http://www.esserecomunisti.it/index.aspx?m=77&f=2&IDArticolo=25322
L'antifascista, questo sconosciuto

di Franco Giustolisi

su Il Manifesto del 28/08/2008

Il fascismo è derubricato. Così scriveva su la Stampa il 28 marzo di
quest'anno Giovanni De Luna, docente di storia contemporanea
all'Università di Torino.
Per questo concetto ineccepibile lo storico prendeva a pretesto il
decreto del governo Prodi (un governo di centro-sinistra, badate)
risalente al 29 febbraio che toglieva all'Aned, l'associane degli ex
deportati, proprietaria del blocco 21 del lager di Auschwitz, il
diritto consolidato di allestire il padiglione italiano nel museo che
trasmette al mondo le atrocità del nazismo, socio in affari, in
politica e in criminalità col fascismo. Secondo De Luna, e non vedo
chi possa dargli torto, «se da un lato per decenni la memoria della
Resistenza, dell'antifascismo e della deportazione era così
straripante da annettersi anche quella della Shoah, oggi la situazione
si è capovolta proprio nel segno della Shoah. E a rischiare di sparire
dal discorso pubblico e dalla nostra memoria collettiva è proprio
l'antifascismo». Che è scomparso, finito, non esiste più. Le cause
sono tante, partiamo da quella famosa invettiva di Giancarlo Pajetta
rivolta agli eredi di Salò, «con voi abbiamo chiuso il 25 aprile», che
ebbe come conseguenza persino il rifiuto di Rinascita, casa editrice
di proprietà del Pci, di pubblicare il libro di Alessandro Natta,
futuro segretario del partito, L'altra resistenza in cui si
denunciavano senza veli fascismo e nazismo. Evitare le provocazioni è
un conto, giustamente per non riaprire vecchie polemiche, altra cosa è
cancellare al storia e la memoria.
Un'altra formidabile spinta nel senso indicato da De Luna, l'hanno
data e la danno gli ebrei, vittime certamente della più grande
tragedia della storia, ma accentratori e globalizzanti di quella loro
memoria che deve restare esclusiva e non ammette altro. Sintomatico
che proprio loro, prime vittime del fascismo, abbiano contribuito a
far scomparire l'antifascismo. Ricordo una vicenda che mi vide in un
certo senso protagonista. Si avvicinava un giorno della memoria, un 27
gennaio, non ricordo bene se del 2003 o dell'anno successivo. In
quello stesso periodo infuriava la battaglia (politica, ovviamente)
per arrivare a sapere chi, come, quando e perché aveva deciso di
seppellire nell'armadio della vergogna i fascicoli che narravano dei
massacri di decine e decine di migliaia di nostri concittadini a opera
dei nazifascisti. Pensavo e penso, pur con il massimo rispetto verso
la Shoah, che anche gli altri caduti trucidati in nome e per conto
delle dittature, dovessero avere spazio, voce, memoria. Brigai,
insistei, ruppi le scatole, come al mio solito, sinché, pur con l'Anpi
di Roma riluttante, don Abbondio Veltroni, allora sindaco di Roma, per
una volta tanto prese una decisione dandomi ragione. La manifestazione
si fece, e nel luogo più simbolico della città, l'aula Giulio Cesare
del comune. Feci in modo che partecipasse anche Furio Colombo, non in
quanto direttore de l'Unità, ma come proponente della legge sulla
memoria, che riguardava tutti, come lui stesso confermò, non solo gli
ebrei. E ci fu a dire la sua, l'ex presidente della Corte
costituzionale, Giuliano Vassalli, e Massimo Rendina, presidente
dell'Anpi romano, nonché lo stesso sindaco. E io, fanalino di coda,
che avevo preparato, e esposi, i crimini feroci, ancor più feroci
delle SS, dei repubblichini di Salò, come a Fivizzano, in Veneto, in
Toscana, i Emilia... Ebbene il giorno dopo cercai sui giornali, cercai
e non trovai niente tranne la Shoah. E che a nessuno salti in mente di
pensare o dire che fu per disattenzione, disinformazione,
trascuratezza dei giornalisti. Ci sarà anche un po' di questi
elementi, ma i miei colleghi, si può dire tutti o quasi, in cui quel
quasi va cercato con il lanternino, di destra o di sinistra, annusano
l'odore del potere da qualsiasi distanza e si adeguano immediatamente.
Mettersi contro la lobby ebraica? Scherziamo. Alludere agli eredi di
Salò che sedevano in Parlamento e che avevano fatto e avrebbero fatto
ancora, come oggi, parte del governo? Rischerziamo?
Alberto Asor Rosa su queste stesse pagine ha parlato di un ritorno del
fascismo (e ne aveva già scritto nel 2000), trovando un'eco non
trascurabile sino a Famiglia Cristiana, di cui tutto si può dire
tranne che sia comunista o cattocomunista.
Non si pensi a un revival di camicie nere o di teschi con la scritta
dux, ormai appannaggio di infime minoranze, però accolte sempre a
braccia aperte dalla destra. No, c'è stata la mitizzata svolta di
Fiuggi nella quale un Fini, cui non si può negare intelligenza e
lungimiranza, annusando l'aria del berlusconismo in arrivo, ha
liquidato certe esteriorità. Esteriorità, ripeto, perché l'anima
rimane sempre quella: impronte digitali, militari in prima linea,
dagli addosso al diverso... L'ultima è venuta dal neo sindaco che
vuole una piazza, una strada, un parco, un qualcosa, insomma, in
ricordo di Giorgio Almirante. La patria della resistenza che generò la
Costituzione che vieta e condanna ancora il regime fascista, vuole
onorare il repubblichino Giorgio Almirante, persecutore dei
partigiani. Ma no, non esageriamo, hanno ribattuto in tanti, non
esageriamo nel senso che poi Almirante non è quel mostro di cui si
parla. E al coro, come tocco finale, si è aggiunto anche quel Luciano
Violante che per arrivare alla Corte costituzionale, pensa che Parigi
non vale solo una messa, bensì mille. Fu lui a farmi dire dal suo
portavoce, Claudio Ligas, che le vicende dell'armadio della vergogna
non meritavano alcun approfondimento perché «si tratta di vicende di
oltre cinquant'anni fa». E di vicende che si cerca ancor oggi di
coprire con ogni velo possibile. Lo ha fatto proprio in questi giorni,
in occasione della ricorrenza della strage di Stazzema, il presidente
della Camera, Gianfranco Fini, autore della svolta di Fiuggi, che io
definisco solo di facciata, quando ha parlato di un massacro
«nazista». Il «fascista» è scomparso, mentre la commissione
parlamentare d'inchiesta che lui stesso alla fine votò, in cambio
forse di qualcosa con il centro-sinistra, probabilmente il consenso
alla giornata del ricordo per istriani e dalmati l'11 febbraio, fu
esplicitamente instaurata per far luce sulle stragi «nazifasciste».
Siamo di fronte a una serie di voltafaccia, di commedia degli
equivoci, di inganni palesi e altri meno, senza precedenti. Altrimenti
non ci si può spiegare come un ministro di An, Mirko Tremaglia, venne
portato al governo e giurò sulla Costituzione che condanna il
fascismo, che lui ex repubblichino, esalta. Né ci si può spiegare come
il futuro intoccabile presidente del Consiglio, che aveva già
presieduto nel passato, abbia osato pubblicamente e televisivamente,
alla vigilia delle elezioni, porre sullo stesso piano fascismo e
comunismo, anzi con alcuni punti a vantaggio del primo. E i
giornalisti, a sentire a bocca aperta, come se avessero davanti il
creatore del nuovo Vangelo. Ehh, che volete farci, si ricade sempre
sul nodo vero, quello dell'informazione serva e deficiente.



http://www.esserecomunisti.it/index.aspx?m=77&f=2&IDArticolo=25333

Il fascismo derubricato

Il governo restaura il Memorial di Auschwitz lo affida agli ebrei e
così dimentica i deportati politici

di Giovanni De Luna

su La Stampa del 28/03/2008

Per quanto sia entrato solo di sfuggita nella campagna elettorale, il
rapporto con la nostra storia novecentesca resta un nervo scoperto del
dibattito politico e culturale. Il 29 febbraio 2008, con la
conversione in legge del «decreto mille proroghe», la Presidenza del
Consiglio ha stanziato 900 mila euro (nel 2008) per il restauro del
blocco 21 del campo di prigionia di Auschwitz. I lettori della Stampa
sanno di cosa si tratta perché ne abbiamo riferito il 21 gennaio
scorso. Ad allestire il padiglione italiano del Museo di Auschwitz
(inaugurato nel 1980) furono chiamati Primo Levi per i testi, Luigi
Nono per la colonna sonora, Ludovico di Belgioioso per l’architettura,
Mario Samonà per l’affresco che decora le pareti. Si tratta quindi di
un monumento di grande valore artistico.

Il problema è capire oggi se quella rappresentazione della storia
della deportazione sia ancora in grado di trasmettere conoscenza
storica, se i criteri validi negli anni ‘70, quando l’opera fu
concepita, possano resistere validamente alle rotture e alle
discontinuità del post-Novecento. Una cosa è un’opera d’arte, un’altra
è la sua ricezione nel tempo, che cambia così come cambiano gli
sguardi delle generazioni e i significati che le si attribuiscono.

Il Memorial italiano fu allora fortemente voluto dall’Aned,
l’associazione degli ex deportati politici; ed è oggi fieramente
difeso nella sua integrità dalla stessa Aned che ha reagito con
asprezza alle critiche di chi - come me - ritiene del tutto inadeguata
quella forma di allestimento espositivo. In una lettera aperta, il suo
presidente, l’avvocato Gianfranco Maris, critica con toni allarmanti
l’iniziativa della Presidenza del Consiglio («un attacco alla
democrazia»), esprimendo il timore che si tratti del tentativo di
sostituire «una memoria civile della deportazione politica e della
lotta antifascista della resistenza» con «una memoria tematica e
didattica sul genocidio ebraico».

È un fatto che quel provvedimento ha modificato i termini di un
confronto che fin qui si era svolto su un terreno storiografico e
culturale. L’Aned, che pure resta la proprietaria del blocco 21, non
solo non è stata coinvolta nell’elaborazione, ma non viene neanche
invitata a far parte della Commissione che deve avviare il restauro
del padiglione. Il progetto del governo sembra invece rivolgersi
direttamente a organizzazioni ebraiche come il CDEC e l’UCEI,
lasciando affiorare un conflitto di memoria che ha già coinvolto molti
paesi europei, specialmente la Francia. Se da un lato, per decenni la
memoria della Resistenza, dell’antifascismo e della deportazione
politica era così straripante da annettersi anche quella della Shoah,
oggi la situazione si è capovolta e nel segno della Shoah a rischiare
di sparire dal discorso pubblico e dalla nostra memoria collettiva è
proprio l’antifascismo.

Quella che si definisce memoria collettiva non è affatto il risultato
di un ricordo ma di un patto per cui ci si accorda su ciò che è
importante trasmettere alle generazioni future. I confini storici e
culturali che circoscrivono questo patto sono fluidi, dinamici,
cambiano a seconda delle fasi che scandiscono il corso politico degli
eventi; in Italia, quelli su cui si fondava la memoria della Shoah, ad
esempio, all’inizio erano circoscritti ai sopravvissuti e alle loro
famiglie: poi si sono estesi fino ad abbracciare per intero lo
schieramento politico di sinistra. Anzi, negli anni Settanta, la
memoria della Shoah poteva essere considerata un elemento costitutivo
dell’identità della sinistra, uno di quegli ambiti in cui era
possibile distinguerla senza esitazioni dalla «destra». Oggi quei
confini sono amplissimi e hanno inglobato, anche Gianfranco Fini e il
suo partito. Con effetti paradossali. Per prendere le distanze dal
fascismo basta condannare l’infamia delle leggi razziali del 1938,
quasi che quelle leggi esaurissero per intero la dimensione
totalitaria del regime e possano oggi costituire un ottimo pretesto
per chi vuole dimenticare che il fascismo prima uccise la libertà e la
democrazia e poi perseguitò gli ebrei.

Una memoria collettiva diventa ufficiale quando a stabilire i confini
del patto su cui si fonda interviene la sanzione dello Stato, quando,
cioè, la Memoria si incontra con la Politica. Oggi la Shoah rischia di
essere imbalsamata in una elefantiaca dimensione istituzionale: le
celebrazioni per la «giornata della memoria», gli sforzi per
diffondere nella scuole una specifica «didattica della Shoah»,
l’intervento della Presidenza del Consiglio su un «luogo» come il
Memorial, adombrano una monumentalizzazione che avrebbe effetti
devastanti proprio sui delicati meccanismi della trasmissione della
memoria alle nuove generazioni: una storia sovraccarica di
«ufficialità» favorisce più l’oblio che il ricordo.

Da: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Oggetto: [yugoslaviainfo] Digest Number 2729
Data: 27 agosto 2008 10:21:14 GMT+02:00
A: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.


Messages In This Digest (9 Messages)

1.
Kosovo Vs Abkhazia, Ossetia: West's Brazen Hypocrisy Exposed From: Rick Rozoff
2.
Ukraine's Largest Political Party On Caucasus And Kosovo From: Rick Rozoff
3.
Fwd: Stratfor: Georgia and Kosovo From: Tim Fenton
4.
West On Kosovo Vs Caucasus: Any Excuse For War, Build-Up From: Rick Rozoff
5.
Caucasus War Result Of West Trashing International Law In Kosovo From: Rick Rozoff
6.
Kosovo And Caucasus: West's Double Crime From: Rick Rozoff
7.
Kosovo To Caucasus: Insular NATO World Finally Confronted From: Rick Rozoff
8.
Viewpoint: Russia, Georgia And The Kosovo Connection From: Rick Rozoff
9.
Russia: Caucasus Borders International; Kosovo UDI Illegitimate From: Rick Rozoff


1.
Kosovo Vs Abkhazia, Ossetia: West's Brazen Hypocrisy Exposed
Posted by: "Rick Rozoff"
Tue Aug 26, 2008 12:13 pm (PDT)

http://www.russiatoday.com/news/news/29458

Russia Today
August 25, 2008

South Ossetia and Abkhazia to follow in Kosovo's
footsteps?

After Kosovo declared independence in February this
year, Russia warned that other breakaway regions would
follow suit. It now seems that the Pandora's box has
been opened.

The first regions to take the opportunity are
Georgia's breakaway republics. The leaders of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia immediately looked towards Moscow
to demand the prize Kosovo had been granted by other
countries.

Georgia had unsuccessfully attempted to bring the two
regions under its control in by force in the early
1990s. A frozen conflict ensued, with Russian
peacekeepers stationed in both regions.

Throughout this period the self-proclaimed republics
held several referendums calling for full
independence. The overwhelming majority voted to
become separate sovereign states, but their will was
not put into action. Now they hope to follow in
Kosovo's footsteps.

Georgia doesn't want to let the two regions go for
historical and territorial reasons. Georgia's
president has offered the regions what he calls "broad
autonomy", but after the recent invasion, Ossetians
and Abkhazians may have little reason to trust the
offer.

The return of the breakaway regions has been one of
Saakashvili's main aims since he came to power in
2003. NATO membership is another ambition of the
Georgian president, but unsettled territorial
conflicts are a major obstacle.

Now Georgia's territorial integrity is being backed by
countries which supported Kosovo's separation from
Serbia. The EU envoy to the south Caucasus, Peter
Semneby, says: "I will not overemphasise and pay too
much attention to parallels. Every conflict has its
specific character".

However, the three regions share a common historical
experience - a will to set up a state on their own and
wars of independence with their central governments.



2.
Ukraine's Largest Political Party On Caucasus And Kosovo
Posted by: "Rick Rozoff"
Tue Aug 26, 2008 12:13 pm (PDT)

http://en.for-ua.com/news/2008/08/26/170008.html

ForUm (Ukraine)
August 26, 2008

Yanukovych stands for Abkhazia and South Ossetia
independence

-Yanukovych underlined that recognition of Kosovo
without the consent of Serbia destroyed the border
order, established after the World War II.

Ukraine must support the will of the people of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia to obtain independence, the
Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych declared,
the party press office reported.

According to him, the recognition of the independence
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia is a logical
continuation of the process started by western
countries with Kosovo.

"In February I expressed my apprehension concerning
the fact that such a step would cause a chain
reaction. We warned the world about the danger of
using double standards regarding the situation on
recognition of Kosovo independence," he said.

Yanukovych underlined that recognition of Kosovo
without the consent of Serbia destroyed the border
order, established after the World War II.

"Several months passed and the forecast proved to be
right. How should we treat the recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia?

"We must act without double standards. I consider
Ukraine must accept the will of the people of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia and to recognize their
independence," the statement says.
------------------------------------------------------
http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-269246.html

UNIAN (Ukraine)
August 26, 2008

Ukraine must support Moscow's move – Yanukovych

Leader of the Party of Regions Victor Yanukovych
believes Ukraine should recognize the independence of
the Georgian rebel states of Southern Ossetia and
Abkhazia.

The press service of the Party of Regions disclosed
this to UNIAN, citing V.Yanukovych as saying:

"Recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia by the Russian Federation is a logical result
of the process that was started by the western
countries with their recognition of the independence
of Kosovo.

"In February of this year, I publicly expressed my
concern that this step of West would entail a chain
reaction. And we warned the world about the danger of
double standards in situations similar to the
recognition of Kosovo independence", said
V.Yanukovych.

According to his opinion, the proclamation of
independence of Kosovo without consent of Serbia
practically destroyed the order established in the
sphere of inviolability of state borders after the
WWII.

"I believe Ukraine should accept the will of the
peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and recognize
their independence", said the leader of the Party of
Regions.



3.
Fwd: Stratfor: Georgia and Kosovo
Posted by: "Tim Fenton"
Tue Aug 26, 2008 12:13 pm (PDT)

Although his comments on Bosnia are off track this is a good account
of Russia's perspective I think...

Begin forwarded message:

> From: Stratfor
> Date: 26 August 2008 03:18:43 BDT
> Subject: Geopolitical Weekly : Georgia and Kosovo: A Single
> Intertwined Crisis
>
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>
> Georgia and Kosovo: A Single Intertwined Crisis
>
> August 25, 2008
>
>
>
>
> By George Friedman
>
> The Russo-Georgian war was rooted in broad geopolitical processes.
> In large part it was simply the result of the cyclical reassertion
> of Russian power. The Russian empire — czarist and Soviet —
> expanded to its borders in the 17th and 19th centuries. It
> collapsed in 1992. The Western powers wanted to make the
> disintegration permanent. It was inevitable that Russia would, in
> due course, want to reassert its claims. That it happened in
> Georgia was simply the result of circumstance.
>
> There is, however, another context within which to view this, the
> context of Russian perceptions of U.S. and European intentions and
> of U.S. and European perceptions of Russian capabilities. This
> context shaped the policies that led to the Russo-Georgian war. And
> those attitudes can only be understood if we trace the question of
> Kosovo, because the Russo-Georgian war was forged over the last
> decade over the Kosovo question.
>
> Yugoslavia broke up into its component republics in the early
> 1990s. The borders of the republics did not cohere to the
> distribution of nationalities. Many — Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and
> so on — found themselves citizens of republics where the majorities
> were not of their ethnicities and disliked the minorities intensely
> for historical reasons. Wars were fought between Croatia and Serbia
> (still calling itself Yugoslavia because Montenegro was part of
> it), Bosnia and Serbia and Bosnia and Croatia. Other countries in
> the region became involved as well.
>
> One conflict became particularly brutal. Bosnia had a large area
> dominated by Serbs. This region wanted to secede from Bosnia and
> rejoin Serbia. The Bosnians objected and an internal war in Bosnia
> took place, with the Serbian government involved. This war involved
> the single greatest bloodletting of the bloody Balkan wars, the
> mass murder by Serbs of Bosnians.
>
> Here we must pause and define some terms that are very casually
> thrown around. Genocide is the crime of trying to annihilate an
> entire people. War crimes are actions that violate the rules of
> war. If a soldier shoots a prisoner, he has committed a war crime.
> Then there is a class called "crimes against humanity." It is
> intended to denote those crimes that are too vast to be included in
> normal charges of murder or rape. They may not involve genocide, in
> that the annihilation of a race or nation is not at stake, but they
> may also go well beyond war crimes, which are much lesser offenses.
> The events in Bosnia were reasonably deemed crimes against
> humanity. They did not constitute genocide and they were more than
> war crimes.
>
> At the time, the Americans and Europeans did nothing about these
> crimes, which became an internal political issue as the magnitude
> of the Serbian crimes became clear. In this context, the Clinton
> administration helped negotiate the Dayton Accords, which were
> intended to end the Balkan wars and indeed managed to go quite far
> in achieving this. The Dayton Accords were built around the
> principle that there could be no adjustment in the borders of the
> former Yugoslav republics. Ethnic Serbs would live under Bosnian
> rule. The principle that existing borders were sacrosanct was
> embedded in the Dayton Accords.
>
> In the late 1990s, a crisis began to develop in the Serbian
> province of Kosovo. Over the years, Albanians had moved into the
> province in a broad migration. By 1997, the province was
> overwhelmingly Albanian, although it had not only been historically
> part of Serbia but also its historical foundation. Nevertheless,
> the Albanians showed significant intentions of moving toward either
> a separate state or unification with Albania. Serbia moved to
> resist this, increasing its military forces and indicating an
> intention to crush the Albanian resistance.
>
> There were many claims that the Serbians were repeating the crimes
> against humanity that were committed in Bosnia. The Americans and
> Europeans, burned by Bosnia, were eager to demonstrate their will.
> Arguing that something between crimes against humanity and genocide
> was under way — and citing reports that between 10,000 and 100,000
> Kosovo Albanians were missing or had been killed — NATO launched a
> campaign designed to stop the killings. In fact, while some
> killings had taken place, the claims by NATO of the number already
> killed were false. NATO might have prevented mass murder in Kosovo.
> That is not provable. They did not, however, find that mass murder
> on the order of the numbers claimed had taken place. The war could
> be defended as a preventive measure, but the atmosphere under which
> the war was carried out overstated what had happened.
>
> The campaign was carried out without U.N. sanction because of
> Russian and Chinese opposition. The Russians were particularly
> opposed, arguing that major crimes were not being committed and
> that Serbia was an ally of Russia and that the air assault was not
> warranted by the evidence. The United States and other European
> powers disregarded the Russian position. Far more important, they
> established the precedent that U.N. sanction was not needed to
> launch a war (a precedent used by George W. Bush in Iraq). Rather —
> and this is the vital point — they argued that NATO support
> legitimized the war.
>
> This transformed NATO from a military alliance into a quasi-United
> Nations. What happened in Kosovo was that NATO took on the role of
> peacemaker, empowered to determine if intervention was necessary,
> allowed to make the military intervention, and empowered to
> determine the outcome. Conceptually, NATO was transformed from a
> military force into a regional multinational grouping with
> responsibility for maintenance of regional order, even within the
> borders of states that are not members. If the United Nations
> wouldn't support the action, the NATO Council was sufficient.
>
> Since Russia was not a member of NATO, and since Russia denied the
> urgency of war, and since Russia was overruled, the bombing
> campaign against Kosovo created a crisis in relations with Russia.
> The Russians saw the attack as a unilateral attack by an anti-
> Russian alliance on a Russian ally, without sound justification.
> Then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin was not prepared to make this
> into a major confrontation, nor was he in a position to. The
> Russians did not so much acquiesce as concede they had no options.
>
> The war did not go as well as history records. The bombing campaign
> did not force capitulation and NATO was not prepared to invade
> Kosovo. The air campaign continued inconclusively as the West
> turned to the Russians to negotiate an end. The Russians sent an
> envoy who negotiated an agreement consisting of three parts. First,
> the West would halt the bombing campaign. Second, Serbian army
> forces would withdraw and be replaced by a multinational force
> including Russian troops. Third, implicit in the agreement, the
> Russian troops would be there to guarantee Serbian interests and
> sovereignty.
>
> As soon as the agreement was signed, the Russians rushed troops to
> the Pristina airport to take up their duties in the multinational
> force — as they had in the Bosnian peacekeeping force. In part
> because of deliberate maneuvers and in part because no one took the
> Russians seriously, the Russians never played the role they
> believed had been negotiated. They were never seen as part of the
> peacekeeping operation or as part of the decision-making system
> over Kosovo. The Russians felt doubly betrayed, first by the war
> itself, then by the peace arrangements.
>
> The Kosovo war directly effected the fall of Yeltsin and the rise
> of Vladimir Putin. The faction around Putin saw Yeltsin as an
> incompetent bungler who allowed Russia to be doubly betrayed. The
> Russian perception of the war directly led to the massive reversal
> in Russian policy we see today. The installation of Putin and
> Russian nationalists from the former KGB had a number of roots. But
> fundamentally it was rooted in the events in Kosovo. Most of all it
> was driven by the perception that NATO had now shifted from being a
> military alliance to seeing itself as a substitute for the United
> Nations, arbitrating regional politics. Russia had no vote or say
> in NATO decisions, so NATO's new role was seen as a direct
> challenge to Russian interests.
>
> Thus, the ongoing expansion of NATO into the former Soviet Union
> and the promise to include Ukraine and Georgia into NATO were seen
> in terms of the Kosovo war. From the Russian point of view, NATO
> expansion meant a further exclusion of Russia from decision-making,
> and implied that NATO reserved the right to repeat Kosovo if it
> felt that human rights or political issues required it. The United
> Nations was no longer the prime multinational peacekeeping entity.
> NATO assumed that role in the region and now it was going to expand
> all around Russia.
>
> Then came Kosovo's independence. Yugoslavia broke apart into its
> constituent entities, but the borders of its nations didn't change.
> Then, for the first time since World War II, the decision was made
> to change Serbia's borders, in opposition to Serbian and Russian
> wishes, with the authorizing body, in effect, being NATO. It was a
> decision avidly supported by the Americans.
>
> The initial attempt to resolve Kosovo's status was the round of
> negotiations led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari that
> officially began in February 2006 but had been in the works since
> 2005. This round of negotiations was actually started under U.S.
> urging and closely supervised from Washington. In charge of keeping
> Ahtisaari's negotiations running smoothly was Frank G. Wisner, a
> diplomat during the Clinton administration. Also very important to
> the U.S. effort was Assistant Secretary of State for European and
> Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, another leftover from the Clinton
> administration and a specialist in Soviet and Polish affairs.
>
> In the summer of 2007, when it was obvious that the negotiations
> were going nowhere, the Bush administration decided the talks were
> over and that it was time for independence. On June 10, 2007, Bush
> said that the end result of negotiations must be "certain
> independence." In July 2007, Daniel Fried said that independence
> was "inevitable" even if the talks failed. Finally, in September
> 2007, Condoleezza Rice put it succinctly: "There's going to be an
> independent Kosovo. We're dedicated to that." Europeans took cues
> from this line.
>
> How and when independence was brought about was really a European
> problem. The Americans set the debate and the Europeans implemented
> it. Among Europeans, the most enthusiastic about Kosovo
> independence were the British and the French. The British followed
> the American line while the French were led by their foreign
> minister, Bernard Kouchner, who had also served as the U.N. Kosovo
> administrator. The Germans were more cautiously supportive.
>
> On Feb. 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence and was recognized
> rapidly by a small number of European states and countries allied
> with the United States. Even before the declaration, the Europeans
> had created an administrative body to administer Kosovo. The
> Europeans, through the European Union, micromanaged the date of the
> declaration.
>
> On May 15, during a conference in Ekaterinburg, the foreign
> ministers of India, Russia and China made a joint statement
> regarding Kosovo. It was read by the Russian host minister, Sergei
> Lavrov, and it said: "In our statement, we recorded our fundamental
> position that the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo
> contradicts Resolution 1244. Russia, India and China encourage
> Belgrade and Pristina to resume talks within the framework of
> international law and hope they reach an agreement on all problems
> of that Serbian territory."
>
> The Europeans and Americans rejected this request as they had
> rejected all Russian arguments on Kosovo. The argument here was
> that the Kosovo situation was one of a kind because of atrocities
> that had been committed. The Russians argued that the level of
> atrocity was unclear and that, in any case, the government that
> committed them was long gone from Belgrade. More to the point, the
> Russians let it be clearly known that they would not accept the
> idea that Kosovo independence was a one-of-a-kind situation and
> that they would regard it, instead, as a new precedent for all to
> follow.
>
> The problem was not that the Europeans and the Americans didn't
> hear the Russians. The problem was that they simply didn't believe
> them — they didn't take the Russians seriously. They had heard the
> Russians say things for many years. They did not understand three
> things. First, that the Russians had reached the end of their rope.
> Second, that Russian military capability was not what it had been
> in 1999. Third, and most important, NATO, the Americans and the
> Europeans did not recognize that they were making political
> decisions that they could not support militarily.
>
> For the Russians, the transformation of NATO from a military
> alliance into a regional United Nations was the problem. The West
> argued that NATO was no longer just a military alliance but a
> political arbitrator for the region. If NATO does not like Serbian
> policies in Kosovo, it can — at its option and in opposition to
> U.N. rulings — intervene. It could intervene in Serbia and it
> intended to expand deep into the former Soviet Union. NATO thought
> that because it was now a political arbiter encouraging regimes to
> reform and not just a war-fighting system, Russian fears would
> actually be assuaged. To the contrary, it was Russia's worst
> nightmare. Compensating for all this was the fact that NATO had
> neglected its own military power. Now, Russia could do something
> about it.
>
> At the beginning of this discourse, we explained that the
> underlying issues behind the Russo-Georgian war went deep into
> geopolitics and that it could not be understood without
> understanding Kosovo. It wasn't everything, but it was the single
> most significant event behind all of this. The war of 1999 was the
> framework that created the war of 2008.
>
> The problem for NATO was that it was expanding its political reach
> and claims while contracting its military muscle. The Russians were
> expanding their military capability (after 1999 they had no place
> to go but up) and the West didn't notice. In 1999, the Americans
> and Europeans made political decisions backed by military force. In
> 2008, in Kosovo, they made political decisions without sufficient
> military force to stop a Russian response. Either they
> underestimated their adversary or — even more amazingly — they did
> not see the Russians as adversaries despite absolutely clear
> statements the Russians had made. No matter what warning the
> Russians gave, or what the history of the situation was, the West
> couldn't take the Russians seriously.
>
> It began in 1999 with war in Kosovo and it ended in 2008 with the
> independence of Kosovo. When we study the history of the coming
> period, the war in Kosovo will stand out as a turning point.
> Whatever the humanitarian justification and the apparent ease of
> victory, it set the stage for the rise of Putin and the current and
> future crises.
>
> Tell Stratfor What You Think
>
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4.
West On Kosovo Vs Caucasus: Any Excuse For War, Build-Up
Posted by: "Rick Rozoff"
Tue Aug 26, 2008 12:13 pm (PDT)

http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=31657&cid=87&p=26.08.2008

Voice of Russia
ugust 26, 2008

WASHINGTON'S STAND ON GEORGIA'S `TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY' SEEN LACKING IN CONSISTENCY
By Yuri Reshetnikov

-The rare unanimous statements by both chambers of
Russia's parliament appeared to come as the strongest
signal yet that Russia will not bend to western
pressure over its action on Georgia's aggression in
South Ossetia and it is prepared to go all the way if
the United States and its western allies attempt to
retaliate.
-Temuri Yakobashvili, Georgian minister for
reintegration of the breakaway region was quoted in
the media as saying that "absolutely, in the future,
this is a recipe for future clashes. If it is accepted
by the Russian government, sooner or later, the
fighting will re-erupt."

The Russian parliament unanimously urged President
Dmitry Medvedev this week to recognize the
independence of two breakaway regions of Georgia and
the Russian President promptly signed decrees on
recognizing the two entities as independent states.

The move is likely to escalate what has become of the
most serious conflicts between Russia and the United
States since the end of the Cold War almost two
decades ago.

The rare unanimous statements by both chambers of
Russia's parliament appeared to come as the strongest
signal yet that Russia will not bend to western
pressure over its action on Georgia's aggression in
South Ossetia and it is prepared to go all the way if
the United States and its western allies attempt to
retaliate.

In a statement issued at his ranch in Crawford, Texas,
President George W. Bush said he was "deeply
concerned" by the move and that recognition of the two
entities would violate both a cease-fire agreement and
United Nations resolutions, which, however, have yet
to be adopted.

"I call on Russia's leadership to meet its commitments
and not recognize these separatist regions," Bush
said. "Georgia's territorial integrity and borders
must command the same respect as every other nation's,
including Russia's."

Bush said that Washington "will continue to stand with
the people of Georgia and their democracy and to
support its sovereignty and territorial integrity."

The European Union also said the two breakaway regions
should remain part of Georgia, while an emboldened
Tbilisi official blurted out that a Russian move to
recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent
entities could lead again to war.

Temuri Yakobashvili, Georgian minister for
reintegration of the breakaway region was quoted in
the media as saying that "absolutely, in the future,
this is a recipe for future clashes. If it is accepted
by the Russian government, sooner or later, the
fighting will re-erupt."

In urging Moscow to accord the same respect to
Georgia's "territorial integrity and borders as every
other nation's, including Russia's", George W. Bush
evidently failed to recall Serbia whose "territorial
integrity and borders" Washington had failed to
respect in recognizing the Serbian breakaway province
of Kosovo earlier this year.

And Washington sure needs to be aware while denying
that principle to any one nation the United States
automatically forfeits the right to demand that same
approach for any another.

In any case, US foreign policy makers have yet to come
up with a convincing explanation how Kosovo might be
any different in its independence bid from South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Folks at Foggy Bottom need to
check the facts and draw the proper conclusions on
that score.



5.
Caucasus War Result Of West Trashing International Law In Kosovo
Posted by: "Rick Rozoff"
Tue Aug 26, 2008 12:13 pm (PDT)

http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=31595&cid=45&p=25.08.2008

Voice of Russia
August 25, 2008

Georgia's attack on S.Ossetia comes in the wake of
trampling underfoot international law in Kosovo

Georgia's recent attack on South Ossetia has come in
the wake of the West's trampling underfoot
international law provisions in Kosovo, says the
deputy Russian Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin.

The official points out in an interview with the
Spiegel Online German newspaper that Russia has long
since, and in a most patient way, warned of the tragic
consequences that the unilateral proclamation of
Kosovo's independence could trigger.

Russia did stick to its principled position prior to
Georgia's aggression, but now, the diplomat says, it
should think all over again.

Karasin pointed out the United States' questionable
and guileful role in the aggravation of the
Georgian-South Ossetian conflict.

Washington has for a whole five years armed Georgia
and sent it wrong signals, which has eventually
prompted the Georgian authorities to launch
aggression.



6.
Kosovo And Caucasus: West's Double Crime
Posted by: "Rick Rozoff"
Tue Aug 26, 2008 3:35 pm (PDT)

http://en.rian.ru/world/20080826/116297829.html

Russian Information Agency Novosti
August 26, 2008

Russia says Abkhazia, S. Ossetia situation different
from Kosovo


-"In both cases the center started a war in Kosovo and
South Ossetia, as well as Abkhazia, but the conflicts
were halted in different ways - through the ruthless
inhuman bombardment of Belgrade in the case of Kosovo
and without punishing Tbilisi for its attacks on
Sukhumi [Abkhazia's capital]."
-"Belgrade has never tried to use military force or
cast doubt on negotiations since 1999, but they were
destroyed by Kosovo Albanians supported by the West.
And it was Tbilisi that undermined the settlement
mechanisms in South Ossetia and Abkhazia."

SOCHI - Russia's foreign minister said on Tuesday
Moscow's decision to recognize Abkhazia and South
Ossetia as independent states has no parallel with
Kosovo's declaration of independence made earlier this
year.

Russia recognized Georgia's breakaway republics
earlier Tuesday when President Dmitry Medvedev signed
a resolution which was unanimously passed by both
houses of parliament. The move will further worsen
Russia's relations with Western powers, already
strained over Moscow's "disproportionate" response to
Georgia's attack on Tskhinvali.

Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been seeking
independence since the early 1990s, resulting in
bloody conflicts with Georgia. Their hopes were given
a new lease of life following Kosovo's declaration of
independence from Serbia in February and subsequent
recognition by most EU and western countries,
including the United States.

"In both cases the center started a war in Kosovo and
South Ossetia, as well as Abkhazia, but the conflicts
were halted in different ways - through the ruthless
inhuman bombardment of Belgrade in the case of Kosovo
and without punishing Tbilisi for its attacks on
Sukhumi [Abkhazia's capital]," Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov said.

"A ceasefire was agreed, peacekeepers were deployed
and mechanisms for talks established. Belgrade has
never tried to use military force or cast doubt on
negotiations since 1999, but they were destroyed by
Kosovo Albanians supported by the West. And it was
Tbilisi that undermined the settlement mechanisms in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia," the minister said.

"Therefore, drawing parallels is irrelevant here, and
the difference is evident between Belgrade's policy
towards Kosovo and how Saakashvili's regime behaved
towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia," Lavrov said.

Tbilisi launched a military offensive on South Ossetia
on August 8 seeking to retake control of the region in
which at least 64 Russian peacekeepers and hundreds of
South Ossetian civilians died with thousands more
forced to flee the conflict.

Russia expelled Georgian forces sending tanks and
troops to the region crossing into Georgian territory
as part of Moscow military response. Although Moscow
has now withdrawn most of its troops from Georgia,
some manned checkpoints remain on key roads

Russia says they are needed to deter further bloodshed
and protect South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Lavrov also said Russia was unconcerned by the threat
of possible sanctions being imposed by western
countries following Moscow's decision.

"Russia is a self-sufficient country, and attempts to
block our ambitious plans, which are extremely
important for the country's social and economic
development, will bring no good, although someone is
obviously keen to take advantage of a provocation like
Georgia's attack," Lavrov said.



7.
Kosovo To Caucasus: Insular NATO World Finally Confronted
Posted by: "Rick Rozoff"
Tue Aug 26, 2008 7:46 pm (PDT)

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Editorial/Look_Whos_Talking/articleshow/3409074.c
ms

Times of India
August 27, 2008

LEADER ARTICLE: Look Who's Talking
Ramesh Thakur

[Edited]


-On the Georgian crisis, while the western media have
portrayed the West as united against Russian
aggression, the rest of the world faults a bullying
West that incredibly glosses over the reality of
Georgia attacking South Ossetia indiscriminately.
-[L]iberal and conservative commentators and
politicians alike seem to believe they have a divine
dispensation to be the moral arbiter of their own
conduct and that of everyone else. Who should be the
judge of NATO conduct in the Balkans, Afghanistan and
the Caucasus? Why, NATO, of course.
-Great powers have core vital interests that they will
defend. Repeated warnings from Russia of red lines
that must not be crossed were serially dismissed as
the angry growls of a Russian bear in deep and
permanent hibernation.
They have been encircled by western bases, missiles
and allies, alternately taunted, ignored and
dismissed.
-Those who wish to back rebel movements and
internationalise a crisis by intervening militarily
had better be prepared for payback time in other
places and conflicts.

You have to admire their chutzpah, castigating Russia
for attacking another country and emulating in the
Caucasus NATO's behaviour in the Balkans.

Who does Vladimir Putin think he is — George W Bush?

Reading western mainstream media commentators has been
a revelation. They live on a different planet.

Much of the western media do not seem to have realised
yet that their opinions are now staple fare for people
all around the world in real time, who also have
access to other media. They are therefore well read
and well informed. They are also better educated than
ever before and have sufficient critical skills to be
able to spot rank double standards and hypocrisy.

The net result is that while the American media, for
example, might want to dump responsibility on the Bush
administration for the rise of anti-Americanism around
the world, they too have contributed to the decline of
soft power as more and more people lose faith in the
objectivity of leading US media outlets and are tired
of their one-sided moralising and hectoring.

On the Georgian crisis, while the western media have
portrayed the West as united against Russian
aggression, the rest of the world faults a bullying
West that incredibly glosses over the reality of
Georgia attacking South Ossetia indiscriminately.

There are three levels on which the world parts
company with the West on this.

First, liberal and conservative commentators and
politicians alike seem to believe they have a divine
dispensation to be the moral arbiter of their own
conduct and that of everyone else. Who should be the
judge of NATO conduct in the Balkans, Afghanistan and
the Caucasus? Why, NATO, of course.

And who should stand in judgment over China's actions
vis-a-vis Darfur and Myanmar or Russia's in the
Balkans and the Caucasus? Why, the West,
self-evidently.

Except, secondly, that the narrative of the virtuous
West standing up valiantly to the rest in defence of
universal values is getting rather tiresome.

Russian references to NATO actions to defend the right
of Kosovo to secede from...Serbia...and to recognise
and guarantee Kosovo's independence, do resonate with
the rest of the world as providing a fairly compelling
parallel to what has happened in the Caucasus.

NATO set the precedent for flouting the rule of
international law and violating long-settled
collective norms of the international community
against unilateral military interventions.

No two situations are exactly alike. Still, much as
most westerners dismiss any analogy between Russia's
actions to prise South Ossetia and Abkhazia away from
Georgia and NATO actions to detach Kosovo from Serbia,
most others do accept the basic parallel.

Russia has pointed to Georgian complicity in killing
many South Ossetians, including many Russian citizens,
the responsibility of Russia to protect its nationals,
and UN endorsement of the responsibility to protect
them.
....
The final problem is behaving as if geopolitics and
realism belong on history's shelf and have no
relevance or applicability any more.
....
The end of the Cold War saw a very rare phenomenon in
human history. Russia agreed to the terms of its
defeat and to the new world order that came out of it.

Instead of demonstrating grace in victory and some
sensitivity to Russia's legitimate fears, interests
and national dignity, the West has repeatedly rubbed
Russian noses in the dirt of their historic Cold War
defeat.

Instead of being dismantled with victory in the Cold
War, NATO, an alliance in search of a role and
mission, has progressively expanded its borders and
reached steadily closer to Russia.

Great powers have core vital interests that they will
defend. Repeated warnings from Russia of red lines
that must not be crossed were serially dismissed as
the angry growls of a Russian bear in deep and
permanent hibernation.

They have been encircled by western bases, missiles
and allies, alternately taunted, ignored and
dismissed.

Champion chess players that they are, the Russians
bided their time patiently before checkmating the West
brutally but brilliantly in South Ossetia and firing a
warning shot across the bows of other former parts of
the now forgotten Soviet empire.

Those who wish to back rebel movements and
internationalise a crisis by intervening militarily
had better be prepared for payback time in other
places and conflicts....

The writer is with the Centre for International
Governance Innovation in Waterloo, Canada.




8.
Viewpoint: Russia, Georgia And The Kosovo Connection
Posted by: "Rick Rozoff"
Tue Aug 26, 2008 7:46 pm (PDT)

http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/53982

Media Monitors (US)
August 26, 2008

Russia, Georgia, and the Kosovo Connection
by J. Victor Marshall

-While many observers questioned Kosovo's readiness
for independence, given corruption in its civil
administration and the murderous campaign of ethnic
cleansing waged by Albanian nationalists against Serbs
in their midst, Kosovo unilaterally declared its
independence on February 17.
Although Kosovo's move arguably violated UN Security
Council Resolution 1244, which recognized Serbia's
ultimate sovereignty, many NATO countries including
the United States sided with Kosovo.

In Russia even more than in America, "Kosovo" rhymes
with "I told you so."

Many Americans don't realize that the former Serbian
province of Kosovo, which broke away in 1999 after
US-led NATO forces bombed Serbia for 78 days, helped
set the stage for the recent conflict between Russia
and neighboring Georgia.

But Russian leaders, who like most leaders care
intensely about what happens at their borders
(Georgia) and to their longtime allies (Serbia),
warned earlier this year that support for Kosovo's
independence would set a precedent that could trigger
separatist conflicts in places like Georgia.

It was a warning that Washington and several of its
European allies foolishly, even recklessly, failed to
heed.

In negotiations over the final status of Kosovo, which
had been under United Nations jurisdiction since 1999,
Serbia promised the province autonomy but not
independence.

While many observers questioned Kosovo's readiness for
independence, given corruption in its civil
administration and the murderous campaign of ethnic
cleansing waged by Albanian nationalists against Serbs
in their midst, Kosovo unilaterally declared its
independence on February 17.

Although Kosovo's move arguably violated UN Security
Council Resolution 1244, which recognized Serbia's
ultimate sovereignty, many NATO countries including
the United States sided with Kosovo.

"The Kosovars are now independent," declared President
Bush.

Humiliated by NATO's military intervention in 1999,
Russia now chafed at the political intervention of
NATO countries in favor of Kosovo's secession, which
Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned as "immoral
and illegal."

Russian leaders warned that unilateral recognition of
Kosovo's independence would open a "Pandora's box" by
appearing to support similar claims by other
separatist movements in some 200 regions of the world.

The Russian Foreign Ministry declared, "Those who are
considering supporting separatism should understand
what dangerous consequences their actions threaten to
have for world order, international stability and the
authority of the U.N. Security Council's decisions
that took decades to build."

Outside of NATO, many countries sided with Russia's
statement of principles.
....
Just as NATO justified its intervention in 1999 as a
humanitarian defense of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians
against Serbian atrocities, so Russia said it came to
the defense of South Ossetia, which suffered terrible
atrocities at Georgian hands in the early 1990s, after
Georgian troops shelled its capital earlier this
month.

In addition to Kosovo, Russia can justify its
intervention on behalf of South Ossetia by pointing to
any number of other precedents set by the United
States: the Bush administration's doctrine of
preemption, its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, its
silence in the face of Israel's invasion of Lebanon,
and many more.

What difference do all these precedents and broken
principles make?

By selectively turning principles into propagandist
slogans for scoring points, the United States no
longer occupies the political high ground.
....
Kosovo was one of the fields upon which the United
States laid down its moral arms.



9.
Russia: Caucasus Borders International; Kosovo UDI Illegitimate
Posted by: "Rick Rozoff"
Tue Aug 26, 2008 7:46 pm (PDT)

http://www.russiatoday.com/news/news/29523

Russia Today
August 26, 2008

Russia urges UN to back independence move

-"The Georgian attack on South Ossetia created a new
reality," Vitaly Churkin said. "We had warned many
times that the recognition of independent Kosovo would
trigger a corresponding reaction."

Russia has officially informed the UN Secretary
General about the country's recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia's independence.

The Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly
Churkin, has called on the Security Council to adopt a
resolution, which would go along with the six point
peace plan.

He started a media conference in New York by reading a
statement from Russia's Foreign Ministry.

"Russia has recognised the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, mindful of its responsibility
for ensuring the survival of their fraternal peoples
in the face of aggressive, chauvinistic policy pursued
by Tbilisi," it says.

"Saakashvili has himself dashed the possibility of the
territorial integrity of Georgia. Using repeatedly
brutal military force against the peoples, whom,
according to his words, he would like to see within
his state, Mikhail Saakashvili left them no other
choice but to ensure their security and the right to
exist through self-determination as independent
states."

Also, Churkin dismissed allegations that Russia is
preparing to annex the two regions after the
recognition of their sovereignty.

He said that now borders around Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are, according to Russia, international.

The Georgian ambassador to the UN, Irakli Alasania has
also addressed the media and has called on
international community to condemn Russia's decision.
He said that the new development has no international
standings in regards to Georgia's sovereignty.

"The Georgian attack on South Ossetia created a new
reality," Vitaly Churkin said. "We had warned many
times that the recognition of independent Kosovo would
trigger a corresponding reaction."

Churkin, however, confirmed that Russia would not
recognize the independence of Kosovo.

"I personally believe that Abkhazia and South Ossetia
have a lot more reasons and a much better legal ground
for their independence than Kosovo," he said.