Informazione
Si vedano anche le foto al link dell'articolo originale (in lingua norvegese):
Noen av krigens grusomme dødsleirer var på norsk jord
TROMSØ (Aftenposten.no): 400 nordmenn var fangevoktere sammen med tyske SS, og mange av dem overgikk SS i brutalitet og drap.
Ole Magnus Rapp - Publisert: 15.nov. 2012 23:39 Oppdatert: 16.nov. 2012 12:23
TROMSØ (Aftenposten.no): 400 nordmenn var fangevoktere sammen med tyske SS, og mange av dem overgikk SS i brutalitet og drap.
Ole Magnus Rapp - Publisert: 15.nov. 2012 23:39 Oppdatert: 16.nov. 2012 12:23
Titolo dell'articolo:
"Alcuni dei più crudeli campi di concentramento si trovarono in suolo norvegese"
Parti salienti:
Parti salienti:
Su oltre 4000 prigionieri politici jugoslavi, 1600 sopravvissero.
Nei campi di Narvik e Karasjok (al nord) oltre l'80% degli jugoslavi lì internati morì. Il più giovane aveva 15 anni. Questi furono campi di sterminio all'altezza di quelli in Polonia.
Oltre alle SS che comandavano i campi del nord, c'erano 400 guardie norvegesi che spesso superavano le SS in brutalità, arrivando spesso ad uccidere i prigionieri a sangue freddo. In genere nel dopoguerra furono condannati a pene detentive di medio-lunga durata (spesso 12 anni), che vennero presto (nel 1948) dimezzate. A rendere i processi più difficili furono la nutrita presenza di ex membri del Nasjonal Samling (il partito collaborazionista di Quisling, ndt) tra gli avvocati degli imputati.
La notte tra il 17 e 18 luglio 1942 avvenne il più grande massacro su suolo norvegese della storia. Nel campo di Beisfjord vicino a Narvik 278 prigionieri jugoslavi vennero arsi vivi o mitragliati, quando le SS dettero fuoco alla baracca dei malati, che credettero fosse infestata di tifo.
Il primo a parlarne fu il professor Nils Christie alla sua tesi di laurea nel 1952, che ricevette pochissima attenzione. 'Era troppo difficile per la nostra società credere che cose del genere fossero accadute anche qui da noi. Col tempo ho capito che in Norvegia non c'era interesse per questo tema' disse Christie, che nel 1972 pubblicò anche un libro in merito, il quale ricevette anch'esso poca attenzione.
(a cura di A. Degobbis)
CASO SALLUSTI
Il Giornale: rom e sinti ladri di bambini. Tuonano le associazioni
Italia | 16 novembre 2012
Le associazioni tuonano nei confronti del quotidiano “Il Giornale”, dopo che il 30 ottobre sullo spazio web e nell’edizione cartacea, sono stati pubblicati due articoli di cronaca nera nei quali, senza alcuna prova, vengono accusati i rom del rapimento di bambini. Negli articoli viene riportata una presunta appartenenza etnica degli aggressori e si arriva ad attribuire numerosi casi di rapimento di bambine, ad un comportamento tipico della minoranza rom.
“La diffusione di questi articoli – dichiarano le Associazioni – trasmette un’immagine criminosa di un intero gruppo di persone ed è lesiva della dignità delle persone sinti e rom. In questi articoli è stato dato ampio e acritico spazio a dichiarazioni violente, di carattere congetturale e generalizzante delle e degli intervistati, senza evidenziarle come pure e semplici supposizioni, contribuendo in questo modo alla diffusione dell’allarme sociale basato su ipotesi, pregiudizi e, in taluni casi, sul risentimento delle vittime dei reati, veri o presunti”.
Per questo motivo le associazioni Articolo 3, 21 luglio e Naga, hanno chiesto al Consiglio regionale lombardo dell’Odg di verificare illeciti deontologici e se tali articoli potrebbero istigare alla violenza e alla discriminazione. Non solo, le associazioni hanno anche chiesto di valutare l’omesso controllo di Alessandro Sallusti, su titolazioni e pubblicazione anonima su web e cartaceo.
“Con viva preoccupazione – concludono le Associazioni – continuiamo a rilevare casi che ci paiono in contrasto con la deontologia che regolamenta la professione giornalistica e che, per la loro diffusione, divengono amplificatori di pregiudizi e stereotipi discriminatori e, in taluni casi, possono indurre all’odio e alla violenza. Contro questi comportamenti e contro queste forme di discriminazione continueremo a batterci”.
“La diffusione di questi articoli – dichiarano le Associazioni – trasmette un’immagine criminosa di un intero gruppo di persone ed è lesiva della dignità delle persone sinti e rom. In questi articoli è stato dato ampio e acritico spazio a dichiarazioni violente, di carattere congetturale e generalizzante delle e degli intervistati, senza evidenziarle come pure e semplici supposizioni, contribuendo in questo modo alla diffusione dell’allarme sociale basato su ipotesi, pregiudizi e, in taluni casi, sul risentimento delle vittime dei reati, veri o presunti”.
Per questo motivo le associazioni Articolo 3, 21 luglio e Naga, hanno chiesto al Consiglio regionale lombardo dell’Odg di verificare illeciti deontologici e se tali articoli potrebbero istigare alla violenza e alla discriminazione. Non solo, le associazioni hanno anche chiesto di valutare l’omesso controllo di Alessandro Sallusti, su titolazioni e pubblicazione anonima su web e cartaceo.
“Con viva preoccupazione – concludono le Associazioni – continuiamo a rilevare casi che ci paiono in contrasto con la deontologia che regolamenta la professione giornalistica e che, per la loro diffusione, divengono amplificatori di pregiudizi e stereotipi discriminatori e, in taluni casi, possono indurre all’odio e alla violenza. Contro questi comportamenti e contro queste forme di discriminazione continueremo a batterci”.
Fonte: Frontiere news / http://www.arci.it/index.php?area=8&idcat=312
Sulla ricorrente bugia razzista dei "furti di bambini", recentemente usata in Italia per provocare pogrom contro Rom e Sinti, si veda la documentazione raccolta alla nostra pagina:
[Nell'ambito dei "processi" a Karadzic e Mladic, il "Tribunale ad hoc" dell'Aia è costretto ad occuparsi dei controversi episodi dei massacri del mercato di Markale, nel centro di Sarajevo (1994-1995), dei quali da subito altissimi funzionari dell'ONU e della UNPROFOR misero in dubbio la paternità, ma che servirono per "aprire la pista" ai bombardamenti della NATO contro i serbo-bosniaci. Sul tema si veda anche la documentazione raccolta al nostro sito:
• Reportage di M. Caldarola e M. Marianetti (Contropiano 2/1995)
• Stragi nel mercato (1994, 1995): CHI SONO GLI STRAGISTI? (Guerre e Pace 10/1995)
• Sarajevo 1994: La strage di Markale / Sami snimili svoj zločin
Markale false-flag massacres discussed at ICTY
1) My Brigade Had No Snipers at Sarajevo – Witness (19 Oct 12)
2) Karadzic Witness Denies Mortar Attack Happened (25 Oct 12)
3) Karadzic Witnesses Question Markale Attack (2 Nov 12)
4) Bosnian Army "Shelled Own Side" – Karadzic Witness (9 Nov 12)
5) More articles at serbophobic, anti-yugoslav IWPR website (LINKS)
=== 1 ===
http://iwpr.net/report-news/my-brigade-had-no-snipers-sarajevo-–-witness
Courtside
My Brigade Had No Snipers at Sarajevo – Witness
Battalion commander in besieging Serb forces claims incidents were often fabricated to make his side look bad.
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY
TRI Issue 761, 19 Oct 12
A former colonel in the Bosnian Serb army told the Hague tribunal this week that there were no professional snipers in his brigade based at Sarajevo, and that incidents where civilians were targeted were “rigged” by the other side.
Blagoje Kovacevic was the third witness to testify on behalf of wartime Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic, whose defence case began on October 16. [For more, see Karadzic Says He Deserves Praise, Not Prosecution.)
Prosecutors allege that Karadzic, who was president of Bosnia's self-declared Republika Srpska from 1992 to 1996, planned and oversaw the 44-month siege of Sarajevo that ravaged the city and left nearly 12,000 people dead. Karadzic’s army is accused of deliberately sniping at and shelling the city’s civilian population in order to “spread terror” among them.
The indictment alleges that Karadzic was responsible for crimes of genocide, persecution, extermination, murder and forcible transfer which "contributed to achieving the objective of the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory".
Karadzic was arrested in Belgrade in July 2008 after 13 years on the run. He is representing himself in the courtroom.
According to a lengthy summary of evidence which Karadzic read aloud in court, Kovacevic held various positions in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the Bosnian Serb army between 1992 and 1996, including chief of operations and training of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade, and then commander of a battalion in the same brigade.
He now works as an education and training adviser for the defence ministry of Bosnia and Hercegovina.
Karadzic put no questions to the witness once he had finished reading out the summary of his evidence.
During the prosecution’s cross-examination, lawyer Carolyn Edgerton asked the witness about his assertion that there were “no trained professional snipers” in his unit.
“I was the person in charge of training units. I had never organised nor conducted any training of snipers. Snipers in units are selected on the basis of physical and psychological traits and are subjected to special shooting training. I can categorically assert that in the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade, there were no such personnel,” Kovacevic said.
He went on to assert that the brigade never issued orders to use snipers. As a battalion commander in the brigade, he said, he would have known about it.
He said it was possible that there were “individuals who wanted to portray themselves as being some sort of specialist to boost their image” but there was no “organised sniper group.”
“Are you disputing that the brigade had firing positions in buildings on Grbavica Street?” Edgerton asked.
“No, but I dispute that they had sniper groups. The brigade did not organise such things. I know that for sure,” Kovacevic said.
Edgerton then read from a wartime army document listing the types of weapons issued to soldiers in firing positions, including semi-automatic rifles with optical sights, machine guns with optical sights, sniper rifles, and sniper-rifle silencers.
Kovacevic replied that the majority of units of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade were deployed in the “outer ring” of the city, and not facing it.
“That is where this type is weapon is prominent,” he said, adding that “Croatian and Muslim forces had identical weaponry.”
“Are you saying that brigade units at the confrontation line in Sarajevo did not possess any of these weapons?” Edgerton asked.
“Please, an optical sight can be mounted on any kind of rifle, including a hunting rifle, but [a] person having this kind of weapon does not [make] this person is a sniper. In that case, you can say all hunters are snipers if you apply that logic,” Kovacevic said.
Edgerton then asked who “planned the fire” for soldiers using these weapons in the inner ring of the city.
“There can be no planning of fire. A soldier is either in a trench or in a facility. He’s observing the area in front of him and whatever appears that poses danger, he will fire [at]. If there is no danger, there is no need [to fire],” the witness said.
Edgerton asked “what kind of reporting” units had to make, and if they had to report “every kill” to superiors.
“The person who fires a shot – he doesn’t know whether he made a kill or not. How can he send a report to that effect? This is beyond comprehension,” the witness said.
“Are you saying that a person firing a rifle shot wouldn’t see the target impact? I don’t quite understand,” Edgerton retorted.
The witness chuckled and replied: “I understand that you don’t understand me because you were not in this position.”
He went on to say that “a soldier on the line makes his own decision about whether he will shoot or not, based on the risk assessment that he himself makes”.
“If [the soldier was] really in danger and waited to send a report, and waited for the order to open fire, he would have been killed a hundred times in the meantime. That is completely pointless and senseless,” Kovacevic said.
He pointed out that generally, when a chain of command is set up, an “order is issued of what kind of regime [of] fire is going to be applied, and most often amongst our ranks… we were forced to prove that we were not the ones who opened fire first but rather did it in self-defence”.
Edgerton then asked the witness about a line in his witness statement where he asserts that he only learned about civilian casualties in Sarajevo through the “Muslim mass media.”
Kovacevic confirmed that this was the case, and added that he “didn’t know what was going on in Sarajevo and whether it was really so. I watched that on television.”
“I know how a media war is conducted, and this time the enemy side did not hide it, they openly announced it. I knew that many incidents were rigged but that was all I knew, I didn’t know anything else,” Kovacevic continued.
“Do you mean to say that you had no forward observation of anything that was going on in city?” Edgerton asked.
“In Sarajevo, an urban area, that’s impossible,” the witness replied.
“You had no forward observation of any targets you might be seeking to engage?” Edgerton asked.
“Only what can be seen from the [confrontation] line at a distance of 20 metres,” Kovacevic answered.
Edgerton then pointed out that the witness’s statement says he took measures to avoid collateral damage “when determining whether or not to engage a target”.
“If you fired your weapons with no forward observation I’m really curious about what measures you took to avoid collateral damage,” the lawyer put to the witness.
“You are asking [for] an impossible answer,” the witness said, adding that “to claim that somebody could see from [the] Grbavica [area] what going on in Bascarsija [the old town], that person is crazy… Not every bullet hits the target; there are also ricochets, there are misses, etcetera.”
Edgerton pressed him on this, saying she was not asking for “an impossible answer”, and referred again to his comments about measures to “reduce civilian collateral damage.”
“Quite simply, the order not to open fire without need avoids unnecessary casualties,” Kovacevic replied. “Refraining from senselessly opening fire when there is not a reason – those are simple things, nothing spectacular.… It’s more like appealing to the conscience of the soldier in the trench. To be composed, smart and protect himself without endangering unnecessarily others.”
Edgerton later asked the witness to explain a part of his statement where he says that “we punished breaches of discipline” in the unit.
Kovacevic said the most common example of this would be a soldier getting drunk, firing off his weapon and “provoking a response from the other side.”
Edgerton asked whether any of these breaches had to do with shooting and killing civilians in parts of the city held by the Bosnian government.
“I cannot say precisely what exactly happened over there because I was unable to go there. However, there is one thing that I know because I saw it most often on television… I know many things were staged. There were instances, and I don’t know if they were truthful ones, and it’s not up to me to judge,” Kovacevic said.
Asked whether he ever investigated the shelling of civilians by his forces, the witness said he was not “competent” to do so because he did not have artillery pieces in his unit.
“Were you aware of investigations [into the] sniping and shelling of civilians by [Bosnian Serb] forces in Bosnian government-held territory?”
“I know definitely that the chief of artillery [in the brigade] was maintaining constant contact with the [United Nations] observation team which was deployed at the command post of the artillery unit,” the witness said.
“I take it from your answer that’s a ‘no’, and we’ll move on,” Edgerton replied.
The trial will continue next week.
Rachel Irwin is IWPR’s Senior Reporter in The Hague.
Blagoje Kovacevic was the third witness to testify on behalf of wartime Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic, whose defence case began on October 16. [For more, see Karadzic Says He Deserves Praise, Not Prosecution.)
Prosecutors allege that Karadzic, who was president of Bosnia's self-declared Republika Srpska from 1992 to 1996, planned and oversaw the 44-month siege of Sarajevo that ravaged the city and left nearly 12,000 people dead. Karadzic’s army is accused of deliberately sniping at and shelling the city’s civilian population in order to “spread terror” among them.
The indictment alleges that Karadzic was responsible for crimes of genocide, persecution, extermination, murder and forcible transfer which "contributed to achieving the objective of the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory".
Karadzic was arrested in Belgrade in July 2008 after 13 years on the run. He is representing himself in the courtroom.
According to a lengthy summary of evidence which Karadzic read aloud in court, Kovacevic held various positions in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the Bosnian Serb army between 1992 and 1996, including chief of operations and training of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade, and then commander of a battalion in the same brigade.
He now works as an education and training adviser for the defence ministry of Bosnia and Hercegovina.
Karadzic put no questions to the witness once he had finished reading out the summary of his evidence.
During the prosecution’s cross-examination, lawyer Carolyn Edgerton asked the witness about his assertion that there were “no trained professional snipers” in his unit.
“I was the person in charge of training units. I had never organised nor conducted any training of snipers. Snipers in units are selected on the basis of physical and psychological traits and are subjected to special shooting training. I can categorically assert that in the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade, there were no such personnel,” Kovacevic said.
He went on to assert that the brigade never issued orders to use snipers. As a battalion commander in the brigade, he said, he would have known about it.
He said it was possible that there were “individuals who wanted to portray themselves as being some sort of specialist to boost their image” but there was no “organised sniper group.”
“Are you disputing that the brigade had firing positions in buildings on Grbavica Street?” Edgerton asked.
“No, but I dispute that they had sniper groups. The brigade did not organise such things. I know that for sure,” Kovacevic said.
Edgerton then read from a wartime army document listing the types of weapons issued to soldiers in firing positions, including semi-automatic rifles with optical sights, machine guns with optical sights, sniper rifles, and sniper-rifle silencers.
Kovacevic replied that the majority of units of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade were deployed in the “outer ring” of the city, and not facing it.
“That is where this type is weapon is prominent,” he said, adding that “Croatian and Muslim forces had identical weaponry.”
“Are you saying that brigade units at the confrontation line in Sarajevo did not possess any of these weapons?” Edgerton asked.
“Please, an optical sight can be mounted on any kind of rifle, including a hunting rifle, but [a] person having this kind of weapon does not [make] this person is a sniper. In that case, you can say all hunters are snipers if you apply that logic,” Kovacevic said.
Edgerton then asked who “planned the fire” for soldiers using these weapons in the inner ring of the city.
“There can be no planning of fire. A soldier is either in a trench or in a facility. He’s observing the area in front of him and whatever appears that poses danger, he will fire [at]. If there is no danger, there is no need [to fire],” the witness said.
Edgerton asked “what kind of reporting” units had to make, and if they had to report “every kill” to superiors.
“The person who fires a shot – he doesn’t know whether he made a kill or not. How can he send a report to that effect? This is beyond comprehension,” the witness said.
“Are you saying that a person firing a rifle shot wouldn’t see the target impact? I don’t quite understand,” Edgerton retorted.
The witness chuckled and replied: “I understand that you don’t understand me because you were not in this position.”
He went on to say that “a soldier on the line makes his own decision about whether he will shoot or not, based on the risk assessment that he himself makes”.
“If [the soldier was] really in danger and waited to send a report, and waited for the order to open fire, he would have been killed a hundred times in the meantime. That is completely pointless and senseless,” Kovacevic said.
He pointed out that generally, when a chain of command is set up, an “order is issued of what kind of regime [of] fire is going to be applied, and most often amongst our ranks… we were forced to prove that we were not the ones who opened fire first but rather did it in self-defence”.
Edgerton then asked the witness about a line in his witness statement where he asserts that he only learned about civilian casualties in Sarajevo through the “Muslim mass media.”
Kovacevic confirmed that this was the case, and added that he “didn’t know what was going on in Sarajevo and whether it was really so. I watched that on television.”
“I know how a media war is conducted, and this time the enemy side did not hide it, they openly announced it. I knew that many incidents were rigged but that was all I knew, I didn’t know anything else,” Kovacevic continued.
“Do you mean to say that you had no forward observation of anything that was going on in city?” Edgerton asked.
“In Sarajevo, an urban area, that’s impossible,” the witness replied.
“You had no forward observation of any targets you might be seeking to engage?” Edgerton asked.
“Only what can be seen from the [confrontation] line at a distance of 20 metres,” Kovacevic answered.
Edgerton then pointed out that the witness’s statement says he took measures to avoid collateral damage “when determining whether or not to engage a target”.
“If you fired your weapons with no forward observation I’m really curious about what measures you took to avoid collateral damage,” the lawyer put to the witness.
“You are asking [for] an impossible answer,” the witness said, adding that “to claim that somebody could see from [the] Grbavica [area] what going on in Bascarsija [the old town], that person is crazy… Not every bullet hits the target; there are also ricochets, there are misses, etcetera.”
Edgerton pressed him on this, saying she was not asking for “an impossible answer”, and referred again to his comments about measures to “reduce civilian collateral damage.”
“Quite simply, the order not to open fire without need avoids unnecessary casualties,” Kovacevic replied. “Refraining from senselessly opening fire when there is not a reason – those are simple things, nothing spectacular.… It’s more like appealing to the conscience of the soldier in the trench. To be composed, smart and protect himself without endangering unnecessarily others.”
Edgerton later asked the witness to explain a part of his statement where he says that “we punished breaches of discipline” in the unit.
Kovacevic said the most common example of this would be a soldier getting drunk, firing off his weapon and “provoking a response from the other side.”
Edgerton asked whether any of these breaches had to do with shooting and killing civilians in parts of the city held by the Bosnian government.
“I cannot say precisely what exactly happened over there because I was unable to go there. However, there is one thing that I know because I saw it most often on television… I know many things were staged. There were instances, and I don’t know if they were truthful ones, and it’s not up to me to judge,” Kovacevic said.
Asked whether he ever investigated the shelling of civilians by his forces, the witness said he was not “competent” to do so because he did not have artillery pieces in his unit.
“Were you aware of investigations [into the] sniping and shelling of civilians by [Bosnian Serb] forces in Bosnian government-held territory?”
“I know definitely that the chief of artillery [in the brigade] was maintaining constant contact with the [United Nations] observation team which was deployed at the command post of the artillery unit,” the witness said.
“I take it from your answer that’s a ‘no’, and we’ll move on,” Edgerton replied.
The trial will continue next week.
Rachel Irwin is IWPR’s Senior Reporter in The Hague.
=== 2 ===
Courtside
Karadzic Witness Denies Mortar Attack Happened
Former Serb officer says heavy mortar unit was redeployed before Markale market was struck.
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY
TRI Issue 762, 25 Oct 12
A former officer in the Bosnian Serb army testified at the Hague tribunal this week that it would have been impossible for a mortar shell to hit Sarajevo’s Markale Market in August 1995, as prosecutors claim it did.
“I don’t think that a [120 millimetre] shell can fall on Markale…these are weapons I know very well. In order to hit such a location – well that’s simply impossible. I’d stake my life on that,” said defence witness Stevan Veljovic, who was testifying on behalf of wartime Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic.
The accused has long claimed that the August 28, 1995 attack on Markale market – which killed some 34 people and wounded more than twice that number – was staged by the Bosnian government army and not perpetrated by Serb forces for which he was responsible.
This was the second of two major attacks on the Markale market, and should not be confused with the one that occurred in February 1994.
The argument that the 1995 attack was staged was rejected in the 2007 tribunal verdict against Dragomir Milosevic, the former commander of the Bosnian Serb army’s Sarajevo Romanija Corps, who is now serving a 29 year prison sentence.
Prosecutors allege that Karadzic, the president of Bosnia's self-declared Republika Srpska from 1992 to 1996, planned and oversaw the 44-month siege of Sarajevo that ravaged the city and left nearly 12,000 people dead. Karadzic’s army is accused of deliberately sniping at and shelling the city’s civilian population in order to “spread terror” among them.
The indictment alleges that Karadzic was responsible for crimes of genocide, persecution, extermination, murder and forcible transfer which "contributed to achieving the objective of the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory".
He was arrested in Belgrade in July 2008 after 13 years on the run, and represents himself in the courtroom.
Karadzic told the court that witness Veljovic held various posts in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps during the war. As of early August 1995, the witness was commander of the 4th Sarajevo Brigade.
The accused read out a brief summary of Veljovic’s witness statement, which included the assertion that the 120-millimetre mortar battery located in Sarajevo was sent to the southeastern municipality of Trebinje in August 1995 to assist Bosnian Serb forces there. Thus, such a mortar could not have been used to strike Markale, Karadzic told the court.
The accused did not ask any further questions of the witness.
During the prosecution’s cross examination, lawyer Carolyn Edgerton seized on Veljovic’s claims regarding the 1995 Markale attack. She pointed out that when the witness testified in the Dragomir Milosevic case, he never denied that the incident occurred, and did not mention that the mortar battery had been sent away from Sarajevo.
“Which testimony are we supposed to rely on?” Edgerton asked at one point.
The witness insisted that the army had sent the mortar battery to Trebinje before the August 28 attack on Markale, and was not responsible for the massacre.
Instead, he said, the munition that exploded in the market was “planted and activated by remote control”.
“Our opinion was that the Muslim forces had done this for propaganda purposes,” Veljovic said, adding that he did not mention these matters in his previous testimony because he was not asked about them.
Edgerton pressed the point, especially as regards Veljovic’s new claim that the mortar battery had been moved out of the city.
“This incident is one of the single most controversial events in the history of the conflict around Sarajevo. In the [Dragomir] Milosevic case, you were testifying at the last opportunity to provide that evidence, and you’re saying it didn’t even occur to you to bring it up,” the lawyer said.
Karadzic’s legal advisor Peter Robinson objected before the witness could answer, but the prosecutor continued to press the witness on the issue.
“You had an opportunity in [the Dragomir Milosevic] proceedings to talk about that mortar battery, and are you asserting now that the only reason you chose not to raise it was because you weren’t asked?” Edgerton asked.
Robinson again objected, saying, “That’s an unfair question. He doesn’t have the opportunity to raise issues. He can only answer what he is asked. She’s making a point that this [was] omitted from the Milosevic testimony, and that’s as far as she can go with it.”
“Fair enough,” presiding Judge O-Gon Kwon replied.
Prosecutor Edgerton then turned to a Bosnian Serb army report on the “availability of ammunition and fuel for combat vehicles” dated August 31, 1995 and signed by Veljovic himself.
The report, Edgerton said, listed the number of weapons and vehicles available to Veljovic’s unit, and included “some self-propelled guns and a number of mortars, including 120-millimetre mortars”.
“It seems that this document, dated 31 August 1995, puts in doubt your assertion that your brigade’s mortar battery was out of the Sarajevo theatre,” Edgerton said to the witness.
Veljovic contended that there was “nothing surprising” about this.
“I listed all the equipment that belonged to a number of battalions. I made a list of all material and equipment in order to be sure we had them,” he said.
The prosecutor then moved onto the topic of aerial bombs, which the Bosnian Serb army is accused of using on Sarajevo. They were modified so that they could be launched at targets from the ground.
Veljovic confirmed that the air bombs were “not concise” and the army was “only allowed to use them in wild areas” because they could cause so much damage. They were not used in urban areas “because we might hit our own men or civilians”, he added.
He said that it “should have been the case” that corps or brigade commander would decide on how to use the air bombs, with approval of the army’s main staff.
Edgerton then showed him a report that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps sent the main staff on April 7, 1995 which stated that a 250-kilogram aerial bomb was fired into the Hrasnica area of Sarajevo.
“This document suggests that something happened other than what you said,” Edgerton said.
The witness said that the detonation of such a large aerial bomb would have “such a destructive power” and would be heard “60 kilometres away”.
He said that the United Nations Protection Force in Sarajevo, known as UNPROFOR, would have recorded an incident like this, but that “they never mentioned anything of that kind happening in the territory of the city of Sarajevo”.|
“Are you then saying this didn’t happen?” Edgerton asked.
“It didn’t happen,” the witness said, adding that during his previous testimony, he saw UNPROFOR reports which stated that everything was “calm” in Sarajevo.
Hrasnica, he said, is very close to the city’s airport and UNPROFOR “would have heard [the blast]; they would have informed someone about it. This never happened.”
Edgerton then read aloud from a Bosnian Serb army report, sent from the main staff to Karadzic himself and dated April 7, 1995. It stated that “the enemy activity was adequately responded to whereby an air bomb [of] 250 kilograms was launched on the centre of Hrasnica.”
“This document says not only that Karadzic was informed [but] contradicts your assertion that it didn’t happen,” Edgerton said.
“I don’t know what the main staff told the supreme command. I don’t know anything about that. That’s why I referred to the UNPROFOR report covering the four-day period which was relevant and coincided with this event. For that period, they stated that the situation in Sarajevo was calm,” the witness said.
Edgerton pointed out that Veljovic had previously testified that he knew everything that was happening in the brigade and was also involved in drafting such reports.
“So what should we rely on, Mr. Veljovic?” Edgerton asked.
The witness reiterated that he did not draft the report, that he did not know anything about the bomb being launched, and that “only UNPROFOR could know about that”.
“So in contrast to what you said in the Milosevic case, and what you said today – that the bomb wasn’t launched – you’re now saying you didn’t know anything about it. Is that correct?” Edgerton asked.
“I didn’t know anything about that. I told you that the detonation would have been heard at 60 kilometres away. The UNPROFOR soldiers were there; they would have heard it,” the witness said again.
Judge Kwon then interjected to say it was “difficult to follow” Veljovic’s testimony.
“It’s a separate thing to say that the aerial bomb was not launched at all and saying you don’t know. Even after having looked at the documents that say that the aerial bomb was launched, you are still saying that the bomb was not launched, which means that these reports were lying at the time,” the judge said.
The witness responded that “maybe at that moment” he was not there and was not in a position to know whether the bomb had been launched.
“If UNPROFOR had confirmed the launch, then yes, it happened. I don’t know who signed this on behalf of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, on behalf of the main staff, and sent it to President Karadzic,” Veljovic said.
The judge again questioned the witness’s assertions.
“So, to be sure, is it your submission that if the UNPROFOR report doesn’t confirm the content of this [army] document, this [air bomb incident] is not true?” he asked.
“Yes, because maybe that day I was in Rogatica and that’s why I didn’t know about that bomb. Maybe I was at home…. If the UNPROFOR report confirmed there was a launch, then yes, but they said it was calm, so there was no launch,” the witness said.
The trial will continue next week.
Rachel Irwin is IWPR’s Senior Reporter in The Hague.
“I don’t think that a [120 millimetre] shell can fall on Markale…these are weapons I know very well. In order to hit such a location – well that’s simply impossible. I’d stake my life on that,” said defence witness Stevan Veljovic, who was testifying on behalf of wartime Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic.
The accused has long claimed that the August 28, 1995 attack on Markale market – which killed some 34 people and wounded more than twice that number – was staged by the Bosnian government army and not perpetrated by Serb forces for which he was responsible.
This was the second of two major attacks on the Markale market, and should not be confused with the one that occurred in February 1994.
The argument that the 1995 attack was staged was rejected in the 2007 tribunal verdict against Dragomir Milosevic, the former commander of the Bosnian Serb army’s Sarajevo Romanija Corps, who is now serving a 29 year prison sentence.
Prosecutors allege that Karadzic, the president of Bosnia's self-declared Republika Srpska from 1992 to 1996, planned and oversaw the 44-month siege of Sarajevo that ravaged the city and left nearly 12,000 people dead. Karadzic’s army is accused of deliberately sniping at and shelling the city’s civilian population in order to “spread terror” among them.
The indictment alleges that Karadzic was responsible for crimes of genocide, persecution, extermination, murder and forcible transfer which "contributed to achieving the objective of the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory".
He was arrested in Belgrade in July 2008 after 13 years on the run, and represents himself in the courtroom.
Karadzic told the court that witness Veljovic held various posts in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps during the war. As of early August 1995, the witness was commander of the 4th Sarajevo Brigade.
The accused read out a brief summary of Veljovic’s witness statement, which included the assertion that the 120-millimetre mortar battery located in Sarajevo was sent to the southeastern municipality of Trebinje in August 1995 to assist Bosnian Serb forces there. Thus, such a mortar could not have been used to strike Markale, Karadzic told the court.
The accused did not ask any further questions of the witness.
During the prosecution’s cross examination, lawyer Carolyn Edgerton seized on Veljovic’s claims regarding the 1995 Markale attack. She pointed out that when the witness testified in the Dragomir Milosevic case, he never denied that the incident occurred, and did not mention that the mortar battery had been sent away from Sarajevo.
“Which testimony are we supposed to rely on?” Edgerton asked at one point.
The witness insisted that the army had sent the mortar battery to Trebinje before the August 28 attack on Markale, and was not responsible for the massacre.
Instead, he said, the munition that exploded in the market was “planted and activated by remote control”.
“Our opinion was that the Muslim forces had done this for propaganda purposes,” Veljovic said, adding that he did not mention these matters in his previous testimony because he was not asked about them.
Edgerton pressed the point, especially as regards Veljovic’s new claim that the mortar battery had been moved out of the city.
“This incident is one of the single most controversial events in the history of the conflict around Sarajevo. In the [Dragomir] Milosevic case, you were testifying at the last opportunity to provide that evidence, and you’re saying it didn’t even occur to you to bring it up,” the lawyer said.
Karadzic’s legal advisor Peter Robinson objected before the witness could answer, but the prosecutor continued to press the witness on the issue.
“You had an opportunity in [the Dragomir Milosevic] proceedings to talk about that mortar battery, and are you asserting now that the only reason you chose not to raise it was because you weren’t asked?” Edgerton asked.
Robinson again objected, saying, “That’s an unfair question. He doesn’t have the opportunity to raise issues. He can only answer what he is asked. She’s making a point that this [was] omitted from the Milosevic testimony, and that’s as far as she can go with it.”
“Fair enough,” presiding Judge O-Gon Kwon replied.
Prosecutor Edgerton then turned to a Bosnian Serb army report on the “availability of ammunition and fuel for combat vehicles” dated August 31, 1995 and signed by Veljovic himself.
The report, Edgerton said, listed the number of weapons and vehicles available to Veljovic’s unit, and included “some self-propelled guns and a number of mortars, including 120-millimetre mortars”.
“It seems that this document, dated 31 August 1995, puts in doubt your assertion that your brigade’s mortar battery was out of the Sarajevo theatre,” Edgerton said to the witness.
Veljovic contended that there was “nothing surprising” about this.
“I listed all the equipment that belonged to a number of battalions. I made a list of all material and equipment in order to be sure we had them,” he said.
The prosecutor then moved onto the topic of aerial bombs, which the Bosnian Serb army is accused of using on Sarajevo. They were modified so that they could be launched at targets from the ground.
Veljovic confirmed that the air bombs were “not concise” and the army was “only allowed to use them in wild areas” because they could cause so much damage. They were not used in urban areas “because we might hit our own men or civilians”, he added.
He said that it “should have been the case” that corps or brigade commander would decide on how to use the air bombs, with approval of the army’s main staff.
Edgerton then showed him a report that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps sent the main staff on April 7, 1995 which stated that a 250-kilogram aerial bomb was fired into the Hrasnica area of Sarajevo.
“This document suggests that something happened other than what you said,” Edgerton said.
The witness said that the detonation of such a large aerial bomb would have “such a destructive power” and would be heard “60 kilometres away”.
He said that the United Nations Protection Force in Sarajevo, known as UNPROFOR, would have recorded an incident like this, but that “they never mentioned anything of that kind happening in the territory of the city of Sarajevo”.|
“Are you then saying this didn’t happen?” Edgerton asked.
“It didn’t happen,” the witness said, adding that during his previous testimony, he saw UNPROFOR reports which stated that everything was “calm” in Sarajevo.
Hrasnica, he said, is very close to the city’s airport and UNPROFOR “would have heard [the blast]; they would have informed someone about it. This never happened.”
Edgerton then read aloud from a Bosnian Serb army report, sent from the main staff to Karadzic himself and dated April 7, 1995. It stated that “the enemy activity was adequately responded to whereby an air bomb [of] 250 kilograms was launched on the centre of Hrasnica.”
“This document says not only that Karadzic was informed [but] contradicts your assertion that it didn’t happen,” Edgerton said.
“I don’t know what the main staff told the supreme command. I don’t know anything about that. That’s why I referred to the UNPROFOR report covering the four-day period which was relevant and coincided with this event. For that period, they stated that the situation in Sarajevo was calm,” the witness said.
Edgerton pointed out that Veljovic had previously testified that he knew everything that was happening in the brigade and was also involved in drafting such reports.
“So what should we rely on, Mr. Veljovic?” Edgerton asked.
The witness reiterated that he did not draft the report, that he did not know anything about the bomb being launched, and that “only UNPROFOR could know about that”.
“So in contrast to what you said in the Milosevic case, and what you said today – that the bomb wasn’t launched – you’re now saying you didn’t know anything about it. Is that correct?” Edgerton asked.
“I didn’t know anything about that. I told you that the detonation would have been heard at 60 kilometres away. The UNPROFOR soldiers were there; they would have heard it,” the witness said again.
Judge Kwon then interjected to say it was “difficult to follow” Veljovic’s testimony.
“It’s a separate thing to say that the aerial bomb was not launched at all and saying you don’t know. Even after having looked at the documents that say that the aerial bomb was launched, you are still saying that the bomb was not launched, which means that these reports were lying at the time,” the judge said.
The witness responded that “maybe at that moment” he was not there and was not in a position to know whether the bomb had been launched.
“If UNPROFOR had confirmed the launch, then yes, it happened. I don’t know who signed this on behalf of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, on behalf of the main staff, and sent it to President Karadzic,” Veljovic said.
The judge again questioned the witness’s assertions.
“So, to be sure, is it your submission that if the UNPROFOR report doesn’t confirm the content of this [army] document, this [air bomb incident] is not true?” he asked.
“Yes, because maybe that day I was in Rogatica and that’s why I didn’t know about that bomb. Maybe I was at home…. If the UNPROFOR report confirmed there was a launch, then yes, but they said it was calm, so there was no launch,” the witness said.
The trial will continue next week.
Rachel Irwin is IWPR’s Senior Reporter in The Hague.
=== 3 ===
Courtside
Karadzic Witnesses Question Markale Attack
Former United Nations officers express uncertainty over prosecution allegation that Serb unit fired fatal shell at Sarajevo market.
By Velma Šarić - International Justice - ICTY
TRI Issue 762, 2 Nov 12
According to the indictment against Karadzic, on February 5, 1994, a single mortar shell fired from a Bosnian Serb army position outside the city killed 66 civilians and wounded 140 in this crowded open-air market in central Sarajevo.
Karadzic, who represents himself in court, claims that the incident was staged by the Bosnian army in order to provoke NATO attacks on Serb positions around the city.
The first witnesses who testified this week was Stephan Joudry, a retired Canadian army colonel. At the time of the 1994 Markale attack, Joudry was a senior staff officer in the United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR, stationed in the Croatian capital Zagreb.
"We received reports about the incident [at the Markale market] which were sent to us from the UN teams in Sarajevo", Joudry said, adding that this was "standard operational procedure".
However, he noted that the reports he saw were not compiled in an entirely professional manner.
"Looking at the report of the crater analysis which was carried out by the operatives on site, there is no way that one could conclude… who was to blame for this incident."
He added that the "methods and the results of the investigation left a rather strange feeling about the whole thing, and many unanswered questions".
The witness said that in his personal view, "the incident was caused by the Bosnian side, probably by a projectile which was thrown by hand from a nearby terrace".
Joudry offered no explanation as to how he came to this conclusion, except to say that “it would be the most efficient way to hit [the target]. Otherwise, it would be impossible to hit the market with just one projectile.”
During cross-examination of the witness, prosecutor Alan Tieger challenged his testimony.
"Mr Joudry, did you visit the crime scene?", Tieger asked, to which the witness replied that he had not done so. Joudry also confirmed that he had not seen the crater or the projectile, or spoken to the witnesses.
"So do you have a basis to dispute the statements of the witnesses?" the prosecutor asked.
“No, I don’t,” Joudry replied.
Asked by the prosecutor to elaborate on his claim that the projectile was thrown by hand from a nearby terrace, Joudry said that "one or two persons could do it, with a mechanism or without one".
Tieger said that afterwards, the attackers would have had to run down "among the bodies of the dead and injured and place a stabiliser [mortar round tailfin] within the crater at such an angle which would show that the shell was fired from far away".
"Yes, that could be the case," Joudry said.
The second witness who testified this week was another Canadian officer, John Russell. He served with UNPROFOR and was based in Sarajevo at the time of the attack.
Russell told the court that he was in Markale on the day of the incident and saw the shell crater.
"The large impact angle was indicating that [the mortar round] probably came from the Bosnian Muslim side," he said. "I mean, that was my initial feeling, but what I stated in my report later was that the projectile was fired from a distance ranging from 900 to 4,800 metres. And judging by the direction from which it was fired, it could have been launched from either side of the front line.”
The witness added that by the time he arrived on the scene, "the shrapnel and the dead bodies had been removed from the site".
“This was an unacceptable interference with the investigation from the Bosnian Muslim side. The stabiliser and all the remains of the projectile had also been removed", Russell said.
During the cross-examination of the witness, prosecutor Kimberly West said such a clean-up was considered "normal procedure", and would not have influenced the investigation because there were sufficient traces left on site.
However, Russell stuck to his claim that clearing the site interfered with evidence, adding that he had even written in his diary that he was convinced “the Bosnian side fired on its own people".
The third witness who testified about the Markale massacre this week, retired Canadian general Michael Gaultier, said that he investigated the scene of the incident a few days after it happened.
He said he was sent to Sarajevo on February 11, 1994, from UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb to investigate the incident.
When Karadzic asked this witness whether the crater could have been "dug up", he replied, "We saw a crater on site, but it is true that it may have been interfered with during the time between the incident and the time by which we arrived at the scene."
"The result of our investigation was that the mortar shell was fired from a direction which spread across the territory controlled by both sides, from a distance between 300 and 5,500 meters, and any side could have fired the shell," Gaultier said.
Prosecutor Carolyn Edgerton asked Gaultier whether he was familiar with UNPROFOR's information that there were no Bosnian army mortar positions in the given line of fire at the time of the incident, to which the witness replied that he was.
He also said that he and his team did not visit Bosnian Serb army positions located along the flight path of the mortar.
"It would be like looking for a needle in a haystack", he explained, "so we didn't even ask to go there".
In addition to the three Canadian officers, Karadzic invited another witness this week, Dr Derek Allsop from Great Britain, who wrote an expert report on the Markale incident for the defence.
According to Allsop, the only thing he could confirm as a result of his investigation was that it was "impossible to determine the speed and angle of the shell and therefore the place where it was fired from".
However, Allsop dismissed the theory "that the projectile was fired from the terrace of a nearby building". He said this was "entirely improbable and unfeasible".
The trial continues next week.
Velma Saric is an IWPR-trained reporter in Sarajevo.
=== 4 ===
http://iwpr.net/report-news/bosnian-army-shelled-own-side-–-karadzic-witness
Courtside
Bosnian Army "Shelled Own Side" – Karadzic Witness
Former UN observer claims Serb units were not responsible for certain shelling incidents blamed on them.
By Velma Šarić - International Justice - ICTY
TRI Issue 764, 9 Nov 12
A former United Nations military observer testified this week that the Bosnian government army targeted civilians on its own side in Sarajevo in order to provoke an international military intervention.
“I believe that it was part of a strategy, a general strategy of the Bosnian government, to cause an international intervention. Therefore they did what was necessary, including shooting at their own civilians,” said Richard Gray, a retired officer in the New Zealand army, who appeared as a witness on behalf of wartime Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic.
Gray served as a UN military observer in Sarajevo from April to September 1992.
He said that when British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd visited the city on July 17, 1992, “the Presidency building was shot at [with mortar fire], and that resulted in the deaths of some ten [people]”.
Gray said that because the mortar shell was fired from a distance of approximately 200 metres, “it could only have been fired from a position controlled by the Bosnian army".
The witness failed to explain how he concluded that the mortar was based at such a close location.
Gray mentioned another incident in July 1992, in which he said "a group of teenagers were being shot at by the Bosnian army while some UN peacekeepers were trying to give them candy".
He also claimed that Bosnian army kept firing at Bosnian Serb Army, VRS, positions from the vicinity of civilian buildings and UN headquarters, in order "to cause the [Serb army] to fire back at these objects".
"This was a general strategy. In fact, we even lodged protests to the Bosnian government against this kind of activity, which we considered illegitimate,” Gray said.
Gray added that the Bosnian army even fired directly on a group of UN observers stationed in Sarajevo.
In the prosecution’s cross-examination, Gray acknowledged that it was "very hard for UN military observers to determine who was actually the first to have opened fire".
"We were in a difficult position, but it was obviously hard to know all the details", Gray explained.
In addition, Gray was asked whether a quote he apparently gave an American journalist – that "the Serbs actually wanted peace"- reflected his views.
Gray said this quote was "not accurate".
"But that doesn't surprise me – journalists tend to misquote and simply state things which aren't accurate," Gray said.
Karadzic, who served as founder and president of the Bosnian Serb entity Republika Srpska, RS, from 1992 to 1996, is alleged to be responsible for crimes of genocide, persecution, extermination, murder and forcible transfer, committed across a number of municipalities throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina. He is also charged with the responsibility for the 44 month sniping and shelling campaign against Sarajevo and the massacre of more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995.
Another witness appearing on behalf of Karadzic this week was Savo Simic, the former head of artillery for the 1st Sarajevo Motorised Brigade of the VRS. Simic said he was "on the front line for a rather long time, for most of the war", but could not remember the exact dates of his deployment.
At the outset, Karadzic – who represents himself in court – read out a summary of Simic's written statement. It said that "the only activity that the [Bosnian Serb army] had around Sarajevo was defensive, and… that several incidents involving civilians were obviously caused by fire from the Muslim side".
Simic’s zone of control was "in the western part of the front", around the area of Dobrinja and towards Lukavica.
"There was never any kind of intention to terrorise the civilian population," he adde.
In court, Simic said there was “a simple reason" why it was practically impossible for the VRS to shoot at civilians:
"You see, we were under permanent UN observation, and our positions were being constantly monitored by UN peacekeepers."
Simic rejected claims that fire from positions under his control related to incidents mentioned in the indictment.
Under cross-examination from prosecutor Alan Tieger, Simic was asked to explain his statement that VRS troops around Sarajevo were "under double siege, from within and from without".
Simic answered that "one couldn't quite call it a typical siege... rather a major half-siege". He said the presence of Bosnian army troops not just inside Sarajevo but also in areas adjacent to the city created an "internal siege for the Serbs", while the presence of troops of the Bosnian Croat armed forces or HVO could be "considered an external siege".
He failed to explain how the concept of a "siege" fitted these explanations, given that VRS troops were never truly isolated from other Serb units.
"We were all under a kind of siege," he said. "You see, it would have been disastrous for the Bosnian Serbs if the Sarajevo corps of the Bosnian Muslim army connected [up] with the other units of their army. That was a very strained position we were in."
The cross-examination will continue next week.
Velma Saric is an IWPR contributor in Sarajevo.
“I believe that it was part of a strategy, a general strategy of the Bosnian government, to cause an international intervention. Therefore they did what was necessary, including shooting at their own civilians,” said Richard Gray, a retired officer in the New Zealand army, who appeared as a witness on behalf of wartime Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic.
Gray served as a UN military observer in Sarajevo from April to September 1992.
He said that when British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd visited the city on July 17, 1992, “the Presidency building was shot at [with mortar fire], and that resulted in the deaths of some ten [people]”.
Gray said that because the mortar shell was fired from a distance of approximately 200 metres, “it could only have been fired from a position controlled by the Bosnian army".
The witness failed to explain how he concluded that the mortar was based at such a close location.
Gray mentioned another incident in July 1992, in which he said "a group of teenagers were being shot at by the Bosnian army while some UN peacekeepers were trying to give them candy".
He also claimed that Bosnian army kept firing at Bosnian Serb Army, VRS, positions from the vicinity of civilian buildings and UN headquarters, in order "to cause the [Serb army] to fire back at these objects".
"This was a general strategy. In fact, we even lodged protests to the Bosnian government against this kind of activity, which we considered illegitimate,” Gray said.
Gray added that the Bosnian army even fired directly on a group of UN observers stationed in Sarajevo.
In the prosecution’s cross-examination, Gray acknowledged that it was "very hard for UN military observers to determine who was actually the first to have opened fire".
"We were in a difficult position, but it was obviously hard to know all the details", Gray explained.
In addition, Gray was asked whether a quote he apparently gave an American journalist – that "the Serbs actually wanted peace"- reflected his views.
Gray said this quote was "not accurate".
"But that doesn't surprise me – journalists tend to misquote and simply state things which aren't accurate," Gray said.
Karadzic, who served as founder and president of the Bosnian Serb entity Republika Srpska, RS, from 1992 to 1996, is alleged to be responsible for crimes of genocide, persecution, extermination, murder and forcible transfer, committed across a number of municipalities throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina. He is also charged with the responsibility for the 44 month sniping and shelling campaign against Sarajevo and the massacre of more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995.
Another witness appearing on behalf of Karadzic this week was Savo Simic, the former head of artillery for the 1st Sarajevo Motorised Brigade of the VRS. Simic said he was "on the front line for a rather long time, for most of the war", but could not remember the exact dates of his deployment.
At the outset, Karadzic – who represents himself in court – read out a summary of Simic's written statement. It said that "the only activity that the [Bosnian Serb army] had around Sarajevo was defensive, and… that several incidents involving civilians were obviously caused by fire from the Muslim side".
Simic’s zone of control was "in the western part of the front", around the area of Dobrinja and towards Lukavica.
"There was never any kind of intention to terrorise the civilian population," he adde.
In court, Simic said there was “a simple reason" why it was practically impossible for the VRS to shoot at civilians:
"You see, we were under permanent UN observation, and our positions were being constantly monitored by UN peacekeepers."
Simic rejected claims that fire from positions under his control related to incidents mentioned in the indictment.
Under cross-examination from prosecutor Alan Tieger, Simic was asked to explain his statement that VRS troops around Sarajevo were "under double siege, from within and from without".
Simic answered that "one couldn't quite call it a typical siege... rather a major half-siege". He said the presence of Bosnian army troops not just inside Sarajevo but also in areas adjacent to the city created an "internal siege for the Serbs", while the presence of troops of the Bosnian Croat armed forces or HVO could be "considered an external siege".
He failed to explain how the concept of a "siege" fitted these explanations, given that VRS troops were never truly isolated from other Serb units.
"We were all under a kind of siege," he said. "You see, it would have been disastrous for the Bosnian Serbs if the Sarajevo corps of the Bosnian Muslim army connected [up] with the other units of their army. That was a very strained position we were in."
The cross-examination will continue next week.
Velma Saric is an IWPR contributor in Sarajevo.
=== 5 ===
More to read on Markale's false-flag massacres at serbophobic, anti-yugoslav IWPR website (in chronological order):
Prosecution and Defence Appeal Galic Judgment
By Katy Glassborow - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 466, 1 Sep 06
By Katy Glassborow - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 466, 1 Sep 06
Markale Massacre Revisited
By Merdijana Sadović - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 486, 26 Jan 07
By Merdijana Sadović - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 486, 26 Jan 07
Milosevic Defence Tries to Raise Doubts About Sarajevo Massacre
By Rebekah Heil - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 509, 10 Jul 07
By Rebekah Heil - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 509, 10 Jul 07
Karadzic Denies Sarajevo Siege
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 637, 6 Mar 10
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 637, 6 Mar 10
Milosevic Allegedly Distrusted Army
By Velma Šarić - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 662, 24 Sep 10
By Velma Šarić - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 662, 24 Sep 10
Ex-UN Commander Says Bosnian Serbs Blocked Aid
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 664, 8 Oct 10
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 664, 8 Oct 10
Karadzic Urges “Reconciliation”
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 665, 15 Oct 10
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 665, 15 Oct 10
http://iwpr.net/report-news/karadzic-urges-“reconciliation”
Karadzic Markale Staging Claims Challenged
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 673, 10 Dec 10
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 673, 10 Dec 10
Karadzic Wants Greek President Questioned
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 726, 27 Jan 12
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 726, 27 Jan 12
Judges Won't Subpoena Greek President
By Rachel Irwin - TRI Issue 734, 26 Mar 12
By Rachel Irwin - TRI Issue 734, 26 Mar 12
Mladic Trial Hears Witness to Second Markale Attack
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 764, - 9 Nov 12
By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY - TRI Issue 764, - 9 Nov 12
Il “socialismo di mercato” cinese in confronto all’URSS e alla Jugoslavia
23/10/2012
Rispetto al processo di analisi della categoria teorica (e realtà storica) del “socialismo di mercato”, va segnalato con piacere un interessante saggio di A. Gabriele e F. Schettino del 2012, intitolato “Market socialism as a distinct socioeconomic formation internal to the modern mode of production”.
Il socialismo di mercato si differenzia innanzitutto da quello di matrice sovietica, a partire dagli studi di O. Lange e dall’esperienza Jugoslava del 1950/88, perché il processo di formazione dei prezzi dei mezzi di produzione e mezzi di consumo viene affidato al suo interno principalmente al processo di decisione relativamente autonomo delle singole unità produttive, sempre di proprietà collettiva: tale fenomeno si verificò nell’area Jugoslava specialmente dopo il 1965, in Cina dopo il 1979. A partire dal 1980, infatti, nel gigantesco paese asiatico lo stato conferì un certo grado di autonomia alle imprese fissando “un contratto, tra dirigenti delle imprese” (di stato) “e ministeri, che stabilisce da un lato gli obbiettivi produttivi da raggiungere in un orizzonte di 3-4 anni e la quota da conferire allo stato, dall’altro gli obblighi finanziari” (tasse) nel giro di pochi anni, soprattutto dopo il 1988, le aziende statali diventarono soggetti in buona parte autonomi sul piano giuridico ed economico.
Inoltre il livello microeconomico/aziendale di matrice socialista acquisisce anche il potere principale (ma non esclusivo) di determinare “quanto e cosa produrre”, a partire dal rapporto tra fondo di consumo dei lavoratori e fondo di accumulazione, oltre che dal processo di selezione concreta dei prodotti finali verso cui indirizzare la produzione delle singole unità produttive: in Jugoslavia uno dei centri principali delle decisioni microeconomiche iniziarono ad essere i collettivi dei lavoratori, già a partire dal 27 giugno del 1950.
In terzo luogo, a differenza che nel socialismo ipercentralizzato di matrice sovietica, sussiste e si riproduce nel socialismo di mercato un grado (variabile) di concorrenza tra le singole unità produttive che operano nello stesso settore (ad esempio in quello automobilistico): in modo tale che il “mercato”, inteso come l’insieme dei consumatori dei diversi oggetti d’uso (gli acquirenti di automobili, nel caso specifico), decide in via principale – anche se non esclusiva – quale sia l’impresa che produce gli oggetti d’uso migliori in termini di rapporto tra prezzo e qualità rispetto ai “concorrenti”.
Rispetto all’argomento stimolante del rapporto/scelta tra pianificazione e mercato all’interno del processo di sviluppo del socialismo, Gabriele e Schettino hanno sicuramente ragione nell’affermare che “l’esperienza storica ha mostrato che l’alto e sempre crescente grado di complessità dell’economia moderna, legata alla sua continua e stratificata accumulazione di conoscenze da parte di numerosi e diversificati attori, non consente semplicistiche o supercentralizzate soluzioni al problema-chiave della gestione/governance”, mentre proprio l’economia pianificata di tipo sovietico ha mostrato di essere “troppo rigida” per essere in grado di assorbire “l’innovazione” tecnologica e scientifica, di matrice autoctona o estera.
Ma altresì è sempre l’esperienza storica che mostra i disastri economici a cui porta il “mercato” – seppur operante con imprese ed unità produttive di tipo socialista e collettivizzante – se essa viene privato della guida di una seria e vincolante pianificazione sulle linee-guida del processo economico, a partire dal tasso di accumulazione/consumi e dalla dinamica di distribuzione (settoriale e geografica) degli investimenti nel socialismo di mercato.
Il caso jugoslavo del 1950/88 ha provato che il mercato senza pianificazione crea inevitabilmente:
- crisi periodiche di sovrapproduzione e fasi recessive (1974 e 1980/83), come nel capitalismo;
- asimmetrie di sviluppo tra le diverse zone geopolitiche della stessa nazione, e crescenti contraddizioni tra di esse;
- asimmetrie di sviluppo tra i diversi settori produttivi della stessa nazione;
- aumenti dei prezzi di consumo ed intensità a volte di notevole peso ed intensità;
- privilegi corporativi nei settori produttivi meglio posizionati.
Infatti all’interno dell’economia jugoslava si verificò, a partire dalla metà degli anni Cinquanta, che “la libera economia di mercato” basata su aziende socialiste autonome “moltiplicò i beni di consumo a disposizione, ma produsse anche inflazione”.
Alla base della disputa sui vantaggi della programmazione centrale contro la libera economia di mercato c’era il conflitto di interessi tra le diverse repubbliche della federazione, tra il Nord, prospero e industrializzato, e il Sud, contadino e impoverito. Il reddito medio della popolazione in Croazia era quasi doppio rispetto al reddito in Bosnia, Montenegro e Macedonia; in Slovenia, era due volte e mezzo più alto. La Serbia occupava una posizione intermedia, cui contribuivano la ricca provincia settentrionale della Vojvodina (provincia autonoma, all’interno della Serbia) e il Sud povero di Kossovo e Metohija. Le differenze si accentuarono con l’introduzione dell’economia di mercato: ogni anno, Croazia, Slovenia e Vojvodina diventavano più ricche e Bosnia, Erzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kossovo e Metohija più povere. Tito era perfettamente consapevole del problema, come disse a Dedijer. “Per molti anni ho lottato in campo internazionale per mettere fine alla pauperizzazione di grandi parti del mondo. I paesi ricchi diventavano sempre più ricchi e quelli poveri sempre più poveri, e molto in fretta. Mi dispiace vedere che questo processo ha luogo anche in Jugoslavia.” Dal 1945 “nel nostro paese, le regioni industriali diventano sempre più ricche a spese delle regioni economicamente sotto-sviluppate”.
Tito era risoluto a elevare il livello di vita nel Sud e a crearvi posti di lavoro, ma questo si poteva fare molto meglio mediante la programmazione centralizzata che con la libera economia di mercato.”
Un altro esempio delle contraddizioni che possono sorgere tra imprese socialiste autonome ed interesse generale delle società collettivistiche viene fornita dall’esperienza sovietica del 1918, visto che “nella primavera del 1918, cominciò a diffondersi tra i comitati di fabbrica una tendenza sindacalista; essa era un derivato dell’idea che le aziende dovessero essere gestite direttamente dagli operai in esse occupati nel loro esclusivo interesse. Questo fenomeno determinò un ulteriore abbassamento della produzione e della disciplina di fabbrica, in molti casi fece sorgere fra gli operai un sentimento particolaristico e di possesso nei confronti delle loro fabbriche, che andava a detrimento degli interessi della più vasta comunità e resisteva gelosamente ai tentativi di coordinamento e di direzione dall’alto. “Subentrò un altro proprietario – scriveva uno dei dirigenti del sindacato degli operai metallurgici – che, alla pari del precedente, era individualista ed antisociale ed il nome del nuovo proprietario era comitato di controllo. Nel bacino del Donez le officine metallurgiche e le miniere si rifiutavano reciprocamente di fornirsi il ferro e il carbone a credito, e vendevano il ferro ai contadini, senza alcun riguardo per i bisogni dello Stato”. Un successivo rapporto del Vesenkha riassumeva la posizione assunta da tale organismo durante questo periodo in termini molto franchi. “Il Vesenkha ha chiaramente compreso la necessità di un coordinato piano di nazionalizzazione condotto su linee ben precise. Tuttavia, nel primo periodo esso non ha potuto disporre dell’apparato statistico ed amministrativo, né stabilire contratti efficienti con le singole località e, per conseguenza, mancando il numero sufficiente di organi locali efficienti e di “quadri” operai, è stato costretto a portare entro i limiti della propria competenza e a cercare di dirigere un numero troppo grande di imprese economicamente deboli: ciò ha reso l’organizzazione della produzione estremamente difficile. Il primo tempestoso periodo di amministrazione industriale ha sconvolto ogni organizzazione sistematica dell’industria e della rilevazione economica”.
Proprio basandosi su un esperienza socioproduttiva ormai quasi secolare dall’Ottobre Rosso sovietico fino ad oggi, risulta evidente pertanto che la combinazione dialettica tra una pianificazione di tipo vincolante a livello strategico e la simultanea azione del mercato/libera concorrenza tra imprese autonome (parzialmente) a livello di decisioni microeconomiche, unita all’intervento statale tesa a riequilibrare costantemente le asimmetrie via via createsi tra i processi di formazione dei prezzi e nella destinazione (sia settoriale che geografica) degli investimenti, si sia dimostrata nei fatti la via migliore per ottimizzare il processo di riproduzione allargata del sistema socialista: tesi verificata proprio dalla concreta esperienza cinese del 1978-2013, con le sue luci ed ombre oltre che con le sue “correzioni di tiro” in corso d’opera anche rispetto all’interrelazione dialettica tra piano e mercato, tra prezzi di mercato e prezzi fissati dallo stato, ecc.
Per definire la “coabitazione” tra due poli dialettici, si potrebbe usare lo slogan “il massimo di pianificazione macroeconomica compatibile con il mercato a livello microeconomico o viceversa”, mentre solo la pratica permette di superare le inevitabili contraddizioni tra i due meccanismi di interconnessione/intervento nei processi economici in Cina.
Come meglio sottolineeremo in un prossimo saggio, se il “mercato” precede ed anticipa di almeno sette millenni la genesi del capitalismo (Engels, 1894) a sua volta quest’ultimo ha utilizzato con una certa efficacia e su larga scala il meccanismo della pianificazione vincolante a livello strategico fin dall’esperienza concreta dell’“economia di guerra” tedesca del 1914-1918, diretta da un geniale organizzatore come il magnate W. Rathenau: bisogna innanzitutto de-ideologizzare la questione del rapporto dialettico tra mercato e pianificazione, evitando sia l’errata ed antistorica identificazione tra il primo elemento ed il capitalismo, che l’altrettanto corretta equazione socialismo=pianificazione omnicomprensiva.
