Informazione
[ Un interessantissimo quadro delle complicazioni internazionali
relative al petrolio del Mar Caspio, con particolare riferimento alla
posizione della Russia tra mafie interne (gli oligarchi e la Yukos) e
pressioni e violenze esterne (soprattutto da parte di USA e GB). Decine
di paesi, che del petrolio ex-sovietico hanno estremo bisogno, sono
letteramente presi in trappola nella tenaglia... ]
http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/afrika/azija/2004-09-14.html
Putin's hands on the oil pumps
The Asia Times
August 26. 2004
Central Asia
By John Helmer
MOSCOW - For a decade Washington has backed the Turkish and Azerbaijan
governments to steer the export of Caspian region crude oil away from
Russia. Russia's newest riposte has been to ally the Russian and
Iranian oil industries, and open up the shortest, cheapest and most
lucrative oil route of all, southwards out of the Caspian to Iran.
The economics of the southward route are the latest blow for the Bush
administration as it tries to redraw the geography of the Caucasus on
an anti-Russian map. But for oil exporters and shippers in the Caspian,
President George W Bush's jawboning looks to be as futile as King
Canute telling the sea to roll backwards.
Early oil from Azerbaijan's newest offshore oilfields has been piped
northwestwards through the Russian pipeline system to Novorossiysk
port, on the Black Sea, along with crude from the Caspian shoreline of
Kazakhstan. But there have been frequent arguments with the Azeris over
volumes and transit fees, and these have led to frequent oil stoppages.
Azeri oil for transit across Georgia to Supsa port is a costly trickle,
by comparison.
Bosphorus chokepoint, Bosphorus bypass
In parallel, Turkey has been steadily tightening restrictions on tanker
movements out of the Black Sea, through the Bosphorus Straits. The
latest rules ban lengthy and large-capacity tankers - those which are
most cost-effective for charterers and cargo-owners - from moving
through the straits at night. The delay adds to the transport charges,
creating an expensive chokepoint that has multiplied the costs of
routing oil through the Black Sea for US allies, and Russia, alike.
As new Caspian oilfields come onstream, and the volumes of crude lifted
grow beyond the capacities of the Russian pipeline system to absorb,
the American strategy has been to press hard to redirect these exports
across land towards Turkey. The pipeline route chosen is known by its
origin and destination as Baku-Ceyhan (Azerbaijan-Turkey). It passes
through Tbilisi in Georgia and is known as the BTC project.
The Russian government has always understood that the this pipeline was
part of the broader US strategy to cut all links with Moscow of the
former Soviet states in the Caucasus, building a new economic
infrastructure that would dissuade the Caucasus group from ever
renewing these ties. These efforts have proved to be a costly boomerang.
To thwart those in Turkey who view the Bosphorus logjam as leverage to
promote the Ceyhan route, Russia's state-controlled pipeline agency
Transneft has found a Turkish partner, and proposes building a
relatively low-cost, short-distance pipeline to avoid the straits - and
avoid the Ceyhan pipeline too.
Transneft disclosed its Bosphorus bypass plan in February, when chief
executive officer Semyon Vainshtok said his company was interested in
constructing a 193 kilometer pipeline on the territory of Turkey, with
the local contractor Anadolu. Last year, he noted, Russian companies
shipped 62 million tonnes of oil through the straits, or over 30% of
all Russian export volumes. Compared with the Ceyhan's project cost of
more than $5 billion, the bypass reportedly would cost about $900
million, with capacity estimated in the range of 50-60 million tonnes
per year.
This is roughly equal to Russian shipments by tanker through the
straits. Vainshtok also claimed that two major Russian oil producers,
Tatneft and Tyumen Oil Company - now controlled by British Petroleum -
have offered their guarantees to supply the bypass with crude. This was
another slap at the Ceyhan project, whose backers admit it lacks
guarantees of enough crude to justify its cost. According to the latest
news reported in Moscow, the potential starting point for the Bosphorus
bypass route could be Kiyikei on the Black Sea, and the end-point at an
offloading terminal at Ibrikhaba on the Aegean Sea.
In June, while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) heads of state
were holding their annual meeting on the shores of the Bosphorus at
Istanbul, the Russian government despatched a warning that the security
measures Turkey had implemented in the straits violated 68-year-old
treaty provisions that still bind both the NATO states and the
Russians. In an unusual statement, the federal Ministry of Transport in
Moscow issued a warning to the Turkish government, accusing its ban on
tanker traffic through the Bosphorus of being a violation of the
Montreux Treaty.
According to the ministry, "unilateral actions undertaken by Turkey
contradict Article 2 of the treaty of Montreux of 1936". The statement,
drafted by the foreign relations department at the Transport Ministry,
referred to the ban, in effect from June 27 to 29, on vessels carrying
hazardous cargoes, notably oil and gas. The Montreux Treaty was the
most recent in a series of last-century international pacts declaring
the straits to be international waters, and prohibiting Turkey from
taking unilateral action to interfere with innocent passage of vessels.
Ukrainian reversal, Croatian opening
The American effort at the north end of the Black Sea, on the Ukrainian
shore, has had even less success.
A Ukrainian pipeline, designed to attract Caspian oil into Odessa port,
on the Black Sea, and then pump it northwards to Brody, and thence into
Poland and other central European destinations, has lain empty for
almost a year. Despite US government prodding, even the major US oil
companies in the Caspian cannot quite absorb the commercial
disadvantages of the route. Nor can US allies in the Polish government
overrule their colleagues with demands to buy this anti-Russian, but
higher-priced oil.
The Russian government, together with Russian oil exporters, has
countered with a proposal for the Ukrainian government to reverse the
oil flow in the pipeline, and pipe Russian crude southwards to Odessa,
for tankering out of the Black Sea. At first, the Ukrainians rejected
the offer. But as port shipments of oil from Odessa dwindled, and the
economics of the Brody direction began to talk louder than politics, a
deal was done to accept the Russian oil, and reverse the pipeline
direction.
The conflict in Kiev over the strategic pros and cons of these
alternative oil routes has damaged another US ally in the region. Late
last year, the Ukrainian parliament voted to block the Adria pipeline
reversal project. This is aimed at delivering Russian crude to the
deep-water port of Omishalj in Croatia, on the Adriatic Sea. The
Ukrainian veto was retaliation by the anti-Russian oil lobby in Kiev
for the failure of its Odessa-Brody project.
The irony of this outcome is that the Omishalj project was first
proposed in 2002, and agreed upon by Russia, Belarus, Ukraine,
Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia as a way of despatching Russian crude in
large tankers to Bush constituents who own the refineries on the Texas
coast of the United States.
Initial capacity, according to the Omishalj plan, was 5 million tonnes
per year, rising eventually to 15 million tonnes. The Ukrainian
deputies justified their no-vote because, they said, it would be the
final blow to the proposed Odessa-Brody pipeline, should the Druzhba
line be filled up west of Ukraine. "This is true," says Adam Landes, an
oil analyst in Moscow. "But Odessa-Brody is doomed regardless. It
offers no competitive advantage to potential Caspian shippers, or
buyers of crude, and this is why it has been idle for two years now,
since it was essentially completed. The longer Ukraine takes to face up
to these rather obvious facts, the longer that this ill-fated pipeline
will lie dormant." The Croatians, too, have now bowed to the realities
of the oil marketplace, and Omishalj will soon start regular dispatches
of Russian oil cargoes.
Embargo for Latvia
Another US ally to be caught in the cross-fire has been Latvia. As the
anti-Russian pressure has mounted against Russian oil shipments in the
south, Moscow accelerated the completion of a new oil outlet on the
Gulf of Finland and Baltic Sea. This is Primorsk, which opened two
years ago, and is being expanded by Transneft to become Russia's
largest oil port.
Controlled by Transneft, Primorsk receives its crude from the Baltic
Pipeline System - a network of pipelines linking Russia's new Arctic
oilwells and expanding northwest Siberian fields to the sea lanes to
Western Europe's markets. Once the Primorsk outlet was established, the
Russian government ordered Transneft to turn off the supply of oil to
Ventspils in Latvia. At one time the Soviet Union's northern gateway
for oil exports, in 1990 Ventspils almost matched Novorossiysk in
capacity and throughput. But no longer. The Latvians have appealed to
Washington for help, but Moscow will not listen. The opening of
Primorsk was the deathknell for Ventspils.
Checkmate for the Yukos-Houston alliance
The Americans responded in 2003 by pressing the Russian government to
end Transneft's monopoly over pipelines, and allow the Russian oil
majors to build a pipeline of their own to Murmansk. That, Washington
energy officials claimed, would open a new, commercially effective
route for crude deliveries to US East Coast refineries. Transneft has
responded by accelerating the expansion of the Baltic Pipeline System,
while the Kremlin has started prosecutions of Yukos, the oil company
which was closest to Washington. The speed of this pipeline expansion
effort will overtake the growth of Russian export volumes by 2005,
Transneft officials have said. The Murmansk project will wither, they
believe, for lack of oil to ship.
Beginning in May 2002, Russian and US energy officials appeared to
endorse public announcements from the two leading Russian producers and
exporters, Yukos and LUKoil, that they were prepared to start strategic
shipment of oil to the US. Russian tanker operators were skeptical from
the start. Yukos led with a shipment of about 250,000 tonnes of oil
which was despatched to Houston in June of 2002 on three 80,000-tonne
tankers, which transferred the cargo to a VLCC (Very large crude
carrier) in the Mediterranean.
LUKoil followed with an announcement it was preparing a shipment at
Malta. Dmitri Skarga, chief executive of Sovcomflot, Russia's leading
tanker company, told Asia Times Online at the time that he thought the
Yukos project "may be effective, but that depends on the level of
prices and the tariff rates". He said that adjusting deliveries to
refinery needs was a time-consuming and costly business. Yukos chief
executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky then announced that the trade would not
be profitable unless oil were above $25 per barrel.
Mikhail Perfilov, a leading Moscow analyst, noted skeptically, "LUKoil
has been speaking of plans to start supplies to the US for years now,
and I won't be surprised if they still continue this talk a few years
from now."
By August, Russian oil industry sources were conceding that two years
of publicity and political talks by the two governments had failed to
produce a viable Russian supply line for crude deliveries to the US.
Sergei Grigoriev, vice president of Transneft and the company
spokesman, told Asia Times Online that the Murmansk project - also
known by the Russians as the North Project - is still under study, and
no decisions have been made. "The pipeline direction starts from Surgut
and goes towards to the Barents Sea, but we don't know where it will
finish. We have two variants - a port in the Indigo area, in the Nenets
region, or at an undeveloped site called Svyatoy Nos [Saint Nose], also
in the Nenets region." In the ongoing feasibility studies, Grigoriev
said the throughput target is "approximately 50-60 million tonnes".
But is this route a realistic option for Russia to supply the US? "I
wouldn't talk about US shipments now," Grigroiev replies, "because
currently there is no direct shipment of oil from Russia to the US. The
numbers are insignificantly small - something less than 300,000 tonnes
a year in 2002, and I don't know the later numbers. Maybe the US buys
some Russian oil in Rotterdam. The only direct shipment project I know
was the Yukos experiment, but it failed."
Two years ago, LUKoil, Russia's largest oil producer and second
exporter after Yukos, waxed enthusiastic on the Murmansk project, but
no longer. Spokesman Mikhail Mikhailov says now "it's too early to
speak about the project. While it's at the feasibility study stage we
aren't ready to announce how we will use it because a lot of necessary
information is unknown." He claimed that LUKoil had earlier announced
that it would contribute 20 million tonnes to the line, "but now the
situation has changed, and the terms and extraction volumes are
different".
Does LUKoil have a view of the projected capacity of Russia to supply
the US with crude oil? "We are speaking about non-existent facts. Maybe
some oil was shipped through Rotterdam, but its volume was very small."
The commercial viability of Russian oil shipments to the US, LUKoil now
concedes, depends not on the US, but on the Russian government. "[This]
depends on the terms of the project, terms which Transneft will
create." TNK-BP - the new British-controlled form of Tyumen Oil - is
also no longer the talkative US booster it once was. A spokesman,
claiming anonymity, would say only that the Murmansk project was
"currently at such a preliminary stage we are not ready to discuss its
details or its opportunities".
The data on Russian crude exports to the US confirm that the Yukos
experiment has failed. Petroleum Argus reports that in the first half
of this year, direct Russian exports to the US were "close to zero".
Indirect shipments, through Rotterdam and other markets, were
"approximately 250 to 270,000 tonnes per month". A Russian Energy
Ministry official told Asia Times Online he lacked a precise number for
total Russian exports to the US, but he acknowledged that there is no
direct shipment, and the aggregate is "too small to report".
Yukos sources now say they believe Yukos, now close to insolvency after
being held liable for billions of dollars in unpaid taxes from 2000,
and former chief executive officer Mikhail Khodorkovsky - now on trial
in Moscow on multiple charges relating to his share dealings - never
intended that Russia should assist the US as a strategic oil supply
partner. Rather, the sources believe that Khorokovsky and his
shareholding allies in the company believed the oil shipments to
Houston could generate favorable publicity as they sought to sell their
shares on the New York Stock Exchange, or find a major US oil producer
to buy up to 40% of the stock. "It was a case of what the US could do
for the Yukos shareholders," one source said, "not what Russian oil
could for the US." The arrest of Khodorkovsky in October 2003 exposed
how far apart these two ambitious plans were.
Putin's hand on the oil pump - the eastern option
Until Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, Russian oil policy was
dictated by a corrupt alliance of Russian oil producers and the US
government. Putin's campaign against Yukos has put a stop to that. Even
during the Boris Yeltsin period, however, Russian public policy was not
to attack the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline on strategic grounds. Rather,
Russian tactics were to play for time, and wait for the economics of
oil transportation to tell against the US plan. So long as crude oil
prices remained low, time encouraged delay in starting Baku-Ceyhan. The
US war against Iraq threatened the pipeline plan too, by raising the
prospect of a gusher of Iraqi crude on the market, cutting prices.
But now that Bush is proving that he cannot lift Iraqi oil, and oil has
begun to substitute for the US dollar in international financial
speculation, further counters to Baku-Ceyhan are being created by
Moscow to retain the upper hand.
One new export route for Russian oil goes southwards by tanker through
the Caspian to Iran. Russian oil producers and shippers say they are
expecting the volume of crude oil and petroleum products shipped from
the Russian Caspian port of Astrakhan to Iran to more than double this
year. A spokesman for Volgotanker, the leading tanker operator in the
Caspian, said it is expecting growth of its oil volume to jump 150%
over the 2003 level of 800,000 tonnes.
Russian industry sources claim the expansion of the Iranian port of
Neka, and the construction of a 120,000-barrels/day pipeline from Neka
to Rey, is one of the new options for oil movement southwards. The
Russian shipments of Caspian oil are paid for by swap arrangements with
Iranian oil shipped out of Persian Gulf ports. Enzeli, the only Iranian
Caspian port able to receive deep-draught vessels, is also being
considered for receiving oil aboard railcars shipped by ferry from
Astrakhan. LUKoil's new oil terminal at Ilyinka, on the Astrakhan
shore, will reach transshipment capacity of 3 million tonnes annual
capacity (60,000 barrels per day) next year; this year capacity is 1
million tonnes (20,000 bd).
Russian use of its oil exports in strategic policy has been frustrating
to China, an erstwhile ally in the Far East. So far, despite years of
negotiations, the government in Beijing has failed in its bid to get
access to the pipeline flow of Russian oil exports. A non-binding
agreement signed last year between the Chinese and Russian governments
envisages that China will receive 700 million tonnes of Russian crude
through the pipeline over 25 years at a current cost of about $150
billion. The price formula Russia and China would use for the oil has
not been disclosed, and is apparently not settled. The strategic
objective for Beijing is obvious: it wants to reduce its growing
dependence on oil shipped from the Middle East, Africa and Southeast
Asia, and lower both oil and delivery premiums Beijing is currently
obliged to pay.
The target for this Chinese strategy has been the construction of a
pipeline from the southeastern Russian refinery town of Angarsk to the
northwestern Chinese terminal center of Daqing. The Chinese section of
the pipeline is already under way. The Russian section is stalled on
the drawing-board. An increase in rail deliveries across the border
makes up only a fraction of the planned pipeline deliveries.
Statements to Asia Times Online by Transneft executives have backed the
Russian and Chinese government decision of last year to build the
Angarsk-Daqing line at a cost of less than $3 billion, in preference to
the $7 billion line to Nakhodka. But Putin's campaign since last July
against shareholders of Yukos has complicated the China project; that
is because Yukos had been the intended oil supplier to China.
Japanese offers to finance the heavy cost of the Nakhodka line have
been treated skeptically by the Kremlin, which wants to avoid
single-market oil commitments - to repay Japanese loans, as much as to
commit to Chinese supply terms. A Nakhodka oil shipping hub is,
however, viewed in Moscow as potentially more open to spot-market
pricing of oil than Daqing would be.
Transneft sources, along with oil industry executives in Moscow, agree
on one thing about the eastern option for shipping Russian oil. The
principal market for this crude will be Asia, and not the US West
Coast. But think for a moment what might have happened if the Yukos
owners had managed to sell control of their company last July to
Chevron-Texaco or Mobil, as Khodorkovsky intended - Russia as an
independent oil exporter would have been on its way to a level of
independence that is less than Aramco, the Saudi oil company. It is
unsurprising that the US media have failed to report the Yukos affair
in this light, let alone to have noticed that the US, the world's
largest oil consumer, has tried, but so far failed, to compel Russia,
the world's second or first-largest oil exporter, to ship and market
oil in the way Washington, or Houston, wants.
relative al petrolio del Mar Caspio, con particolare riferimento alla
posizione della Russia tra mafie interne (gli oligarchi e la Yukos) e
pressioni e violenze esterne (soprattutto da parte di USA e GB). Decine
di paesi, che del petrolio ex-sovietico hanno estremo bisogno, sono
letteramente presi in trappola nella tenaglia... ]
http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/afrika/azija/2004-09-14.html
Putin's hands on the oil pumps
The Asia Times
August 26. 2004
Central Asia
By John Helmer
MOSCOW - For a decade Washington has backed the Turkish and Azerbaijan
governments to steer the export of Caspian region crude oil away from
Russia. Russia's newest riposte has been to ally the Russian and
Iranian oil industries, and open up the shortest, cheapest and most
lucrative oil route of all, southwards out of the Caspian to Iran.
The economics of the southward route are the latest blow for the Bush
administration as it tries to redraw the geography of the Caucasus on
an anti-Russian map. But for oil exporters and shippers in the Caspian,
President George W Bush's jawboning looks to be as futile as King
Canute telling the sea to roll backwards.
Early oil from Azerbaijan's newest offshore oilfields has been piped
northwestwards through the Russian pipeline system to Novorossiysk
port, on the Black Sea, along with crude from the Caspian shoreline of
Kazakhstan. But there have been frequent arguments with the Azeris over
volumes and transit fees, and these have led to frequent oil stoppages.
Azeri oil for transit across Georgia to Supsa port is a costly trickle,
by comparison.
Bosphorus chokepoint, Bosphorus bypass
In parallel, Turkey has been steadily tightening restrictions on tanker
movements out of the Black Sea, through the Bosphorus Straits. The
latest rules ban lengthy and large-capacity tankers - those which are
most cost-effective for charterers and cargo-owners - from moving
through the straits at night. The delay adds to the transport charges,
creating an expensive chokepoint that has multiplied the costs of
routing oil through the Black Sea for US allies, and Russia, alike.
As new Caspian oilfields come onstream, and the volumes of crude lifted
grow beyond the capacities of the Russian pipeline system to absorb,
the American strategy has been to press hard to redirect these exports
across land towards Turkey. The pipeline route chosen is known by its
origin and destination as Baku-Ceyhan (Azerbaijan-Turkey). It passes
through Tbilisi in Georgia and is known as the BTC project.
The Russian government has always understood that the this pipeline was
part of the broader US strategy to cut all links with Moscow of the
former Soviet states in the Caucasus, building a new economic
infrastructure that would dissuade the Caucasus group from ever
renewing these ties. These efforts have proved to be a costly boomerang.
To thwart those in Turkey who view the Bosphorus logjam as leverage to
promote the Ceyhan route, Russia's state-controlled pipeline agency
Transneft has found a Turkish partner, and proposes building a
relatively low-cost, short-distance pipeline to avoid the straits - and
avoid the Ceyhan pipeline too.
Transneft disclosed its Bosphorus bypass plan in February, when chief
executive officer Semyon Vainshtok said his company was interested in
constructing a 193 kilometer pipeline on the territory of Turkey, with
the local contractor Anadolu. Last year, he noted, Russian companies
shipped 62 million tonnes of oil through the straits, or over 30% of
all Russian export volumes. Compared with the Ceyhan's project cost of
more than $5 billion, the bypass reportedly would cost about $900
million, with capacity estimated in the range of 50-60 million tonnes
per year.
This is roughly equal to Russian shipments by tanker through the
straits. Vainshtok also claimed that two major Russian oil producers,
Tatneft and Tyumen Oil Company - now controlled by British Petroleum -
have offered their guarantees to supply the bypass with crude. This was
another slap at the Ceyhan project, whose backers admit it lacks
guarantees of enough crude to justify its cost. According to the latest
news reported in Moscow, the potential starting point for the Bosphorus
bypass route could be Kiyikei on the Black Sea, and the end-point at an
offloading terminal at Ibrikhaba on the Aegean Sea.
In June, while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) heads of state
were holding their annual meeting on the shores of the Bosphorus at
Istanbul, the Russian government despatched a warning that the security
measures Turkey had implemented in the straits violated 68-year-old
treaty provisions that still bind both the NATO states and the
Russians. In an unusual statement, the federal Ministry of Transport in
Moscow issued a warning to the Turkish government, accusing its ban on
tanker traffic through the Bosphorus of being a violation of the
Montreux Treaty.
According to the ministry, "unilateral actions undertaken by Turkey
contradict Article 2 of the treaty of Montreux of 1936". The statement,
drafted by the foreign relations department at the Transport Ministry,
referred to the ban, in effect from June 27 to 29, on vessels carrying
hazardous cargoes, notably oil and gas. The Montreux Treaty was the
most recent in a series of last-century international pacts declaring
the straits to be international waters, and prohibiting Turkey from
taking unilateral action to interfere with innocent passage of vessels.
Ukrainian reversal, Croatian opening
The American effort at the north end of the Black Sea, on the Ukrainian
shore, has had even less success.
A Ukrainian pipeline, designed to attract Caspian oil into Odessa port,
on the Black Sea, and then pump it northwards to Brody, and thence into
Poland and other central European destinations, has lain empty for
almost a year. Despite US government prodding, even the major US oil
companies in the Caspian cannot quite absorb the commercial
disadvantages of the route. Nor can US allies in the Polish government
overrule their colleagues with demands to buy this anti-Russian, but
higher-priced oil.
The Russian government, together with Russian oil exporters, has
countered with a proposal for the Ukrainian government to reverse the
oil flow in the pipeline, and pipe Russian crude southwards to Odessa,
for tankering out of the Black Sea. At first, the Ukrainians rejected
the offer. But as port shipments of oil from Odessa dwindled, and the
economics of the Brody direction began to talk louder than politics, a
deal was done to accept the Russian oil, and reverse the pipeline
direction.
The conflict in Kiev over the strategic pros and cons of these
alternative oil routes has damaged another US ally in the region. Late
last year, the Ukrainian parliament voted to block the Adria pipeline
reversal project. This is aimed at delivering Russian crude to the
deep-water port of Omishalj in Croatia, on the Adriatic Sea. The
Ukrainian veto was retaliation by the anti-Russian oil lobby in Kiev
for the failure of its Odessa-Brody project.
The irony of this outcome is that the Omishalj project was first
proposed in 2002, and agreed upon by Russia, Belarus, Ukraine,
Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia as a way of despatching Russian crude in
large tankers to Bush constituents who own the refineries on the Texas
coast of the United States.
Initial capacity, according to the Omishalj plan, was 5 million tonnes
per year, rising eventually to 15 million tonnes. The Ukrainian
deputies justified their no-vote because, they said, it would be the
final blow to the proposed Odessa-Brody pipeline, should the Druzhba
line be filled up west of Ukraine. "This is true," says Adam Landes, an
oil analyst in Moscow. "But Odessa-Brody is doomed regardless. It
offers no competitive advantage to potential Caspian shippers, or
buyers of crude, and this is why it has been idle for two years now,
since it was essentially completed. The longer Ukraine takes to face up
to these rather obvious facts, the longer that this ill-fated pipeline
will lie dormant." The Croatians, too, have now bowed to the realities
of the oil marketplace, and Omishalj will soon start regular dispatches
of Russian oil cargoes.
Embargo for Latvia
Another US ally to be caught in the cross-fire has been Latvia. As the
anti-Russian pressure has mounted against Russian oil shipments in the
south, Moscow accelerated the completion of a new oil outlet on the
Gulf of Finland and Baltic Sea. This is Primorsk, which opened two
years ago, and is being expanded by Transneft to become Russia's
largest oil port.
Controlled by Transneft, Primorsk receives its crude from the Baltic
Pipeline System - a network of pipelines linking Russia's new Arctic
oilwells and expanding northwest Siberian fields to the sea lanes to
Western Europe's markets. Once the Primorsk outlet was established, the
Russian government ordered Transneft to turn off the supply of oil to
Ventspils in Latvia. At one time the Soviet Union's northern gateway
for oil exports, in 1990 Ventspils almost matched Novorossiysk in
capacity and throughput. But no longer. The Latvians have appealed to
Washington for help, but Moscow will not listen. The opening of
Primorsk was the deathknell for Ventspils.
Checkmate for the Yukos-Houston alliance
The Americans responded in 2003 by pressing the Russian government to
end Transneft's monopoly over pipelines, and allow the Russian oil
majors to build a pipeline of their own to Murmansk. That, Washington
energy officials claimed, would open a new, commercially effective
route for crude deliveries to US East Coast refineries. Transneft has
responded by accelerating the expansion of the Baltic Pipeline System,
while the Kremlin has started prosecutions of Yukos, the oil company
which was closest to Washington. The speed of this pipeline expansion
effort will overtake the growth of Russian export volumes by 2005,
Transneft officials have said. The Murmansk project will wither, they
believe, for lack of oil to ship.
Beginning in May 2002, Russian and US energy officials appeared to
endorse public announcements from the two leading Russian producers and
exporters, Yukos and LUKoil, that they were prepared to start strategic
shipment of oil to the US. Russian tanker operators were skeptical from
the start. Yukos led with a shipment of about 250,000 tonnes of oil
which was despatched to Houston in June of 2002 on three 80,000-tonne
tankers, which transferred the cargo to a VLCC (Very large crude
carrier) in the Mediterranean.
LUKoil followed with an announcement it was preparing a shipment at
Malta. Dmitri Skarga, chief executive of Sovcomflot, Russia's leading
tanker company, told Asia Times Online at the time that he thought the
Yukos project "may be effective, but that depends on the level of
prices and the tariff rates". He said that adjusting deliveries to
refinery needs was a time-consuming and costly business. Yukos chief
executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky then announced that the trade would not
be profitable unless oil were above $25 per barrel.
Mikhail Perfilov, a leading Moscow analyst, noted skeptically, "LUKoil
has been speaking of plans to start supplies to the US for years now,
and I won't be surprised if they still continue this talk a few years
from now."
By August, Russian oil industry sources were conceding that two years
of publicity and political talks by the two governments had failed to
produce a viable Russian supply line for crude deliveries to the US.
Sergei Grigoriev, vice president of Transneft and the company
spokesman, told Asia Times Online that the Murmansk project - also
known by the Russians as the North Project - is still under study, and
no decisions have been made. "The pipeline direction starts from Surgut
and goes towards to the Barents Sea, but we don't know where it will
finish. We have two variants - a port in the Indigo area, in the Nenets
region, or at an undeveloped site called Svyatoy Nos [Saint Nose], also
in the Nenets region." In the ongoing feasibility studies, Grigoriev
said the throughput target is "approximately 50-60 million tonnes".
But is this route a realistic option for Russia to supply the US? "I
wouldn't talk about US shipments now," Grigroiev replies, "because
currently there is no direct shipment of oil from Russia to the US. The
numbers are insignificantly small - something less than 300,000 tonnes
a year in 2002, and I don't know the later numbers. Maybe the US buys
some Russian oil in Rotterdam. The only direct shipment project I know
was the Yukos experiment, but it failed."
Two years ago, LUKoil, Russia's largest oil producer and second
exporter after Yukos, waxed enthusiastic on the Murmansk project, but
no longer. Spokesman Mikhail Mikhailov says now "it's too early to
speak about the project. While it's at the feasibility study stage we
aren't ready to announce how we will use it because a lot of necessary
information is unknown." He claimed that LUKoil had earlier announced
that it would contribute 20 million tonnes to the line, "but now the
situation has changed, and the terms and extraction volumes are
different".
Does LUKoil have a view of the projected capacity of Russia to supply
the US with crude oil? "We are speaking about non-existent facts. Maybe
some oil was shipped through Rotterdam, but its volume was very small."
The commercial viability of Russian oil shipments to the US, LUKoil now
concedes, depends not on the US, but on the Russian government. "[This]
depends on the terms of the project, terms which Transneft will
create." TNK-BP - the new British-controlled form of Tyumen Oil - is
also no longer the talkative US booster it once was. A spokesman,
claiming anonymity, would say only that the Murmansk project was
"currently at such a preliminary stage we are not ready to discuss its
details or its opportunities".
The data on Russian crude exports to the US confirm that the Yukos
experiment has failed. Petroleum Argus reports that in the first half
of this year, direct Russian exports to the US were "close to zero".
Indirect shipments, through Rotterdam and other markets, were
"approximately 250 to 270,000 tonnes per month". A Russian Energy
Ministry official told Asia Times Online he lacked a precise number for
total Russian exports to the US, but he acknowledged that there is no
direct shipment, and the aggregate is "too small to report".
Yukos sources now say they believe Yukos, now close to insolvency after
being held liable for billions of dollars in unpaid taxes from 2000,
and former chief executive officer Mikhail Khodorkovsky - now on trial
in Moscow on multiple charges relating to his share dealings - never
intended that Russia should assist the US as a strategic oil supply
partner. Rather, the sources believe that Khorokovsky and his
shareholding allies in the company believed the oil shipments to
Houston could generate favorable publicity as they sought to sell their
shares on the New York Stock Exchange, or find a major US oil producer
to buy up to 40% of the stock. "It was a case of what the US could do
for the Yukos shareholders," one source said, "not what Russian oil
could for the US." The arrest of Khodorkovsky in October 2003 exposed
how far apart these two ambitious plans were.
Putin's hand on the oil pump - the eastern option
Until Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, Russian oil policy was
dictated by a corrupt alliance of Russian oil producers and the US
government. Putin's campaign against Yukos has put a stop to that. Even
during the Boris Yeltsin period, however, Russian public policy was not
to attack the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline on strategic grounds. Rather,
Russian tactics were to play for time, and wait for the economics of
oil transportation to tell against the US plan. So long as crude oil
prices remained low, time encouraged delay in starting Baku-Ceyhan. The
US war against Iraq threatened the pipeline plan too, by raising the
prospect of a gusher of Iraqi crude on the market, cutting prices.
But now that Bush is proving that he cannot lift Iraqi oil, and oil has
begun to substitute for the US dollar in international financial
speculation, further counters to Baku-Ceyhan are being created by
Moscow to retain the upper hand.
One new export route for Russian oil goes southwards by tanker through
the Caspian to Iran. Russian oil producers and shippers say they are
expecting the volume of crude oil and petroleum products shipped from
the Russian Caspian port of Astrakhan to Iran to more than double this
year. A spokesman for Volgotanker, the leading tanker operator in the
Caspian, said it is expecting growth of its oil volume to jump 150%
over the 2003 level of 800,000 tonnes.
Russian industry sources claim the expansion of the Iranian port of
Neka, and the construction of a 120,000-barrels/day pipeline from Neka
to Rey, is one of the new options for oil movement southwards. The
Russian shipments of Caspian oil are paid for by swap arrangements with
Iranian oil shipped out of Persian Gulf ports. Enzeli, the only Iranian
Caspian port able to receive deep-draught vessels, is also being
considered for receiving oil aboard railcars shipped by ferry from
Astrakhan. LUKoil's new oil terminal at Ilyinka, on the Astrakhan
shore, will reach transshipment capacity of 3 million tonnes annual
capacity (60,000 barrels per day) next year; this year capacity is 1
million tonnes (20,000 bd).
Russian use of its oil exports in strategic policy has been frustrating
to China, an erstwhile ally in the Far East. So far, despite years of
negotiations, the government in Beijing has failed in its bid to get
access to the pipeline flow of Russian oil exports. A non-binding
agreement signed last year between the Chinese and Russian governments
envisages that China will receive 700 million tonnes of Russian crude
through the pipeline over 25 years at a current cost of about $150
billion. The price formula Russia and China would use for the oil has
not been disclosed, and is apparently not settled. The strategic
objective for Beijing is obvious: it wants to reduce its growing
dependence on oil shipped from the Middle East, Africa and Southeast
Asia, and lower both oil and delivery premiums Beijing is currently
obliged to pay.
The target for this Chinese strategy has been the construction of a
pipeline from the southeastern Russian refinery town of Angarsk to the
northwestern Chinese terminal center of Daqing. The Chinese section of
the pipeline is already under way. The Russian section is stalled on
the drawing-board. An increase in rail deliveries across the border
makes up only a fraction of the planned pipeline deliveries.
Statements to Asia Times Online by Transneft executives have backed the
Russian and Chinese government decision of last year to build the
Angarsk-Daqing line at a cost of less than $3 billion, in preference to
the $7 billion line to Nakhodka. But Putin's campaign since last July
against shareholders of Yukos has complicated the China project; that
is because Yukos had been the intended oil supplier to China.
Japanese offers to finance the heavy cost of the Nakhodka line have
been treated skeptically by the Kremlin, which wants to avoid
single-market oil commitments - to repay Japanese loans, as much as to
commit to Chinese supply terms. A Nakhodka oil shipping hub is,
however, viewed in Moscow as potentially more open to spot-market
pricing of oil than Daqing would be.
Transneft sources, along with oil industry executives in Moscow, agree
on one thing about the eastern option for shipping Russian oil. The
principal market for this crude will be Asia, and not the US West
Coast. But think for a moment what might have happened if the Yukos
owners had managed to sell control of their company last July to
Chevron-Texaco or Mobil, as Khodorkovsky intended - Russia as an
independent oil exporter would have been on its way to a level of
independence that is less than Aramco, the Saudi oil company. It is
unsurprising that the US media have failed to report the Yukos affair
in this light, let alone to have noticed that the US, the world's
largest oil consumer, has tried, but so far failed, to compel Russia,
the world's second or first-largest oil exporter, to ship and market
oil in the way Washington, or Houston, wants.
(castillano)
Quelli che vogliono squartare la Russia (6)
Segnalato da Mauro Gemma: alcune domande di James Petras << ai
"progressisti" che ripetono come pappagali la linea imperialista
statunitense sulla Cecenia >> ...
THIS TEXT IN ENGLISH:
http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/a-list/2004w37/msg00031.htm
---
La política del terrorismo en Osetia del Norte:
Autodeterminación y política imperial
James Petras
Rebelión
Traducido para Rebelión por Marina Trillo
La matanza monstruosa deliberada de más de 330 padres y niños en el
gimnasio escolar de Beslan por terroristas chechenios no es como dice
la BBC una "tragedia", sino un depravado acto criminal.
Para entender la naturaleza del conflicto entre el estado Ruso y los
terroristas chechenios, es importante fijarse en las fuerzas
sociopolíticas y las cuestiones en disputa. Para la mayoría de los
medios de comunicación estadounidenses y europeos el problema es la
"autodeterminación" de los chechenios. ¿Pero a quién y a qué se refiere
lo de "auto"? Con la desintegración de la antigua Unión Soviética,
tanto en Rusia como en los estados del Báltico, Balcanes y Cáucaso,
bandas criminales se aliaron con miembros corruptos del antiguo aparato
Soviético saquearon y se apoderaron de los recursos públicos
controlando las economías y el aparato estatal. Los gánsteres se
hicieron millonarios y los millonarios contrataron asesinos para
eliminar a sus rivales, competidores y a cualquier autoridad reguladora
que cuestionara sus prácticas. Según Paul Klebnikov -el recientemente
asesinado editor de la edición rusa de Forbes Magazine- entre las
depravadas bandas que operan en Moscú una de las más brutales era la
mafia chechenia. Aliada con millonarios rusos y a través de ellos con
el sistema de seguridad ruso acumularon inmensas fortunas que lavaron
en bancos Occidentales y por medio de sus extensas redes con sus
operativos en Chechenia. Cualquier chechenio que protestara o
cuestionara a la mafia chechenia era rápidamente eliminado. Para la
mafia chechenia que opera en Rusia, Chechenia era la "casa matriz", el
santuario en el cual podrían encontrar siempre una zona segura. La
mafia chechenia contribuyó decisivamente a financiar el armamento y
proporcionar cuadros militares y líderes para el "movimiento de
independencia chechenio". Lo que estaba en juego era la creación de un
feudo de la mafia controlado por gánsteres, señores de la guerra y
fundamentalistas islámicos.
Al hablar de la Primera Guerra chechenia (1994-96), Paul Klebnikov
escribió:
"La Guerra chechenia fue el escenario de una guerra gansteril expresada
en una mayor magnitud. Grupos criminales chechenios organizados en
Moscú y otras ciudades rusas mantenían filiales en su patria ancestral.
Chechenia era un punto de tránsito clave en el comercio de narcóticos
ruso y los gánsteres con base en Moscú reenviaban a la patria gran
parte de sus ganancias. Los mismos funcionarios y guardas de seguridad
rusos que patrocinaban a los grupos chechenios del crimen organizado en
Moscú patrocinaban también al gobierno chechenio permitiendo(le)
apropiarse de millones de toneladas del petróleo ruso a poco o ningún
coste" (El Padrino del Kremlin, Harcourt 2000, página 40).
Klebnikov proseguía señalando que los señores de la guerra y los
gánsteres chechenios recibían sus armas de los comandantes corruptos
del ejército y las fuerzas de seguridad rusas (página 41). A la
pregunta de quiénes son las fuerzas políticas de la autodeterminación
en el caso de Chechenia, la respuesta es: Los gánsteres, los señores de
la guerra, y los terroristas extremistas, como Shamil Basayen, Salman
Raduyev y fundamentalistas como Movladi Udugov. Entre 1995-97 el
notorio oligarca ruso, Boris Berezovsky, mantuvo una estrecha relación
con estos señores de la guerra chechenios (Klebnikov, página 261) Hoy
ambos comparten una común y absoluta hostilidad hacia el Presidente
Putin y su tentativa de controlar el crimen y el pillaje.
Los señores de la guerra chechenios procuraron ganar una apariencia de
"legitimidad" para su feudo al provocar un conflicto con Rusia y buscar
el apoyo estadounidense y europeo. Desde finales de los años 1980, pero
en particular después de 1991, la CIA dio la más alta prioridad a
instigar la ruptura de la Unión Soviética financiando y armando
movimientos separatistas locales. La primera oleada de rupturas ocurrió
en Kazajstán, Uzbekistán y Georgia. A Washington y a Londres no les
preocupaba nada si los nuevos líderes eran fundamentalistas islámicos,
autócratas ex-estalinistas, o gánsteres de la Mafia - la cuestión
importante era destruir a la URSS, y minar la influencia rusa en todas
partes del Cáucaso y Sur de Asia. Tras la "independencia" de estas
antiguas repúblicas soviéticas, EEUU se dedicó de modo especial a crear
regímenes clientes, firmando contratos petroleros y construyendo bases
militares. Lo de "autodeterminación" era un eslogan de transición hacia
la rápida incorporación a la nueva zona hegemónica estadounidense.
Rusia bajo el gobernante cliente estadounidense Yeltsin accedió a todas
estas adquisiciones estadounidenses "aconsejada" por los gánsteres,
mafiosos multimillonarios y "oligarcas" más corruptos de la historia
reciente.
El imperio estadounidense, habiendo tenido éxito con la primera oleada
de adquisición de clientes, prosiguió para instigar una segunda oleada
que incluyera a otros territorios autónomos Rusos, aún más cerca de los
centros estratégicos del estado Ruso. Chechenia fue un objetivo
seleccionado por motivos históricos. Durante la revuelta islámica
patrocinada por EEUU y la invasión contra la república reformista
secular Afgana en 1989, Washington formó equipo con Arabia Saudita,
Pakistán y otros estados Musulmanes (incluido Irán) para reclutar,
financiar y armar a decenas de miles de fundamentalistas islámicos de
todas partes de Oriente Medio, Norte de África, sur del Cáucaso y
sureste Asiático. Numerosos "voluntarios" de Chechenia lucharon en
Afganistán contra el gobierno Afgano y sus partidarios. EEUU logró una
victoria pírrica en Afganistán: debilitó gravemente al declinante
estado Soviético, pero creó una red fundamentalista de decenas de miles
bien armados y entrenados. Mientras un sector de las fuerzas islámicas
entró en oposición a EEUU en Arabia Saudita y otras partes otro grupo
se prestó a la estrategia imperial estadounidense para la desmembración
de Yugoslavia y Rusia.
Miles de luchadores Afganos de los ejércitos fundamentalistas se fueron
a Bosnia, donde fueron armados y financiados por EEUU para luchar
contra los Yugoslavos y a favor de un estado separatista bajo la tutela
estadounidense.
Muchos escritores de izquierdas ignoraron la presencia de estos
"voluntarios" que estaban en las primeras líneas de las limpiezas
étnicas de enclaves Serbios y que cometieron un atentado terrorista en
un importante mercado de Sarajevo para enfocar la atención de la
opinión Occidental sobre el "genocidio" serbio. Después de la exitosa
desmembración de las principales regiones de Yugoslavia y la división
de los nuevos "mini-estados" entre clientes estadounidenses y europeos,
EEUU procedió a la agregación de nuevas regiones al imperio. Washington
y Europa apoyaron al separatista Ejército de Liberación de Kosovo,
primero con financiación, entrenamiento y armas y más tarde declarando
la guerra contra lo que quedaba de Yugoslavia. Los chechenios
participaron con el llamado Ejército de Liberación de Kosovo, un
extensamente reconocido grupo terrorista que estaba clasificado como
'criminal' por la Interpol antes de convertirse en cliente de
Washington. El KLA estaba financiado por varias "fuentes internas". En
parte sacó fondos de su control de las rutas de la droga del Sureste
Asiático y Oriente Medio y de la trata de blancas a gran escala. Más
tarde rastrilló dólares y euros de los burdeles del Kosovo 'liberado'.
Por encima de todo esto robó las tierras, negocios y efectos personales
de la población expulsada Serbia y robó miles de millones de dólares de
la ayuda Occidental. Bajo la protección de la OTAN, el KLA limpió
étnicamente a más de 200.000 residentes que no eran de etnia Albanesa y
se convirtieron en un estado cliente de facto viviendo de las entregas
Occidentales y con todas sus fábricas y minas cerradas. EEUU contrató a
Halliburton para construir enormes bases militares en el sur de Europa,
Kosovo, Bosnia y Afganistán todas las cuales fueron campos de batalla
estadounidenses donde Washington había patrocinado movimientos
separatistas so pretexto de la "autodeterminación". Estos ahora están
siendo todos convertidos en estados clientes.
Los separatistas chechenios desarrollaron estrechas relaciones de
trabajo y tácticas terroristas operando con EEUU y Europa Occidental en
todos estos conflictos y se convirtieron en beneficiarios del apoyo
estadounidense diplomático, político y militar (vía Arabia Saudita).
Como los Kosovares, los líderes chechenios salieron de una red
financiada por la mafia, que usa la retórica nacionalista para encubrir
sus fines gansteriles.
A lo largo de los años 1990 hasta el presente, Occidente ha apoyado a
los terroristas chechenios aún cuando estos usen enormemente el apoyo
de gánsteres de Moscú y fundamentalistas islámicos. Sus líderes siguen
la política de "tierra quemada", rechazando cualquier estatus excepto
el de separarse de Rusia y convertirse en cliente estadounidense. Para
EEUU, una victoria de los terroristas chechenios se convertiría en un
trampolín para la desmembración adicional de Rusia en todas partes del
Cáucaso.
Los chechenios combinan las tácticas violentas que aprendieron al
controlar la actividad del hampa en Rusia con las prácticas terroristas
de la guerra Afgana que apuntaban contra maestras de escuela rurales y
trabajadores médicos a las que decapitaban, cortaban el cuello,
arrancando la piel en vivo a los prisioneros 'comunistas'. Su actual
práctica de colocar bombas en teatros, aviones, edificios de
apartamentos y la horrible matanza y mutilación de cientos de alumnos y
sus padres y profesores tienen un precedente sangriento, sancionado por
EEUU. Los chechenios combinan lo peor de la Mafia y los
fundamentalistas Islámicos - el asesinato a sangre fría de víctimas
inocentes para establecer un gobierno teocrático de señores de la
guerra.
Política Occidental
En respuesta a los asaltos terroristas chechenios, todos los medios de
comunicación Occidentales siguieron refiriéndose a ellos como
"nacionalistas", "militantes", "rebeldes" y como representantes
legítimos del pueblo Chechenio, incluso después de que hubieran
masacrado a los escolares. Inmediatamente después, todos los medios
impresos y electrónicos, desde la BBC al Guardian, a Le Monde, New York
Times etc. criticaron a los Rusos por no haber negociado con los
terroristas - aún cuando los terroristas estaban asesinando a niños e
incluso después de que hubieran estallado explosivos que mutilaron a
niños inocentes. Nada captura el profundo compromiso de los medios con
el imperio y el apoyo a la desmembración de Rusia como su apoyo a los
terroristas en medio del asesinato masivo. El apoyo más primitivo y
cobarde a las demandas terroristas en medio de la pena nacional y el
ultraje internacional provocaron finalmente que el estado Ruso
reaccionara con indignación - y que algunos medios minimizaran
temporalmente su apoyo a los terroristas y a la desintegración de Rusia.
Los medios rusos no fueron ninguna excepción. La mayor parte de los
medios privados y comentaristas anhelan la vuelta del período Yeltsin
de servilismo y enriquecimiento y buscan desacreditar y destruir el
régimen de Putin. Muchos de los oligarcas multimillonarios mantienen
estrechas relaciones operativas con los líderes chechenios, sobre todo
Boris Berezovsky. Los oligarcas y sus expertos en los medios de
comunicación rusos se hacen eco de la línea política y mediática
Occidental de culpar a las fuerzas de seguridad Rusas en vez de a los
terroristas chechenios. Los testigos supervivientes proporcionan
relatos vívidos del bombardeo y las matanzas anteriores a las
operaciones rusas de rescate - poniendo así al descubierto la mentira
del encubrimiento Occidental de la acción terrorista.
En Inglaterra el gobierno británico da asilo a un importante líder
terrorista chechenio buscado por las autoridades rusas. En Estados
Unidos, a uno de los líderes separatistas de Chechenia, Ilyas Akhadov,
le concedieron asilo en agosto pasado, en gran parte por los esfuerzos
del "Comité Americano para la Paz en Chechenia" presidido por Consejero
de Seguridad Nacional de Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, y el Secretario
de Estado con Reagan, Alexander Haig - promotores principales de la
invasión Fundamentalista y la destrucción de la República secular de
Afganistán en los años 1980. La obsesión de toda la vida de Brzezinski
ha sido la desmembración total de Rusia - y su reducción a un enclave
feudal controlado por Occidente por medio de los oligarcas locales,
señores de la guerra y gánsteres - como los que él apoya en Chechenia.
Brzezinski y sus colegas neoconservadores del National Endowment for
Democracy -la cara civil de la CIA- concedieron a este 'portavoz'
terrorista una beca de investigación, incluyendo una asignación
mensual, seguro médico y gastos de viaje.
Los gobiernos Anglo-Estadounidenses y sus "frentes políticos"
proporcionan santuario a los líderes terroristas chechenios como parte
de su estrategia de apoyo a una guerra de desgaste contra Rusia y sobre
todo a Putin, utilizando al pueblo Chechenio como conejillos de Indias.
El resultado de la independencia Chechenia probablemente se parecería
más a Kosovo - un estado cliente, con una gran base militar
estadounidense, dirigido por gánsteres y señores de la guerra,
traficando con drogas, esclavas sexuales y contrabando militar - y
profundamente implicado en la instigación del terror separatista a lo
largo de la frontera meridional de Rusia - principalmente la República
de Dagestán (que es multiétnica y está cerca del Mar Caspio rico en
petróleo y gas). El enemigo de Rusia no es una República autónoma
Chechenia, sino un estado terrorista dirigido por gánsteres, controlado
por fuerzas de seguridad estadounidenses y británicas, dedicadas a la
desmembración adicional de Rusia y a la destrucción de los esfuerzos de
Putin para reformar el estado Ruso.
Una de las posibles consecuencias inesperadas, sin embargo, es que la
matanza terrorista y la mutilación de cientos de niños y padres en la
escuela pública de Beslan, pueda dar a Putin la posibilidad de
deshacerse de todos los funcionarios de seguridad remanentes del
régimen Yeltsin. Esto puede obligar Putin a crear un nuevo régimen de
seguridad eficiente capaz de romper las bandas y gánsteres (Chechenios
y otros) que han financiado a los terroristas. Lo más importante es que
tendrá que darse cuenta de que el imperialismo anglo-estadounidense no
es un socio contra el terror, sino un cómplice de los terroristas en su
misión de fragmentar Rusia y destruir a su autoridad pública.
Conclusión
Para entender la aplicación de Washington del principio de
"autodeterminación" de naciones es precisa una perspectiva de clase
crítica del concepto. Washington lo aplica en casos como Kosovo y
Chechenia donde controla a las fuerzas clientes, a pesar de su
ilegitimidad política y su uso de métodos terroristas. Para los
constructores del imperio anglo-estadounidense la "autodeterminación"
es usada como un lema para desmembrar a los estados adversarios, y
convertir a la nueva mini-entidad en un enclave o base militar y
cliente político.
La cuestión fundamental que hay que plantear antes del tema de la
autodeterminación es cual es la naturaleza de las fuerzas políticas y
sociales que apoyan la autodeterminación, si son parte de un proyecto
nacional o son meras marionetas en una lucha por el poder imperial.
Chechenia ilustra esto último, mientras Irak y Palestina representan
casos de luchas independientes nacionales contra la ocupación colonial.
El apoyo bastante insensato de muchos izquierdistas a los gánsteres
Kosovares y Chechenios bajo el principio de "autodeterminación" sin
ningún análisis previo del contexto y la política revela su mediocridad
y lo que es peor, su sumisión servil a la propaganda imperial.
La cuestión del día es la expansión imperial global
Anglo-Estadounidense, directamente por medio de guerras coloniales e
indirectamente por medio de terroristas "separatistas" subrogados. El
asesinato masivo de Chechenia debería de provocar como mínimo algún
replanteamiento crítico de la cuestión de lo que está implicado en la
Guerra Chechenia, quiénes son sus promotores y quién saldrá beneficiado.
En los Estados Unidos los promotores principales de los "separatistas"
chechenios son los mismos neoconservadores Sionistas que promovieron la
invasión de Irak y apoyan incondicionalmente a Israel y la limpieza
étnica de los Palestinos: Perle, Wolfowitz, Ledeen, Feith y Adelman
entre otros. ¡La "izquierda" pro-Chechenia viaja con compañeros
extraños!
El doble rasero que EEUU y Europa aplican al evaluar el terrorismo
queda en evidencia más descaradamente en el caso de los líderes
terroristas de Chechenia. Concedieron a Ilyas Akmadov asilo en EEUU a
pesar de que los investigadores de seguridad Rusos aseguran tener
pruebas de los vínculos de Akhmadov con líderes terroristas chechenios,
Aslan Maskhadov y el célebre Shamil Basayev. Gran Bretaña ha concedido
asilo a Akmed Zakayev, portavoz de Maskhadov y "Ministro Cultural" de
su 'gobierno de oposición', como se denominan a la red terrorista
cuando a ella se refieren sus patrocinadores. Maskhadov ha enviado a
Umar Khabuyev a Francia, Apti Bisultanov a Alemania, entre otros
'ministros en libertad'. Los gobiernos Occidentales demuestran que con
respecto a los terroristas pro-occidentales chechenios no hay ningún
delito -ni siquiera el asesinato masivo de más de 150 niños- que sea
suficientemente brutal para conceder la extradición.
La política dual de los gobiernos occidentales hacia el terrorismo
viene dada por la pregunta de contra quien se dirige el terror. Es un
mito hablar, como lo hace Washington, de la lucha mundial contra el
terrorismo. Washington y Europa en el pasado y en el presente apoyan a
grupos terroristas en Kosovo, Afganistán y Chechenia - como los
apoyaron en los años 1980 en Nicaragua, Mozambique y Angola. Para
Washington, la cuestión del terror está subordinada a una pregunta más
básica: ¿Debilita esto a los enemigos u opositores del imperio?
¿Conduce esto a futuras bases militares? ¿Pueden los grupos terroristas
ser reciclados como regímenes clientes? Durante los últimos 13 años
EEUU y Europa han contribuido decisivamente a la instigación de
movimientos separatistas en la antigua Unión Soviética, Rusia y
Yugoslavia, que usan el terror y la violencia para lograr sus
objetivos. Sólo hace poco que el Presidente Putin se ha dado cuenta de
que no hay ningún final a la expansión imperial - salvo la Plaza Roja.
Su cooperación con Washington en la lucha contra el terror dirigido
contra EEUU (Al Qaeda) no se ha traducido en un apoyo recíproco a los
esfuerzos rusos para derrotar al terrorismo en el Cáucaso. La gran
pregunta es si Putin está dispuesto o es capaz de tener una nueva
estimación completa de la política exterior Rusa, sobre todo una nueva
estimación de las relaciones estadounidenses-rusas, que es central para
la lucha del Kremlin contra el terrorismo.
Finalmente uno puede preguntar ¿por qué tantos aparentes "progresistas"
e "intelectuales de izquierdas" repiten como papagayos la línea
imperialista estadounidense de "autodeterminación" para Chechenia? ¿Es
por ignorancia de las fuerzas sociales en Chechenia? ¿Simplemente
descontextualizan los actos terroristas e imponen principios abstractos
de negligentes hábitos intelectuales? ¿O simplemente se inclinan a la
presión de sus colegas derechistas para que "apoyen de modo consecuente
la 'autodeterminación' en todas partes"? Cualquiera que sea el caso
estos lameculos del imperialismo son incurables: Incluso en medio del
asesinato masivo chechenio de los inocentes niños de Beslan, culpan a
los rusos. por no rendirse a las demandas de los terroristas. ¿Alguno
de estos progresistas e izquierdistas de principios condenó a Bush
después del 11-S por no negociar con Osama bin Laden y recompensarle?
¡Claro que no! Apoyaron la guerra de Bush "contra el terrorismo" aun
cuando implicara la invasión y la ocupación de un país extranjero. ¿Por
qué entonces la reticencia de apoyar el esfuerzo de Putin para acabar
con el terrorismo dentro de las fronteras de Rusia? ¿Puede ser que los
progresistas tengan más en común con sus gobernantes imperiales de lo
que les gustaría admitir, sobre todo cuando se trata de cuestiones de
guerra y paz, terrorismo y autodeterminación?
8 de Setiembre de 2004
Quelli che vogliono squartare la Russia (6)
Segnalato da Mauro Gemma: alcune domande di James Petras << ai
"progressisti" che ripetono come pappagali la linea imperialista
statunitense sulla Cecenia >> ...
THIS TEXT IN ENGLISH:
http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/a-list/2004w37/msg00031.htm
---
La política del terrorismo en Osetia del Norte:
Autodeterminación y política imperial
James Petras
Rebelión
Traducido para Rebelión por Marina Trillo
La matanza monstruosa deliberada de más de 330 padres y niños en el
gimnasio escolar de Beslan por terroristas chechenios no es como dice
la BBC una "tragedia", sino un depravado acto criminal.
Para entender la naturaleza del conflicto entre el estado Ruso y los
terroristas chechenios, es importante fijarse en las fuerzas
sociopolíticas y las cuestiones en disputa. Para la mayoría de los
medios de comunicación estadounidenses y europeos el problema es la
"autodeterminación" de los chechenios. ¿Pero a quién y a qué se refiere
lo de "auto"? Con la desintegración de la antigua Unión Soviética,
tanto en Rusia como en los estados del Báltico, Balcanes y Cáucaso,
bandas criminales se aliaron con miembros corruptos del antiguo aparato
Soviético saquearon y se apoderaron de los recursos públicos
controlando las economías y el aparato estatal. Los gánsteres se
hicieron millonarios y los millonarios contrataron asesinos para
eliminar a sus rivales, competidores y a cualquier autoridad reguladora
que cuestionara sus prácticas. Según Paul Klebnikov -el recientemente
asesinado editor de la edición rusa de Forbes Magazine- entre las
depravadas bandas que operan en Moscú una de las más brutales era la
mafia chechenia. Aliada con millonarios rusos y a través de ellos con
el sistema de seguridad ruso acumularon inmensas fortunas que lavaron
en bancos Occidentales y por medio de sus extensas redes con sus
operativos en Chechenia. Cualquier chechenio que protestara o
cuestionara a la mafia chechenia era rápidamente eliminado. Para la
mafia chechenia que opera en Rusia, Chechenia era la "casa matriz", el
santuario en el cual podrían encontrar siempre una zona segura. La
mafia chechenia contribuyó decisivamente a financiar el armamento y
proporcionar cuadros militares y líderes para el "movimiento de
independencia chechenio". Lo que estaba en juego era la creación de un
feudo de la mafia controlado por gánsteres, señores de la guerra y
fundamentalistas islámicos.
Al hablar de la Primera Guerra chechenia (1994-96), Paul Klebnikov
escribió:
"La Guerra chechenia fue el escenario de una guerra gansteril expresada
en una mayor magnitud. Grupos criminales chechenios organizados en
Moscú y otras ciudades rusas mantenían filiales en su patria ancestral.
Chechenia era un punto de tránsito clave en el comercio de narcóticos
ruso y los gánsteres con base en Moscú reenviaban a la patria gran
parte de sus ganancias. Los mismos funcionarios y guardas de seguridad
rusos que patrocinaban a los grupos chechenios del crimen organizado en
Moscú patrocinaban también al gobierno chechenio permitiendo(le)
apropiarse de millones de toneladas del petróleo ruso a poco o ningún
coste" (El Padrino del Kremlin, Harcourt 2000, página 40).
Klebnikov proseguía señalando que los señores de la guerra y los
gánsteres chechenios recibían sus armas de los comandantes corruptos
del ejército y las fuerzas de seguridad rusas (página 41). A la
pregunta de quiénes son las fuerzas políticas de la autodeterminación
en el caso de Chechenia, la respuesta es: Los gánsteres, los señores de
la guerra, y los terroristas extremistas, como Shamil Basayen, Salman
Raduyev y fundamentalistas como Movladi Udugov. Entre 1995-97 el
notorio oligarca ruso, Boris Berezovsky, mantuvo una estrecha relación
con estos señores de la guerra chechenios (Klebnikov, página 261) Hoy
ambos comparten una común y absoluta hostilidad hacia el Presidente
Putin y su tentativa de controlar el crimen y el pillaje.
Los señores de la guerra chechenios procuraron ganar una apariencia de
"legitimidad" para su feudo al provocar un conflicto con Rusia y buscar
el apoyo estadounidense y europeo. Desde finales de los años 1980, pero
en particular después de 1991, la CIA dio la más alta prioridad a
instigar la ruptura de la Unión Soviética financiando y armando
movimientos separatistas locales. La primera oleada de rupturas ocurrió
en Kazajstán, Uzbekistán y Georgia. A Washington y a Londres no les
preocupaba nada si los nuevos líderes eran fundamentalistas islámicos,
autócratas ex-estalinistas, o gánsteres de la Mafia - la cuestión
importante era destruir a la URSS, y minar la influencia rusa en todas
partes del Cáucaso y Sur de Asia. Tras la "independencia" de estas
antiguas repúblicas soviéticas, EEUU se dedicó de modo especial a crear
regímenes clientes, firmando contratos petroleros y construyendo bases
militares. Lo de "autodeterminación" era un eslogan de transición hacia
la rápida incorporación a la nueva zona hegemónica estadounidense.
Rusia bajo el gobernante cliente estadounidense Yeltsin accedió a todas
estas adquisiciones estadounidenses "aconsejada" por los gánsteres,
mafiosos multimillonarios y "oligarcas" más corruptos de la historia
reciente.
El imperio estadounidense, habiendo tenido éxito con la primera oleada
de adquisición de clientes, prosiguió para instigar una segunda oleada
que incluyera a otros territorios autónomos Rusos, aún más cerca de los
centros estratégicos del estado Ruso. Chechenia fue un objetivo
seleccionado por motivos históricos. Durante la revuelta islámica
patrocinada por EEUU y la invasión contra la república reformista
secular Afgana en 1989, Washington formó equipo con Arabia Saudita,
Pakistán y otros estados Musulmanes (incluido Irán) para reclutar,
financiar y armar a decenas de miles de fundamentalistas islámicos de
todas partes de Oriente Medio, Norte de África, sur del Cáucaso y
sureste Asiático. Numerosos "voluntarios" de Chechenia lucharon en
Afganistán contra el gobierno Afgano y sus partidarios. EEUU logró una
victoria pírrica en Afganistán: debilitó gravemente al declinante
estado Soviético, pero creó una red fundamentalista de decenas de miles
bien armados y entrenados. Mientras un sector de las fuerzas islámicas
entró en oposición a EEUU en Arabia Saudita y otras partes otro grupo
se prestó a la estrategia imperial estadounidense para la desmembración
de Yugoslavia y Rusia.
Miles de luchadores Afganos de los ejércitos fundamentalistas se fueron
a Bosnia, donde fueron armados y financiados por EEUU para luchar
contra los Yugoslavos y a favor de un estado separatista bajo la tutela
estadounidense.
Muchos escritores de izquierdas ignoraron la presencia de estos
"voluntarios" que estaban en las primeras líneas de las limpiezas
étnicas de enclaves Serbios y que cometieron un atentado terrorista en
un importante mercado de Sarajevo para enfocar la atención de la
opinión Occidental sobre el "genocidio" serbio. Después de la exitosa
desmembración de las principales regiones de Yugoslavia y la división
de los nuevos "mini-estados" entre clientes estadounidenses y europeos,
EEUU procedió a la agregación de nuevas regiones al imperio. Washington
y Europa apoyaron al separatista Ejército de Liberación de Kosovo,
primero con financiación, entrenamiento y armas y más tarde declarando
la guerra contra lo que quedaba de Yugoslavia. Los chechenios
participaron con el llamado Ejército de Liberación de Kosovo, un
extensamente reconocido grupo terrorista que estaba clasificado como
'criminal' por la Interpol antes de convertirse en cliente de
Washington. El KLA estaba financiado por varias "fuentes internas". En
parte sacó fondos de su control de las rutas de la droga del Sureste
Asiático y Oriente Medio y de la trata de blancas a gran escala. Más
tarde rastrilló dólares y euros de los burdeles del Kosovo 'liberado'.
Por encima de todo esto robó las tierras, negocios y efectos personales
de la población expulsada Serbia y robó miles de millones de dólares de
la ayuda Occidental. Bajo la protección de la OTAN, el KLA limpió
étnicamente a más de 200.000 residentes que no eran de etnia Albanesa y
se convirtieron en un estado cliente de facto viviendo de las entregas
Occidentales y con todas sus fábricas y minas cerradas. EEUU contrató a
Halliburton para construir enormes bases militares en el sur de Europa,
Kosovo, Bosnia y Afganistán todas las cuales fueron campos de batalla
estadounidenses donde Washington había patrocinado movimientos
separatistas so pretexto de la "autodeterminación". Estos ahora están
siendo todos convertidos en estados clientes.
Los separatistas chechenios desarrollaron estrechas relaciones de
trabajo y tácticas terroristas operando con EEUU y Europa Occidental en
todos estos conflictos y se convirtieron en beneficiarios del apoyo
estadounidense diplomático, político y militar (vía Arabia Saudita).
Como los Kosovares, los líderes chechenios salieron de una red
financiada por la mafia, que usa la retórica nacionalista para encubrir
sus fines gansteriles.
A lo largo de los años 1990 hasta el presente, Occidente ha apoyado a
los terroristas chechenios aún cuando estos usen enormemente el apoyo
de gánsteres de Moscú y fundamentalistas islámicos. Sus líderes siguen
la política de "tierra quemada", rechazando cualquier estatus excepto
el de separarse de Rusia y convertirse en cliente estadounidense. Para
EEUU, una victoria de los terroristas chechenios se convertiría en un
trampolín para la desmembración adicional de Rusia en todas partes del
Cáucaso.
Los chechenios combinan las tácticas violentas que aprendieron al
controlar la actividad del hampa en Rusia con las prácticas terroristas
de la guerra Afgana que apuntaban contra maestras de escuela rurales y
trabajadores médicos a las que decapitaban, cortaban el cuello,
arrancando la piel en vivo a los prisioneros 'comunistas'. Su actual
práctica de colocar bombas en teatros, aviones, edificios de
apartamentos y la horrible matanza y mutilación de cientos de alumnos y
sus padres y profesores tienen un precedente sangriento, sancionado por
EEUU. Los chechenios combinan lo peor de la Mafia y los
fundamentalistas Islámicos - el asesinato a sangre fría de víctimas
inocentes para establecer un gobierno teocrático de señores de la
guerra.
Política Occidental
En respuesta a los asaltos terroristas chechenios, todos los medios de
comunicación Occidentales siguieron refiriéndose a ellos como
"nacionalistas", "militantes", "rebeldes" y como representantes
legítimos del pueblo Chechenio, incluso después de que hubieran
masacrado a los escolares. Inmediatamente después, todos los medios
impresos y electrónicos, desde la BBC al Guardian, a Le Monde, New York
Times etc. criticaron a los Rusos por no haber negociado con los
terroristas - aún cuando los terroristas estaban asesinando a niños e
incluso después de que hubieran estallado explosivos que mutilaron a
niños inocentes. Nada captura el profundo compromiso de los medios con
el imperio y el apoyo a la desmembración de Rusia como su apoyo a los
terroristas en medio del asesinato masivo. El apoyo más primitivo y
cobarde a las demandas terroristas en medio de la pena nacional y el
ultraje internacional provocaron finalmente que el estado Ruso
reaccionara con indignación - y que algunos medios minimizaran
temporalmente su apoyo a los terroristas y a la desintegración de Rusia.
Los medios rusos no fueron ninguna excepción. La mayor parte de los
medios privados y comentaristas anhelan la vuelta del período Yeltsin
de servilismo y enriquecimiento y buscan desacreditar y destruir el
régimen de Putin. Muchos de los oligarcas multimillonarios mantienen
estrechas relaciones operativas con los líderes chechenios, sobre todo
Boris Berezovsky. Los oligarcas y sus expertos en los medios de
comunicación rusos se hacen eco de la línea política y mediática
Occidental de culpar a las fuerzas de seguridad Rusas en vez de a los
terroristas chechenios. Los testigos supervivientes proporcionan
relatos vívidos del bombardeo y las matanzas anteriores a las
operaciones rusas de rescate - poniendo así al descubierto la mentira
del encubrimiento Occidental de la acción terrorista.
En Inglaterra el gobierno británico da asilo a un importante líder
terrorista chechenio buscado por las autoridades rusas. En Estados
Unidos, a uno de los líderes separatistas de Chechenia, Ilyas Akhadov,
le concedieron asilo en agosto pasado, en gran parte por los esfuerzos
del "Comité Americano para la Paz en Chechenia" presidido por Consejero
de Seguridad Nacional de Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, y el Secretario
de Estado con Reagan, Alexander Haig - promotores principales de la
invasión Fundamentalista y la destrucción de la República secular de
Afganistán en los años 1980. La obsesión de toda la vida de Brzezinski
ha sido la desmembración total de Rusia - y su reducción a un enclave
feudal controlado por Occidente por medio de los oligarcas locales,
señores de la guerra y gánsteres - como los que él apoya en Chechenia.
Brzezinski y sus colegas neoconservadores del National Endowment for
Democracy -la cara civil de la CIA- concedieron a este 'portavoz'
terrorista una beca de investigación, incluyendo una asignación
mensual, seguro médico y gastos de viaje.
Los gobiernos Anglo-Estadounidenses y sus "frentes políticos"
proporcionan santuario a los líderes terroristas chechenios como parte
de su estrategia de apoyo a una guerra de desgaste contra Rusia y sobre
todo a Putin, utilizando al pueblo Chechenio como conejillos de Indias.
El resultado de la independencia Chechenia probablemente se parecería
más a Kosovo - un estado cliente, con una gran base militar
estadounidense, dirigido por gánsteres y señores de la guerra,
traficando con drogas, esclavas sexuales y contrabando militar - y
profundamente implicado en la instigación del terror separatista a lo
largo de la frontera meridional de Rusia - principalmente la República
de Dagestán (que es multiétnica y está cerca del Mar Caspio rico en
petróleo y gas). El enemigo de Rusia no es una República autónoma
Chechenia, sino un estado terrorista dirigido por gánsteres, controlado
por fuerzas de seguridad estadounidenses y británicas, dedicadas a la
desmembración adicional de Rusia y a la destrucción de los esfuerzos de
Putin para reformar el estado Ruso.
Una de las posibles consecuencias inesperadas, sin embargo, es que la
matanza terrorista y la mutilación de cientos de niños y padres en la
escuela pública de Beslan, pueda dar a Putin la posibilidad de
deshacerse de todos los funcionarios de seguridad remanentes del
régimen Yeltsin. Esto puede obligar Putin a crear un nuevo régimen de
seguridad eficiente capaz de romper las bandas y gánsteres (Chechenios
y otros) que han financiado a los terroristas. Lo más importante es que
tendrá que darse cuenta de que el imperialismo anglo-estadounidense no
es un socio contra el terror, sino un cómplice de los terroristas en su
misión de fragmentar Rusia y destruir a su autoridad pública.
Conclusión
Para entender la aplicación de Washington del principio de
"autodeterminación" de naciones es precisa una perspectiva de clase
crítica del concepto. Washington lo aplica en casos como Kosovo y
Chechenia donde controla a las fuerzas clientes, a pesar de su
ilegitimidad política y su uso de métodos terroristas. Para los
constructores del imperio anglo-estadounidense la "autodeterminación"
es usada como un lema para desmembrar a los estados adversarios, y
convertir a la nueva mini-entidad en un enclave o base militar y
cliente político.
La cuestión fundamental que hay que plantear antes del tema de la
autodeterminación es cual es la naturaleza de las fuerzas políticas y
sociales que apoyan la autodeterminación, si son parte de un proyecto
nacional o son meras marionetas en una lucha por el poder imperial.
Chechenia ilustra esto último, mientras Irak y Palestina representan
casos de luchas independientes nacionales contra la ocupación colonial.
El apoyo bastante insensato de muchos izquierdistas a los gánsteres
Kosovares y Chechenios bajo el principio de "autodeterminación" sin
ningún análisis previo del contexto y la política revela su mediocridad
y lo que es peor, su sumisión servil a la propaganda imperial.
La cuestión del día es la expansión imperial global
Anglo-Estadounidense, directamente por medio de guerras coloniales e
indirectamente por medio de terroristas "separatistas" subrogados. El
asesinato masivo de Chechenia debería de provocar como mínimo algún
replanteamiento crítico de la cuestión de lo que está implicado en la
Guerra Chechenia, quiénes son sus promotores y quién saldrá beneficiado.
En los Estados Unidos los promotores principales de los "separatistas"
chechenios son los mismos neoconservadores Sionistas que promovieron la
invasión de Irak y apoyan incondicionalmente a Israel y la limpieza
étnica de los Palestinos: Perle, Wolfowitz, Ledeen, Feith y Adelman
entre otros. ¡La "izquierda" pro-Chechenia viaja con compañeros
extraños!
El doble rasero que EEUU y Europa aplican al evaluar el terrorismo
queda en evidencia más descaradamente en el caso de los líderes
terroristas de Chechenia. Concedieron a Ilyas Akmadov asilo en EEUU a
pesar de que los investigadores de seguridad Rusos aseguran tener
pruebas de los vínculos de Akhmadov con líderes terroristas chechenios,
Aslan Maskhadov y el célebre Shamil Basayev. Gran Bretaña ha concedido
asilo a Akmed Zakayev, portavoz de Maskhadov y "Ministro Cultural" de
su 'gobierno de oposición', como se denominan a la red terrorista
cuando a ella se refieren sus patrocinadores. Maskhadov ha enviado a
Umar Khabuyev a Francia, Apti Bisultanov a Alemania, entre otros
'ministros en libertad'. Los gobiernos Occidentales demuestran que con
respecto a los terroristas pro-occidentales chechenios no hay ningún
delito -ni siquiera el asesinato masivo de más de 150 niños- que sea
suficientemente brutal para conceder la extradición.
La política dual de los gobiernos occidentales hacia el terrorismo
viene dada por la pregunta de contra quien se dirige el terror. Es un
mito hablar, como lo hace Washington, de la lucha mundial contra el
terrorismo. Washington y Europa en el pasado y en el presente apoyan a
grupos terroristas en Kosovo, Afganistán y Chechenia - como los
apoyaron en los años 1980 en Nicaragua, Mozambique y Angola. Para
Washington, la cuestión del terror está subordinada a una pregunta más
básica: ¿Debilita esto a los enemigos u opositores del imperio?
¿Conduce esto a futuras bases militares? ¿Pueden los grupos terroristas
ser reciclados como regímenes clientes? Durante los últimos 13 años
EEUU y Europa han contribuido decisivamente a la instigación de
movimientos separatistas en la antigua Unión Soviética, Rusia y
Yugoslavia, que usan el terror y la violencia para lograr sus
objetivos. Sólo hace poco que el Presidente Putin se ha dado cuenta de
que no hay ningún final a la expansión imperial - salvo la Plaza Roja.
Su cooperación con Washington en la lucha contra el terror dirigido
contra EEUU (Al Qaeda) no se ha traducido en un apoyo recíproco a los
esfuerzos rusos para derrotar al terrorismo en el Cáucaso. La gran
pregunta es si Putin está dispuesto o es capaz de tener una nueva
estimación completa de la política exterior Rusa, sobre todo una nueva
estimación de las relaciones estadounidenses-rusas, que es central para
la lucha del Kremlin contra el terrorismo.
Finalmente uno puede preguntar ¿por qué tantos aparentes "progresistas"
e "intelectuales de izquierdas" repiten como papagayos la línea
imperialista estadounidense de "autodeterminación" para Chechenia? ¿Es
por ignorancia de las fuerzas sociales en Chechenia? ¿Simplemente
descontextualizan los actos terroristas e imponen principios abstractos
de negligentes hábitos intelectuales? ¿O simplemente se inclinan a la
presión de sus colegas derechistas para que "apoyen de modo consecuente
la 'autodeterminación' en todas partes"? Cualquiera que sea el caso
estos lameculos del imperialismo son incurables: Incluso en medio del
asesinato masivo chechenio de los inocentes niños de Beslan, culpan a
los rusos. por no rendirse a las demandas de los terroristas. ¿Alguno
de estos progresistas e izquierdistas de principios condenó a Bush
después del 11-S por no negociar con Osama bin Laden y recompensarle?
¡Claro que no! Apoyaron la guerra de Bush "contra el terrorismo" aun
cuando implicara la invasión y la ocupación de un país extranjero. ¿Por
qué entonces la reticencia de apoyar el esfuerzo de Putin para acabar
con el terrorismo dentro de las fronteras de Rusia? ¿Puede ser que los
progresistas tengan más en común con sus gobernantes imperiales de lo
que les gustaría admitir, sobre todo cuando se trata de cuestiones de
guerra y paz, terrorismo y autodeterminación?
8 de Setiembre de 2004
SERBIA: VOLEVA ABOLIRE DARWIN, MINISTRO SI DIMETTE
(ANSA) - BELGRADO, 16 SET - Aveva annunciato seraficamente che avrebbe
cancellato dall'insegnamento scolastico in Serbia la teoria
evoluzionista di Charles Darwin. Avrebbe anche evitato che i ragazzini
serbi si ''rovinassero gli occhi'' nell'imparare a usare il computer.
Per non parlare delle lingue straniere, troppo costose, da abolire.
Aveva scatenato un putiferio. Oggi Liljana Colic, ministro
dell'istruzione di Belgrado, si e' dimessa. ''Liljana Colic ha
presentato al primo ministro Vojslav Kostunica i risultati del lavoro
del suo ministero e ha affermato che i problemi di fronte ai quali si
e' trovata incidono sull'attivita' del governo. Per queste ragioni ha
presentato le dimissioni'', afferma oggi un comunicato del governo
serbo citato dall'agenzia Beta. ''Il premier le ha accettate - prosegue
la nota - ringraziando il ministro per il lavoro svolto''. Si conclude
cosi' una vicenda che ha tenuto banco sui giornali serbi, che ha
provocato scioperi dei professori, una rivolta dell' opinione pubblica,
e molto imbarazzo per il governo di Kostunica, una coalizione di
minoranza di quattro partiti di centrodestra sostenuta, dall'esterno,
dai socialisti dell'ex presidente jugoslavo Slobodan Milosevic. Due
settimane fa, in un'intervista a un giornale, il ministro aveva
affermato che la teoria evoluzionista di Darwin non sarebbe stata piu'
insegnata nelle scuole (ultimo anno delle primarie), a meno che non si
fosse dato identico peso e spazio alla teoria della creazione del
Vecchio Testamento. Aveva aggiunto, senza precisazioni, che in ''altri
Paesi'' cio' avviene, ossia viene insegnato sia l'evoluzionismo sia il
credo secondo il quale gli uomini discendono da Adamo ed Eva e che Dio
creo' il mondo in sei giorni. L'eliminazione del darwinismo ''Sara' il
'segno' che lascero' nell'istruzione serba'', aveva spiegato la Colic.
Ma pochi giorni dopo, in seguito alle proteste suscitate, il suo
ministero era stato costretto a tornare sui suoi passi. Colic aveva poi
detto che avrebbe tolto l'obbligo di studiare informatica dalla scuola
primaria (''le radiazioni fanno male ai bambini'') e lingua straniera,
sempre nei primi anni delle primarie (con la motivazione: ''Costa
troppo''). Nuovi scioperi, e nuovo ripensamento. Oggi il ministro
dell'istruzione, ormai per molti ''la medievale'', ha deciso di
lasciare l'incarico. Kostunica, che in un primo momento aveva cercato
di 'sgonfiare' il caso, nei giorni scorsi l'aveva convocata per un
colloquio privato. Se ne va, ma un ''segno'' nel sistema
dell'istruzione pubblica serba Liljana Colic lo ha lasciato: ha fatto
votare in parlamento una legge che annulla di fatto gli effetti di una
riforma del sistema scolastico approvata un anno fa, destinata ad
allinearlo agli standard dell'Unione europea. (ANSA). COR-PAN
16/09/2004 17:35
http://www.ansa.it/balcani/serbiamontenegro/20040916173533076968.html
Sullo stesso argomento VEDI ANCHE / SEE ALSO:
La Serbia ritorna indietro di duecento anni
Serbs in Dispute Over Darwin Vs. Divine (AP)
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/3800
(ANSA) - BELGRADO, 16 SET - Aveva annunciato seraficamente che avrebbe
cancellato dall'insegnamento scolastico in Serbia la teoria
evoluzionista di Charles Darwin. Avrebbe anche evitato che i ragazzini
serbi si ''rovinassero gli occhi'' nell'imparare a usare il computer.
Per non parlare delle lingue straniere, troppo costose, da abolire.
Aveva scatenato un putiferio. Oggi Liljana Colic, ministro
dell'istruzione di Belgrado, si e' dimessa. ''Liljana Colic ha
presentato al primo ministro Vojslav Kostunica i risultati del lavoro
del suo ministero e ha affermato che i problemi di fronte ai quali si
e' trovata incidono sull'attivita' del governo. Per queste ragioni ha
presentato le dimissioni'', afferma oggi un comunicato del governo
serbo citato dall'agenzia Beta. ''Il premier le ha accettate - prosegue
la nota - ringraziando il ministro per il lavoro svolto''. Si conclude
cosi' una vicenda che ha tenuto banco sui giornali serbi, che ha
provocato scioperi dei professori, una rivolta dell' opinione pubblica,
e molto imbarazzo per il governo di Kostunica, una coalizione di
minoranza di quattro partiti di centrodestra sostenuta, dall'esterno,
dai socialisti dell'ex presidente jugoslavo Slobodan Milosevic. Due
settimane fa, in un'intervista a un giornale, il ministro aveva
affermato che la teoria evoluzionista di Darwin non sarebbe stata piu'
insegnata nelle scuole (ultimo anno delle primarie), a meno che non si
fosse dato identico peso e spazio alla teoria della creazione del
Vecchio Testamento. Aveva aggiunto, senza precisazioni, che in ''altri
Paesi'' cio' avviene, ossia viene insegnato sia l'evoluzionismo sia il
credo secondo il quale gli uomini discendono da Adamo ed Eva e che Dio
creo' il mondo in sei giorni. L'eliminazione del darwinismo ''Sara' il
'segno' che lascero' nell'istruzione serba'', aveva spiegato la Colic.
Ma pochi giorni dopo, in seguito alle proteste suscitate, il suo
ministero era stato costretto a tornare sui suoi passi. Colic aveva poi
detto che avrebbe tolto l'obbligo di studiare informatica dalla scuola
primaria (''le radiazioni fanno male ai bambini'') e lingua straniera,
sempre nei primi anni delle primarie (con la motivazione: ''Costa
troppo''). Nuovi scioperi, e nuovo ripensamento. Oggi il ministro
dell'istruzione, ormai per molti ''la medievale'', ha deciso di
lasciare l'incarico. Kostunica, che in un primo momento aveva cercato
di 'sgonfiare' il caso, nei giorni scorsi l'aveva convocata per un
colloquio privato. Se ne va, ma un ''segno'' nel sistema
dell'istruzione pubblica serba Liljana Colic lo ha lasciato: ha fatto
votare in parlamento una legge che annulla di fatto gli effetti di una
riforma del sistema scolastico approvata un anno fa, destinata ad
allinearlo agli standard dell'Unione europea. (ANSA). COR-PAN
16/09/2004 17:35
http://www.ansa.it/balcani/serbiamontenegro/20040916173533076968.html
Sullo stesso argomento VEDI ANCHE / SEE ALSO:
La Serbia ritorna indietro di duecento anni
Serbs in Dispute Over Darwin Vs. Divine (AP)
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/3800
(english / italiano)
Il capitalismo è la causa strutturale della guerra
1. Il vero fantasma di Monaco `38 (Luigi Cavallaro / Il Manifesto)
2. The Economist: The risks ahead for the world economy (Fred Bergsten)
=== 1 ===
http://www.ilmanifesto.it/
il manifesto - 21 Settembre 2004
GUERRA
Il vero fantasma di Monaco `38
LUIGI CAVALLARO
Il 29 settembre 1938, i capi di stato di due importanti paesi europei
si recarono a Monaco, a trovare un loro collega che, nel breve volgere
di cinque anni da quando era stato democraticamente eletto, aveva
finanziato su larga scala il riarmo del proprio paese e promosso una
politica estera aggressiva e destabilizzante nell'intera Europa
centrale, culminata qualche mese prima nell'annessione coatta di uno
stato sovrano. Il nobile intento degli statisti in visita in Baviera
era di indurre quel loro collega a più miti consigli, ricercando con
lui una strategia multilaterale che gli consentisse di perseguire
comunque quelli che essi stessi consideravano suoi legittimi interessi;
e certo pesava la consapevolezza che nessuna pacificazione duratura -
nessun appeasement, come si disse - era possibile se non con il suo
consenso. Il 30 settembre dal virtuoso consesso sortì un accordo.
Commentandolo, Winston Churchill disse che le potenze europee potevano
scegliere tra la vergogna e la guerra, e avrebbero avuto entrambe
(Churchill qualche anno dopo avrebbe trescato col padrone di casa di
Monaco e col suo italico servitore per negoziare un ribaltone che
ricacciasse i russi ben oltre l'Elba; ma questo è un altra storia).
Sessantasei anni dopo c'è il presidente di uno stato assai importante
che si proclama war president, ha fatto letteralmente esplodere la
spesa militare, ha mosso guerra a due stati senza esserne attaccato e,
in generale, sta esercitando una funzione destabilizzante in tutto il
Medio Oriente, la cui situazione è ancora più torbidamente complessa di
quanto non fosse l'Europa centrale nel 1938. E ci sono capi di stato
che cercano di indurlo a più miti consigli e a ricercare una strategia
non unilaterale per tutelare i suoi legittimi interessi (inclusi il
controllo dell'approvvigionamento energetico mondiale e un signoraggio
monetario che gli consenta di esportare all'estero le contraddizioni
del proprio modello di crescita). Come i loro colleghi d'allora, essi
sono realisti: sono cioè consapevoli che non c'è oggi alcuna pace
possibile senza il consenso di questo collega dai modi un po' cowboy. E
altrettanto realisti sono gli aspiranti statisti attualmente
all'opposizione nel nostro paese: sperano vivamente che alle prossime
elezioni costui possa essere sconfitto dal suo avversario (un tipo così
progressista da aver sostenuto già sette anni fa, in un libro, quel che
il presidente in carica sta praticando), ma non si tirano indietro
nemmeno di fronte a una (probabile) rielezione del war president
attuale, al punto che hanno intrapreso in patria un dialogo costruttivo
con colui che ne è il più fiero e zelante difensore e alleato. Oggi
come ieri questi eventi non maturano nel vuoto, ma nel pieno di una
deflazione mondiale, che ha sancito il ritorno in auge di una politica
economica che gli inglesi chiamano beggar-thy-neighbour e testimonia
ancora una volta dell'incapacità del capitalismo di risolvere le
contraddizioni prodotte dal suo sviluppo incontrollato, dalla
disoccupazione alla distribuzione arbitraria e iniqua delle ricchezze e
dei redditi. È ozioso chiedersi se avremo la guerra o la vergogna:
abbiamo già tutt'e due. È certo invece che questo è l'unico modo
sensato di evocare oggi lo spettro dell'appeasement. Ogni diverso
paragone, che sfrutti l'emozione creata da un terrorismo brutale che è
solo il ritorno di fiamma di un imperialismo nato molto prima, è frutto
di corta memoria e/o lunga malafede.
=== 2 ===
(dalla lista: marxiana @yahoogroups.com )
The risks ahead for the world economy
Sep 9th 2004
From The Economist print edition
Fred Bergsten explains why policymakers need to act now in order to
avert the danger of serious damage to the world economy
FIVE major risks threaten the world economy. Three centre on the United
States: renewed sharp increases in the current-account deficit leading
to a crash of the dollar; a budget profile that is out of control; and
an outbreak of trade protectionism. A fourth relates to China, which
faces a possible hard landing from its recent overheating. The fifth is
that oil prices could rise to $60-70 per barrel even without a major
political or terrorist disruption, and much higher with one.
Most of these risks reinforce each other. A further oil shock, a dollar
collapse and a soaring American budget deficit would all generate much
higher inflation and interest rates. A sharp dollar decline would
increase the likelihood of further oil price rises. Larger budget
deficits will produce larger American trade deficits, and thus more
protectionism and dollar vulnerability. Realisation of any one of the
five risks could substantially reduce world growth. If two or three,
let alone all five, were to occur in combination then they would
radically reverse the global outlook.
There is still time to head off each of these risks. Decisions made in
America immediately after this year's elections will be pivotal. China,
the new growth locomotive, is key to resolving the global trade
imbalances and must play a central role in future. Action by a number
of other countries will be essential to maintain global growth and to
avoid deeper oil shocks and new trade restrictions.
The most alarming new prospect is another sharp deterioration in
America's current-account deficit. It has already reached an annual
rate of $600 billion, well above 5% of the economy. New projections by
my colleague Catherine Mann (see chart 1) suggest it will now be rising
again by a full percentage point of GDP per year, as actually occurred
in 1997-2000. On such a trajectory, the deficit would exceed $1
trillion per year by 2010.
There are three reasons for this dismal prospect. First, American
merchandise imports are now almost twice as large as exports; hence
exports would have to grow twice as fast as imports merely to halt the
deterioration. (In the past, such a relationship occurred only after
the massive fall experienced by the dollar in 1985-87.) Second,
economic growth is likely to remain faster in America than in its major
markets and higher incomes there increase demand for imports much
faster than income growth elsewhere increases demand for American
exports. Third, America's large debtor position (it currently is in the
red by more than $2.5 trillion) means that its net investment income
payments to foreigners will escalate steadily, especially as interest
rates rise.
Of course, it is virtually inconceivable that the markets will permit
such deficits to eventuate. The only issue is how they are to be
averted. An immediate resumption of the gradual decline of the dollar,
as in the period 2002-03, cumulating in a fall of at least another 20%,
is needed to reduce the deficits to sustainable levels.
If delayed much longer, the dollar's inevitable fall is likely to be
much larger and much faster. Moreover, much of the slack in America's
product and labour markets will probably have disappeared in a year or
so. Sharp dollar depreciation at that stage would push up inflation and
macroeconomic models suggest that American interest rates could even
hit double digits.
The situation would be still worse if future increases in energy prices
and the budget deficit compound such developments, as they surely
could. The negative impact would also be much greater in other
countries because of their need to generate larger and faster domestic
demand increases in order to offset declining trade surpluses.
Fears of a hard landing for the dollar and the world economy are of
course not new. The situation is much more ominous today, however,
because of the record current-account deficits and international debt,
and the high probability of further rapid increases in both. The
potential escalation of oil prices suggests a parallel with the dollar
declines of the 1970s, which were associated with stagflation, rather
than the 1980s when a sharp fall in energy costs and inflation
cushioned dollar depreciation (but still produced higher interest rates
and Black Monday for the stockmarket). Paul Volcker, former chairman of
the Federal Reserve, predicts with 75% probability a sharp fall in the
dollar within five years.
The prospects for the budget deficit and trade protectionism further
darken the picture. Official projections score the fiscal imbalance at
a cumulative $5 trillion over the next decade, but exclude probable
increases in overseas military and homeland-security expenditures,
extension of the recent tax cuts and new entitlement increases proposed
by both presidential candidates. This deficit could also approach $1
trillion per year (see chart 2), yet there is no serious discussion of
how to restore fiscal responsibility, let alone an agreed strategy for
reining in runaway entitlement programmes (especially Medicare).
Different deficits
The budget and current-account deficits are not “twin”. The budget in
fact moved from large deficit in the early 1990s into surplus in
1999-2001, while the external imbalance soared anew. But increased
fiscal shortfalls, especially with the economy nearing full employment,
will intensify the need for foreign capital. The external deficit would
almost certainly rise further as a result.
Robert Rubin, former secretary of the Treasury, also stresses the
psychological importance for financial markets of expectations
concerning the American budget position. If that deficit is viewed as
likely to rise substantially, without any correction in sight,
confidence in America's financial instruments and currency could crack.
The dollar could fall sharply as it did in 1971-73, 1978-79, 1985-87
and 1994-95. Market interest rates would rise substantially and the
Federal Reserve would probably have to push them still higher to limit
the acceleration of inflation.
These risks could be intensified by the change in leadership that will
presumably take place at the Federal Reserve Board in less than two
years, inevitably creating new uncertainties after 25 years of superb
stewardship by Mr Volcker and Alan Greenspan. A very hard landing is
not inevitable but neither is it unlikely.
The third component of the “America problem” is trade protectionism.
The leading indicator of American protection is not the unemployment
rate, but rather overvaluation of the dollar and its attendant external
deficits, which sharply alter the politics of trade policy. It was
domestic political, rather than international financial, pressure that
forced previous administrations (Nixon in 1971, Reagan in 1985)
aggressively to seek dollar depreciation. The hubbub over outsourcing
and the launching of a spate of trade actions against China are the
latest cases in point. The current-account, and related budget,
imbalances may not be sustainable for much longer, even if foreign
investors and central banks prove willing to continue funding them for
a while.
The fourth big risk centres on China, which has accounted for over 20%
of world trade growth for the past three years. Fuelled by runaway
credit expansion and unsustainable levels of investment, which recently
approached half of GDP, Chinese growth must slow. The leadership that
took office in early 2003 ignored the problem for a year. It has
finally adopted a peculiar mix of market-related policies, such as
higher reserve requirements for the banks, and traditional
command-and-control directives, such as cessation of lending to certain
sectors. The ultimate success of these measures is highly uncertain.
Under the best of circumstances, China's expansion will decelerate
gradually but substantially from its recent 9-10% pace. When the
country cooled its last excessive boom after 1992, growth declined for
seven straight years. A truly hard landing could be much more abrupt
and severe. Either outcome will, to a degree, counter the inflationary
and interest-rate consequences of the other global risks. But a
slowdown, and especially a hard landing, in China would sharply
reinforce their dampening effects on world growth.
The fifth threat is energy prices. In the short run, the rapid growth
of world demand, low private inventories, shortages of refining and
other infrastructure (particularly in America), continued American
purchases for its strategic reserve and fears of supply disruptions
have outstripped the possibilities for increased production. Hence
prices have recently hit record highs in nominal terms. The impact is
extremely significant since every sustained rise of $10 per barrel in
the world price takes $250 billion-300 billion (equivalent to about
half a percentage point) off annual global growth for several years. Mr
Greenspan frequently notes that all three major post-war recessions
have been triggered by sharp increases in the price of oil.
My colleague Philip Verleger concludes that this lethal combination
could push the price to $60-70 per barrel over the next year or two,
perhaps exceeding the record high of 1980 in real terms. Gasoline
prices per gallon in America would rise from under $2 now to $2.60 in
2006. Prices would climb even more if political or terrorist events
were further to unsettle production in the Middle East, the former
Soviet Union or elsewhere.
Curtail the cartel
The more fundamental energy problem is the oligopolistic nature of the
market. The OPEC cartel in general, and dominant supplier Saudi Arabia
in particular, restrict supply in the short run and output capacity in
the long run to maintain prices far above what a competitive market
would generate. They do not always succeed and indeed have suffered
several sharp price falls over the past three decades. They are often
unable to counter excessive price escalation when they want to, as at
present.
Primarily due to the cartel, however, the world price has averaged
about twice the cost of production over the past three decades. The
recent price above $40 per barrel compares with production charges of
$15-20 per barrel in the highest-cost locales and much lower marginal
costs in many OPEC countries. This underlying problem also looks likely
to get worse, as the Saudis have talked openly about increasing their
target range from the traditional $22-28 per barrel to $30-40.
There is a high probability that one or more of these risks to global
prosperity and stability will eventuate. The consequences for the world
economy of several of them reinforcing each other are potentially
disastrous. All five risks can be avoided, however, or their adverse
effects at least substantially dampened, by timely policy actions. The
most important single step is for the president of the United States to
present and aggressively pursue a credible programme to cut the federal
budget deficit at least in half over the coming four years and to
sustain the improvement thereafter. This will require a combination of
spending cuts, revenue increases and procedural changes (including the
restoration of “PAYGO” rules in Congress), as well as rapid economic
growth.
Such a programme would maximise the prospects for maintaining solid
growth in America and the world by avoiding the crowding out of
private-sector investment and by reducing the likelihood of higher
interest rates. It would represent the best insurance against a hard
landing via the dollar, by buttressing global confidence in the
American economy. It should be feasible, having been more than
accomplished during the 1990s. Its absence would virtually assure
realisation of at least some of the inter-related global risks within
the next presidential term.
An energy stability pact
America and its allies must also move decisively on energy. Sales from
their strategic reserves, which total about 1.3 billion barrels
(including 700m in the United States), would reverse the recent price
increases for at least a while and demonstrate a willingness to counter
OPEC. For the longer run, America must expand production (including in
Alaska) and increase conservation (especially for motor vehicles).
Democrats and Republicans must together take the political heat of
establishing a gasoline, carbon or energy tax that will limit
consumption, help protect the environment and reduce the need for
future military interventions abroad.
All three major post-war recessions have been triggered by sharp
increases in the price of oil
The most effective “jobs programme” for any American administration and
the world as a whole, however, would be an initiative to align the
global oil price with levels that would result from market forces.
America should therefore seek agreement among importing countries
(including China, India and other large developing importers as well as
industrialised members of the International Energy Agency) to offer the
producers an agreement to stabilise prices within a fairly wide range
centred at about $20 per barrel.
Consumers would buy for their reserves to avoid declines below the
floor of the range and sell from those reserves to preserve its
ceiling. A sustained cut of $20 per barrel in the world price could add
a full percentage point to annual global growth for at least several
years. The resultant stabilisation of price swings would avoid the
periodic spikes (in both directions) that tend to trigger huge economic
disruption. Producers would benefit from these global economic gains,
from their new protection against sharp price falls and from trade
concessions that could be included in the compact to help them
diversify their economies.
China must also play a central role in protecting the global outlook.
Fortunately, it can resolve its internal overheating problem and
contribute substantially to the needed global rebalancing through the
single step of revaluing the renminbi by 20-25%. Such a currency
adjustment would simultaneously address all of China's domestic
troubles: dampening demand (for its exports) by enough to cut economic
growth to the official target of 7%; countering inflation (now
approaching double digits for inter-company transactions) directly by
cutting prices of imports; and checking the inflow of speculative
capital that fuels monetary expansion.
A sizeable renminbi revaluation is also crucial for global adjustment
because much of the further fall of the dollar needs to take place
against the East Asian currencies. These have risen little if at all,
although their countries run the bulk of the world's trade surpluses.
China has greatly intensified the problem by maintaining its dollar peg
and riding the dollar down against most other currencies, further
improving its competitiveness. Other Asian countries, from Japan
through India, have thus intervened massively to keep their currencies
from appreciating against the dollar (and, with it, against the
renminbi). This has severely limited correction of the American deficit
and thrown the corresponding surplus reduction on to Europe and a few
others with freely flexible exchange rates. China should reject the
US/G-7/IMF advice to float its currency, which is far too risky in
light of its weak banking system and could even produce a weaker
renminbi, and opt instead for a
substantial one-shot revaluation. It should in fact take the lead in
working out an “Asian Plaza Agreement” to ensure that all the major
Asian countries make their necessary contributions to global adjustment.
Countries that undergo currency appreciation, and thus face reductions
in their trade surpluses, will need to expand domestic demand to
sustain global growth. China need not do so now because it must cool
its overheated economy. But the other surplus countries, including
Japan and the euro area, will have to implement structural reforms and
new macroeconomic policies to pick up the slack. America and the
surplus countries should also work together to forge a successful Doha
round, renewing the momentum of trade liberalisation and reducing the
risks of protectionist backsliding.
Risk in our times
The global economy faces a number of major risks that, especially in
combination, could throw it back into rapid inflation, high interest
rates, much slower growth or even recession, rising unemployment,
currency conflict and protectionism. Even worse contingencies could of
course be envisaged: a terrorist attack with far larger economic
repercussions than September 11th or a sharp slowdown in American
productivity growth, as occurred after the oil shocks of the 1970s,
that would further undermine the outlook for both economic expansion
and the dollar.
Fortunately, policy initiatives are available that would avoid or
minimise the costs of the most evident risks. America will be central
to achieving such an outcome and the president and Congress will have
to decide in early 2005 whether to address these problems aggressively
or simply avert their eyes and hope for the best, taking major risks
with their own political futures as well as with the world economy.
China will have to play a new and decisive leadership role. The major
oil producers and the other large economies must do their part. The
outlook for the global economy for at least the next few years hangs in
the balance.
Fred Bergsten
Il capitalismo è la causa strutturale della guerra
1. Il vero fantasma di Monaco `38 (Luigi Cavallaro / Il Manifesto)
2. The Economist: The risks ahead for the world economy (Fred Bergsten)
=== 1 ===
http://www.ilmanifesto.it/
il manifesto - 21 Settembre 2004
GUERRA
Il vero fantasma di Monaco `38
LUIGI CAVALLARO
Il 29 settembre 1938, i capi di stato di due importanti paesi europei
si recarono a Monaco, a trovare un loro collega che, nel breve volgere
di cinque anni da quando era stato democraticamente eletto, aveva
finanziato su larga scala il riarmo del proprio paese e promosso una
politica estera aggressiva e destabilizzante nell'intera Europa
centrale, culminata qualche mese prima nell'annessione coatta di uno
stato sovrano. Il nobile intento degli statisti in visita in Baviera
era di indurre quel loro collega a più miti consigli, ricercando con
lui una strategia multilaterale che gli consentisse di perseguire
comunque quelli che essi stessi consideravano suoi legittimi interessi;
e certo pesava la consapevolezza che nessuna pacificazione duratura -
nessun appeasement, come si disse - era possibile se non con il suo
consenso. Il 30 settembre dal virtuoso consesso sortì un accordo.
Commentandolo, Winston Churchill disse che le potenze europee potevano
scegliere tra la vergogna e la guerra, e avrebbero avuto entrambe
(Churchill qualche anno dopo avrebbe trescato col padrone di casa di
Monaco e col suo italico servitore per negoziare un ribaltone che
ricacciasse i russi ben oltre l'Elba; ma questo è un altra storia).
Sessantasei anni dopo c'è il presidente di uno stato assai importante
che si proclama war president, ha fatto letteralmente esplodere la
spesa militare, ha mosso guerra a due stati senza esserne attaccato e,
in generale, sta esercitando una funzione destabilizzante in tutto il
Medio Oriente, la cui situazione è ancora più torbidamente complessa di
quanto non fosse l'Europa centrale nel 1938. E ci sono capi di stato
che cercano di indurlo a più miti consigli e a ricercare una strategia
non unilaterale per tutelare i suoi legittimi interessi (inclusi il
controllo dell'approvvigionamento energetico mondiale e un signoraggio
monetario che gli consenta di esportare all'estero le contraddizioni
del proprio modello di crescita). Come i loro colleghi d'allora, essi
sono realisti: sono cioè consapevoli che non c'è oggi alcuna pace
possibile senza il consenso di questo collega dai modi un po' cowboy. E
altrettanto realisti sono gli aspiranti statisti attualmente
all'opposizione nel nostro paese: sperano vivamente che alle prossime
elezioni costui possa essere sconfitto dal suo avversario (un tipo così
progressista da aver sostenuto già sette anni fa, in un libro, quel che
il presidente in carica sta praticando), ma non si tirano indietro
nemmeno di fronte a una (probabile) rielezione del war president
attuale, al punto che hanno intrapreso in patria un dialogo costruttivo
con colui che ne è il più fiero e zelante difensore e alleato. Oggi
come ieri questi eventi non maturano nel vuoto, ma nel pieno di una
deflazione mondiale, che ha sancito il ritorno in auge di una politica
economica che gli inglesi chiamano beggar-thy-neighbour e testimonia
ancora una volta dell'incapacità del capitalismo di risolvere le
contraddizioni prodotte dal suo sviluppo incontrollato, dalla
disoccupazione alla distribuzione arbitraria e iniqua delle ricchezze e
dei redditi. È ozioso chiedersi se avremo la guerra o la vergogna:
abbiamo già tutt'e due. È certo invece che questo è l'unico modo
sensato di evocare oggi lo spettro dell'appeasement. Ogni diverso
paragone, che sfrutti l'emozione creata da un terrorismo brutale che è
solo il ritorno di fiamma di un imperialismo nato molto prima, è frutto
di corta memoria e/o lunga malafede.
=== 2 ===
(dalla lista: marxiana @yahoogroups.com )
The risks ahead for the world economy
Sep 9th 2004
From The Economist print edition
Fred Bergsten explains why policymakers need to act now in order to
avert the danger of serious damage to the world economy
FIVE major risks threaten the world economy. Three centre on the United
States: renewed sharp increases in the current-account deficit leading
to a crash of the dollar; a budget profile that is out of control; and
an outbreak of trade protectionism. A fourth relates to China, which
faces a possible hard landing from its recent overheating. The fifth is
that oil prices could rise to $60-70 per barrel even without a major
political or terrorist disruption, and much higher with one.
Most of these risks reinforce each other. A further oil shock, a dollar
collapse and a soaring American budget deficit would all generate much
higher inflation and interest rates. A sharp dollar decline would
increase the likelihood of further oil price rises. Larger budget
deficits will produce larger American trade deficits, and thus more
protectionism and dollar vulnerability. Realisation of any one of the
five risks could substantially reduce world growth. If two or three,
let alone all five, were to occur in combination then they would
radically reverse the global outlook.
There is still time to head off each of these risks. Decisions made in
America immediately after this year's elections will be pivotal. China,
the new growth locomotive, is key to resolving the global trade
imbalances and must play a central role in future. Action by a number
of other countries will be essential to maintain global growth and to
avoid deeper oil shocks and new trade restrictions.
The most alarming new prospect is another sharp deterioration in
America's current-account deficit. It has already reached an annual
rate of $600 billion, well above 5% of the economy. New projections by
my colleague Catherine Mann (see chart 1) suggest it will now be rising
again by a full percentage point of GDP per year, as actually occurred
in 1997-2000. On such a trajectory, the deficit would exceed $1
trillion per year by 2010.
There are three reasons for this dismal prospect. First, American
merchandise imports are now almost twice as large as exports; hence
exports would have to grow twice as fast as imports merely to halt the
deterioration. (In the past, such a relationship occurred only after
the massive fall experienced by the dollar in 1985-87.) Second,
economic growth is likely to remain faster in America than in its major
markets and higher incomes there increase demand for imports much
faster than income growth elsewhere increases demand for American
exports. Third, America's large debtor position (it currently is in the
red by more than $2.5 trillion) means that its net investment income
payments to foreigners will escalate steadily, especially as interest
rates rise.
Of course, it is virtually inconceivable that the markets will permit
such deficits to eventuate. The only issue is how they are to be
averted. An immediate resumption of the gradual decline of the dollar,
as in the period 2002-03, cumulating in a fall of at least another 20%,
is needed to reduce the deficits to sustainable levels.
If delayed much longer, the dollar's inevitable fall is likely to be
much larger and much faster. Moreover, much of the slack in America's
product and labour markets will probably have disappeared in a year or
so. Sharp dollar depreciation at that stage would push up inflation and
macroeconomic models suggest that American interest rates could even
hit double digits.
The situation would be still worse if future increases in energy prices
and the budget deficit compound such developments, as they surely
could. The negative impact would also be much greater in other
countries because of their need to generate larger and faster domestic
demand increases in order to offset declining trade surpluses.
Fears of a hard landing for the dollar and the world economy are of
course not new. The situation is much more ominous today, however,
because of the record current-account deficits and international debt,
and the high probability of further rapid increases in both. The
potential escalation of oil prices suggests a parallel with the dollar
declines of the 1970s, which were associated with stagflation, rather
than the 1980s when a sharp fall in energy costs and inflation
cushioned dollar depreciation (but still produced higher interest rates
and Black Monday for the stockmarket). Paul Volcker, former chairman of
the Federal Reserve, predicts with 75% probability a sharp fall in the
dollar within five years.
The prospects for the budget deficit and trade protectionism further
darken the picture. Official projections score the fiscal imbalance at
a cumulative $5 trillion over the next decade, but exclude probable
increases in overseas military and homeland-security expenditures,
extension of the recent tax cuts and new entitlement increases proposed
by both presidential candidates. This deficit could also approach $1
trillion per year (see chart 2), yet there is no serious discussion of
how to restore fiscal responsibility, let alone an agreed strategy for
reining in runaway entitlement programmes (especially Medicare).
Different deficits
The budget and current-account deficits are not “twin”. The budget in
fact moved from large deficit in the early 1990s into surplus in
1999-2001, while the external imbalance soared anew. But increased
fiscal shortfalls, especially with the economy nearing full employment,
will intensify the need for foreign capital. The external deficit would
almost certainly rise further as a result.
Robert Rubin, former secretary of the Treasury, also stresses the
psychological importance for financial markets of expectations
concerning the American budget position. If that deficit is viewed as
likely to rise substantially, without any correction in sight,
confidence in America's financial instruments and currency could crack.
The dollar could fall sharply as it did in 1971-73, 1978-79, 1985-87
and 1994-95. Market interest rates would rise substantially and the
Federal Reserve would probably have to push them still higher to limit
the acceleration of inflation.
These risks could be intensified by the change in leadership that will
presumably take place at the Federal Reserve Board in less than two
years, inevitably creating new uncertainties after 25 years of superb
stewardship by Mr Volcker and Alan Greenspan. A very hard landing is
not inevitable but neither is it unlikely.
The third component of the “America problem” is trade protectionism.
The leading indicator of American protection is not the unemployment
rate, but rather overvaluation of the dollar and its attendant external
deficits, which sharply alter the politics of trade policy. It was
domestic political, rather than international financial, pressure that
forced previous administrations (Nixon in 1971, Reagan in 1985)
aggressively to seek dollar depreciation. The hubbub over outsourcing
and the launching of a spate of trade actions against China are the
latest cases in point. The current-account, and related budget,
imbalances may not be sustainable for much longer, even if foreign
investors and central banks prove willing to continue funding them for
a while.
The fourth big risk centres on China, which has accounted for over 20%
of world trade growth for the past three years. Fuelled by runaway
credit expansion and unsustainable levels of investment, which recently
approached half of GDP, Chinese growth must slow. The leadership that
took office in early 2003 ignored the problem for a year. It has
finally adopted a peculiar mix of market-related policies, such as
higher reserve requirements for the banks, and traditional
command-and-control directives, such as cessation of lending to certain
sectors. The ultimate success of these measures is highly uncertain.
Under the best of circumstances, China's expansion will decelerate
gradually but substantially from its recent 9-10% pace. When the
country cooled its last excessive boom after 1992, growth declined for
seven straight years. A truly hard landing could be much more abrupt
and severe. Either outcome will, to a degree, counter the inflationary
and interest-rate consequences of the other global risks. But a
slowdown, and especially a hard landing, in China would sharply
reinforce their dampening effects on world growth.
The fifth threat is energy prices. In the short run, the rapid growth
of world demand, low private inventories, shortages of refining and
other infrastructure (particularly in America), continued American
purchases for its strategic reserve and fears of supply disruptions
have outstripped the possibilities for increased production. Hence
prices have recently hit record highs in nominal terms. The impact is
extremely significant since every sustained rise of $10 per barrel in
the world price takes $250 billion-300 billion (equivalent to about
half a percentage point) off annual global growth for several years. Mr
Greenspan frequently notes that all three major post-war recessions
have been triggered by sharp increases in the price of oil.
My colleague Philip Verleger concludes that this lethal combination
could push the price to $60-70 per barrel over the next year or two,
perhaps exceeding the record high of 1980 in real terms. Gasoline
prices per gallon in America would rise from under $2 now to $2.60 in
2006. Prices would climb even more if political or terrorist events
were further to unsettle production in the Middle East, the former
Soviet Union or elsewhere.
Curtail the cartel
The more fundamental energy problem is the oligopolistic nature of the
market. The OPEC cartel in general, and dominant supplier Saudi Arabia
in particular, restrict supply in the short run and output capacity in
the long run to maintain prices far above what a competitive market
would generate. They do not always succeed and indeed have suffered
several sharp price falls over the past three decades. They are often
unable to counter excessive price escalation when they want to, as at
present.
Primarily due to the cartel, however, the world price has averaged
about twice the cost of production over the past three decades. The
recent price above $40 per barrel compares with production charges of
$15-20 per barrel in the highest-cost locales and much lower marginal
costs in many OPEC countries. This underlying problem also looks likely
to get worse, as the Saudis have talked openly about increasing their
target range from the traditional $22-28 per barrel to $30-40.
There is a high probability that one or more of these risks to global
prosperity and stability will eventuate. The consequences for the world
economy of several of them reinforcing each other are potentially
disastrous. All five risks can be avoided, however, or their adverse
effects at least substantially dampened, by timely policy actions. The
most important single step is for the president of the United States to
present and aggressively pursue a credible programme to cut the federal
budget deficit at least in half over the coming four years and to
sustain the improvement thereafter. This will require a combination of
spending cuts, revenue increases and procedural changes (including the
restoration of “PAYGO” rules in Congress), as well as rapid economic
growth.
Such a programme would maximise the prospects for maintaining solid
growth in America and the world by avoiding the crowding out of
private-sector investment and by reducing the likelihood of higher
interest rates. It would represent the best insurance against a hard
landing via the dollar, by buttressing global confidence in the
American economy. It should be feasible, having been more than
accomplished during the 1990s. Its absence would virtually assure
realisation of at least some of the inter-related global risks within
the next presidential term.
An energy stability pact
America and its allies must also move decisively on energy. Sales from
their strategic reserves, which total about 1.3 billion barrels
(including 700m in the United States), would reverse the recent price
increases for at least a while and demonstrate a willingness to counter
OPEC. For the longer run, America must expand production (including in
Alaska) and increase conservation (especially for motor vehicles).
Democrats and Republicans must together take the political heat of
establishing a gasoline, carbon or energy tax that will limit
consumption, help protect the environment and reduce the need for
future military interventions abroad.
All three major post-war recessions have been triggered by sharp
increases in the price of oil
The most effective “jobs programme” for any American administration and
the world as a whole, however, would be an initiative to align the
global oil price with levels that would result from market forces.
America should therefore seek agreement among importing countries
(including China, India and other large developing importers as well as
industrialised members of the International Energy Agency) to offer the
producers an agreement to stabilise prices within a fairly wide range
centred at about $20 per barrel.
Consumers would buy for their reserves to avoid declines below the
floor of the range and sell from those reserves to preserve its
ceiling. A sustained cut of $20 per barrel in the world price could add
a full percentage point to annual global growth for at least several
years. The resultant stabilisation of price swings would avoid the
periodic spikes (in both directions) that tend to trigger huge economic
disruption. Producers would benefit from these global economic gains,
from their new protection against sharp price falls and from trade
concessions that could be included in the compact to help them
diversify their economies.
China must also play a central role in protecting the global outlook.
Fortunately, it can resolve its internal overheating problem and
contribute substantially to the needed global rebalancing through the
single step of revaluing the renminbi by 20-25%. Such a currency
adjustment would simultaneously address all of China's domestic
troubles: dampening demand (for its exports) by enough to cut economic
growth to the official target of 7%; countering inflation (now
approaching double digits for inter-company transactions) directly by
cutting prices of imports; and checking the inflow of speculative
capital that fuels monetary expansion.
A sizeable renminbi revaluation is also crucial for global adjustment
because much of the further fall of the dollar needs to take place
against the East Asian currencies. These have risen little if at all,
although their countries run the bulk of the world's trade surpluses.
China has greatly intensified the problem by maintaining its dollar peg
and riding the dollar down against most other currencies, further
improving its competitiveness. Other Asian countries, from Japan
through India, have thus intervened massively to keep their currencies
from appreciating against the dollar (and, with it, against the
renminbi). This has severely limited correction of the American deficit
and thrown the corresponding surplus reduction on to Europe and a few
others with freely flexible exchange rates. China should reject the
US/G-7/IMF advice to float its currency, which is far too risky in
light of its weak banking system and could even produce a weaker
renminbi, and opt instead for a
substantial one-shot revaluation. It should in fact take the lead in
working out an “Asian Plaza Agreement” to ensure that all the major
Asian countries make their necessary contributions to global adjustment.
Countries that undergo currency appreciation, and thus face reductions
in their trade surpluses, will need to expand domestic demand to
sustain global growth. China need not do so now because it must cool
its overheated economy. But the other surplus countries, including
Japan and the euro area, will have to implement structural reforms and
new macroeconomic policies to pick up the slack. America and the
surplus countries should also work together to forge a successful Doha
round, renewing the momentum of trade liberalisation and reducing the
risks of protectionist backsliding.
Risk in our times
The global economy faces a number of major risks that, especially in
combination, could throw it back into rapid inflation, high interest
rates, much slower growth or even recession, rising unemployment,
currency conflict and protectionism. Even worse contingencies could of
course be envisaged: a terrorist attack with far larger economic
repercussions than September 11th or a sharp slowdown in American
productivity growth, as occurred after the oil shocks of the 1970s,
that would further undermine the outlook for both economic expansion
and the dollar.
Fortunately, policy initiatives are available that would avoid or
minimise the costs of the most evident risks. America will be central
to achieving such an outcome and the president and Congress will have
to decide in early 2005 whether to address these problems aggressively
or simply avert their eyes and hope for the best, taking major risks
with their own political futures as well as with the world economy.
China will have to play a new and decisive leadership role. The major
oil producers and the other large economies must do their part. The
outlook for the global economy for at least the next few years hangs in
the balance.
Fred Bergsten
