Informazione


(La politica occidentale sul Kosovo, preannunciando l'ennesimo riconoscimento del separatismo etnico secondo la logica del "divide et impera"', sta causando nervosismo nel nord e nel sud del Caucaso, dove crescono innumerevoli e contrastanti le rivendicazioni nazionalitarie...)


West's Kosovo Policy To Lead To Wars In Caucasus, too


1) Russia, U.S. clash at U.N. over Georgian region 
By Patrick Worsnip - Reuters - April 10, 2007

2) Granting Kosovo Independence to Become Precedent for Separatism: Russian Speaker
K. Ramazanova - Trend News Agency (Azerbaijan) - July 20, 2007

3) Having suffered a defeat in resolution of Kosovo Conflict, 
UNO got down to other conflicts of post-Soviet area 
PanArmenian.net - July 28, 2007

4) Armenian President does not rule out new war with Azerbaijan 
Azeri Press Agency - July 12, 2007

5) The Coming Independence of Kosovo and the Steps Russia Should Take
Andrei Areshev - Strategic Cultural Foundation (Russia) - September 24, 2007



=== 1 ===

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N10445886.htm

Reuters - April 10, 2007

Russia, U.S. clash at U.N. over Georgian region

By Patrick Worsnip


UNITED NATIONS - Russia and the United States clashed
sharply over Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia on
Tuesday as the United Nations Security Council debated
renewing a U.N. mission in the Caucasus state.

Russia's U.N. ambassador Vitaly Churkin told reporters
the United States had made a "serious diplomatic and
political mistake" in refusing to allow Abkhazia's
"foreign minister" to come to New York.

U.S. officials denied they had turned down a formal
visa request by the minister, and U.S. ambassador
Alejandro Wolff accused Churkin of a "mischievous
effort" to create "false analogies" between Abkhazia
and Serbia's troubled Kosovo region.

Abkhazia, on the Black Sea, broke away from Georgia in
1993 after the Soviet Union collapsed, when
separatists, backed by mercenaries and arms from
Russia's northern Caucasus region, drove out Tbilisi's
troops.

Moscow, which has frayed relations with Georgia, props
up the region by paying pensions, issuing Russian
passports and allowing cross-border traffic.

A U.N. military and police observer mission in
Georgia, currently 142-strong, has monitored the
situation since 1993. Its current six-month mandate
will expire on Friday.

Abkhazia is not officially recognized by any country
or international body, but Churkin took issue with
Washington's decision not to let the Abkhaz minister,
Sergei Shamba, come to the United States to address
the Security Council.

"This is clearly a fact of violating the spirit of the
obligation of the host country," Churkin said. "We
think it was a rather serious diplomatic and political
mistake." The Security Council, he said, should listen
to both sides.

"As I mentioned in the Council meeting today, can you
imagine what would be the situation ... if in the case
of the Kosovo conflict, all those years the
international community were listening only to the
Serb side?"

"MISCHIEVOUS EFFORT"

Kosovo has been under U.N. administration since 1999,
when NATO bombing drove out Serb forces. A U.N. plan,
backed by the West but opposed by Russia's ally
Serbia, proposes independence.

In a statement distributed by Russian officials,
Shamba himself attacked the Security Council for
failing to consult both sides, "which makes us think
that the UN has not become an equidistant party."

But Wolff told reporters that of a six-nation group of
"friends of Georgia" - Russia, the United States,
Britain, France, Germany and Slovakia - only Russia
thought the time was ripe for Shamba to attend the
United Nations.

"We've heard ambassador Churkin today, as he has done
previously, raise false analogies with Kosovo, in a
mischievous effort to complicate that discussion," he
said.

U.S. embassy spokesman Richard Grenell contended the
United States had not turned down a visa request by
Shamba. Diplomats said Shamba had made no official
visa application after receiving word that he would
not be welcome.

The Security Council adjourned without a decision on
the U.N. mission, known as UNOMIG. A report on
Abkhazia earlier this month by Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon said a helicopter attack on March 11 on
Georgian-controlled territory bordering Abkhazia had
been a "major setback" to peace efforts.

Russia's air force denied Georgian charges that the
helicopters were Russian. Churkin said Moscow believed
Georgia's armed presence in the area involved, the
upper Kodori valley, "exceeds the limits of the
reasonable."

Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, appearing
later at an exhibit of photographs of the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, said his country had only
police in the area, which he said was its right. 


=== 2 ===

http://news.trendaz.com/cgi-bin/readnews2.pl?newsId=960129&lang=EN

Trend News Agency (Azerbaijan) - July 20, 2007

Granting Kosovo Independence to Become Precedent for Separatism: Russian Speaker

K. Ramazanova


Azerbaijan, Baku - The Head of the Russian State Duma
believes that the current variant of the draft
resolution, envisaging granting Kosovo independence,
can be a precedent for separatist regimes in many
countries worldwide.

”The draft resolution on the future status of Kosovo
might be a precedent and light a fuse of separatism in
many countries worldwide, including Abkhazia,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Spain,
the UK and many African countries,” Boris Gryzlov, the
chairman of the State Duma, declared during
discussions regarding Montenegro.

He announced that Russia will use its right of veto
against the resolution, which is not supported by
Belgrade and Pristina.

Earlier the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated
that granting Kosovo independence cannot be a
precedent for separatist movements in other countries,
including Azerbaijan and Georgia.
...


=== 3 ===

http://www.panarmenian.net/details/eng/?nid=787

PanArmenian.net - July 28, 2007

Having suffered a defeat in resolution of Kosovo
Conflict, UNO got down to other conflicts of
post-Soviet area

[Synopsis: The West exploits the UN to
'internationalize' local disputes when it's to its
advantage to do so, and arrogantly acts outside the UN
when that is advantangeous. Planned actions in
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh. South Ossetia,
Transdniester and later Kaliningrad, the Kurile
Islands, etc. are examples of the first. The NATO
states are now pressed to 'resolve' the above issues
before formalizing their recognition of Kosovo
secession for fear of establishing a precedent.]


If the Security Council takes any decision, the
conflict zones [in the former Soviet Union] will by
all means have “blue helmets” arriving there, which
will have a most negative impact on the situation of
the region; the very Kosovo is the most evident proof
of the above-mentioned fact.

-[E]verything is still ahead both for the world
community and UNO, which managed to prove in a short
time that it is just a political tool in the hands of
great powers.

Having suffered a defeat in resolution of the Kosovo
conflict, UNO [the UN] decided to get down to other
conflicts, including those which exist in the
post-Soviet area.

Presently the UN Security Council has the situation of
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone under its
consideration.

As it is stated in the report on the state of affairs
in the region, which was handed in to the Security
Council by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,
Abkhazia and Georgia “Failed to justify the hopes of
resuming a dialogue. This brought no stability in the
situation of the confrontation zone.”

In the opinion of Ban Ki-moon, because of the absence
of direct dialogue between Tbilisi and Sokhumi
[Abkhazia] there is “distrust and suspicion which may
make the situation even much tenser.”

The Resolution adopted unanimously by the Security
Council called on both parties to resume the dialogue
and fully keep to the agreement about a ceasefire,
force-free process and returning the refugees reached
earlier. The Secretary General mentioned with regret
that the parties interpret this document differently.

Meanwhile it is well known in UNO that in the conflict
zone there is the Conciliatory Commission made up of
representatives from RF [Russian Federation], Georgia
and Abkhazia, which also seeks a conflict resolution.

However, no commission or no any other international
organization may help the problem which has existed
for 15 years already.

It is natural that Georgia, as well as GUAM countries
in general (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova)
would love to have the resolution of conflicts of
their territory reach the UN, to once and for all
“bury” the last hope that they will ever be regulated.

This refers to both Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh.

In this regard it should be reminded that two
questions having direct connection with the Karabakh
conflict have been put on the agenda of the 61st
Session of the UN General Assembly.

One of the questions was proposed by Azerbaijan, the
second one - by [all the] GUAM countries.

However neither of them has yet been discussed at the
61st Session, and according to the General Assembly
Order they will be discussed at the next session.

“An issue is included in the agenda if there is a
corresponding decision made by the General Assembly,”
said the acting press-secretary of RA Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Vladimir Karapetyan.

According to him, Azerbaijan's wish to lead the issue
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict regulation out of the
framework of the present negotiations has a negative
impact on the whole process.

“The given step speaks of the absence of political
will in Azerbaijan for positive regulation of the
conflict,” he mentioned in his comment on Baku's will
of putting the issue of Karabakh conflict regulation
on the agenda of UN General Assembly's Session.

Georgia and Azerbaijan appeal to UN, being well aware
of the fact that if the Security Council takes any
decision, the conflict zone will by all means have
“blue helmets” arriving there, which will have a most
negative impact on the situation of the region; the
very Kosovo is the most evident proof of the above
mentioned fact.
....
On the whole according to the OSCE and Conciliatory
Commission statements no progress is registered in the
process of conflict regulation.
....
[T]o what extent this [Kosovo's] independence will
become the key for regulation of the conflicts in CIS
is not clear.

In any case a 15-20 year-period is not long for the
resolution of such conflicts.

The Arab- sraeli conflict began in 1948 and exists up
to the present in spite of the declaration of
independence by Palestine.

So everything is still ahead both for the world
community and UNO, which managed to prove in a short
time that it is just a political tool in the hands of
great powers.


=== 4 ===

http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=30517

Azeri Press Agency - July 12, 2007

Armenian President does not rule out new war with Azerbaijan


The cause of unsuccessful negotiations on the
settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is the
fact that Azerbaijan is unwilling to accept reality
and mistakenly thinks that the opposite process is
possible, whereas it is senseless to turn back the
wheel of history.

"The people who gained independence, will not refuse
from that,” Armenian President Robert Kocharian stated
in an interview to SPIEGEL ONLINE.

Drawing a parallel between Kosovo and the Nagorno
Karabakh conflicts he said, “We do not want to [make]
analogies, but undoubtedly the Karabakh people have
the same right to independence as do the Albanians of
Kosovo.

"Moreover, they protected their right alone without
interference by the international community. As to the
assistance from Armenia, Armenian people fought during
the war. Do you really think that Albania has not
provided assistance to the Albanians of Kosovo?

"There are a lot of correlations here and I see
Armenia and Karabakh’s future as an asymmetric
confederation,” Kocharian said.

He did not rule out a new war with Azerbaijan.

“Though I doubt that Azerbaijan’s military budget is
bigger than our state budget, I would warn against
judging about the correlation of forces from both
sides only by figures.

"You must take into account the fact that the soldier
who defends his homeland has another motivation than
the one who acts on a foreign territory.

"We do not have any intention to launch military
operations. But in case of a prepared aggression we
will make decisions, to which we will be obliged by
the military situation of the time and which will meet
our security interests.

"Our offers on the settlement of the conflict are
connected with the recognition of the republic and
security guarantees. They suppose the presence of
peacekeepers. It must be an international peacekeeping
contingent,” Armenian President underscored. 


=== 5 ===

http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=974

Strategic Cultural Foundation (Russia) - September 24, 2007

The Coming Independence of Kosovo and the Steps Russia Should Take

Andrei Areshev


The negotiations on the future status of Kosovo
continue, but there seems to be no hope to break the
stalemate to which the politics of the West have led
to in the Balkans. 

Local elections in Kosovo are scheduled for November
17, and the Albanian leaders are open about their
intention to declare independence unilaterally in the
aftermath of the event, by December 10, 2007. 

Following the talks in London with the representatives
of the troika of envoys, Kosovo "prime minister" Agim
Ceku said he made it clear that the Kosovo Albanians
had won independence, and that the latter was not what
they demanded, but actually a starting point. 

At the same time, even the Western media describe the
situation in the province as one of total misery. 

Unemployment among the local population is at the
level of 40% to 50%, making people turn to subsistence
agriculture or smuggling to survive (1). 

Certainly, neither official Belgrade nor the Serb
people will agree to the forming of a gangster enclave
in the historically important Serbian region.

Besides, such an enclave is likely to create problems
for the south of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. 

Nor is the Serbian leadership going to accept the
partition of Kosovo – Belgrade insists that a broad
autonomy of the province within Serbia as prescribed
by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is the only
option. 

The quagmire makes EU authorities initiate intense
activity, though there are no indications that they
might yield any results whatsoever. 

More consultations will possibly take place during the
session of the UN General Assembly, but it is hard to
believe that they will be fruitful. 

A unilateral recognition of Kosovo will irreversibly
undermine the authority of international organizations
such as the UN Security Council - it will transpire
that the resolutions of the latter respectable
institution serve as distracting maneuvers, and that
nobody planned to comply with them from the start. 

In this context, the serious question is what will be
Moscow's position if Kosovo declares independence
unilaterally and is recognized by a number of
countries? 

The answer is that the only logical step for Russia
would be a full recognition of the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Premises for this move are
available. This would be exactly what Russia can and
must do from the standpoint of its own national
interests. 

For a long time, the Russian leadership has been
overly cautious about the option of recognizing
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and ignored the political
and legal arguments made in favor of the step. 

This approach is explained both by the chaos of the
Russian foreign politics of the 1990es that in some
aspects lingers on, and by the attempts to reach a
compromise with Georgia and the US (2). 

It is already clear, however, that the US understands
compromise solely as the readiness of others to agree.
For example, by the time of the next NATO Summit in
Bucharest in 2008, Georgia will be ready to implement
its plan of joining the bloc. 

Its full integration into NATO will thus become a
matter of the not-so-distant future. 

The de facto failure of the talks on the joint use of
the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan is another illustration
of the tendency. 

It is questionable whether the US visit to Gabala,
with its predictable outcome, was worth the
consequences for the relations between Russia and Iran
and for Russia's standing in the Muslim world. If we
really needed to hear another "no" from the US, we got
what we wanted. 

Russian foreign politics can be serious only in the
case that they are guided by the country's national
interests. 

No other guidelines are appropriate. This indisputable
truth can be derived from V. Putin's speech in Munich
and from Moscow's subsequent military-political
decisions (the withdrawal from the Conventional Forces
in Europe treaty, etc.). 

We believe that the political course Russia adheres to
will be reflected in its relations with the
self-determined Republics (which are de facto new
independent states) on the territory of the former
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. 

Election campaigns have already started in Georgia. 

They can have unpredictable consequences for the
Caucasus region. 

The fact that most of the competition will unfold
between the hawk M. Saakashvili and the even more
irresponsible Irakli Okruashvili is not the only
problem. 

Finding themselves in a rush situation, with so little
time remaining till the anticipated unilateral
proclamation of independence by Kosovo, the Georgian
leaders are quite likely to launch "a small victorious
war" by which they can hope to strengthen their
domestic positions. 

Saakashvili generously dispensed promises to return
the insurgent Republics to Georgia during his first
term in office. 

His electorate is highly susceptible to such pledges. 

Now, Saakashvili’s second term is nearing the end. A
wave of arrests of local officials, formally under the
pretext of financial abuse charges, began in Gori, a
location in close proximity to South Ossetia. 

One of the versions of the developments is that the
individuals arrested had strong ties with the former
defense minister Okruashvili. 

There is no guarantee that the anti-corruption
campaign will not get transformed into a military
offensive against South Ossetia. One should keep in
mind that the invasion of Abkhazia in August 1992 was
carried out under the pretext of "protecting
transportation routes." 

The so-called "peace march" to Tskinvali ended up as
another failed provocation planned by the Georgian
authorities. 

The technology of such marches was put to practice in
Ajaria in 2004, when secret service operatives mixed
with the march of residents of other Georgian regions,
penetrated into the Republic's territory, and
neutralized Ajaria's defense officials (3). 

In that case bloodshed did not follow because the
people of Ajaria were Georgians as well. 

In Ossetia, a tragic scenario is likely. A build-up of
the Georgian armed forces from 60,000 to 90,000
servicemen (including reservists) is planned to take
place by the end of the year. There is no doubt as to
whom this impressive force will be used against. 

On September 20, Georgian saboteurs attacked
Abkhazia's army base. The incident ended with
fatalities. As long as Moscow's position remains
indefinite, provocations from the Georgian side will
continue with increasing frequency. Sooner or later,
they will evolve into a full-scale aggression against
the self-determined Republics. The consequences of the
military escalation can be severe. 

So far, Moscow's politics in the Caucasus have often
been inconsequential and largely driven by inertia. 

Moscow's granting an official recognition to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia would restrain the hawks in Georgia
and thus tilt the geopolitical balance in the Caucasus
in Russia's favor, which would help to ensure peace in
the southern regions of Russia as well. 

If the Georgian leadership's present course continues,
the recent escalation of the terrorist activity in
Ingushetia will look like a minor problem, especially
since the Georgian legislation envisions unparalleled
conditions for hosting US armed forces in the country
neighboring Russia. It is as if one day China would
deploy its military infrastructure in Mexico, some 20
miles from Rio Grande. 

Statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry are not
enough to depart entirely from the logic of
geopolitical retreat. 

This applies to Russia's politics with respect to the
Caucasus as well. The Kremlin itself must advance its
position. It should also be realized that the
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be
meaningless verbiage unless it is backed by a range of
practical measures including those of the military
character. 

We keep hearing that Russia will face severe
consequences in case it takes this diplomatic step. 

The secret hope of those who say so is that when
Russia gets a new President in 2008, the country's
foreign politics will revert to the condition in which
it used to be in the epoch of President Yeltsin and
Foreign Minister Kozyrev. 

They hope that all they have to do is wait for the
2008 elections in Russia. 

In reality, no serious consequences (the uproar in the
media of several countries notwithstanding) would be
entailed by Russia's official recognition of the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

The anti-Russian rhetoric in the Western media will
persist under any scenario (it has become an
indispensable part of the US and European political
culture), especially now that Brussels has in fact
declared a war on Gazprom. 

The answer to the question about the steps Moscow
should take after the West ignores the positions of
Russia and Serbia and recognizes the criminal Albanian
regime in Kosovo as "an independent country" is clear:
Russia must finally recognize the new independent
states which have existed on the territory of the
former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic for over 15
years. 



2  Another pertinent factor is the influence of the
Georgian lobby. Over the past several years, it has
lost some of its positions. 

3  M. Perevozkina. Georgia: Rebooting. Profil, ¹ 34,
September 17, 2007 





DISUMANIZZARE IL NEMICO


"Dove si nasconde
LA BELVA KARADZIC":
proprio così, con la seconda riga in maiuscolo, titola un articolo
che appare sull'ultimo numero - datato 27/09/2007 - del settimanale
L'Espresso.
L'Espresso è la stessa rivista che in prima pagina inventò
HITLEROSEVIC (primavera 1999), affiancando propagandisticamente le
bombe che bombardavano i petrolchimici, gli autobus e le piazze dei
mercati.
Per comprendere bene il significato, la finalità in termini di
strategie militari e di guerra psicologica di questi titoloni de
L'Espresso, è il caso di ricordare che l'Editoriale omonima controlla
anche La Repubblica (quotidiano più letto d'Italia) e gli strategici
Il Piccolo (letto a Trieste ma anche in Istria e Dalmazia) e LiMeS
(rivista che pretende addirittura di saper definire l'interesse
nazionale italiano).

(a cura di Italo Slavo)

SERBI DELLA UE, SERBI DELLA NATO

22. septembar 2007. 14:42

Šutanovac: Vojska Srbije neće ratovati na Kosovu

Ministar odbrane Srbije Dragan Šutanovac izjavio je da će Vojska
Srbije slediti državnu politiku koja je jasno odredila da će se
pitanje Kosova i Metohije rešavati isključivo mirnim putem i
diplomatskim sredstvima. U skladu sa državnom politikom spremni smo
da ispunimo sve zadatke, ali ne očekujem da iko izda naređenje da
ratujemo sa NATO ili nekim drugim, rekao je Šutanovac u intervjuu
"Blicu". Ističući da je ulazak u NATO samo jedna stepenica na putu
ka Evropskoj uniji, Šutanovac je podsetio da nijedna zemlja u
poslednje vreme nije postala članica EU a da prethodno nije postala
članica NATO. Prema njegovim rečima, protivljenje premijera
Vojislava Koštunice ulasku u NATO stvara konfuziju u radu
Ministarstva odbrane i Vojsci Srbije. Po toj politici naša vojska
treba da se standardizuje po najboljem standardu, a to je NATO standard

Notizie Radioyu - 22.09.2007. - http://www.radioyu.org/

Il Ministro della Difesa della Serbia Dragan Sutanovac ha dichiarato
che „L’esercito della Serbia seguira’ la politica statale che ha
stabilito chiaramente che la questione dello status del Kosovo sara’
risolta esclusivamente con i mezzi pacifici e diplomatici.
Conformemente alla politica statale siamo disposti a adempiere a
tutti i nostri obblighi. Suppongo che nessuno dara’ l’ordine che
il nostro Paese entri in guerra contro la NATO. L’adesione alla NATO
e’ un grado indispensabile verso l’adesione all’Unione europea.
Nell’ultimo periodo nessun Paese e’ diventato suo membro senza che
abbia aderito alla NATO. L’opposizione del premier serbo in questo
senso crea confusione nel lavoro del Ministero della Difesa e
dell’esercito. Secondo la nostra politica l’esercito deve seguire
gli standard migliori, vale a dire gli standard della NATO“, ha
sottolineato Sutanovac.

(srpskohrvatski / italiano)


1) INIZIATIVA A TORINO, 16-19/10/2007:
La memoria rimossa - l'occupazione italiana della Jugoslavia (1941 - 1943)

Lordan Zafranović sarà a Torino per la rassegna del 16-19 ottobre p.v.

2) Lordan Zafranović sta completando il suo film a puntate su Tito, tra mille difficoltà /
Lordan Zafranović dovršava film o Titu, ali uz finansijske i druge teškoće


=== 1 ===

http://www.ancr.
to.it/Tool/News/Single/view_html?id_news=647

23.08.2007

La memoria rimossa - l'occupazione italiana della Jugoslavia (1941 - 1943)

L´Archivio Nazionale Cinematografico della Resistenza sta preparando per i giorni fra il 16 e il 19 ottobre un´iniziativa a Torino sull´occupazione italiana della Jugoslavia dall´aprile 1941 all´otto settembre 1943.
L´iniziativa avrà due nuclei portanti: 1) la presentazione di alcuni film di finzione, documentari e documenti filmici incentrati sull´argomento; 2) una giornata di comunicazioni su vari aspetti e implicazioni e su premesse e conseguenze della vicenda dell´occupazione.
L´intento è quello di sollecitare l´attenzione su temi spesso rimossi nell´ambito della comunicazione e della didattica.
L´iniziativa è organizzata dal Consiglio della Provincia di Torino e da quello del Comune di Torino, con la collaborazione dell´Archivio Nazionale Cinematografico della Resistenza, dell´Anpi di Torino, dell´Istituto friulano per la storia del movimento di liberazione, dell´Istituto piemontese per la storia della Resistenza e della società contemporanea e del Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia.

A breve sarà disponibile il programma dettagliato dell´iniziativa


=== 2 ===

Lordan Zafranović sta completando il film su Tito, tra mille difficoltà

E' molto probabile che, in un prossimo futuro, ci dovremo rivolgere a tutti gli estimatori di Zafranović e agli antifascisti jugoslavi con la richiesta di raccogliere fondi per consentire al regista di concludere i film nel tempo previsto. Chiederemo, quindi, probabilmente una Vostra sottoscrizione.
Zafranović, nell'intento di inquadrare un'epoca attraverso la grande figura di Josip Broz Tito, ritiene "che sia impossibile immaginare la storia del XX secolo senza Tito. Il mondo, senza di lui, sarebbe stato diverso”. Questo momento, afferma Zafranović, è decisivo per far conoscere direttamente il mondo dell'epoca di Tito.

Nonostante Lordan Zafranović già da due anni lavorasse ad un grande documentario su Tito, la Televisione di Stato della Croazia ha voluto commissionare - con un poderoso finanziamento dell'ordine di un milione di euro - un lavoro sullo stesso tema ad un altro regista, Antun Vrdoljak (che per inciso non ha ancora neanche iniziato il lavoro). Per capire chi sia questo personaggio, che a nostro avviso è regista di regime, basti sapere che costui si vanta di aver aperto una bottiglia di champagne dopo la notizia della morte di Tito, nel 1980.
Lordan Zafranović invece è l'autore di tanti film, lungo- e cortometraggi, tra cui spicca il leggendario "Occupazione in 26 immagini" in cui analizzò minutamente la mentalità dei fascisti nazionalisti croati (gli "ustascia") ed i loro inenarrabili crimini commessi durante la II Guerra Mondiale. Ragion per cui lo Stato odierno di Croazia, che dalla propria fondazione negli anni '90 per tanti versi è in continuità con lo Stato Indipendente Croato (NDH) 1941-1945, oggi è probabilmente disposto a nascondere e seppellire quei fatti storici sotto al tappeto dell'oblio.
Il vero assurdo è iniziato nel mese di maggio scorso, quando la Televisione di Stato della Croazia (HRT), senza alcun concorso pubblico, ha attribuito 7,4 milioni di kune (1 milione di Euro) al regista Antun Vrdoljak, come se all'improvviso si fosse voluto contrastare e mettere in crisi il lavoro biennale di Zafranović con il suo film-documentario su Tito. Allo stesso tempo, il regista Vrdoljak ha ricevuto ulteriori fondi dal Ministero della Cultura di Croazia - circa 1 milione di kune = 0,125 milioni di Euro. Tutto questo importo per soli sei episodi, mentre il serial di 10 episodi di Zafranović costa meno della metà: circa 410.000 Euro.
La notizia sull'incarico conferito nel frattempo a Vrdoljak ha sollevato tante proteste in Croazia da parte della gente che guarda con rispetto e stima al Presidente Tito. Anche l'Unione dei Combattenti della II Guerra Mondiale e l'Associazione che porta il nome di Tito, protestando, hanno affermato che questo regista non può in alcun modo realizzare un film oggettivamente corretto su Josip Broz Tito (parole di Tomislav Badovinac, Presidente della „Društvo Josip Broz Tito”).
E' molto probabile che Zafranović tra breve dovrà iniziare una raccolta di fondi per poter concludere il suo film nel tempo previsto.
Trovatosi nella situazione di dover al più presto finalizzare i lavori, facendo uscire la sua versione al più presto possibile, ora Zafranović punta a finire tutto entro la fine del 2007, assistito da Mira Šuvar e da un grande team di collaboratori. Anziché le 12 puntate ideate per la televisione, più il lungometraggio, il regista potrebbe produrre 10 episodi per la TV, ridotti a sei episodi per il pubblico dei paesi Non-allineati ed il Terzo mondo, e 3 episodi per Europa e America del Nord. A tutt'oggi, un terzo del lavoro è stato fatto. Il lavoro rimanente per la maggior parte ora consiste nell'intervistare, dopo i primi 37, ancora una sessantina di personaggi e uomini politici di tutto il mondo.
Oltre a svariati passaggi inediti, sono ugualmente originali e sconosciute le testimonianze delle persone che a Tito stavano accanto, che fino ad ora non avevano mai rilasciato interviste.
Questo momento, afferma Zafranović, è decisivo per far conoscere direttamente il mondo dell'epoca di Tito.


Sui film di Zafranović, si faccia riferimento anche ai nostri messaggi precedenti:
L'offensiva del revisionismo e del neoirredentismo http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/5368
Retrospettiva dei film di Zafranović in Croazia http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/5224
Lordan Zafranović sta completando un film su Tito http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/5197
AVVISO - con preghiera di massima diffusione http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/4576
Comunicato stampa: Retrospettiva Lordan Zafranović http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/4561

(a cura di DK e AM per la versione in italiana)


### NA SRPSKOHRVATSKOM ###

Lordan Zafranović dovršava film o Titu, ali uz finansijske i druge teškoće

Vrlo je verovatno da će se reditelj Zafranović uskoro obratiti javnosti s molbom za novčani doprinos radi što dovršetka filma u predviđenom roku. Znači da bismo i mi sigurno pokrenuli kampanju za prikupljanje sredstava.
Zafranović, koji skupa sa prikazom ličnosti kakva je bio Predsednik Tito, ima nameru da obuhvati i čitavu epohu: „nezamisliva je istorija 20. stoleća bez njega, svet bi bez njega bio drukčiji.“ Ovaj trenutak je odlučan da se prikaže neposredno sve što je okruživalo vreme s Titom.

Iako Lordan Zafranović već dve zadnje godine radi na velikom dokumentarcu o Titu, državna televizija Hrvatske (HRT) je prošlog proleća dodelila zamašan iznos drugom režiseru, Antunu Vrdoljaku, koji prethodno nije ni započeo radove na ovu temu.
Antun Vrdoljak se, između ostalog, ponosi izjavom (osim što je filmksi reditelj za sve istorijske periode, dodajemo mi) da je na vest o Titovoj smrti, 1980. godine, nazdravio istoj otvaranjem boce šampanjca!
Lordan Zafranović je autor brojnih dugometražnih i kratkometražnih filmova, između kojih se posebno ističe legendarna "Okupacija u 26 slika" u kojoj je dao oštar i dubok presek mentaliteta domaćih fašista u Hrvatskoji za vreme II svetskog rata (ustaša) tj. njihovih nepojmljivih zločina.
Stvorila se apsurdna situacija tokom maja meseca ove godine, kada je HRT, bez ikakvog javnog konkursa, dodelila režiseru Antunu Vrdoljaku, iznos od milion eura za snimanje drugog filma o Titu, što je dovelo u krizu dvogodišnji rad Lordana Zafranovića i brojne ekipe. U isto vreme, Vrdoljaku su usmerena dodatna sredstva Ministarstva kulture, od 125 miliona eura. Za šest episoda! Sa druge strane, serija od 10 epizoda kod Zafranovića košta 410.000 eura!
Na ovu se vest u Hrvatskoj javilo dosta protesta od strane ljudi koji s dužnim poštovanjem gledaju na epohu socijalističke Jugoslavije i Tita. Savez boraca II svetskog rata kao i Udruga „Josip Broz Tito“ izrazili su svoje oštre proteste i nevericu da režiser Antun Vrdoljak može uopšte biti osoba za snimanje objektivnog filma o Titu.
Vrlo je verovatno da će se reditelj Zafranović uskoro obratiti javnosti s molbom za novčani doprinos radi što dovršetka filma u predviđenom roku
Lordan Zafranović sada se našao u situaciji da mora što pre realizovati svoj objektivan film o Titu, svoju verziju, i žuri da završi sve potrebne radove na njemu do kraja tekuće 2007. godine. Dužina filma i broj epizoda pretrpeće skraćenja. Ostaje aktuelna namera reditelja Zafranovića da napravi barem 10 televizijskih epizoda za ex-jugoslovenske prostore, šest emisija za nesvrstane i zemlje Trećeg sveta, kao i tri epizode za Evropu i Severnu Ameriku. Do sada, završeno je oko 40% posla. Prestali zadaci sastoje se u što hitnijem intervjuisanju svetskih političara.
Pored brojnog novog materijala, do sada neobjavljivane i nepoznate izjave lica koji su živeli i radili u Titovoj blizini, obogatiće ovaj film.
Zafranović, koji skupa sa prikazom ličnosti kakva je bio Predsednik Tito, ima nameru da obuhvati i čitavu epohu: „nezamisliva je istorija 20. stoleća bez njega, svet bi bez njega bio drukčiji.“ Ovaj trenutak je odlučan da se prikaže neposredno sve što je okruživalo vreme s Titom.


Za dalje informacije o našim tekućim inicijativama na ovu temu, molimo pogledajte i:
"La memoria rimossa - l'occupazione italiana della Jugoslavia (1941 - 1943)" L´Archivio Nazionale Cinematografico della Resistenza sta preparando per i giorni fra il 16 e il 19 ottobre un´iniziativa a Torino sull´occupazione italiana della Jugoslavia dall´aprile 1941 all´otto settembre 1943.

Radi daljih informacija o svim dosadašnjim izveštajima o stvaralaštvu Lordana Zafranovića i o našim akcijama u oblasti filmske medijacije:
L'offensiva del revisionismo e del neoirredentismo http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/5368
Retrospettiva dei film di Zafranović in Croazia http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/5224
Lordan Zafranović sta completando un film su Tito http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/5197
AVVISO - con preghiera di massima diffusione http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/4576
Comunicato stampa: Retrospettiva Lordan Zafranović http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/4561

(napisao: DK)