventi serbi [i prigionieri del campo, ndT] si sono ritrovati in
libertà e tra di noi, questi scheletri viventi hanno accarezzato i
nostri bambini, hanno parlato con noi. I serbi dunque hanno
accarezzato i bambini di quelli che hanno avvolto il loro paese in un
drappo nero...
Appena adesso comprendiamo perché il nostro poeta Goethe studiasse la
lingua serba. Ora capiamo perché l'ultima parola di Bismarck, sul
letto di morte è stata: "Serbia".
Perciò la vittoria serba è più bella, piu' alta, più di qualunque
altra vittoria materiale. Questa vittoria la potevano conseguire
soltanto i serbi, educati nello spirito di San Sava e nella loro epica
eroica, tanto amata da Goethe. Questa vittoria vivrà nei secoli
nell'animo tedesco. Ed e' a questa vittoria ed ai serbi che ho voluto
dedicare questa mia ultima predica pastorale"

[Lo speaker della radio:] Commoventi queste parole oggidì, quando da
tutte le parti si parla dei serbi con tutt'altri toni. Almeno in
generale. Ma naturalmente non sono tutti uguali. Grazie, ancora una
volta per aver ricordato queste parole di questo generoso sacerdote
tedesco. Che risuonino le sue parole anche in tante altre teste...>>

[Trascrizione dalla registrazione da Milena.
Traduzione di Ivan del CNJ per "Voce jugoslava" (trasmissione
radiofonica su Radio Città Aperta), 20 maggio 2003.]


--- SRPSKOHRVATSKI ---

Radio Beograd-I, Maj 1995.

Povodom pedestogodisnjice pobede nad fasizmom i nacizmom, g. Maric iz
Osnabrika, za slusaoce Radio Beograda (u emisiji "Veceras zajedno")
izvestio je sledece:

Kada je 1945. oslobodjen koncetracioni logor u Osnabriku i
zarobljenici pusteni na slobodu, protestantski pastor Fridrih
Hrisenberg, maja 1945. odrzao je svojim vernicima prpoved, koja je
istovremeno bila i njegova poslednja, pred odlazak u penziju. Ova
propoved u prevodu glasi:

"Nasa otadzbina izgubila je rat. Pobedili su Rusi, Amerikanci,
Englezi.
Mozda su imali bolje oruzje, vise vojnika, bolje vocstvo. Ali to je
izrazito materijalna pobeda. Tu pobedu oni su odneli. Ali ovde, medju
nama, ima jedan narod koji je izvojevao jednu drugu i mnogo lepsu
pobedu, pobedu duse, pobedu srca i postenja. Pobedu mira i hriscanske
ljubavi. To su Srbi.
Mi smo ih ranije samo donekle poznavali, ali smo isto tako znali sta
smo cinili u njihovoj otadzbini. Ubijali smo stotinu Srba, koji su
branili zemlju, za jednog naseg vojnika, koji je inace pretstavljao
vlast okupatora nasilnika. Ne samo to da smo cinili, nego smo
blagonaklono gledali kako su tamo na Srbe pucali sa svih strana: i
Hrvati, i Arnauti i Italijani i Madjari i Bugari. Znali smo da se ovde
medju nama nalazi 5000 oficira Srba, koji su nekad u svojoj zemlji
pretstavljali drustvenu elitu, a sada su licili na zive kosture,
iznemogli i malaksali od gladi. Drzali smo da kod Srba tinja verovanje
"Ko se ne osveti, taj se ne posveti", i mi smo se zaista plasili
osvete tih srpskih mucenika. Bojali smo se da ce oni, po nasoj
kapitulaciji, raditi ono sto smo mi sa njima cinili. Zamisljali smo
jasno tu tragfediju i vec videli nasu decu kako plivaju kanalizacijom
ili se peku u gradskoj pekari. Zamisljali smo ubijanje nasih ljudi,
silovanja, rusenja i razaranja nasih domova. Medjutim kako je bilo:
Kada su pukle zarobljenicke zice i kada se 5000 zivih srpskih kostura
naslo na slobodi u nasoj sredini, ti kosturi su milovali nasu decu,
davali im bombone, razgovarali su sa nama. Srbi su dakle milovali decu
onih koji su njihovu otadzbinu u crno zavili.
Tek sada razumemo zasto je nas pesnik Gete ucio srpski jezik. Sada tek
shvatamo zasto je Bizmarku poslednja rec na samrtnoj postelji bila:
Srbija. Ta pobeda Srba je lepsa i uzvisenija od svake druge pobede.
Takvu pobedu cini mi se, mogli su izvojevati i dobiti samo Srbi,
odnegovani u njihovom svetosavskom duhu i junackim srpskim pesmama,
koje je i nas Gete tako voleo. Ova pobeda ce vekovima ziveti u dusama
Nemaca, a toj pobedi i Srbima, koji su je izvojevali, zeleo sam da
posvetim ovu moju poslednju svestenicku propoved".

Spiker:
Dirljive reci, u ovo vreme kad se o Srbima na tim stranama govori
nekim drugacijim tonovima, bar u vecini. Naravno nisu svi isti.
Hvala vam, jos jednom, sto ste potsetili na uzvisene reci plemenitog
pastora. Neka odjeknu i u nekim drugim glavama."

Sa magnetoofnske trake prenela u pisani tekst, Milena


=== ALLEGATO / ANNEX ===


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/antiguer-ops/AG-BALKAN.HTM
German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/balkan/20_260_2.htm

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN THE BALKANS (SPRING 1941): PART II

"III. German Propaganda

German propaganda efforts naturally took full advantage
of this open rift between Serbs and Croats. The
constantly repeated official line was that Germany and
Italy desired the creation of an independent state of
Croatia and that the military operations were being
conducted only against the Serbs. However, when Hitler
was first told of the open animosity among the various
ethnic factions in Yugoslavia, he is said to have remarked:
"That is none of our business. If they want to bash each
others' heads in, let them go ahead."

...

"In a letter Mussolini wrote to Hitler on 29 December
1941, the former stated with reference to Yugoslavia:

Before next spring every nucleus of insurrection must be
wiped out or else we run the risk of having to fight a
subsidiary war in the Balkans. The first territory to be
pacified is Bosnia, then Serbia and Montenegro. The
military operations must be conducted with great
determination and must lead to a real and complete
disarmament of the population, this being the sole
guarantee I for avoiding surprise in the future. For this
purpose our military forces must cooperate according to a
common plan to prevent duplication of effort and achieve
the desired result with a minimum of manpower and
materiel."

1. UNHCHR on Human Rights Violations by the Serbian Police State
"POVERLJIVI MEMORANDUM MINISTARSTVIMA PRAVDE I UNUTRA©NJIH POSLOVA
REPUBLIKE SRBIJE"

2. Unity for freedom!
On the demonstrations in Belgrade and The Hague, on the activities of
Sloboda and ICDSM. By Vladimir Krsljanin


=== 1 ===


Subject: UNHCHR on Human Rights Violations by the Serbian Police State
Date: Sun, 18 May 2003 14:51:56 +0200
From: "Vladimir Krsljanin"


English original and Serbian translation (bellow).

The following very polite text contains very serious admissions and
(preliminary) findings. All progressive and democratic forces should
join the battle against these outrageous practices. The message of
President Milosevic is: 'the time of dictatorship is a right time for
action of all honest people and of all the people devoted to
democracy'.

Human rights violation practices are imposed to Serbia by ICTY (the
Hague 'tribunal'). There was never in history an institution under UN
cover whose practices was systematic violation of human rights and
dignity. The malignant anti-Yugoslav grouping of Western intelligence
bureaucracy, facing fiasco in their show-trials find a common language
with the regime that lost all credibility and support of the people.
Both desperately try to justify its existence and lot of money spent
to support their illegal activities. Allying with criminals in Serbia
and abroad they unsuccessfully try to blame for all their dirty work
President Milosevic and Serbian people.

On Tuesday, May 20, at 15:00, in front of the 'Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro' in Belgrade there will be a
demonstration, organized by Sloboda, against the new visit of Carla
del Ponte, already accused in German press for her links with the
criminal circles in Serbia.

We stand for law, justice and truth!

We stand for freedom, sovereignty and democracy!

We invite all the people to the major Vidovdan (June 28)
demonstrations:

At The Hague
organized by a Serbian-International Organizational Committee
(see the inviting leaflet at
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/sloboda051203.htm /English
version/
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/POZIVZAHAG.htm /Serbian
version/
or at
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/ /Both
versions + PDF/)

And of course in Belgrade
organized by SLOBODA

The UNHCHR text bellow was originally circulated by:
news@...
http://www.antic.org/

Support the peace and stability in the Balkans and in Europe!
Support democracy and human rights in Serbia!
Free Slobodan Milosevic!

Udruzenje SLOBODA / Freedom Association
Belgrade
Phone: +381 11 630 206 Fax: +381 11 630 549
E-mail slobodavk@...


> UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
> COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
> SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
>
>
>
>
> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
> Mission to Serbia and Montenegro
>
>
>
>
> 24 April 2003
>
> CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTRIES OF JUSTICE
> AND THE INTERIOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
>
> Initial findings and recommendations arising from the visit
> to detainees in Belgrade 14-15 April 2003



[ FOR THE ENGLISH VERSION SEE:
http://www.icdsm.org/more/shock.htm
OR OUR NEXT MESSAGE ON "JUGOINFO":
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/messages ]



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Mission to Serbia and Montenegro

POVERLJIVI MEMORANDUM MINISTARSTVIMA PRAVDE I UNUTRA©NJIH POSLOVA
REPUBLIKE SRBIJE

24. april 2003.

Inicijalna zapa¾anja i predlozi koji proistièu iz posete pritvorenim
licima u Beogradu od 14. do 15. aprila 2003. godine

Nakon zajednièke posete mestima pritvora i pritvorenicima u Beogradu
14. i 15. aprila 2003. godine, Kancelarija Visokog komesara
Ujedinjenih nacija za ljudska prava, Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji i Crnoj
Gori i OEBS-ova Kancelarija za demokratske institucije i ljudska
prava, utvrdili su devet hitnih preporuka koje ¾ele da prenesu
organima vlasti u Republici Srbiji.

Ove preporuke ne treba smatrati kompletnim nalazima i preporukama ove
tri institucije. Taènije, one predstavljaju odreðen broj hitnih mera
koje bi, ukoliko se sprovedu, po mi¹ljenju Delegacije koja je izvr¹ila
posetu odmah popravile situaciju lica koja su pritvorena nakon
uvoðenja vanrednog stanja. Ove tri organizacije æe u dogledno vreme
objaviti sveobuhvatan zajednièki izve¹taj o svojim nalazima i
preporukama. Ovaj izve¹taj æe detaljno razraditi navedene preporuke i
biæe dopunjen drugima. Tri organizacije ¾ele da skrenu pa¾nju Vlade na
èinjenicu da, po njihovom shvatanju, mnogi od problema ne proistièu
direktno od uslova nastalih usled vanrednog stanja, to su pre svega
problemi Centralnog zatvora u Beogradu koji postoje veæ du¾e vremena
i ustanovljeni su tokom poseta 2001. godine. Vanredno stanje je
pogor¹alo veæinu ovih problema i verovatno je da æe odreðene odrebe
izmenjenog Zakona o borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala nastaviti to
da èine ukoliko se odmah ne uvede odgovarajuæa za¹tita.

Tri organizacije pozdravljaju prestanak vanrednog stanja od 22.
aprila. Mada odredbe koje se odnose na pritvor nisu vi¹e na snazi, one
smatraju da su nalazi i preporuke iz ovog memoranduma koje se odnose
na pritvor i dalje relevantne. Ovo zasnivaju na èinjenici da i dalje
postoje pritisci na sistem kriviènog pravosuða Srbije; odredbe o
produ¾enom pritvoru bez sudskog nadzora i dalje ostaju na snazi prema
izmenama i dopunama Zakona o borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala; i
dalje postoje sistemski problemi koji su veæ identifikovani nakon
posete iz 2001. radi utvrðivanja stanja u zatvorima, posete Komiteta
protiv muèenja u 2002. i drugih procena.

Uz ni¾e navedena pitanja koja zahtevaju pa¾nju, Delegacija ¾eli da
navede da su konstatovane pozitivne promene u odnosu na situaciju iz
2001. Tu spadaju bolji odnosi izmeðu pritvorenika i zatvorskih èuvara.
Takoðe, Delegacija je tokom poverljivih razgovora sa pritvorenicima
èula dosledno pozitivne ocene o èuvarima. Uz to, Delegacija ¾eli da
konstatuje da su svi dr¾avni slu¾benici bili predusretljivi i otvoreni
prilikom razogovara sa Delegacijom.

Tri organizacije se nadaju da æe poèetni nalazi i preporuke sadr¾ane u
ovom memorandumu biti od pomoæi vladi u njenim naporima u borbi protiv
organizovanog kriminala i podr¾avanju vladavine prava u skladu sa
relevantnim meðunarodnim standardima. Predstavnici tri organizacije
oèekuju da æe uskoro podneti potpuni izve¹taj i imati moguænost da
ponovo posete pritvorske ustanove.

Nalazi i preporuke

Deo A: Pravni osnov za pritvaranje

Nalaz 1: Dalje pravdanja pritvora bez sudskog nadzora

Èlan 4. Meðunarodne konvencije o graðanskim i politièkim pravima
(ICCPR) jasno navodi da odstupanje od prava garantovanih Konvencijom
mora biti strogo ogranièeno na odstupanja koja nala¾u potrebe
situacije. I postupci u vreme vanrednog stanja kao i nedavni amandmani
na Zakon o borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala sad¾e odredbe o
produ¾enom pritvoru bez adekvatnog sudskog nadzora. Jasno je da takve
odredbe nisu u saglasnosti sa meðunarodnim standardima o ljudskim
pravima, posebno sa èlanom 9(4). ICCPR-a i èlanom 5(4) Evropske
konvencije za za¹titu ljuskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (ECHR).
Komentari i obièajno pravo ukazuju da pritvorenici mogu biti dr¾ani
samo nekoliko dana kao apsolutni maksimum, èak i za vreme vanredne
situacije.

Delegacija je utvrdila da ne postoji jasno opravdanje za produ¾enje
pritvora pojedinaca bez sudskog nadzora, posebno ¹to mnogi od njih
nisu ispitivani danima i ¹to je dosta vremena proteklo od poèetne
vanredne situacije nakon atentata. Neki, koji su bili u pritvoru
nekoliko dana, izjavili su da uop¹te nisu bili ispitivani.

Sa okonèanjem vanrednog stanja, do èega je do¹lo nakon na¹e poslednje
posete, sva derogiranja od prava, a naroèito od prava da lice bude
izvedeno pred sudiju bez odlaganja treba smatrati neva¾eæim i samim
tim pritvaranje bez podizanja optu¾be nije vi¹e dopustivo. Stoga se
pritvorenici moraju ili optu¾iti za krivièno delo ili pustiti, u
skladu sa èlanom 9. ICCPR.

Delegaciju posebno brine ¹to pritvor bez sudskog nadzora zajedno sa
nekim od drugih ni¾e navedenih nalaza znaèi da se kr¹enje ljudskih
prava jo¹ vi¹e komplikuje ili pogor¹ava kombinacijom ovih dodatnih
faktora.

Preporuka 1: Ponovo ispitati, na osnovu èinjeniènog stanja svakog
predmeta, da li i dalje postoje uslovi za pritvor svakog pojedinca
koji se i dalje nalazi u pritvoru, nakon uvoðenja vanrednog stanja
(ukljuèujuæi i one koji su pritvoreni na osnovu izmenjenog zakona o
borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala). Obezbediti da pritvorene osobe
budu ili osloboðene ili optu¾ene za krivièno delo, a da se dalji
pritvor zasniva na sudskoj odluci. Ove odluke treba da podle¾u
redovnom preispitivanju.

Nalaz 2: Informacije o statusu i pravima pritvorenih lica; pristup
advokatu; postupak za razmatranje ¾albi

Meðunarodni standardi kao i principi utvrðeni Ustavnom poveljom
Dr¾avne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora i Zakonom o kriviènom postupku
nagla¹avaju pravo pritvorenih lica da budu obave¹teni o svom statusu i
pravima, kao i da im se omoguæu pristup braniocu radi za¹tite njihovih
interesa. Vanredno stanje je ukinulo ili organièilo jedan broj prava
koja se odnose na komunikaciju sa spoljnim svetom, ukljuèujuæi i
posete porodice i komunikaciju sa braniocem. Dok neka od ovih
ogranièenja mogu imati opravdanje kao izuzeci izazvani potrebama
situacije, koji se primenjuju od sluèaja do sluèaja i tokom kratkih
perioda èini se, umesto toga, da su ona primenjena zbirno, i to ili na
prozvoljan naèin i èesto tokom du¾eg vremenskog perioda.

Delegacija je utvrdila da mnogim pritvorenicima nije jasan njihov
status i prava. Èini se da nije postojao nikakv sistematski proces
kojim se obezbeðuje da pritvorenici budu upoznati o svom pravu da
ospore pritvor na osnovu Naredbe o vanrednom stanju. Ta konfuzija o
statusu, pravima, i moguænosti za komunikaciju se i dalje nastavlja i
u sluèaju pritvorenika koji su sprovedeni u pritvor na osnovu odluke
suda ili nareðenja specijanog tu¾ioca.

Preporuka 2: Sprovesti sistematski postupak informisanja svih
pritvorenih lica o njihovom statusu i pravima. Ovde se, izmeðu
ostalog, mora pokloniti posebna pa¾nja onim licima koja su prvobitno
pritvorena na osnovu nareðenja koja su izdata na osnovu vanrednog
stanja ali sada prelaze u druge oblike pritvora. Obezbediti da sva
pritvorena lica odmah dobiju pristup advokatu.

Nalaz 3: ®albeni postupak

Delegacija je na¹la da je najmanje jedno pritvoreno lice je obave¹teno
pismenim putem, da ¾albu mora podneti u roku od 12 sati od prijema
odluke o svom pritvaranju. Nikakav rok nije dat za postupanje i
dono¹enje odluka po ¾albi, a najmanje jedno pritvoreno lice je dobilo
negativan odgovor na svoju ¾albu o pritvoru i to oko 30-tog dana svog
tridesetdnevnog pritvora. Postupak komunikacije izmeðu pritvorenih
lica i vlasti nije transparentan u tome da obezbeðuje adekvatno
evidentiranje i izdavanje potvrda o prijemu ¾albi, pritu¾bi itd.
Delegacija takoðe smatra da pravo na ¾albu Ministru unutra¹njih
poslova ne predstavlja nezavisan mehanizam za¹tite prava pritvorenika.
Delegacija izra¾ava zabrinutost zato ¹to ovi problemi i dalje opstaju
za lica pritvorena na osnovu odredbi izmenjenog Zakona o borbi protiv
organizovanog kriminala.

Preporuka 3: Odmah uvesti sudski nadzor nad pritvorenim licima. Uvesti
jasan i dosledan postupak kojim se reguli¹e proces kojim se dopu¹ta
pritvorenim licima da ula¾u ¾albu na pritvaranje, kojim se obezbeðuje
da ne postoje vremenska ogranièenja u pogledu prava pritvorenika da
se ¾ale i da se po svim ¾albama odluèuje, i odluka saop¹tava
podnosiocu u roku od 24 sata.

Nalaz 4: Proizvoljni faktori koji odreðuju uslove pritvora

Delegacija je utvrdila da va¾eæa pravila koja odreðuju uslove pritvora
nisu jasna i da zavise delom od individualnih odluka samih zatvorskih
vlasti. Ovo je posebno problematièno jer se ima utisak da ove odluke i
postupciutièu na pritvorenike razlièito i dovode do nejednakih
moguænosti da dobiju higijenske pakete, lekove i da komuniciraju sa
porodicama ili advokatima.

Preporuka 4: Obezbediti da va¾eæi zakon i propisi ne omoguæavaju
uvoðenje arbitrarnosti koja utièe na moguænost pritvorenika da imaju
pristup advokatu ili koji ogranièavaju druga prava.

Deo B: Pritvorski uslovi

Nalaz 5: Policijski objekti neprikladni za produ¾eni pritvor

Delegacija je utvrdila da su uslovi u policijskoj stanici koju je
posetila neprikladni za bilo ¹ta drugo osim za kratkotrajan pritvor i
da su neprikladni za boravak preko noæi. To je, izmeðu ostalog, zbog
nedostatka kreveta za svakog pritvorenika kao i æebadi i du¹eka;
neodgovarajuæe hrane i lekarske pomoæi; neodgovarajuæeg osvetlenja i
ventilacije. Svi ovi zahtevi su sadr¾ani u Standardnim minimalnim
pravilima o postupanju sa zatvorenicima (SMR) i Evropski zatvorskim
propisima (EPR). Pravilo br. 19 SMR-a i pravilo br. 24 EPR Deo II o
ovome daje precizna uputstva.

Delegacija je sa zabrinuto¹æu primili informaciju da su neka
pritvorena lice boravila u Beogradskoj glavnoj policijskoj stanici pod
ovim uslovima do ¹est ili sedam dana.

Preporuka 5: Obezbediti da pritvorena lica borave u policijskim
pritvorskim objektima ¹to je kraæe moguæe i da se ista ne koriste za
dr¾anje pritvorenih lica preko noæi..

Nalaz 6: Stanje pritvorenika koji su dr¾ani u izolaciji u Centralnom
zatvoru u Beogradu je neprihvatljivo

Delegacija je videla da se veæina zatvorenika koji su dr¾ani u
izolaciji u Centralnom zatvoru u Beogradu nalazila u malim, slabo
osvetljenim æelijama sa slabim osvetlenjem i ventilacijom. Takoðe je
utvrdila da veæini nije bilo dopu¹teno fizièko ve¾banje i da su sve
vreme dr¾ani u æelijama i samo povremeno izvoðeni uglavnom radi
ispitivanja.

Kumulativni i kombinovani efekti spornog produ¾enog pritvora u
sadejstvu sa uslovima pod kojima se vr¹i pritvor, koji su ispod
standarda, za mnoge privorenike predstavljaju poni¾avajuæe ka¾njavanje
ili postupak a ¹to je nespojivo sa èlanom 3. Konvencije protiv muèenja
i drugog okrutnog,neèoveènog ili poni¾avajuæeg postupanja (CAT), i
èlanom 3. ECHR-a i èlanom 7. ICCPR-a.

Delegacija je konstatovala da poveæanje populacije u zatvoru takoðe
umanjuje moguænost fizièkog ve¾banja za sve zatvorenike. Konstatovano
je da je nalazom iz 2001. godine utvrðeno su veæ tada uslovi za
ve¾banje u Centralnom zatvoru u Beogradu bili neadekvatni za oko 400
pritvorenika i da vreme za ve¾bu bilo prekratko. Prema izve¹tajima
trenutna populacija je veæa od 1,000.

Preporuka 6: Obezbediti da svim zatvorenicima bude omoguæeno adekvatno
ve¾banje od najmanje jedan sat dnevno i da se preduzmu druge mere radi
pobolj¹anja uslova u æelijama za izolaciju u Centralnom zatvoru u
Beogradu.

Nalaz 7: Postupci podnosenja ¾albi

Tokom posete Gradskom SUP i Okru¾nom zatvoru u Beogradu, delegacija je
obave¹tena o postupku za podno¹enje ¾albi unutar institucije, kao i
spoljnim organima za kontrolu. Postupci u okviru zatvora, kako su
opisani i utvrðeni od strane delegacije, predstavljaju vrlo
centralizovan pristup za podno¹enje ¾albi. Moglo bi se zakljuèiti da
predstavljaju neadekvatnu garanciju i da ne obezbeðuju nezavisnu i
javnu analizu ¾albi. Neadekvatnost postojeæeg metoda naroèito se
ogledala u slabom poverenju pritvorenih lica u delotvornost unutra¹nje
istrage.

Ova zabrinutost je, izgleda, od naroèitog znaèaja, po¹to je tokom
posete delegacija èula optu¾be ili videla indikacije muèenja ili
zlostavljanja tokom hap¹enja dva pritvorena lica. Bilo je nemoguæe u
potpunosti proveriti istininost ovih optu¾bi, ali delegacija smatra
va¾nim da pritvorena lica imaju moguænost da prijave svaku takvu
optu¾bu sa uverenjem da æe njihove ¾albe biti razmatrane po hitnom
postupku. Delegacija je takoðe obave¹tena o naèinima ispitivanja i
pritiska prilikom isleðivanja, koja se èine neprimerenim, posebno ako
se odnose na mlaðe ¾ene.

Preporuka 7: Pobolj¹ati moguænosti za obraæanje pritvorenih lica
relevantnim organima u vezi uslova u pritvoru i razvijanja dugoroènog
plana revizije sistema unutra¹nje kontrole, kako u policiji, tako i u
zatvoru. Svaka prijava zlostavljanja trebala bi da bude hitno i
ozbiljno istra¾ena uz sprovoðenje odgovarajuæeg kriviènog i/ili
disciplinskog postupka protiv odgovornog slu¾benog lica.

Nalaz 8: Proporcionalnost mera primenjenih protiv svakog pritvorenog
lica

Delegacija je utvrdila da fizièki uslovi u pritvoru i moguænosti za
komunikaciju u okviru zatvora ili sa spoljnim svetom, enormno varira
od sluèaja do sluèaja. Izgleda da nema valjanog razloga za¹to se neke
mere primenjuju prema svima ili samo u pojedinim sluèajevima. Kao ¹to
je naznaèeno u nalazu 4, izgleda da postoje elementi proizvoljnosti i
nedostatka transparentnosti propisa i uputstava.

Preporuka 8: Preispitati na osnovu pojedinacnih sluèajeva da li su
mere primenjene u konkretnom sluèaju, kao ¹to su pritvor u izolaciji,
proporcionalne i odgovarajuæe u svakom od sluèajeva. Uveriti se da su
odluke u vezi primene ovih mera bile proveravane u svakom pojedinaènom
sluèaju.

Nalaz 9: Moguænosti pru¾anja zdravstvene zastite

Jedan broj pritvorenih lica zadr¾anih u izolaciji ¾alio se na
neadekvatnu zdravstvenu za¹titu, ukljuèujuæi te¹koæe u nabavljanju
neophodnih lekova, sredstava za liènu higijenu i èiste odeæe. Takoðe
su se ¾alili i da su bili onemoguæeni da obaveste porodice o svom
zdravstvenom stanju i da dobiju informaciju o zdravstvenom stanju
svojih bli¾njih. Neki od pritvorenih lica nisu bili ubeðeni da im je
omoguæen pravovremen pristup lekarima, ili doktorima koji su upoznati
sa njihovim zdravstvenim stanjem.

Delimiène ili netaène informacije o zdravstvenom stanju ili razvoju
situacije do¹le su do rodbine pritvorenih lica, bilo putem medija ili
usmeno. U nekim sluèajevima navodno su informacije stizale iz
slu¾benih izvora.

Delegacija bi ¾elela da skrene pa¾nju na pravila 25 i 62 "Skupa
minimalnih pravila o postupanju sa zatvorenicima", pravila 29 - 62 iz
Dela II Evropskih Zatvorskih Pravila, koja daju dodatna uputstva u
vezi obezbeðenja zdravstvene za¹tite, kao i pravila 15 "Skupa
minimalnih pravila o postupanju sa zatvorenicima" i pravila 20 Dela II
Evropskih Zatvorskih Pravila u kojima su navedena sredstva neophodna
za liènu higijenu.

Ukoliko se to zatra¾i, organizacija kakva je Meðunarodni komitet
crvenog krsta bi trebala da bude u moguænosti da odgovori ovim
potrebama.

Preporuka 9: Pobolj¹ati dostupnost zdravstvenoj nezi, kao i
obezbeðenju èiste odeæe i sredstava za liènu higijenu. Kao dodatno
obezbeðenje, zatra¾iti pomoæ nezavisne organizacije sposobne da
odgovori zdravstvenim, higijenskim i ostalim sliènim potrebama
pritvorenih lica i omoguæiti komunikaciju sa njihovim porodicama.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Mission to Serbia and Montenegro

ENDS

Serbian News Network - SNN

news@...

http://www.antic.org/


=== 2 ===


Subject: Unity for freedom!
Date: Wed, 28 May 2003 02:25:09 +0200
From: "Vladimir Krsljanin"


Unity for freedom!

(On the demonstrations in Belgrade and The Hague,
on the activities of Sloboda and ICDSM)

By Vladimir Krsljanin



The puppet colonial regime in Belgrade is loosing more and
more influence every day. The people is outraged by they're
ruthless dictatorship and obvious links to the criminal circles.

By the first political demonstration after the "State of
Emergency" five days ago Sloboda have opened a season of
protests against the regime in agony.

Before the demonstration, almost 200 people have submitted,
one by one, individually, to the Belgrade District Prosecution
the criminal charges against the "acting president" Natasa
Micic, Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic, all ministers in the
Serbian Government and unknown investigative judge in the
"Stambolic case". They are charged for serious violations of the
Constitution and Low, abuse of power, spread of the false news
aiming to discredit President Milosevic, his family and political
opposition.

The demonstration of several hundred in front of the Foreign
Ministry and Government of Serbia buildings, on the day of the
last visit of Carla del Ponte to Belgrade demanded "end of the
Hague-DOS dictatorship", restoration of democracy and
sovereignty in Serbia.

The speakers pointed the existence of the coalition between the
illegal Hague tribunal and the present rulers in Serbia. It is a
coalition of common despair - both anti Serbian groupings face
total failure in their attempt to suppress the truth and
freedom-loving spirit of the Serbian people.

The patterns of this coalition are seen in the present mass
violation of human rights in Serbia, following the example of
the Hague tribunal. [1]

The atmosphere of fear is still present in Serbia. But President
Milosevic teaches: "Time of the dictatorship is a right time
for the activity of all honest people and of all people devoted
to democracy."

Our duty is to work on the creation of the broadest possible
political front to return freedom, hope, dignity and sovereignty
to the Serbian people, to stop turning the country into a colony.

Serbs in Diaspora demanded to mark this year's Vidovdan by a
demonstration at The Hague. Sloboda supported this demand
immediately [2].

The work of Serbian-International Organizational Committee
of the Hague demonstration is supported up to now by Serb
organizations and groups from Germany, France, Britain,
Austria, Sweden, by progressive and leftist parties, groups and
organizations from several European countries, by many
distinguished personalities, including many ICDSM members.

The situation in Serbia now, for the sake of the future of the
Serbian people require unity, lack of sectarian approaches and
total solidarity with the struggle of an old European people for
its freedom, democracy, sovereignty and equality.

This important and decisive struggle also requires new effective
and more developed forms of organization and mutual support
at home and abroad.

Everyone ready to support or to take part in this struggle should
be aware of its importance for the world peace and destiny of
the mankind.

In that struggle everyone will take a position he is willing or
able to take [3]. The progressive forces today don't need
disputes. The struggle for the freedom of Slobodan Milosevic,
Serbia and Yugoslavia is a cause absolutely clean and
undisputable. We don't have time nor wish to measure our
contributions to that struggle. After we reach the victory, which
is close, the reward for the fighters will be the benefit of the
people.



[1] http://www.icdsm.org/more/shock.htm

[2] see the inviting leaflet at
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/sloboda051203.htm
/English version/
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/POZIVZAHAG.htm
/Serbian version/
or at
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/
/Both versions + PDF/

[3] Honoring all who associated their names with the ICDSM
and our struggle in general, the author of these lines does not
subscribe to making analyses of individual contributions to this
struggle. What I have witnessed is the visit Mr. Ramsey Clark to
Belgrade in 2001, aiming to intervene against the extradition,
but delayed due to manipulation of that time Yugoslav
Ambassador to Washington. Mr. Clark made a speech in the
people's rally in front of the Federal Parliament and two press
conferences in Belgrade. Then, there were two visits (all on his
own expense) to President Milosevic at the Hague, with one
press conference there [4], all the time readiness to give advice,
several written interventions to the Tribunal etc. Ramsey Clark
signed the ICDSM letter to all heads of states:

http://www.icdsm.org/appeal.htm

In his recent interview to Egyptian "Al Ahram" (Weekly
On-Line No.624, February 6-12), Ramsey Clark stated:

"I met Milosevic a few days ago. His health has deteriorated,"
he tells me in Cairo. "He had the strength to hold the people of
his country together in a very difficult situation."

"Only absolute power, unrestrained by any rule of law or
standards of human decency, openly taunts an intended victim as
President George W Bush has taunted Iraq."

Yesterday it was Yugoslavia. Milosevic was struggling to
preserve Yugoslavia, Clark says. "If there was any independent
state in central and eastern Europe it was Yugoslavia. They were
playing off the Soviet Union and the US to maintain their
independence and relative prosperity." That was during the
socialist and non- aligned regime of the country's founder,
Joseph Broz Tito. In Tito's day, Yugoslavs were happily united
-- a rare occurrence in the Balkans.

"In 1991 there were six [constituent] republics with lots of
different peoples in Yugoslavia. And Belgrade had held all these
formerly warring groups together in peace. In 1991 Time
reported that by far the most progressive, and truly the most
successful country in Eastern Europe, was Yugoslavia. And
almost immediately you see foreign powers trying to dismantle
it. First they dismantled Slovenia, then Croatia. Germany comes
in after its deplorable historical record in the Balkans and
encourages Croatian independence. Then Bosnia and
Macedonia."

"We deliberately broke it up. It was US policy to break it up for
economic exploitation and to show other Eastern European
nations not to dare dream of being independent. If you want to
have any economic or political independence you'll be crushed.
That was the brutal message signalled to Yugoslavia's
neighbours."

A public example had to be made of Milosevic's Yugoslavia:
"Within two years of the break up of the Soviet Union Ukraine
became the third largest recipient of US aid. First Israel and
second Egypt and third Ukraine. Can you imagine the old
enemy? And what was the aid for? It was to identify public
facilities for privatisation. And most went to American
companies, and we identified 6,000 properties. We destroyed
their economies and they were obliged to buy our goods. And
you pay our price. And we'll advertise and make you want to
buy our goods just like we make you want McDonald's and blue
jeans. And now what have the people got? They lost their
education system, they've lost their health care system and
they've lost their jobs. [Western investors] came in with big
plans for privatisation and nationalisation. What they did is
unbelievable -- a despicable act of greed," Clark says. And the
same fate awaits a defeated Iraq, he warns.

[4] http://www.icdsm.org/more/clarkm.htm#a

On the police and mafia regime in Serbia


1. IMPORTANT LINKS to articles about the "state of emergency" in
Serbia and its implications.
Many authors agree about the anti-democratic and mafia character of
the ruling mafia coalition, independent from their very different
point of views.

2. MISCELLANEA
Agencies and short articles about the "state of emergency" and NATO/US
support.

3. United Nations Office Of The High Commissioner For Human Rights,
Serbia And Montenegro:
Confidential Memorandum To The Ministries Of Justice And The Interior
Of The Republic Of Serbia. Initial findings and recommendations
arising from the visit to detainees in Belgrade 14-15 April 2003


For a very good summary of the recent events in Serbia we advice to
read:
BHHRG: THE KIROV MURDER REVISITED?
Zoran Djindjic's assassination and Serbia's political elite
An analysis of the events surrounding the assassination of Serbia's
prime minister on 12th March 2003
http://www.oscewatch.org/CountryReport.asp?CountryID=20&ReportID=197


=== 1 ===
IMPORTANT LINKS to articles about the "state of emergency" in Serbia
and its implications.
Many authors agree about the anti-democratic and mafia character of
the ruling mafia coalition, independent from their very different
point of views.
=== * ===


THE ARGUMENT OF FORCE. SERBIA UNDER MARTIAL LAW
by Nebojsa Malic
Antiwar.com - March 27, 2003
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m032703.html

<<...Djindjic's murder has been blamed on "remnants of the Milosevic
regime", both by the Serbian government and the Imperial press. It is
hard to say exactly who claimed it first, though the accusations
seemed to appear in American papers sooner than in official Serbian
statements....>>


WASHINGTON'S STOOGE:
DJINDJIC ASSASSINATION EXPOSES U.S. ROLE IN SERBIA
By Heather Cottin
Reprinted from the March 27, 2003 issue of Workers World newspaper
http://www.workers.org/ww/2003/djindjic0327.php

<<...Djindjic had the distinction of being one of the only nationally
known politicians in Serbia to support the U.S./NATO 78-day bombing
campaign of Yugoslavia that began exactly four years ago on March 24,
1999... The Serbian government is using Djindjic's assassination
as an excuse to institute political repression, directing their
attacks on the remaining supporters of Slobodan Milosevic...
Zoran Djindjic was the corrupt beneficiary of U.S. regime change
and instituted the economic reforms that destroyed Yugoslavian
society as surely as the NATO bombs destroyed its infrastructure...>>


RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AGAINST STATE OF EMERGENCY IN SERBIA
Press service of the Russian Communist Party
Pravda.RU: Politics. 2003-04-01
http://english.pravda.ru/politics/2003/04/01/45411.html

<<...Western countries, which allegedly take care of their democracy,
ignore the fact that civil freedoms in Serbia are imperiled greatly at
present moment. The People's Patriotic Union of Russia denounces the
use of the state of emergency in Serbia as a way to intimidate
political opponents of the present government...>>


A FALLING-OUT AMONG THIEVES?
John Laughland
"All News is Lies", Sanders Research Associates, April 7, 2003
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0304/S00233.htm

<<...The West has not been able to contain its enthusiasm for this
massive crackdown in Serbia. The Union of Serbia and Montenegro (as
Yugoslavia is now known) was admitted last week to Europe's main human
rights body, the Council of Europe - at the height of these purges and
mass arrests... while the all-powerful US ambassador in Belgrade,
William Montgomery, also stated that "the international community
supports the Serbian government's fight against organised crime". As
Montgomery added, again without a trace of irony, that a contract had
just been signed between US Steel, based in Pittburgh, and the Sartid
company to buy the steel works at Smederevo...>>


THE ZORAN DJINDJIC ASSASSINATION: "DEMOCRACY" AT WORK?
by TV Weber
http://www.serbianna.com/columns/weber/002.shtml

<<...After Tito's death, the image of the Serbs took another
unexpected transformation, to that of insane nationalists, responsible
for all the evils in the Balkans. But now, with Yugoslavia dissolved
and Milosevic on ice in the Hague, the press wants to view the Serbs
as a bunch of gangsters...>>


AN INNOCENT ABROAD: POWELL IN BELGRADE
by Srdja Trifkovic
ChroniclesExtra, April 10, 2003
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/News/Trifkovic/NewsViews.htm

<<..The campaign against Kostunica indicates the real
government agenda: to eliminate political and media opposition in
advance of the lifting of the state of emergency, so that a snap
election-with a preordained result-can be called before the opposition
recovers and regroups...>>


BOLSHEVIKS IN BELGRADE. SERBIAN PURGES UNMASKED
by Nebojsa Malic
Antiwar.com - April 10, 2003
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m041003.html

<<...And what a purge it is: judges, military and police officials,
lawyers, even some politicians, all have been targeted in the past
three weeks, and the hunt is about to get even bigger...>>


POST-YUGOSLAVIA AND THE EXCEPTIONAL STATE OF SERBIA-MONTENEGRO
Tamara Vukov Interviews Andrej Grubacic, April 22, 2003
http://www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID=3498§ionID=36

<<...A few days ago, the vice-president of the government announced
that we should not complain that there is no opposition. Now we are a
democracy, so opposition is no longer necessary - we are so
democratic, that no opposition needs to exist. This is so-called
"total democracy." A situation in which democracy, in its total
self-fulfillment, abolishes itself. They are so devoted to democracy
that they no longer need it... The NGOs and rent-a-dissidents are
supporting it, promising complete loyalty to the Serbian
government...>>

AFTER PROMISING "DEMOCRACY"
by John Catalinotto
http://www.workers.org/ww/2003/serbia0417.php

<<...A state of emergency continues. Some 7,000 people were arrested,
with 2,000 held in prison for investigation, say both European press
accounts and dispatches direct from Belgrade. There can be no
criticism of the government, no demonstrations or strikes. Not even
public statements are allowed. The threat is now that parties will be
forbidden...>>


"SHOCK AND AWE" IN TURBULENT SERBIA
By David Binder, MSNBC CONTRIBUTOR (WASHINGTON, May 16)
http://www.msnbc.com/news/911513.asp or
http://www.icdsm.org/more/shock.htm

<<...HOW ELSE TO characterize a 65-day state of emergency with 10,111
citizens questioned by the police, some 4,000 detained, 45 indicted
for "inciting terrorism and murder," the mysterious gunning down of
two prime suspects, sharp curbs on the independent press and
television, dismissal of judges and the imposition of draconian
laws?...>>


STATE OF EMERGENCY AS THE INTRODUCTION TO THE DICTATORSHIP
Spomenka Deretic, Belgrade, 10 May 2003
http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/jugoslavija/2003-05-11.html

<<...Among more than ten thousand imprisoned citizens of Serbia are
also several newspapermen. The majority of them are released, but the
work is forbidden to the editors of the only two papers that were not
under the complete control of the current authorities in Serbia....>>


BHHRG: THE KIROV MURDER REVISITED?
Zoran Djindjic's assassination and Serbia's political elite
An analysis of the events surrounding the assassination of Serbia's
prime minister on 12th March 2003
http://www.oscewatch.org/CountryReport.asp?CountryID=20&ReportID=197

<<...It was puzzling that a cameraman had managed to be conveniently
situated outside the government building to record the moment Dr.
Djindjic was shot. There were no special events scheduled for the
12th March - the prime minister was only arriving for work as usual.
Even stranger, was the fact that the security cameras covering the
entrance and scene of the crime had been switched off...>>



=== 2 ===
MISCELLANEA
Agencies and short articles about the "state of emergency" and NATO/US
support.
=== * ===


Objective responsibility of the Serbian Government
http://www.dss.org.yu/nasstav.asp#1389

PRESS RELEASE BY THE DSS PRESIDENCY, 7.04.2003
OBJECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SERBIAN GOVERNMENT

It is precisely because of its pronounced European orientation that
the Democratic Party of Serbia will use all means at its disposal so
that the truth about the seamy side of the state of emergency in
Serbia can reach the local and international public


At this evening's meeting chaired by Vojislav Kostunica, the DSS
Presidency discussed the situation in the country nearly a month after
the assassination of Serbian premier Zoran Djindjic and the
introduction of a state of emergency, and decided that the tardy
measures implemented by the Serbian government, clearly targeted
against organised crime though, do not have a comprehensive character.
The Democratic Party of Serbia has been a fervent advocate of an
all-inclusive and unselective struggle against all forms of organised
crime for years.
For this effort, the party, its president and his aides have been
attacked time and again and exposed to the genuine atmosphere of
lynch. This is particularly the case today.
The logical question is what the state of emergency is good for in the
hands of the Serbian government if it is quite clear that the
proclaimed purpose is not the only one. Aside from the uncontestable
results it has produced, the purpose of the state of emergency is to
keep the ruling coalition in power at all cost, relying on a doubtful
majority in the Serbian parliament, to help it shun responsibility for
the reforms it pledged but failed to carry out, for a wracked economy
and the sell-off of national companies, for growing unemployment rates
and flourishing commercial crime and corruption. There is also no need
to waste words on those who got rich recklessly under the former
regime and have now found secure livelihood with the new regime
composed of the remnants of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia.
After all, is there anyone else to blame for the fact that crime had
assumed the proportions that allowed for the murder of premier
Djindjic but the very same government? It is exactly the Serbian
cabinet that made it
possible for all sorts of crime to burgeon by denying that organised
crime existed at all. It is the Serbian government that has openly
sided with one criminal group clashed with another by preparing the
leader of one of them for the role of a protected witness. The very
fact that the Serbian government's State Security Council
coordinated the work of the Spec-Ops Unit since early January 2002
tells us that the responsibility for the assassination of premier
Djindjic lies with the government staff. The fact that the justice
minister plays an important role in the High Judicial Council points
to his objective responsibility for the appointment of Milan
Sarajlic as a deputy to the Serbian public prosecutor. The fact that a
Serbian deputy premier visited Dusan Spasojevic in jail and took him
out of it, and then was friends with him, also points to the objective
responsibility for links with an organised criminal group.
Serbia and Montenegro's membership of international organisations,
including the Council of Europe since not long ago, implies certain
rights and, even more so - obligations. Among other things, this
membership requires
that all the questions posed here be answered. It is precisely because
of its pronounced European orientation that the Democratic Party of
Serbia will use all means at its disposal so that the truth about the
seamy side of the state of emergency in Serbia can reach the local and
international public alike. We are not going to let the flag raised in
Strasbourg after two and a half years of hard work be tarnished by the
autocracy of the DOS core plainly intending to restore the one-party
system we once had in Serbia.
=

Information Service of the Democratic Party of Serbia

---

Evidence instead of fabrications
http://www.dss.org.yu/nasstav.asp#1417

PRESS RELEASE, 11.04.2003
EVIDENCE INSTEAD OF FABRICATIONS

This is virtually about an invented conspiracy in the
making, which followed the authentic one that led
to the murder of the premier, while the media are
just tipped off who is the next to be removed from
the political and public life


The Democratic Party of Serbia will cooperate
with all truly democratic forces and the civil
sector, fighting against blatant human rights
violations and threats to democratic institutions.
Likewise, it will not hesitate to internationalise
this problem, since the admission of Serbia and
Montenegro into the Council of Europe implies
both rights and obligations in this regard.
At today's briefing for editors-in-chief of
Serbian media, a government representative
informed the reporters about what allegedly was
the latest discovery in the investigation into the
assassination of premier Zoran Djindjic.
According to this "discovery", the blame for the
crime falls on a coalition of patriotic forces,
which, as they insinuate, has been led by the
Democratic Party of Serbia. Let alone that such
an allegation might imply that some parties in the
country are not patriotic.
Not for a moment contesting its genuinely
democratic and national orientation, the
Democratic Party of Serbia is openly pointing out
that it is now crystal clear that the state of
emergency, instead of allowing for an authentic
showdown with all forms of organised crime, has
been used for a showdown with the Serbian
strongest political party.
Everyone should be clear already that the
prisons have been closed and visits by family and
lawyers banned precesily to allow the
government's mouthpiece to seize the role of the
sole source of information about who purportedly
said what during the investigation. Accordingly,
the first thing to be done is to make up a
statement by a prisoner, and than develop it into a
concocted version that might serve as a basis for
the arrest of political rivals.
This is virtually about an invented
conspiracy in the making, which followed the
authentic one that led to the murder of the
premier, while the media are just tipped off who is
the next to be removed from the political and
public life. Isn't this undeniable evidence of a
political abuse of the state of emergency? Today,
Gradimir Nalic has been mentioned; tomorrow -
anyone can be mentioned and as falsely accused,
without the possibility of communicating at least
with lawyers. Moreover, extremely compromised
and blackmailed persons have been used as
supposedly reliable witnesses during the
investigation.

Information Service of the Democratic Party of Serbia

---

STATE OF EMERGENCY ENDS

BELGRADE, April 22 (Beta) - Acting Serbian President Natasa Micic on
April 22 lifted the state of emergency that was introduced on March
12, after the assassination of Serbian premier Zoran Djindjic.
Addressing the public, the acting Serbian president said that the
steps taken during the state of emergency had yielded results, since
"the perpetrators and organizers of Djindjic's assassination and many
other crimes have been found and will be brought to justice."
"We have dealt the final blow to organized crime. We have dismantled
Milosevic's [sic] criminal apparatus and stopped the spiral of
violence that has been tearing our country apart for over a decade.
The country has been preserved," Natasa Micic said.
She pointed out that the state institutions defended the country "with
full respect to international standards during the state of emergency.
She said that the authorities were now facing a reform of the
SerbianMontenegrin army, stressing that the army "used to be an
institution that managed to avoid public control for decades."
The acting Serbian president also said that Serbia should face the
fact that certain individuals had committed war crimes on its behalf.
"There will be elections and therefore a chance for campaigning and a
new distribution of political power, in accordance with the will of
the people. Until then, let us do what the people have clearly
demanded from us: finish the job we have started," Micic said.

COMMENTS ON DECISION TO LIFT STATE OF EMERGENCY

BELGRADE, April 22 (Beta) - OSCE CHAIRMAN: OSCE chairman Dutch Foreign
Minister Japp de Hoop Scheffer said in Belgrade on April 22 that the
OSCE would have applied pressure [sic] on the Serbian government had
it not chosen to lift the state of emergency. He said that there had
been no abuse during this period.
"Had the state of emergency continued, the OSCE would have applied
pressure to have it lifted," Scheffer said, after meeting with Serbia
and Montenegro President Svetozar Marovic, Serbian Premier Zoran
Zivkovic and Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic.
Scheffer said that no country could exist in a prolonged state of
emergency. He said he hoped that everyone involved in the
assassination of Serbian premier Zoran Djindjic would be brought to
justice and that this could be accomplished in regular conditions.

PROSECUTOR AND PRESIDENT OF SERBIA'S SUPREME COURT ELECTED

BELGRADE, April 23 (Tanjug) - The Serbian Parliament Tuesday elected
Acting President of the Supreme Court of Serbia Sonja Brkic as
president of this court, while Acting Republican Public Prosecutor
Djordje Ostojic was elected as Public Prosecutor.
The Parliament released former Supreme Court president Leposava
Karamarkovic and former public prosecutor Sinisa Simic of their
duties at their own request [sic]. The newly elected President of the
Supreme Court and the Public Prosecutor took oath before the MPs.

SERBIAN LEGISLATION PASSES PUBLIC INFORMATION LAW

BELGRADE, April 22 (Beta)-The Serbian Legislature adopted on April 22
a law on public information, which regulates the numerous rights and
obligations of journalists, because it provides for the greater
protection of persons who are the subjects of information.
Several amendments were made to the government's proposal of the law,
including the provision under which information must be accessible to
all media under equal conditions.
Government representatives explained that the reason that the
provision on the free access to information was absent from the new
law is the fact that a special law on this is soon to be adopted.
One of the principal objections to the new public information law made
by Serbian experts and media representatives is the possibility of
banning the distribution of newspapers and magazines [sic], which was
rejected as unacceptable in the course of the public debate.
The possibility of banning the distribution of information was
included in order to prevent the propagation of war, incitement to
direct violence or the advocacy of racial, national or religious
hatred, as well as in cases when a published or broadcast information
might have direct "grave, irreparable consequences which cannot be
prevented in any other way."

---

LIGHT THROWN ON 28 MURDERS - MIHAJLOVIC

BELGRADE, April 29 (Tanjug) - Serbian Interior Minister Dusan
Mihajlovic said on Tuesday that during the Operation Sword, light had
been thrown on 28 murders, 23 attempts of murder, 45 exortitions, 15
kidnappings, 208 criminal acts of illegal production, keeping and
putting into traffic of drugs, and other criminal acts.
Mihajlovic told a press conference that as of March 12, 2003, the
police had filed 3,919 criminal charges against 3,400 persons, due to
sustained suspicion that they had committed 5,812 criminal acts.
He also said that 1,325 peaces of various weaponry had been taken
away, as well 357 hand granades, 110,097 pieces of various
ammunition, 74,830 kg.of different drugs and many other objects.

---

http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/
FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1051389842266&p=1012571727166

Financial Times May 8, 2003

Bush backs military support for Serbia

By Eric Jansson and James Politi

President George W. Bush yesterday authorised the US
to provide military assistance to Serbia and
Montenegro, offering Belgrade's new leader Zoran
Zivkovic, who recently replaced assassinated prime
minister Zoran Djindjic, one of the strongest
indications yet of international support for his
policies.
The White House said the decision followed
"significant steps" taken by Mr Zivkovic's government.
In the past week, officials from Serbia and Montenegro
agreed to place the military under civilian command,
ordered the police to arrest any individuals sought by
UN war crimes prosecutors, and sacked some
Milosevic-era generals.
The moves, according to Reuters, were described by US
officials as an important step in Serbia and
Montenegro's bid to join Nato's Partnership for Peace.

James Politi in Washington and Eric Jansson in Belgrade

---

http://www.b92.net/english/news/index.php?lang=english&version=
standard&my_categories_class=%27News%27&nav_category=
&nav_id=22668&order=priority&style=headlines

NATO offers help to achieve alliance standards

Beta, AP May 7, 2003

BRUSSELS -- Wednesday -- NATO today welcomed military
restructuring in Serbia-Montenegro and offered help
implementing more democratic changes, which would
enhance the country's bid to join the alliance.
After being presented with the programme for military
restructuring and civilian control by federal Defence
Minister Boris Tadic and army chief-of-staff Branko
Krga, NATO ambassadors expressed support for the state
union.
An anonymous NATO official told agency AP "the
minister made a very convincing presentation", adding
that the 19-nation alliance had offered to send a
group of expert reform advisors to Serbia-Montenegro.
He explained that the assassination of PM Djindjic had
prompted NATO ambassadors to hasten reforms in
Belgrade saying:
"The murder of Djindjic galvanized the emphasis on
reform. There is a sense of urgency that did not exist
before and we want to develop closer relations."
Tadic: membership within the year
Following the Brussels presentation, Tadic said that
he expects the new state union to join NATO?s
Partnership for Peace programme within the year.
Expressing hope that Serbia-Montenegro will accept
suggestions regarding full cooperation with The Hague
Tribunal and the International Court of Justice, Tadic
said that NATO Secretary General George Robertson and
the NATO Council had offered support to the
presentation outlining a concept of regional security.
The concept, presented by Tadic and Krga, calls for a
regional security policy for the Balkan Peninsula,
which will ensure there are no alliances between some
Balkan states against other Balkan states.

Strong support

Tadic also said that the armed forces civilian-control
reform plan had been well received and that
practically all ambassadors strongly supported the
Supreme Defence Council?s decision to transfer
military jurisdiction to the ministry of defence.
The defence minister confirmed the readiness of NATO
ambassadors to back Serbia-Montenegro's accession to
the programme, provided concrete steps are taken.
He added: "We will continue to cooperate with The
Hague tribunal and I am sure that we will meet all the
pre-conditions. I want to believe that we will become
a member of the partnership for Peace this year".

---

From: Mrs. Jela Jovanovic
Sent: Thursday, May 22, 2003 6:00 PM
Subject: Scandals are shaking Serbian government

DAN-PODGORICA

Scandals are shaking Serbian government

- Assistant of the Health Minister falsified her diploma

- Minster Dusan Mihajlovic covered up the case of a double murder

Mrs. Aleksandra Makaj, assistant of the Minister of health in the
Government of Serbia is caught in forgery.

Mrs. Makaj is member of the Socialdemocratic party of Slobodan Orlic.
She was in the group of putschists that took the Socialdemocratic
party from Vuk Obradovic. Afterwards the Supreme court of Serbia
returned the Party to Vuk Obradovic, but the leader of the putschists,
Mr. Slobodan Orlic, with his mercenaries kept all the Assembly
representatives' mandates and functions.

Mrs. Aleksandra Makaj, presenting herself as the graduated student of
the Medicine faculty of the Zagreb University, became the assistant to
the Minister of health. Her domain is sanitary surveillance.

Through the checking at the Medicine Faculty in Zagreb, it was
ascertained that Mrs. Aleksandra Utopljenikov (her maiden name), born
of father Georgije and mother Anka in Virovitica 1952,Croatia, never
finished this Faculty. Minister's assistant is these days under the
surveillance of the Ministry of the interior affairs. She had, in
cooperation with her party colleagues, imported 20 thousand tons of
genetically modified crushed seeds. Serbia is in danger that EU
forbids the import of food from it.

In spite of the existence of the report that the assistant of the
Minister of health not only does not have the Diploma of the Medical
doctor, but not even the elementary education in the field of
medicine, the Government of Serbia refused to release her from the
duty. On the site of the Government of Serbia one can still read that
Mrs. Makaj is by profession doctor specialist. For fraud, as it seams.

Party colleague of Mrs. Makaj, representative in the Assembly and the
director of the Belgrade Fair, Mr. Branko Gligoric, seven month ago,
on the hill Goc killed by his vehicle two students of the Ministry of
interior
affairs, that were on the course for the multiethnic police in the
south of Serbia. He drove the car in the state of heavy alcohol
intoxication. Two youngsters passed away five days later in the
hospital. Minister Dusan
Mihajlovic covered up this case of double murder.

Milovan BRKIC

Wednesday, 21. May, 2003


=== 3 ===


Source: http://www.icdsm.org/more/shock.htm
or: http://www.ohchr.org/news/State%20of%20Emergency%
20%20UNHCHR-ODIHR-OSCE%20Memorandum%20on%20Detention%
20Facilities%2024%20April%202003.doc

United Nations Office Of The High Commissioner For Human Rights,
Serbia And Montenegro

Confidential Memorandum To The Ministries Of Justice And The Interior
Of The Republic Of Serbia

Initial findings and recommendations arising from the visit to
detainees in Belgrade 14-15 April 2003

CONFIDENTIAL

Following their joint visit to places of detention and detainees in
Belgrade on 14 and 15 April 2003 the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OSCE Mission to
Serbia and Montenegro and OSCE Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights have identified nine urgent
recommendations which they would draw to
the attention of the authorities in the Republic of Serbia.

These recommendations are not intended to represent the complete
findings and recommendations of the three
institutions. Rather, they represent a number of urgent steps which,
if implemented, the Delegation considers
would immediately improve the situation of persons detained following
the imposition of the state of emergency.
The three institutions will issue a comprehensive joint report of
their findings and recommendations in due
course. This report will expand upon the recommendations below and be
complemented by additional ones. The three institutions would like to
draw the Government's attention to the fact that, in its observations,
many of the problems do not arise directly from the conditions under
the state of emergency, but are long-standing problems concerning the
Belgrade Central Prison which were identified during assessment visits
in 2001. The state of emergency has exacerbated most of these problems
and that certain provisions of the amended Law on the Suppression of
Organised crime are likely to continue doing so unless appropriate
safeguards are promptly introduced.

The three institutions welcome the lifting of the state of emergency
orders on 22 April. Although the provisions relating to detention
under the state of emergency are no longer in force, they consider
that the findings and recommendations pertaining to detention
contained in this memorandum remain relevant. They base this on
recognition of the fact that the pressures on Serbia's criminal
justice system remain; that provisions for extended detention without
judicial supervision remain in force under the amended Law on the
Suppression of
Organized Crime; and the continued existence of systemic problems
which have previously been identified
following the 2001 prison assessment, the visit of the Committee
against Torture in 2002 and other assessments.

Besides the matters requiring attention which are identified below,
the Delegation would like to record that
welcome improvements upon the situation in 2001 were noted. These
included improved relationships between
detainees and prison guards. The Delegation heard consistently
positive references to the guards from detainees
during their confidential interviews. In addition the Delegation also
noted that all government officials were
helpful and open in their discussions with it.

The three institutions hope that the initial findings and
recommendations contained in this memorandum will be
of assistance to the Government in its efforts to combat organized
crime and uphold the rule of law on
accordance with the relevant international standards. They look
forward to delivering the full report in the
near future and of having the opportunity to carry up follow-up visits
to places of detention.

Findings and Recommendations

Section A: The legal basis for detention

Finding 1: The continued justification for detention without judicial
supervision

Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) states clearly that derogations of rights guaranteed under the
Covenant must be strictly limited to those required by the exigencies
of the
situation. Both the procedures under the state of emergency and the
recent amendments to the Law on the
Suppression of Organized Crime include provisions for extended periods
of detention without adequate judicial
supervision. These are clearly not in conformity with the
international human rights standards, notably Article
9(4) of the ICCPR and Article 5(4) of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The
commentaries and case law indicate that detainees may be held without
judicial supervision for a few days as an absolute maximum, even in
times of public emergency.

The Delegation found that the justification for the continued
detention of individuals without judicial
supervision was unclear in many cases, particularly as many
individuals had not been subject to any form of
questioning for many days and that much time has passed since the
initial emergency following the assassination.
Some, who had been in detention for several days, reported that they
had not been questioned at all.

With the ending of the state of emergency, which has occurred since
the visit, all derogations to the right to
be brought promptly before a judge are to be considered invalid and
therefore detention without charge is no
longer permissible. Therefore the detainees must be either charged
with a criminal offence or released in
accordance with Article 9 of the ICCPR.

The Delegation was particularly concerned that the combination of
detention without judicial supervision
combined with some of the other findings given below meant that human
rights violations were being compounded or exacerbated by a
combination of these factors.

Recommendation 1: Re-examine, on the basis of the facts of each case,
whether the conditions continue to warrant the detention of each
individual detained since the state of emergency was introduced
(including those detained under the amended Law on the Suppression of
Organized Crime). Ensure that detainees are either released or charged
with a criminal offence and kept in further detention only on the
basis of judicial decisions. These decisions should be subject to
regular review.

Finding 2: Information about status and rights for detainees; access
to counsel; procedures for considering
appeals

International standards as well as the principles established in the
Constitutional Charter of the State Union
and the Code of Criminal Procedure emphasize the rights right of
detainees to be informed of their status and
rights as well as being given access to legal counsel to protect their
interests. The state of emergency
suspended or restricted a number of rights relating to communication
with the outside world including visits by
families and communication with legal counsel. While some of these
restrictions may be justified as exceptions
required by the exigencies of the situation, applied on a case-by-case
basis and for short periods, they appear
instead to have been applied on a group basis or in an arbitrary way
and often for extended periods.

The Delegation found that many detainees were unclear about their
status and rights. There appeared to be no
systematic process to ensure that detainees were informed of their
right to challenge detention under the state
of emergency order. The confusion about their status, rights, and
possibilities for communication extended to
detainees who had passed to detention on judicial orders or on the
orders of the Special Prosecutor.

Recommendation 2: Carry out a systematic process of informing all
detainees of their status and rights. This
should include, inter alia, particular attention to those who were
initially detained under orders issued under
the state of emergency, but are now passing into other forms of
detention. Ensure that all detainees are given
immediate access to legal counsel.

Finding 3: Appeals procedures

At least one detainee was informed in writing that he had to submit
any appeal within 12 hours of receiving the
decision on his detention. No effective deadlines existed for ruling
on appeals; at least one detainee received
the negative decision around the 30th day of his 30-day detention. The
processes for communicating between
detainees and the authorities were not transparent in ensuring
adequate recording and issuing receipts for
communications. The Delegation also felt that a review by the Minister
of Internal Affairs was not a
sufficiently independent mechanism. The Delegation is concerned that
these problems persist for detainees held
under the provisions of the amended Law on the Suppression of
Organized Crime.

Recommendation 3: Introduce judicial supervision of all detainees
immediately. Introduce a clear and consistent
procedure regulating the process of allowing detainees to appeal
against detention, ensuring that there are no
temporal limits on the detainees' right to appeal and that all appeals
are ruled upon and communicated to the
individual concerned within 24 hours.

Finding 4: Arbitrary factors controlling conditions of detention

The Delegation found that the applicable rules governing detainees
conditions of detention were not clear and
that they depended in part on individual decisions by the prison
authorities. This was particularly problematic
as these decisions and the procedures applied appeared variously to
influence the detainees' possibilities to
obtain medical supplies or sanitary items and to communicate with
families and legal counsel.

Recommendation 4: Ensure that the law and regulations applied do not
introduce arbitrary factors which affect
the possibility of detainees to obtain access to counsel or restrict
other rights.

Section B: Conditions of detention

Finding 5: Police facilities unsuitable for extended detention

The Delegation found that the facilities in the police station it
visited were unsuitable for anything other
than short periods of detention and were not suitable for overnight
stays. The reasons for the unsuitability
included, inter alia, the lack of beds for each detainee and of any
blankets or mattresses; inadequate
provisions for food and medical care; and inadequate lighting and
ventilation. All these are requirements
contained in the Standard Minimum Rules of the Treatment of Prisoners
(SMR) and the European Prison Rules (EPR).
SMR Rule no. 19 and EPR Part II, Rule 24 offer specific guidance in
this.

The Delegation was concerned to learn that some detainees have been in
the Central Police Station in these
conditions for up to six or seven days.

Recommendation 5: Ensure that detainees are kept in police detention
facilities for as short a period as
possible and are not used to detain prisoners for overnight stays.

Finding 6: The conditions of detainees kept in isolation in the
Belgrade Central Prison were unacceptable

The Delegation saw that most prisoners kept in isolation at the
Belgrade Central Prison are kept in small, badly lit cells with poor
lighting and ventilation. It also learned that most were denied
exercise and were kept in the cells all the time and were taken out
infrequently and mainly for the purpose of questioning.

The cumulative and combined effects of the underlying illegality of
extended periods of detention coupled with
the substandard conditions of detention for many detainees amounts to
degrading punishment or treatment which is incompatible with Article 3
of the Convention against Torture and Other, Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CAT), Article 3 of the ECHR and
Article 7 of the ICCPR.

The Delegation noted that the increased population at the prison also
appeared to decrease the possibility for
exercise for all prisoners. It noted that the 2001 assessment found
that the exercise facilities in the Belgrade Central Prison were
already inadequate for the then population of some 400 detainees and
the exercise periods too short. The current population is reported to
be more than 1,000.

Recommendation 6: Ensure that all prisoners are allowed adequate
exercise of at least one hour per day and that
other steps are taken to improve the conditions in the isolation cells
in the Belgrade Central Prison.

Finding 7: Procedures for registering complaints

During the visit to the Belgrade Central Police Station and the
Belgrade Central Prison the Delegation was
briefed about the procedures in place to submit complaints to internal
or external control bodies. The
procedures within the prison which were described to and seen by the
Delegation represented a very centralised
approach to the airing of complaints. They seemed to be an inadequate
guarantee and did not provide for
independent and transparent analysis of complaints. The inadequacy of
the current method was also reflected in
the poor confidence of the detainees in the effectiveness of the
internal investigations.

This concern seems particularly relevant as during the visit, the
Delegation heard allegations or saw
indications of torture or ill-treatment during arrest concerning two
detainees. It was unable to verify in full
the veracity of these allegations, but the Delegation considers it
important that detainees are able to report
any such allegations with confidence in seeing their complaints
promptly addressed. The Delegation also heard
accounts of forms of questioning and pressure during interrogation
which would appear to be inappropriate,
particularly when they involve young women.

Recommendation 7: Improve the possibilities for detainees to
communicate with the relevant authorities
concerning their conditions of detention and develop a long-term plan
of revision of the internal control
systems in both the police and prison systems. Any allegations of
ill-treatment should be subject to prompt and
proper investigation with the invocation of appropriate criminal
and/or disciplinary proceedings against the
officials concerned.

Finding 8: Proportionality of the measures applied to each detainee

The Delegation found that the physical conditions of detention and the
possibilities to communicate within the
prison or the outside world varied enormously. There appeared to be no
clear rationale as to why certain
measures were applied in general or in individual cases. As indicated
in finding 4, there appeared to be
elements of arbitrariness and a lack of transparent regulations and
guidelines.

Recommendation 8: Re-examine on an individual basis whether the
measures applied, such as detention in
isolation, are proportionate and justifiable in each case. Ensure that
the decisions on the application of these measures are subject to
regular review in each case.

Finding 9: Health and medical provisions

A number of prisoners kept in isolation complained of inadequate
medical and provision, including difficulties
in obtaining the necessary medicines, items for personal hygiene and
clean clothes. They also complained that
they were unable to communicate to their families their state of
health and learn of the health of their
relatives. Some detainees were not confident that they had prompt
access to doctors or doctors who were familiar with their existing
medical conditions.

Partial or incorrect information about the health or aspects of the
situation of has reached the relatives of
detainees either through media reports or word of mouth. In some cases
they allege that they heard information
officially.

The Delegation would draw attention to Rules 25 and 62 of the SMR and
Rules 29-62 in Part II of the EPR Part II
which provide more guidance on provisions for medical care and SMR
Rule 15 and EPR Part II, Rule 20 which
describe the requirements necessary to ensure personal hygiene.

If requested, an organization such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross should be able to address
these needs.

Recommendation 9: Improve access to medical care and provision of
clean clothes, personal hygiene items and
facilities. As an additional safeguard, invite the assistance of an
independent organization with capacity to
address the medical and hygienic and related needs of the detainees
and allow the possibility of communication
with their families.

/Ends

United Nations Office Of The High Commissioner For Human Rights,
Serbia And Montenegro

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to Serbia
and Montenegro