Ukraine: Neo-Nazi Criminal State Looming

“There are many who do not know they are fascists
but will find it out when the time comes.”
Ernest Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls

After signing a void agreement on “crisis settlement” on Friday, the situation in Ukraine has rapidly got out of control of its signatories and “witnesses”. No provisions of this document were fulfilled. The legitimate authorities fled (or tried to flee) the country, the governmental buildings in Kiev are taken by the revolutionary mob. The radicals are dictating the new rules to façade opposition “leaders” who desperately try to bridle theMaidan.

What happened to Ukraine on February 21, 2014 is essentially a criminal coup committed by the radical armed anarchists and Ukrainian Nazis who have been enjoying a comprehensive financial, military, diplomatic and even religious support and instigation from the Western power groups for the last two decades. Many of Ukraine’s cities are now falling into the chaos of lootings, unprovoked violence, lynch law and political repressions.

The first signs of upcoming chaos were clearly seen as the Ukrainian authorities wavered at the three-month siege of the centre of Kiev by the radical guerrilla elements from Galicia and local criminal gangs. They watched silently when furious fanatics were burning unarmed riot police Berkut officers alive, lynching them and pulling out their eyes. They did nothing to stop frantic “freedom fighters” from storming regional administrations, humiliating the officials and looting police and military arsenals in the West Ukraine. They were paralyzed when unidentified snipers were cool-bloodily killing militia personnel, protesters and casual passer-bys from the roofs of Kiev’s buildings. They even declared amnesty (twice!) to those guilty of the brutal crimes against policemen and public order. Thus Yanukovych’s regime itself paved the way for a sinister ghost of the war-torn Libya to come to Ukraine.

Is the guerrilla side a self-organized and self-indoctrinated popular movement tired of a corrupt and inefficient state? That is hardly the case.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the international power groups have invested billions of the Federal Reserve notes (aka US$) into Ukrainian “pro-democratic” NGOs and politicians. While preaching “Ukrainian commitment to the European choice and democratic values” in the meantime they clearly saw that there is no short-term historical perspective for making Ukraine a state hostile to Russia, which is evidently the final goal of the globalist Eastern policy. The stakes were placed on the ultranationalist elements in the Western Ukraine and in the Uniate Church, a minority religious Greek-Catholic community of the Eastern rite, created by the Holy See in XVI century in a desperate attempt to weaken close ties of Rzeczpospolita’s Orthodox with Moscow. Since the early 1990s the Uniates enjoyed silent support of the newly-independent central authorities in Kiev. Theit tactic was to aggressively occupy Orthodox cathedrals on the canonic territory of the Moscow Patriarchate. The last thing the Uniate clergy used to preach in the occupied churches for all these years was the Christian call for repentance and peace. Instead they propagated a new crusade against the Orthodox and directly instigated and justified race-motivated prosecutions and even killings, acting exactly like radical jihadist preachers of the militant pseudo-Islamic sects. Suffice to watch a “Sunday sermon” by Mykhailo Arsenych, the clergyman from a local Uniate church in Ivano-Frankovsk region, Ukraine saying: “Today we are really ready for a revolution.The only effective methods of combat are assassination and terror! We want to be sure that no Chinese, Negro, Jew or Muscovite will try to come and grab our land tomorrow!”

The products of such indoctrination were not long in coming. A number of NATO-sponsored training centers for the Ukrainian ultranationalist militants were opened on the territory of the Baltic states immediately after they joined NATO in 2004. The detailed photo report on a Ukrainian group taking a course of subversive activities at a NATO training center in Estonia in 2006 is available here (texts in Russian).

Abundant financial and human resources were directed to bolster the paramilitary units of the radical UNA-UNSO, Svoboda and other ultranationalist organizations in the Ukraine. Since 1990s these thugs were participating in the Chechen and Balkan wars on the side of radical Wahhabi (!) militants and committing war crimes against captured Russian and Serbian soldiers and civilian population. One of the notorious guerilla fighters of the Ukrainian origin in Chechnya, Olexander Muzychko (aka criminal leader Sasha Biliy) today is heading a brigade of “Pravyi Sector”, the radical militant driving force of the ongoing coup d’état in Kiev. According to his “official” biography (linkin Russian), in 1994 he was awarded by the then top commander of terroristIchkeria enclave Dzhohar Dudayev with the order “Hero of Nation” for “outstanding military successes against Russian troops”. His “military skills” were quite specific: he used to lure the Russian units operating in remote Chechen locations to guerilla ambushes. Then he personally participated in tortures and beheadings of the captured Russian soldiers. After returning to the Ukraine in 1995, he led a criminal gang in Rovno. Eventually he was prosecuted and sentences for 8 years term for kidnapping for ransom and attempted assassination of a Ukrainian businessman. He entered politics after release from prison in late 2000s.

After the end of Chechen and Balkan wars the British and American private military contractors were routinely recruiting Ukrainian mercenaries for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere.The Britam Defense scandal revealed the way and scale of how the Ukrainian personnel of the private military contractors were used in provocative clandestine actions to meet Western political goals in the Middle East. Many of them were sent to Kiev to make the job they are paid for – to target both policemen and protesters on “Euromaidan” from the roofs of surrounding buildings.

The real leaders of the protest have already clearly expressed their radical views to the European press (read e.g. the interview with the Pravyi Sector leader Dmitro Yarosh and several recent Guardian’s publications here and here).

That is the sort of people the half-hearted European politicians are about to deal with in the Ukraine. These fanatics are the real authority in today’s Kiev seized by the marauding mobs. They have torn the Friday’s agreement signed by four Ukrainian “leaders” and three European officials before the ink was dry on this paper. Their treatment of Yulia Timoshenko after her emotional speech on the Maidan Saturday night has clearly shown that her nomination de facto head of failing Ukrainian state would be their decision. Latest Western advice to financially support Ukraine with the IMF and the EU funds suggest that they have chosen to buy the loyalty of the ultranationalists for the transition period. Therefore, the ongoing Western policy of appeasement towards the radical insurgents in Kiev very much resembles the Anglo-American connivance in Hitler’s accession to power in Germany in 1933 and the rise of the Third Reich. But if the Western elitist groups suppose that the Neo-Nazi project that they have carefully cherished and supported in Ukraine for decades, would be controlled by political means and set against Russia, they are deadly wrong.After facing furious resistance and blowback at the East and South of the Ukraine, the radical Nazi ideological avalanche encouraged by the illusion of success in Kiev would inevitably enter the degrading European political landscape where the neo-Nazi and hooligan outbreaks are already a notable destabilizing factor. Their established links with the Islamist underground in Europe add another sinister dimension to the murky European future.

Is it the price the Europeans are ready to pay for bringing its eastern neighbors into the “family of civilized nations”?

The geopolitical dimensions of the coup in Ukraine

By Peter Schwarz 
27 February 2014

“When the Soviet Union was collapsing in late 1991, Dick wanted to see the dismantlement not only of the Soviet Union and the Russian empire but of Russia itself, so it could never again be a threat to the rest of the world,” wrote former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in his recently published memoirs. Gates was referring to the then-Secretary of Defense, and later US Vice President, Dick Cheney.

The statement sheds light on the geopolitical dimensions of the recent putsch in Ukraine. What is at stake is not so much domestic issues—and not at all the fight against corruption and democracy—but rather an international struggle for power and influence that stretches back a quarter of a century.

The Financial Times places the recent events in Ukraine in the same light. In an editorial on February 23, it wrote: “For a quarter of a century this huge territory perched precariously between the EU and Russia has been the object of a geopolitical contest between the Kremlin and the west.” In 2008, a clumsy attempt by President George W. Bush failed to draw the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, “But the Maidan revolution now offers a second chance for all parties to reconsider the status of Ukraine on the fault line of Europe.”

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was an unexpected gift to the imperialist powers. The October Revolution in 1917 had removed a considerable part of the world’s surface from the sphere of capitalist exploitation. This was regarded as a threat by the international bourgeoisie, even long after the Stalinist bureaucracy betrayed the goal of world socialist revolution and murdered an entire generation of Marxist revolutionaries. In addition, the economic and military strength of the Soviet Union presented an obstacle to US world hegemony.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the introduction of the capitalist market created conditions for the social wealth created by generations of workers to be plundered by a handful of oligarchs and international finance. The social gains made in the field of education, health care, culture and infrastructure were smashed and left to decline.

This was not enough, however, for the US and the major European powers. They were intent on ensuring that Russia could never again threaten their global hegemony, as is made clear in the above cited statement of Dick Cheney.

By 2009 the US-dominated NATO military alliance had absorbed into its ranks almost all of the East European countries that had once belonged to the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. But attempts to incorporate former Soviet republics into NATO failed—with the exception of the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—due to resistance from Moscow. Ukraine, with its 46 million inhabitants and its strategic location situated between Russia, Europe, the Black Sea and the Caucasus, invariably was at the centre of these attempts.

As far back as 1997, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that without Ukraine, any attempt by Moscow to rebuild its influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union was doomed to fail. The core thesis of his book The Grand Chessboard is that America’s capacity to exercise global primacy depends on whether America can prevent the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic power on the Eurasian landmass. (See: “The power struggle in Ukraine and America's strategy of domination”)

In 2004 the US and the European powers supported and financed the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine that brought a pro-western government to power. The regime rapidly broke apart, however, due to internal strife. The attempt in 2008 to draw Georgia into NATO by provoking a military confrontation with Russia also failed.

Now the US and its European allies are intent to use the putsch in Ukraine to once again destabilize other former Soviet republics as well and draw them into their own sphere of influence. In so doing they risk an open armed conflict with Russia.

Under the headline “After Ukraine, the West Makes Its Move for the Russian Periphery,” the Stratfor think tank, which has close links to the US secret services, writes: “The West wants to parlay the success of supporting Ukraine’s anti-government protesters into a broader, region-wide campaign.”

“A Georgian delegation is currently visiting Washington, and the country’s prime minister, Irakli Garibashvili, is scheduled to meet with U.S. President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry this week,” Stratfor reports. Moldovan Prime Minister Iurie Leanca is also scheduled to visit the White House for a meeting with US Vice President Joe Biden on March 3. “High on the agenda of both visits are the countries’ prospects for Western integration—in other words, how to bring them closer to the United States and the European Union and further from Russia.”

Lilia Shetsova from the US foundation Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (sic) in Moscow, also argues that the coup in Ukraine be extended to other countries and Russia itself. “Ukraine has become the weakest link in the post-Soviet chain,” she writes in a comment for the Süddeutsche Zeitung. “We should keep in mind that similar upheavals in other countries are possible.”

Shetsova stresses a feature of the Ukrainian revolution that she wants to retain at all costs: the mobilization of militant fascist forces. “Yanukovych’s downfall is essentially due to the ‘radical elements’ on the Maidan, including among others, the Right Sector, which have become a serious political force.” She continues: “Ukraine’s future will depend on whether the Ukrainians can maintain the Maidan.”

The “radical elements” which Shetsova wants to retain at all costs are armed fascist militias, which base themselves on the vilest traditions of Ukrainian history: the pogroms and mass murder of Jews and Communists carried out during the Second World War. The future role of these fascist militias will be to terrorize and intimidate the working class.

It took just a few hours for the reactionary social content of the upheaval in Ukraine to become clear. The “European values ” allegedly brought to the country by overthrow of the old regime consist of massive attacks on the already impoverished working class. As a condition for loans the country urgently needs to prevent impending bankruptcy, the IMF is demanding the floating of the exchange rate of the hryvna, a brutal austerity program and a six-fold increase in the price of household gas prices.

The floating of the country’s currency will lead to raging inflation, a corresponding increase in the cost of living, and the destruction of any remaining savings by ordinary Ukrainians. The austerity program will be primarily directed against pensions and social spending and the increase in gas prices will mean that many families cannot heat their homes.

Ukraine is to be reduced to a country where well-trained workers and professionals earn wages far below those currently paid in China. This is of especial interest for Germany, Ukraine’s second largest trading partner (after Russia) and, with a volume of $7.4 billion, the second largest investor in the country.

While for the United States the isolation of Russia stands in the foreground, Germany is interested in the economic benefits of Ukraine, which it has already militarily occupied twice, in 1918 and 1941. It wants to exploit the country as a cheap labor platform and use it to drive down wages in Eastern Europe and Germany even further.

According to statistics compiled by the German Economic Institute, labor costs in Ukraine are at the low end of the international scale. At €2.50 per hour worked, average labor costs (gross wages plus other costs) for workers and clerical employees are already well below those of China (€3.17), Poland (€6.46) and Spain (€21.88). In Germany, an hour of labor costs €35.66, i.e 14 times as much.

The Ukrainian Statistical Office estimates the average monthly wage at 3,073 hryvna (€220). Academics are also very poorly paid.

Former President Yanukovych himself was a representative of Ukrainian oligarchs. He only turned down the Association Agreement with the EU because he feared he would not politically survive the social consequences. Now his downfall serves as a pretext to introduce a level of poverty and exploitation totally incompatible with democratic norms and will lead to new social uprisings. It is precisely in order to suppress future social unrest that the fascist militias are to be retained.

Unused Opportunities for Peace?

Heinz Loquai

Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?

The Kosovo Verification Mission was a big challenge for the OSCE - the
most difficult operational task that it has had to deal with since its founding.
Linked to this Mission was the hope for a peaceful solution of the Kosovo
conflict. Did it have any chance at all of meeting the expectations attached to
it? Was the use of military force in the final analysis inevitable in order to
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe?
This article undertakes to provide answers to these questions. Of course it
represents no more than an initial effort, written mainly from an OSCE perspective.
There must be further studies if we are to have a full picture of the
development of this conflict.

The Holbrooke-Milošević Agreement

Background:

For a long time the Kosovo conflict stood in the shadow of the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It was not dealt with in the Dayton Peace Agreement of 14
December 1995 because at that time it was not yet so virulent, no quick solution
seemed possible and any attempt at one would have put at risk the urgent
ending of the Bosnian war.
Resistance on the part of the Kosovo Albanians against Serbia's policy of oppression,
for a long time peaceful, had enjoyed no success. At the beginning
of 1998, the "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA, also known as UCK) began to
carry out attacks against Serbian security forces and civilians and against Albanian
"collaborators". Their goal was to win Kosovo's independence from
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) through guerrilla warfare. The
KLA carried out its operations from villages located in the vicinity of the Albanian
border and in central Kosovo inhabited mainly by Albanians. The
Yugoslav security forces struck back, often with disproportionate violence.
The civilian population as is customary in this kind of warfare were misused
as living shields by the partisans and thus suffered as well. They fled from
the areas where fighting was going on. In June 1998 the KLA had 30 to 40
per cent of the territory of Kosovo under their control. The Serbian special
police who were brought in, occasionally supported by the army, intensified
their operations in summer 1998 and drove the KLA back.
The United Nations Security Council intervened in the conflict through its
Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998. In this Resolution it condemned both the
excessive force used by Serbian police forces and "all acts of terrorism by the
Kosovo Liberation Army". Both parties to the conflict were called upon to
enter into a political dialogue without preconditions. With a wealth of initiatives
and conversations at the highest level, the OSCE tried to stop the violence
and promote a political solution. However, the attempt to establish an
OSCE mission in Kosovo failed due to resistance from the FRY. It wanted
first to renew Yugoslav participation in the OSCE, which had been discontinued
in 1992. But the United States and Albania opposed this with particular
vehemence in Vienna. The Balkan Contact Group, the European Union
and Russia also joined the search for a political solution. NATO, too, had
taken up the Kosovo problem in early 1998 and over the summer had produced
a barrage of threats which, however, were directed exclusively against
the Yugoslav leadership.
In September and at the beginning of October 1998 the situation reached the
crisis point. In mid-September and later in that month the number of refugees
was estimated at 300,000 of whom about 50,000 were living out in the open,
mostly in forests. On 23 September 1998 the United Nations Security
Council passed Resolution 1199. What was new in it was a sharper condemnation
of the violence being used by the Yugoslav side, concern over an impending
humanitarian catastrophe, and the assertion that the worsening of the
situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region.
This meant that the conflict had taken on a new character for the UN.
In the United States pressure was being applied by the media at this time to
bring about a military intervention in Kosovo. But Russia had declared unambiguously
that it would not vote for any UN resolution that provided for
the use of military force. A number of European countries also had reservations
about NATO action without a mandate from the UN Security Council.
And in Bonn a change of government was about to take place.
In this situation, the American diplomat, Richard Holbrooke, the master
builder of the Dayton Peace Agreement, undertook along with his colleague
Christopher Hill a final effort to work out a political solution with the Yugoslav
leadership. During his talks in Belgrade he urged NATO to increase the
military pressure on Yugoslavia by threatening to intervene. Indeed, on 24
September 1998 NATO had already threatened Yugoslavia with air attacks in
unmistakable terms. On 13 October 1998, the day on which the Holbrooke-
Milošević agreement was concluded, the NATO Council authorized the Secretary-
General of the Alliance to begin "air strikes" against the FRY, in other
words to start a war. In the opinion of participants at the negotiations in Belgrade
these impending air strikes were an unmistakable threat of war causing
the Yugoslav leadership to concede to the agreement.
The Most Important Provisions of the Agreement and Its Further
Development

The Holbrooke-Milošević agreement is a political framework agreement that
sets forth certain essential points. The most important results of this agreement
were:

- The deployment of an OSCE mission, the Kosovo Verification Mission
(KVM), with up to 2,000 unarmed, international "verifiers" (this concept
was important to Holbrooke in order to emphasize the more active role
of verifiers as compared with simple observers). The Mission was to be
responsible for verifying compliance with UN Resolution 1199, supervising
elections in Kosovo, and providing support in building institutions
and setting up a police apparatus. Not specified in the agreement but important
for developing a climate of trust and security, the ubiquitous
presence of the OSCE in Kosovo was supposed to create an international
public in Kosovo and persuade the refugees to return.
- The creation of an air surveillance system to supplement the observation
activity of the OSCE using manned aircraft and unmanned spacecraft.
This system, to be operated by NATO, was supposed to be stationed outside
of Yugoslavia, in Macedonia.
- A declaration of commitment by Belgrade to conclude an agreement
with the Kosovo Albanians by 1 November 1998 providing for extensive
self-government of Kosovo within the Yugoslav state in accordance with
the terms of Resolution 1199.

This basic agreement had to be supplemented by separate specific understandings
in order to be implemented. Thus agreements were concluded in
quick succession on 15 October 1998 between NATO and the FRY, with regard
to the air surveillance system, and between the OSCE and the FRY on
16 October, with respect to the OSCE Mission. The Yugoslav side turned out
to be co-operative in these follow-up negotiations, so that the agreements
were reached in a very short time. During the negotiations, the Yugoslav side
repeatedly demanded that NATO's threat of war be withdrawn. But the threat
potential remained and may well have hastened the negotiating process.

Assessment of the Agreement

The agreement of 13 October 1998 was the last chance to avert a war. Without
an accord, NATO would have started the air war against the FRY on 17
October 1998. Now there was widespread relief that it had once again proved
possible to prevent a war. And so, many participating States at the meeting of
the OSCE's Permanent Council on 15 October expressed a favourable view
of the agreement. Albania also gave its approval in principle on this occasion
but pointed out that the Albanian government still regarded the stationing of
NATO troops in Kosovo as a necessity. The Kosovo Albanians were dissatisfied
because they had not been involved in the negotiating process and the
result seemed to push their goal - a Kosovo independent of the FRY - a long
distance away. They had hoped that NATO military action, which they still
favoured, would hasten the move towards independence. The United States
had demonstrated once again that it could also get results at the negotiating
table; it saw its view confirmed that a credible threat of military action could
bring about desired political results and all in all it welcomed the fact that
NATO had emerged stronger from this crisis.
Holbrooke had indeed managed to extract substantial concessions from the
Yugoslav President. Milošević accepted a strong OSCE presence in Kosovo,
something which he had always made dependent on certain conditions in the
past, even when much smaller numbers of personnel had been involved. The
verifiers were assured of complete and unimpeded freedom of movement.
The FRY accepted responsibility for their security. It undertook to provide
administrative support to the OSCE Mission in carrying out its responsibilities,
to set up liaison offices and to co-operate with the Mission. The army
and the police were to inform the OSCE of troop movements. Military forces
and special police in Kosovo were to be reduced to a certain strength. This
was worked out in detail on 25 October 1998 in a special agreement between
NATO and the Yugoslav General Staff.
This new responsibility represented a quantum leap for the OSCE with regard
to operational tasks. For a long time it had established and led only small
missions of up to 25 members. With the Missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina
and to Croatia the number of personnel went up to 400 for the first time. The
deployment of up to 2,000, and occasionally even more, international staff,
along with several hundred local employees, far exceeded the planning and
leadership capacity of the OSCE's small staff in Vienna. And time was of the
essence! The OSCE had to show the flag quickly in Kosovo and cover the
region with a dense surveillance network. This would only be possible if the
OSCE participating States quickly reinforced the Vienna staff with qualified
personnel, speedily provided experts and verifiers for use in Kosovo, supplied
equipment and vehicles, and expanded the Organization's financial resources.
It is a simple fact that the OSCE does not - as NATO does - have
troops available on short notice and experienced leadership staffs; rather, it
has to ask the participating States for the personnel in connection with each
operational task individually, select the people and train them. This is no big
problem for small missions, but in the case of one the size of the Kosovo
mission it would take months if the normal routine were used. There was
general agreement, however, that the time immediately after conclusion of
the agreement would be of decisive importance for any lasting success.
Thus the OSCE was at a crossroads. If it succeeded in mastering the terribly
difficult task in Kosovo it would emerge strengthened and with enhanced
prestige from this test. A failure of the OSCE Mission would inevitably result
in a lessening of the OSCE's significance in the system of international organizations.

Organization and Increase in Staff at the Kosovo Verification Mission

The basic outline of the organizational structure of the OSCE Mission was set
forth in the agreement between the FRY and the OSCE. However, the agreement
provided for enough organizational flexibility so that the structure could
be adapted to the requirements of the task. The Mission was divided into:

- a headquarters in Priština,
- five regional centres in fairly large cities,
- field offices in small towns and communities,
- groups of verifiers working out of the field offices,
- a training centre, and
- a liaison office in Belgrade to maintain contact with the Yugoslav government.

There were Yugoslav liaison officers to facilitate co-operation between the
Yugoslav government and the OSCE.
The United States had already presented its views on the Mission's structure
and working methods on 16 October in Vienna. This unexpectedly rapid
presentation of their standpoint caused a certain unease amongst a number of
countries. Although the American speakers described their ideas as suggestions,
the polished and detailed presentation gave a clear indication of the
American desire to control proceedings for which the other countries had as
yet no definite conception. American resolve was further reflected in the fact
that on 17 October 1998, i.e. before the OSCE Permanent Council had even
officially adopted the decision to establish the Mission, and without prior
consultation with other countries - which is the usual practice in making such
appointments - the American diplomat William Walker had been named
Head of the Verification Mission by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE,
the Polish Foreign Minister, Bronisław Geremek. The Europeans, who had
also been interested in the top job, were left with the deputy positions. A
Frenchman, Gabriel Keller, became First Deputy. An Englishman, a Russian,
an Italian and a German were chosen as additional Deputies.
On 17 October a 13-man OSCE delegation was already in Belgrade to work
with the Yugoslav side in preparing the deployment of the Mission. NATO
started its air surveillance on the same day.
On 25 October 1998 the Permanent Council of the OSCE made its formal
decision on the establishment of the Kosovo Mission, the way having been
paved by the adoption of Resolution 1203 by the UN Security Council on the
previous day.
Under the circumstances, it was clear that it would not be possible for the
verifiers to show up on the scene immediately. In order to have limited
monitoring, an agreement was reached with the FRY to temporarily expand
Diplomatic Observer Missions that had been set up in summer of 1998. They
were to carry out surveillance activity on behalf of the OSCE and later be absorbed
into the OSCE Mission. Thus there was a limited international presence
on the scene, at least for a transitional period.
On 16 November 1998 in Kosovo, there were 60 OSCE employees in the
headquarters and in the training centre as well as nearly 300 members of the
Diplomatic Observer Mission, of whom about 60 per cent were Americans. A
month later the Mission had grown to 803 members although almost half of
them were local employees (drivers, interpreters, secretaries and the like).
Approximately one third of the international personnel were verifiers in the
area to be observed. Taken together with the remaining 200 diplomatic observers,
they were still far too few to ensure a permanent presence even at the
most critical points. On 16 February 1999 - i.e. five months after conclusion
of the agreement between the OSCE and the FRY - the number of international
OSCE workers had climbed to 934, still less than half of the target figure.
Shortly before the Mission was withdrawn, on 18 March 1999, about 65
per cent of the agreed-upon maximum number of members had been reached.
This unsatisfactorily slow growth in personnel corresponded to delays in
other areas. The security of OSCE personnel was of major concern to the
countries that sent them and to the OSCE itself. Yugoslavia had, to be sure,
agreed to guarantee the security of this personnel. But their rescue system
was not very efficient in emergencies. Hence Switzerland made a rescue helicopter
available to the OSCE, but despite intervention at the highest levels
the Yugoslav government refused to let the helicopter enter the country,
pointing instead to its own rescue system. Appeals by the OSCE to participating
States for a mobile medical core and medical vehicles went unanswered
for a long time. A team of German medics was the first to arrive, but
not until 7 December.
Armoured vehicles, which because of the danger of mines and of armed attacks
provided important protection to personnel, represented a further problem.
From the beginning diplomatic observers had had such vehicles - about
one for every three people. The OSCE Mission did not receive its first vehicle
of this kind until the end of November 1998 and by the end of December
had about 40 of them - one for every seven verifiers!
On 2 December, at the OSCE's Ministerial Council in Oslo, the German Foreign
Minister criticized the OSCE in unusually sharp terms. Fischer stated:
"We are not unaware of the difficulties in setting up the KVM. Nevertheless,
we are worried about its slow progress, its lack of transparency and the application
of unequal standards in the choice of personnel. The planning proc-
ess has scarcely begun for some of the core responsibilities of the KVM. This
is particularly true with regard to the police." In principle the Foreign Minister
was right. However the German government had only a few days before
that, i.e. on 25 November, decided to deploy 40 police officers!
There is no doubt that there were organizational gaps and other weaknesses
in the staff organs of the OSCE. Nor was the leadership style of the American
Head of Mission particularly helpful to the rapid construction of the Mission.
He did not arrive in Kosovo until three weeks after his appointment. Because
he had reserved all decisions on organization and personnel for himself, there
were repeated delays. Experienced candidates often had to spend some weeks
waiting before finally being accepted. Even so, the main problem lay with the
participating States themselves where there was often a huge gap between
verbal support for the OSCE and the contributions actually made in personnel,
material and financial resources. Nor did the new German government
give the impression that it attached top political priority to the Kosovo Mission.
Governments which later sent thousands of soldiers to Kosovo with
heavy equipment obviously had problems making a few hundred unarmed
verifiers rapidly available.

Events in Kosovo from October 1998 until March 1999

The objective here is not to provide a chronological account of all events.
Rather, our attention will be focused first on the initial weeks after conclusion
of the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement, because key accents were set
during that time. Second, we shall attempt to provide an accurate picture of
the immediate pre-war period, i.e. from the beginning of March 1999 until
the outbreak of war. The highly detailed daily reports of the OSCE are the
main source.
On 29 September 1998 the Serbian leadership declares that the KLA has been
defeated. On 6 October 1998 the picture in Kosovo is as follows: Police control
points have been reduced in number; the special police are hardly visible;
the military forces have been almost entirely withdrawn into their barracks;
army units not belonging to the Priština-Corps, which is permanently stationed
in Kosovo, are being transferred to barracks outside of Kosovo. Refugees
are returning to their villages, hesitantly thus far, and are beginning to
prepare for winter there. Only a few refugees are still seen out in the open,
although the supply situation remains critical. However, in those places
where the Serbian military and police have pulled back the KLA are returning.
They are using northern Albania as a base for attacks against the Serbs
and also as a place for withdrawal. The Yugoslav side has obviously started
to meet the requirements of UN Resolution 1199. The KLA, with word and
deed, is working against it.

After conclusion of the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement the picture does not
change much. On 17 and 18 October the KLA carry out a number of raids
against Yugoslav security forces. Four policemen and two soldiers are killed
in the process. On 20 October the KLA abducts two Tanjug correspondents.
KLA leaders call for a continuation of the armed struggle. Yugoslav troops
from Priština are transferred to the areas where KLA operations are concentrated.
The Serbian police remain present in many places, but they are less
visible. At the end of October the situation continues to be ambiguous. The
Yugoslav side still appears to be on course in fulfilling UN requirements. The
Yugoslav army has withdrawn a large portion of the troops that were to leave
Kosovo. Police forces have also been reduced. Their control points are now
manned only by traffic police. Refugees are returning to their places of residence
in larger numbers. But the KLA is filtering back as well, using refugee
camps for protection; it continues to attack Yugoslav security forces and has
regained control over a number of villages. Members of the KLA express
their disappointment that NATO has not yet intervened but are confident that
they can still bring this about. On 23 October, after pressure has been put on
him by EU ambassadors, the Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova speaks out
publicly for the first time in favour of the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement
and calls on the armed Kosovo-Albanian groups to exercise restraint.
In mid-November the overall situation is outwardly calm but there is tension
in certain regions. Most of the refugees have returned. The Yugoslav side is
obviously determined to observe the agreement for the most part while the
KLA is expanding and reinforcing its positions, again and again attacking the
police and the army in guerrilla warfare style. By this time the KLA is better
armed and equipped, has reorganized itself and is taking over sovereign responsibilities
in the areas it controls. The Serbian side complains that there
are still no OSCE verifiers on the scene. Representatives of the Serbian security
forces warn that they cannot tolerate the present situation much longer.
They themselves have to comply with the limitations of the agreement while
the KLA is operating without interference.
A tense calm continues to prevail until the end of November with scattered
incidents in very limited areas. As of 20 November there are no more refugees
living in the open; international assistance has begun to arrive on a large
scale. The KLA is continuing to mount attacks from the protection of villages.
The diplomatic observers, who are still the only OSCE presence on the
scene, are much more than passive onlookers. Their presence strengthens the
sense of security of the civilian population; they exercise a moderating influence
on the parties to the conflict and mediate in the event of disputes. Cooperation
between the diplomats and the Serbs and Albanians is generally
good.
After the beginning of December developments, which have hitherto been for
the most part favourable, no longer continue that way. On 2 December Belgrade
sends a memorandum to the OSCE charging that international organi-
zations and representatives of certain countries are maintaining contact with
"terrorists, killers, kidnappers and other criminals calling themselves KLA".
On 5 December the general staff of the KLA declares that they stand firm to
their commitment to "the just fight towards the creation of our independent
and democratic state". Rugova states at a press conference that the stationing
of NATO troops in Kosovo would ensure lasting security. The armed encounters
between the Serbian police and the KLA grow in number. The Serbian
civilian population in Kosovo becomes hostile towards international assistance
organizations, which they reproach for giving one-sided help to the
Albanians. The deputy commander of police in Kosovo on 15 December expresses
his growing disappointment. He says he is trying to keep the "terrorists"
under control but the international community is reinforcing them.
The American Christopher Hill and the Austrian Wolfgang Petritsch are not
making headway in the political negotiations they are trying to conduct. On
18 November Hill had declared in Vienna that it was realistic to expect Belgrade
and the Kosovo-Albanian side to find a provisional political solution
before Christmas. On 7 December Hill's proposal is rejected by the Albanians
as unacceptable. In the Permanent Council of the OSCE Petritsch expresses
the view on 16 December that the prospects for substantial steps towards a
political solution are not good at the present time. According to Petritsch, the
central problem remains the divisions on the Kosovo-Albanian side. And this
is not so much a question of arguments over substance as of personal differences.
Petritsch also asserts, all Kosovo-Albanian representatives continue to
stand uncompromisingly for independence.
On 11 December the OSCE carries out its first weapons inspection of the
Yugoslav army without finding anything significant to take exception to.
More inspections follow.
On 14 December there is a serious incident in the vicinity of the Albanian
border. The Yugoslav army stops 140 armed Albanians on their way into
Kosovo, shoots 36 and takes nine prisoners who are later freed. On the same
evening two men shoot indiscriminately in a bar frequented by young Serbs
in Peć, killing six students and seriously wounding three.
At this time protests by Kosovo Serbs against the OSCE begin. It and, in particular,
the United States are accused of supporting the KLA and of doing
nothing to clear up the whereabouts of 2,000 Serbs the KLA is supposed to
have abducted and imprisoned. These protests are later directed against the
leadership in Belgrade as well; the Yugoslav and the Serbian President are
given an ultimatum to come to Priština.
The time from mid-December 1998 until the end of February 1999 is characterized
by stagnation in the political negotiating process in Kosovo and by
a growing number of armed encounters - for the most part initiated by the
KLA and met by the Yugoslav police and army with a disproportionate use
of force. Working conditions become more difficult for the OSCE verifiers.
There are new movements of refugees in the fighting zones. Both sides com-
ply less and less with the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement. Again and again
the OSCE is able to intervene and de-escalate the situation, stabilizing it to a
certain - although very tense - level. But in the absence of a political solution
there does not appear to be any likelihood of lasting control over the conflict.
But there are many encouraging events as well. On 25 January 1999, Head of
Mission Walker reports in Vienna that the people in Kosovo are coming more
and more to realize that the Mission is a useful institution. For example, it
had protected Serbian electricians when they were carrying out necessary repairs
on the destroyed electrical facilities in Kosovo-Albanian villages. And
it had mediated in the question of whether to open schools. On 15 February
1999 the buildings of the colleges of law, economics and pedagogy are given
back to the Albanian academic authorities in Priština. (Albanian students had
been excluded since 1991.) Clear progress in ensuring the due process of legal
proceedings is ascribed to the presence of OSCE human rights experts.
In the middle of January 1999 NATO had already started to give thought to
how pressure on the Yugoslav side could be increased. The use of NATO
ground troops in Kosovo was discussed in the North Atlantic Council as was
the possibility of an ultimatum tied to a threat of air attacks. On 1 February,
in the Permanent Council of the OSCE, the United States called for arrangements
to withdraw the OSCE observers quickly in the event of threatened
NATO strikes. France opposed such measures, however, since negotiations
were still determining the logic of events. On 6 February, negotiations begin
in Rambouillet.
At the end of February and the beginning of March 1999 increased preparations
for war by the Yugoslav army are detected. Reservists are called up,
weapons are issued to civilians, bridges are primed to be blown up, troops are
regrouped and transferred out of barracks to field exercises and stationed in
the regions near the borders to Albania and Macedonia. There is no doubt
that these activities are a violation to the agreement. The Serbian justification
- that these were measures to protect against the threat of a NATO attack -
cannot from a military point of view be denied. As a consequence of a growing
military presence and increasingly frequent heavy fighting the Albanian
civilian population start to leave their villages again. There are reports from
Albanian villagers on the plundering of their houses by Serbian soldiers.
The final reports of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo between 15 and 18 March
1999 permit the following summary: the armed disputes are local and of limited
duration; they are concentrated in the areas around Priština and Mitrovica.
The Yugoslav army is bringing in new troops and expanding the defence
positions on the border to Albania and Macedonia. The Kosovo-Albanian
civilian population leave territory being fought over but return to their
villages when the danger is past and start reconstruction work. There has
been considerable violation of the October agreements by both sides. Developments
are again moving towards a crisis. On 19 March 1999 the negotiations
in Paris are broken off.

On the same day the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, now the Norwegian Foreign
Minister Knut Vollebæk, decides on the recommendation of Head of Mission
Walker to withdraw the OSCE Mission from Kosovo. The justification is that
the security of Mission members can no longer be guaranteed and the Mission
can no longer fulfil its responsibilities. The actual situation in Kosovo
does not support this rationale, however. For example, the OSCE reports on
18 March: the situation in the region remains generally tense, but calm. On
this day the OSCE carries out 120 patrols with no difficulty. The main reason
for the decision to withdraw the Mission before NATO air attacks began was
no doubt to protect international verifiers from exposure to Serbian violence.
President Bill Clinton also explains the planned air attacks in a speech on 19
March. The decision had obviously already been made. On 18 March, in Vienna,
Russia had continued to argue that the Mission should remain in
Kosovo because it was the only stabilizing factor there. But the withdrawal
on 20 March 1999 begins anyway. At 12 o'clock the last OSCE vehicle
crosses the border into Macedonia. Following the example of the OSCE, the
employees of other international organizations also withdraw from the province.
Kosovo is largely free of international control and assistance.

The events show that there certainly were opportunities for a peaceful solution
of the Kosovo conflict. The opportunity was ready to be grasped between
the middle of October and the beginning of December 1998. During
those weeks the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been steering a course
towards peace. The doves in that country had obviously got the upper hand.
The Kosovo Albanians ought to have been brought or forced onto the same
course. A rapid and omnipresent deployment of the OSCE Mission would
have been able to secure the path to peace. Neither succeeded.
But even thereafter there were frequent periods of relative calm and opportunities
for a peaceful solution of the conflict still existed. Beginning in December
1998, however, the hawks were circling once again. Both parties to
the conflict escalated their use of force. The KLA felt that it was close to the
goal that it had so doggedly pursued - a NATO attack against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav hard-liners had been seeking to eliminate
the KLA and its entire infrastructure. Neither had much consideration
for the civilian population, which was used for the purposes of each side.
However, there is no evidence that a carefully prepared and systematic plan
to drive out the Kosovo-Albanian population existed before the beginning of
the air attacks. The OSCE had always been able to contain the conflicts and,
on a case-by-case basis, to bring about a fragile stability.
After the end of January 1999, however, the pressure for a military solution
through NATO, with the United States in the lead, became ever stronger. It is
clear that the United States wanted to end the conflict quickly. NATO's
credibility appeared to be at stake. And all of this just a few weeks before the
NATO summit in Washington celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Alliance.
This was another reason why the time for a negotiated solution became
very short. What happened afterwards was, more and more, determined by
the logic of war.
Those who ultimately decided to begin the air attacks must have known that
the Yugoslav leadership would do everything possible to destroy the KLA,
using all resources and without regard for the civilian population, and that the
Yugoslav army, police and bands of soldiers who were no longer under international
observation - and even more inflamed by the air attacks - would
commit acts of violence against the Albanian civilian population. It ought to
have been equally clear that the NATO air attacks would require weeks in
order to bring about a real weakening of the Yugoslav military potential. A
horrible humanitarian catastrophe following the beginning of the air attacks
was in fact quite predictable.
In view of this predictability, the question remains why the small risk of continued
negotiations and of giving peace a chance was not taken and why, instead,
the high risk that war necessarily entailed was chosen. This question,
however, will have to wait some time for a convincing answer.

Quello che Cristicchi dimentica. Magazzino 18, gli «italiani brava gente» e le vere larghe intese

di Piero Purini (guest blogger),
con una postilla di Wu Ming e una breve linkografia ragionata.

[Abbiamo chiesto allo storico Piero Purini  - o Purich, cognome della famiglia prima che il fascismo lo italianizzasse - di guardare il discusso spettacolo di Simone Cristicchi e recensirlo per Giap.
Purini è autore del fondamentale Metamorfosi etniche. I cambiamenti di popolazione a Trieste, Gorizia, Fiume e in Istria. 1914-1975, appena ristampato da KappaVu con una prefazione di Jože Pirjevec.
Consigliamo questo libro a chiunque voglia conoscere e capire la storia del confine orientale nel Novecento. L'autore ha scovato, consultato e confrontato non solo fonti "nostrane", come troppo spesso accade, ma anche fonti in lingua tedesca, slovena, croata e inglese.
Per potersi dedicare alla ricerca degli «esodi» e delle migrazioni forzate nella zona che va dal Friuli orientale al Quarnero, Purini è dovuto andare all'Università di Klagenfurt, visto che in Italia aveva trovato solo porte chiuse. Metamorfosi etniche è l'espansione della sua tesi di dottorato.
Piero è modesto e non lo dice in giro, ma un paio di settimane fa lui e Poljanka Dolhar hanno messo in fuga da Radio 3 Marcello Veneziani, e senza nemmeno fargli «Buh!» Cliccare e ascoltare per credere, ma solo dopo aver letto l'articolo qui sotto.
In calce, una nostra postilla su «memoria condivisa» e rimozione del conflitto.
Ricordiamo che sotto il post ci sono due comandi: uno permette di salvarlo in ePub, l'altro lo apre in versione ottimizzata per la stampa.]
-

Magazzino 18 di Simone Cristicchi mi è sembrato un’operazione teatrale molto furba con uno scopo politico più che evidente: fornire uno strumento artistico efficace per propagandare la cosiddetta memoria condivisa, tanto cara al mondo politico «postideologico», secondo cui tutti gli italiani devono riconoscersi in una storia comune. Storia comune di cui, fin dal nefasto incontro Fini-Violante del 1998, le foibe e l’esodo sono pietre angolari.

Questa finalità prettamente politica è andata decisamente a scapito del valore artistico dello spettacolo: ne è risultata una pièce teatrale che mette insieme in maniera piuttosto bislacca generi disparati, richiami furbeschi all’immaginario collettivo italiano, imitazioni di spettacoli o film più o meno familiari allo spettatore medio. Un mix nazionalpopolare (a mio avviso piuttosto noioso e stucchevole) in cui troviamo un impiegato romano burino (che risulterà nostalgicamente simile ad alcune macchiette di Alberto Sordi); suggestioni musicali che si ispirano evidentemente a Schindler’s List (a suggerire per l’ennesima volta l’improprio paragone tra l’esodo giuliano-dalmata e la Shoah); imbarazzanti imitazioni di Marco Paolini, sia nella struttura dello spettacolo, sia nella recitazione; discutibili inserti tipo musical (alcuni brani non stonerebbero in film Disney come Pomi d’ottone e manici di scopa o Tutti insieme appassionatamente).

Secondo me, proprio l’ultima di queste canzoni – una via di mezzo traAladdin e Il re Leone – mostra l’ambiguità che permea l’intero spettacolo. La canzone si intitola Non dimenticare e recita: «Non è un’offesa che cede al rancore / non è ferita da rimarginare / è l’undicesimo comandamento: / non dimenticare».
E’ sottinteso, ciò che non si deve dimenticare è la tragedia delle foibe e dell’esodo, ma per ricordare questi eventi Cristicchi non esita a dimenticarne o trascurarne completamente altri che potrebbero risultare estremamente scomodi per lo scopo del suo spettacolo: appunto la creazione di una memoria collettiva esclusivamente italiana.

Cinque minuti e poi…

Innanzitutto Cristicchi dimentica di contestualizzare storicamente l’esodo. E’ vero che nello spettacolo è stata inserita una scena in cui vengono narrati i suoi antefatti storici, ma questa scena è del tutto assente nel cd allegato al libro e, se non sbaglio, ridotta nella lunghezza in alcune repliche, in quanto – almeno così mi sembra confrontando la trasmissione Rai, il cd e alcuni spezzoni tratti da YouTube – lo spettacolo viene modificato a seconda del luogo dov’è rappresentato.

Tale spiegazione storica è comunque troppo breve (cinque minuti scarsi su uno spettacolo di un’ora e tre quarti), superficiale, inesatta e abbonda di luoghi comuni. Talmente sbrigativa che sembra essere stata inserita al solo scopo di prevenire eventuali accuse di scarsa obiettività e dare un’apparenza bipartisan allo spettacolo.

La complessità etnico-linguistico-nazionale del territorio è liquidata dicendo che «per questo fazzoletto di terra ci sono passati tutti: italiani, austriaci, francesi, ungheresi, slavi». Già con questa descrizione Cristicchi può creare confusione nel pubblico: lo spettatore inconsapevole non sa che in questo territorio c’erano popolazioni autoctone (italiani, sloveni e croati) presenti da secoli, spesso fuse e mescolate tra loro, mentre Austria-Ungheria e Francia furono le entità statali che lo amministrarono.

Anche sul termine «italiani» ci sarebbe da ridire, in quanto, più che di «italiani» si trattava di popolazioni che parlavano il dialetto istroveneto della zona. Probabilmente la maggior parte degli italofoni residenti a Trieste o a Gorizia avevano la percezione di sé come fedeli sudditi asburgici, mentre l’irredentismo era appannaggio di una limitata ma rumorosa minoranza di altoborghesi (che proprio per la loro posizione sociale riusciva ad amplificare a dismisura le tesi favorevoli all’Italia) e di un’altrettanta sparuta minoranza di giovani contestatori che vedevano nel mito dell’Italia la contrapposizione ad un’Austria percepita come vecchia, bigotta ed opprimente. Esisteva anche una comunità di diverse decine di migliaia di persone di lingua tedesca, che risiedeva sul territorio da almeno 120 anni, e una miriade di piccole ma culturalmente vivacissime comunità non italiane: ebrei, serbi, cechi, greci, armeni, svizzeri, rumeni, turchi.

Gli altri esodi prima dell’esodo

Ciò che Cristicchi dimentica è che questo equilibrio e questa (fragile) convivenza non furono interrotte dal fascismo – come sostiene inMagazzino 18 -, ma già dalle autorità militari italiane subito dopo la conquista del territorio nel 1918.

Cristicchi dimentica che con la vittoria nella Grande Guerra l’Italia si annesse un territorio che comprendeva circa 500.000 non italiani.

Cristicchi, che ha voluto scrivere uno spettacolo sull’«Esodo», dimentica che quello giuliano-dalmata non fu il primo spostamento forzato di popolazione di questo territorio: già a partire dal novembre ’18 si verificò una diaspora degli abitanti della zona, che se ne andavano perchè temevano l’arrivo delle truppe italiane o perché la nuova sistemazione politica del territorio impediva loro di poter restare.

Cristicchi dimentica che le autorità militari italiane già nel novembre 1918 chiusero tutte le scuole della comunità tedesca della Venezia Giulia trasformandole in buona parte in caserme;
dimentica che insegnanti tedeschi, sloveni e croati persero il lavoro, furono espulsi o addirittura internati perchè continuavano ad insegnare clandestinamente nelle loro lingue;
dimentica che migliaia di reduci dell’esercito austroungarico non poterono tornare alle proprie case perchè le autorità militari permettevano il rientro ai soli reduci di lingua italiana;
dimentica che già nel primo anno di occupazione (1918-’19) l’intellighenzia culturale slovena e croata (850 persone tra sacerdoti ed insegnanti) venne internata nel Meridione perché rappresentava il veicolo di sopravvivenza della lingua e della cultura delle due minoranze;
dimentica che vi fu una campagna di delazione nei confronti di chi in casa parlava ancora tedesco, o che molti di coloro che erano definiti “austriacanti” (anche di lingua italiana) vennero fatti salire senza troppe cerimonie sui treni e spediti a Vienna o a Graz.
Dal 1918 al 1920 la vox populi locale parlò di oltre 40.000 partenze dalla sola Trieste verso Austria e Jugoslavia.

Cristicchi dimentica (o non sa) che l’esodo da Pola di cui parla nel suo spettacolo fu preceduto da un altro che nel 1918-’19 vide la partenza di oltre un terzo degli abitanti, e che fu questo esodo a rendere la popolazione così compattamente italiana, dal momento che se ne andarono la stragrande maggioranza dei tedeschi e una parte consistente dei croati e degli sloveni.

Cristicchi ignora che nel periodo tra le due guerre oltre 100.000 abitanti della Venezia Giulia partirono per Jugoslavia, Austria o Argentina perché le condizioni del territorio sotto l’Italia erano per loro invivibili;
dimentica – o più probabilmente non sa, perchè la storiografia italiana non ne ha quasi mai parlato – che nel 1919 più di mille ferrovieri tedeschi e sloveni del compartimento di Trieste vennero pretestuosamente licenziati in tronco durante uno sciopero e spediti in Austria e in Jugoslavia per poterli sostituire con personale ferroviario italiano;
dimentica che lo Stato italiano portò avanti una campagna di insediamento di italiani provenienti soprattutto dal Veneto e dalla Puglia per sostituire i non italiani che erano partiti e che dal ’18 al ’31 furono quasi 130.000 gli immigrati nella Venezia Giulia, un numero tale che le autorità dovettero addirittura proibire l’immigrazione nelle nuove province, perché la situazione economica del territorio non permetteva di fornire occupazione a tutti.

I primi immigrati ad arrivare furono 47.000 tra militari, carabinieri, poliziotti, guardie carcerarie, che dovevano imporre un controllo di stampo quasi coloniale alle nuove terre. La militarizzazione del territorio è particolarmente evidente se viene confrontata con la situazione prebellica: prima del conflitto l’Austria manteneva di stanza nel Litorale solamente 25.000 tra soldati e gendarmi, di cui ben 17.000 concentrati a Pola, dove si trovava la più grande base militare della marina austroungarica.
Cristicchi, poi, dimentica (ma più probabilmente ignora) che nel settembre del 1920, per piegare un sciopero, l’esercito cannoneggiò le case del rione “rosso” di San Giacomo, caso unico nella storia d’Italia di uso dell’artiglieria pesante contro un centro abitato in tempo di pace.

L’incendio del Narodni Dom

Nella sua scena di «introduzione storica» Cristicchi parla delle violenze contro i non-italiani (attribuendole tutte al fascismo, ancor prima che il partito fascista esistesse) e cita – giustamente – l’incendio del Narodni Dom, l’enorme casa del popolo, centro culturale e simbolo degli sloveni, dei croati e dei cechi nel centro di Trieste. Cristicchi sostiene che la sua distruzione fu «la prima grande frattura tra gli italiani della Venezia Giulia e la popolazione slovena e croata». Affermazione discutibile, visto che tensioni e violenze ce n’erano già state prima, e che – ad esempio – già in epoca asburgica il principale partito italiano, quello liberalnazionale, aveva ottenuto che a Trieste venisse impedita la costruzione di un liceo sloveno.

[IMMAGINE: L’incendio del Narodni Dom di Trieste, 13 luglio 1920]

Per giunta Cristicchi presenta l’incendio del Narodni Dom come una reazione all’uccisione di due militari italiani a Spalato. La stampa nazionalista dell’epoca aveva però omesso di dire che quei due militari avevano appena mitragliato i partecipanti ad una manifestazione, uccidendone uno, e pure Cristicchi omette questo particolare. Invece, rispetto all’incendio, in un’intervista a Repubblica ha sostenuto che ci sono «dubbi e chiaroscuri» (aggiungendo tra l’altro «Lì è morta una persona soltanto»!), insinuando forse l’interpretazione in voga durante il fascismo secondo cui dal palazzo si sparò e vennero gettate bombe contro gli assedianti, versione già ampiamente smentita dalla stampa non fascista e dalla stampa straniera dell’epoca, nonché da storici titolati e decisamente non sospettabili di simpatie filoslave come Carlo Schiffrer.

Chi ha detto «Italiano = fascista»?

Magazzino 18 descrive le prevaricazioni che il fascismo adottò per legge contro le minoranze:
il divieto di utilizzare lingue straniere nei tribunali e negli uffici pubblici (ma dimentica che gli sloveni riottennero questo diritto solo nel 2001!);
la totale chiusura delle scuole slovene e croate;
la rimozione delle tabelle in lingue slave (ma dimentica che ancor oggi nel centro di Trieste non ci sono le tabelle bilingui per non urtare la sensibilità di qualcuno…);
l’italianizzazione di «molti» cognomi (si parla di 100.000 persone solo a Trieste, mezzo milione in tutta la Venezia Giulia… Solo «molti»?) e quella dei toponimi (con paesi che ancor oggi, nonostante gli esiti di referendum locali, non possono tornare ufficialmente al nome originario perché è necessaria una votazione in parlamento)…
«Gradualmente,» dice Cristicchi, «gli spazi culturali, economici e sociali degli slavi vengono soppressi». Corretto. Ma non sarebbe stato male aggiungere che accanto alle chiusure per legge avvenivano veri e propri pogrom antislavi, con distruzione di tipografie, circoli, case private, negozi. Chi parlava sloveno o croato in pubblico rischiava bastonate, sputi (alcuni zelanti maestri erano usi sputare in bocca agli alunni che non parlavano in italiano), olio di ricino e addirittura olio da motore, come quello che venne somministrato al dirigente di coroLojze Bratuž, che morì un mese dopo.

[IMMAGINE: Lojze Bratuž, italianizzato in Luigi Bertossi. Morto a Gorizia nel 1937 a soli trentaquattro anni. Una squadra fascista lo sequestrò e gli fece bere a forza olio da motore. Il giorno della sua morte, gli amici si radunarono di fronte all’ospedale e cantarono una canzone slovena (gesto proibito dal fascismo), poi fuggirono per non subire violenze a loro volta.]

Cristicchi scrive che il risentimento produsse tra sloveni e croati l’equazione «italiano = fascista». E anche qui c’è una bella dimenticanza. In realtà questa uguaglianza non fu un’invenzione di sloveni e croati, ma per un ventennio fu portata avanti dalla propaganda fascista: proclamando l’entrata in guerra contro l’Etiopia, dal balcone di palazzo Venezia, il Duce aveva enfaticamente affermato: «L’identità tra Italia e fascismo è perfetta, assoluta, inalterabile». Dunque anche qui si attribuisce agli slavi come errore di valutazione una parola d’ordine che invece era ben radicata nell’ideologia fascista e probabilmente gradita a non pochi italiani.

Occupazione fascista e Resistenza

Cristicchi passa poi all’analisi del periodo bellico: cita l’invasione della Jugoslavia, gli incendi di villaggi, i massacri di civili, i crimini di guerra per cui nessuno ha mai pagato, gli ordini delittuosi di Roatta, le migliaia di morti nei campi di internamento, in primis quello di Arbe (anche se attribuisce tutto ciò a Mussolini, quando invece dietro di lui c’era tutto un apparato militare e amministrativo-burocratico che sosteneva le sue avventure belliche al di là dell’appartenenza al fascismo).

Tutto corretto storicamente, ma troppo sbrigativo: quelle che sono le cause principali di foibe e deportazioni sono liquidate in poche frasi. Forse Cristicchi avrebbe potuto ricordare la città di Lubiana, circondata da filo spinato e trasformata essa stessa in un enorme campo di concentramento; avrebbe potuto spiegare come i militari italiani a Podhum uccisero 91 abitanti, ne deportarono 900 e rasero al suolo l’intero paese, non diversamente da quanto i tedeschi fecero a Sant’Anna di Stazzema o a Marzabotto. Avrebbe potuto dire che la Slovenia ebbe un numero di vittime pari al 6,3% della popolazione, addirittura la città di Lubiana raggiunse il 9% di vittime; avrebbe potuto dire che la Jugoslavia contò un milione e centomila vittime su una popolazione di 15 milioni (solo a titolo di paragone l’Italia su 43 milioni ebbe circa 450.000 vittime).

Soprattutto, Cristicchi dimentica (o non sa) che molti di quelli che sfuggirono ai massacri italiani e tedeschi andarono ad ingrossare le fila della resistenza antifascista di Tito.

[IMMAGINE: Partigiani della divisione italiana Garibaldi, inquadrata nel II° Korpus dell’Esercito Popolare di Liberazione della Jugoslavia.]

I partigiani, nel racconto di Cristicchi, ad un certo punto «scendono dalle montagne dell’interno dove sono accampati» ed iniziano a girare casa per casa alla ricerca delle loro vittime su cui sfogare la propria vendetta.

Cristicchi omette di dire che i partigiani non fecero campeggio in montagna per poi andare ad ammazzare gli italiani: sostennero una lotta durissima contro le forze dell’Asse, contro i nazifascisti e dopo l’8 settembre 1943 contro i tedeschi e contro i collaborazionisti italiani che continuarono a combattere a fianco dei nazisti. Perché anche questo Cristicchi dimentica: che con l’armistizio e la dissoluzione dell’esercito italiano, una parte dei soldati italiani riuscì a tornare a casa, mentre altri si unirono proprio a quelle forze di Tito che sarebbero «scese dalle montagne» per «colpire gli italiani che sono un ostacolo» alla grande Jugoslavia (termine inventato: non è mai esistita una «grande Jugoslavia», a significarne l’espansionismo, a differenza di «grande Serbia», o «grande Germania»).
Altri soldati italiani continuarono a combattere assieme ai tedeschi. Cristicchi dimentica di dire che spesso questi collaborazionisti italiani si incaricarono del «lavoro sporco» (rastrellamenti, torture, esecuzioni), forse facendo – questi sì – odiare gli italiani in quanto fascisti.

Inoltre, quando parla dei partigiani Cristicchi li descrive sempre come «bande», «titini», «ribelli» rimuovendo il fatto che i soldati di Tito non furono bande feroci e selvagge, bensì un esercito che combatteva contro l’Asse e considerato parte integrante delle forze alleate.

Infoibare la storia

L’argomento foibe, poi, è un condensato di luoghi comuni e dimenticanze.

Innanzitutto Cristicchi omette la distinzione tra le cosiddette «foibe istriane» (1943) e le «foibe triestine» (1945). Le prime furono una sorta di jacquerie, di rivolta contadina contro chi aveva detenuto il potere fino ad allora, in cui la rappresaglia politica potè mescolarsi in alcuni casi a vendette personali. Cristicchi esclama: «Sta gente è stata ammazzata in tempo de pace!», ma dimentica che nel settembre ’43 c’era ancora la guerra.

Sulle foibe triestine, Cristicchi sfrutta il solito luogo comune secondo cui tutte le vittime sarebbero state infoibate. Come sa chiunque si occupi anche lontanamente dell’argomento, gli scomparsi del maggio ’45 finiti effettivamente nelle voragini carsiche sono stati una minoranza: qualche decina di persone. Gli altri furono deportati in quanto appartenenti a forze armate che avevano combattuto contro l’esercito jugoslavo, al pari di quanto accadde agli italiani catturati da inglesi, francesi, americani e russi. Le condizioni della prigionia non erano certamente delle più facili (ma i soldati catturati in Russia o in Africa non ebbero condizioni migliori); va detto però che buona parte di chi non aveva responsabilità personali riuscì a tornare.

Per fascisti e collaborazionisti vennero allestiti processi che si conclusero anche con condanne a morte. Il fatto però che le persone venissero liquidate «in quanto italiane» è smentito sia dal fatto che alcuni fascisti colpevoli di crimini vennero liberati dagli jugoslavi che non li riconobbero (il che la dice lunga sulla «terribile efficienza» della polizia segreta jugoslava), sia dai numeri. Cristicchi dà cifre vaghe (500, 5.000, 10.000, 14.000), mentre quasi tutti quelli che sono andati a spulciarsi uno per uno le liste dei “desaparecidos” concordano su un numero tra 1.000 e 2.000 persone. Cifre analoghe a quelle dei morti negli ultimi giorni di guerra a Genova, a Torino o in Emilia. Dove però mai nessuno è stato ucciso «in quanto italiano». Mi sembra dunque che questi numeri siano la riprova numerica del fatto che in queste terre le esecuzioni del maggio ’45 non hanno risposto ad una logica di pulizia etnica, bensì siano state la – purtroppo – fisiologica resa dei conti di un conflitto che era stato atroce e fortemente ideologico.

Se poi si vanno a confrontare le cifre delle vittime a guerra finita in Jugoslavia, si nota come altrove – dove Tito non doveva temere di rendere conto agli alleati – la mano della giustizia partigiana fu estremamente più pesante rispetto alla Venezia Giulia dove sarebbe avvenuta la «pulizia etnica».

Sorvolo sul caso Norma Cossetto, sulla descrizione della foiba (che sembra tratta pari pari dal racconto del sedicente sopravvissuto Graziano Udovisi) e sulla strage di Vergarolla, in quanto Cristicchi le interpreta come avvenimenti sicuri, ma dimentica di segnalare che si tratta invece di singoli episodi sui quali sono cresciuti a dismisura racconti mai corroborati da prove, o al massimo si sono fatte ipotesi investigative.

Davvero «non si può vivere senza essere italiani»?

Rispetto all’esodo è interessante come Cristicchi generalizzi l’esodo da Pola, facendo credere che anche l’esodo dalle altre parti dell’Istria, da Fiume, da Zara, dalla Zona B, dal Muggesano si sia svolto nello stesso modo. La questione è che l’esodo da Pola risponde a tutti i clichés di cui lo spettacolo ha bisogno: la partenza in tempi brevi, le navi, il trasporto delle masserizie, la neve, la bora.

Cristicchi dimentica che l’esodo fu un fenomeno estremamente complesso, che avvenne con modalità e tempi diversi: Zara fu addirittura sfollata ancora durante la guerra a causa dei bombardamenti angloamericani, l’esodo di Fiume si risolse in pochi mesi, l’esodo dalla Zona B si prolungò per anni, dando il tempo agli abitanti di fare una lunga analisi sul se, sul come e sul quando partire; quello del Muggesano coinvolse una popolazione in larghissima parte comunista cominformista che in maggioranza rifiutò l’aiuto delle associazioni dei profughi per non essere strumentalizzata dalla destra o dalla DC.

Soprattutto, Cristicchi dimentica le mille cause di questa complessità. Banalizza affermando che ci fu una causa sola: la gente partì «perché non si può vivere senza essere italiani».

In nome di questa tesi, Cristicchi rimuove il fatto che la Jugoslavia stava realizzando riforme di stampo socialista nell’economia: aveva appena approvato pesanti restrizioni nel commercio privato, imposto la distribuzione delle derrate alimentari attraverso cooperative, pesantemente tassato le rendite finanziarie, attuato una riforma agraria in base alla quale venne proclamata l’abolizione della mezzadria, del colonato e del lavoro agricolo su appalto, assegnato le terre ai contadini che dimostrassero di lavorarle da almeno quindici anni, e infine stabilito il sequestro dei latifondi e la distribuzione delle terre, nonché l’uso collettivo delle macchine agricole, tassando pesantemente le terre incolte ed i terreni oltre determinate superfici.

In un contesto del genere, che qui mi sono limitato a riassumere, è chiaro che tutta una serie di categorie (proprietari immobiliari, commercianti all’ingrosso e al dettaglio, imprenditori, locatori, addetti alla distribuzione ecc.) videro la partenza come l’unica soluzione dei loro problemi, a prescindere da quale paese vi fosse oltre frontiera. Credo che sull’esodo abbia giocato molto di più la paura di un sistema economico-politico demonizzato dal fascismo, dalla chiesa e dall’influente DC che di là dal confine spingeva per la partenza del maggior numero di persone. Non si dimentichi inoltre che per la piccola e media borghesia (quella che oggi viene chiamata middle class) la questione si semplificava in un’equazione molto banale: Jugoslavia = comunismo = miseria, Italia = Stati Uniti = ricchezza.

Un’altra paura che spingeva alla partenza era il sovvertimento di quello che fino ad allora era stato l’ordine sociale: le classi che avevano detenuto il potere venivano ad essere spazzate via da una sorta di tsunami sociale. Operai e braccianti diventavano arbitri dell’esistenza di chi fino ad allora aveva tenuto le redini del sistema sociale e ora non intendeva diventare subalterno agli ex servi. Non dunque fuga per l’italianità, quanto fuga dal socialismo, dal ridimensionamento sociale e dalla (probabile) miseria.

Cristicchi dimentica che le autorità italiane spinsero sotterraneamente all’esodo: attraverso le organizzazioni degli esuli, in Istria si pubblicavano appelli per la partenza e si reclamizzavano i veri e finti vantaggi che i profughi avrebbero avuto in Italia (non si dimentichi che comunque, da un punto di vista economico, l’Istria era una delle zone più depresse del Regno d’Italia e perciò l’esodo poteva essere addirittura allettante). La DC, riuscita ad accreditarsi come la forza politica che maggiormente tutelava i profughi, doveva rendere solida la propria base nelle terre di confine e dopo il 1954 la massa di profughi fu fatta fermare a Trieste, nell’intento da parte del governo di rendere più sicura una città che in realtà molto fedele all’Italia non era mai stata (i due quinti dell’elettorato triestino si esprimevano per partiti favorevoli all’indipendenza). A Trieste i profughi ebbero precedenza nell’impiego pubblico e privato e graduatorie privilegiate nell’assegnazione di case popolari. In Magazzino 18 si dimentica che, con la saturazione del mercato del lavoro e l’impossibilità di accedere ad alloggi, circa 25.000 triestini dovettero optare per l’emigrazione in Australia.

Anche i numeri confutano la tesi che gli esuli siano partiti per mantenere la propria italianità. Cristicchi, prendendo come oro colato il numero canonico di 350.000 profughi (in realtà inventato da Flaminio Rocchi), dimentica che in base al censimento del 1936 il numero di italiani residenti nelle terre perse era di 264.799. Se si dà credito alla cifra di Rocchi, si afferma automaticamente che 85.000 non italiani partirono… per restare italiani!

Non ho grandi considerazioni da fare sul pessimo accoglimento dei profughi a Bologna, salvo ricordare che purtroppo accoglienze di questo genere sono piuttosto frequenti: anche i profughi sloveni dopo la prima guerra mondiale, quando giunsero nei loro luoghi di destinazione in Jugoslavia, vennero spesso accolti con epiteti come lahi– spregiativo di «italiani» – e fašisti, proprio coloro dai quali stavano scappando.

Sulle condizioni dei campi profughi, è indubbio che esse furono terribili, ma solo una minoranza assoluta dei profughi ci visse per dieci anni (come si dice in Magazzino 18): per la maggior parte fu un periodo di transizione relativamente breve: in genere, dopo qualche anno, a volte solo qualche mese, i profughi ottenevano alloggi popolari di buona qualità. A Trieste vennero edificati interi rioni esclusivamente per profughi, come il complesso di Chiarbola con 112 edifici per un totale di 868 appartamenti.

Visita a Goli Otok

Infine due accenni: il «controesodo» e i «rimasti».
Cristicchi dimentica che, tra i cantierini monfalconesi andati in Jugoslavia per «costruire il socialismo», quelli che non abbracciarono la causa del Cominform poterono tranquillamente restare in Jugoslavia. Degli altri solo una minoranza venne arrestata ed internata. La maggior parte potè tranquillamente (e mestamente) tornarsene in Bisiacheria. I monfalconesi che finirono nei gulag della costa adriatica furono una quarantina, a dimostrazione che non ci fu alcun accanimento contro di essi «in quanto italiani», ma solo in quanto irriducibili stalinisti.

«Non esiste un monumento, una targa. Niente. Goli Otok non c’è nemmeno sui dépliant», dice Cristicchi. Gli segnalo che i dépliant su Goli Otok ci sono eccome e ci si possono anche fare delle visite di diverse ore. Resterà un po’ deluso, perché quella che lui definisce «per quasi 40 anni la prigione della Jugoslavia» fu un carcere per prigionieri politici per non più di dieci anni. Divenne poi un penitenziario per criminali comuni e negli anni ’70 fu trasformato in riformatorio, in cui i giovani detenuti venivano indirizzati all’attività turistica. Alcuni abitanti della costa mi hanno raccontato che in estate i turisti potevano raggiungere l’isola in barca e mangiare al ristorante del riformatorio, dove i reclusi lavoravano come cuochi e camerieri. Raccontano ancor oggi di piatti di pesce ottimi e prezzi bassissimi. Dal 1988 l’intero complesso è stato chiuso ed è ora fatiscente.

I «rimasti»

Cristicchi parla della triste sorte dei rimasti, ma dimentica che le comunità italiane di Fiume, Rovigno, Capodistria, Pola, Cittanova (anzi, come piace dire a lui storpiando: Rigeca, Rovini, Coper, Pula, Novigrad…) ebbero scuole italiane, bilinguismo, la possibilità di relazionarsi con gli uffici pubblici nella propria madrelingua, circoli culturali, cori, giornali, case editrici, rappresentanti nelle istituzioni politiche ecc.

In conclusione credo che Cristicchi sia il primo a dover rispettare quel suo «undicesimo comandamento»: all’inizio di Magazzino 18 parla di un’«enorme amnesia», ma mi pare che questo spettacolo continui a perpetuare un’amnesia altrettanto enorme su altri aspetti che è assolutamente necessario conoscere per capire la storia.
Non dimenticare, caro Simone.

Anzi, magari la prossima volta, per non dimenticare, cerca di informarti meglio.

⁂

Una postilla sulla «memoria condivisa»

Anche noi, finalmente, abbiamo trovato il tempo e lo stomaco di vedereMagazzino 18.

Siamo pienamente d’accordo con il nostro guest blogger quando dice che l’intento dello show è chiaramente politico e tutta l’operazione si inserisce nella costruzione della solita «memoria condivisa» pseudo-pacificatrice.

E’ su quest’ultima che vogliamo aggiungere qualcosa.

La «memoria condivisa» è in realtà smemoria collettiva, una ri-narrazione della storia italiana che finge di voler mettere d’accordo tutti, siano essi oppressori od oppressi; sfruttatori eredi di sfruttatori o sfruttati eredi di sfruttati; nipoti di italiani che combatterono agli ordini di Graziani (cioè di Hitler) o nipoti di italiani trucidati dai nazifascisti.
Non devono più esserci destra e sinistra, ragioni buone e cattive, scelte giuste e sbagliate. Soprattutto, non deve più esserci lotta. A sostituire tutto questo, una marmellata di «opinioni» preventivamente rese innocue, neutralizzate. Tutti abbiamo avuto le nostre vittime, e le vittime sono vittime, i morti sono tutti uguali ecc.

Frasi come «i morti sono tutti uguali» significano in realtà: tutte le storie si equivalgono, una scelta è valsa l’altra, chi ha avuto ha avuto, chi ha dato ha dato, e chi cazzo siete voi per dirci cosa dobbiamo fare, non ci rompete i coglioni.
I morti saranno forse «tutti uguali» (qualunque cosa significhi), ma sono diverse – a volte opposte e inconciliabili – le cause per cui si muore. Se non si riconosce questo, l’uguaglianza tra i morti è solo una supercazzola per difendere un sistema basato sulla disuguaglianza tra i vivi.

Dopo il riconoscimento delle «buone ragioni» dei «ragazzi di Salò» (ma «italiani di Hitler» sarebbe più preciso), è stata tutta una valanga.
In questo processo il «centrosinistra» ha molte più responsabilità del «centrodestra», che è solo passato dalle porte che gentilmente gli venivano aperte. Non a caso quell’apertura ai repubblichini la feceLuciano Violante.

Per capirci: se a fini retorici dovessimo dare a questo revisionismo storico omologante un nome di persona, sarebbe quello di Giorgio Napolitano, che ne è il massimo propugnatore istituzionale. Che dire di quest’estratto da un suo famoso discorso del 2007, dove ogni frase contiene un falso storico?