Beograd: Sahranjena Jovanka Broz

[Der originaler Text:

Unser Mann, der Gotteskrieger

Ein BND-Informant gehörte zu den Rädelsführern der antiserbischen Pogrome im Kosovo.

Von Jürgen Elsässer - FreiTag, 26.11.2004

kann man an folgender URL lesen:

http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/4067 ]

FreiTag, 26.11.2004

Il nostro uomo, un guerriero di Dio

Un informatore del BND era tra quelli che hanno tirato i fili del pogrom antiserbo in Kosovo

di Juergen Elsaesser
FreiTag, 26.11.2004

Il 17 e 18 marzo del 2004 si è verificato in Kosovo un pogrom in piena regola contro i serbi ed altri non-albanesi, la peggiore esplosione di violenza avvenuta dalla fine della guerra nell'estate del 1999. Ci sono state 19 persone uccise (in un primo momento si parlava perfino di 31 vittime) e circa 1000 feriti, oltre a 30 monasteri/chiese ortodosse e 500 case serbe demolite, e 4500 non-albanesi cacciati via.

La scorsa settimana sul notiziario ZDF-Heute [della seconda rete televisiva tedesca, ndT] un agente al soldo dei servizi segreti tedeschi (BND) ha ammesso di essere stato tra i principali artefici dell’”incendio” di marzo [2004]. Si tratta di Samedin Xhezairi che nell’esercito clandestino albanese UCK operava con il nome di battaglia “comandante Hodza”. L’uomo ha combattuto nel 1999 nella 171.brigata dell’ UCK contro i serbi. Dopo che questa guerra del 1999 con l’aiuto della NATO è stata vinta, Xhezairi ha passato la frontiera ed ha preso parte nella primavera del 2001 alla 112. brigata nell’insurrezione dell’UCK in Macedonia. Lì ha comandato un’unità composta da altri stranieri, guerrieri di Dio, nella regione di Tetovo. Quando nel giugno 2001 quest’unità è stata accerchiata dall’esercito macedone vicino ad Aracinovo, l'esercito degli USA l'ha sciolta. Con Xhezairi e i suoi mudjaheddin si sono salvati altri 17 consiglieri militari statunitensi.

Xhezairi – come mostrano i documenti della NATO resi pubblici dalla ZDF - attualmente è coordinatore di una rete segreta composta da appartenenti del formalmente sciolto UCK che oggi operano nel Corpo di Protezione del Kosovo e nella Polizia kosovara, dunque nelle organizzazioni riconosciute dalla amministrazione ONU (UNMIK) e dalle truppe d’occupazione dirette dalla NATO (KFOR). Mediante questa rete è stato sobillato il pogrom di marzo. Xhezairi stesso ha dato ordini ai terroristi a Prizren e Urosevac. Ma la NATO sospetta allo stesso tempo che egli abbia buoni contatti con AlQaida e con Hezbollah.

Anche se le forze mercenarie di Pullach [sede del BND, ndT] avrebbero agito nella sommossa antiserba senza consultarsi con i loro mandanti, rimane però un'altra accusa, confermata da tre testimoni. Il BND avrebbe sorvegliato le conversazioni telefoniche dell’uomo e perciò prima del pogrom era a conoscenza del progetto. Perchè da Pullach non hanno informato le truppe di protezione della KFOR in Kosovo o almeno il contingente delle forze armate tedesche stanziato lì?

Forse perchè al governo federale tedesco sta bene se i serbi vengono cacciati via e il nodo kosovaro si può così finalmente sciogliere, senza proteste da parte di minoranze noiose, alla vecchia maniera tedesca – “la Serbia deve morire“ [nell'originale:“Serbien muß sterbien” - lo slogan in rima forzata che indicava l’intenzione delle forze occupanti austriache e tedesche nei confronti della Serbia nella Prima e nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, ndT]. Il ministro della difesa Peter Struck si è già più volte espresso per una “soluzione della questione dello status”, come se lo status della Provincia [di Kosovo e Metohija] nella Risoluzione ONU 1244 non fosse già del tutto chiarito – lì è attestata palesemente la sua appartenenza alla Serbia-Montenegro secondo il diritto internazionale. L’amico di partito di Struck, il presidente del SPD Franz Müntefering, a fine agosto 2004 ha preso posizione molto esplicitamente “che il Kosovo è in grado di essere uno Stato indipendente”. Anche la attivista per la politica estera della SPD Uta Zapf si è subito entusiasmata sulla questione dell’”indipendenza kosovara”: “Un tale Stato sovrano sarà poi incorporato nelle strutture europee”. La più insolente proposta è venuta dalla FDP che ha caldeggiato l’annessione del Kosovo alla UE. Il territorio dovrebbe essere ceduto all’”Europa” come “amministrazione fiduciaria”, è scritto nella proposta che il deputato FDP Rainer Stinner ha lanciato nell’aprile 2004. “La sovranità del Kosovo passerebbe poi all'Europa”. Stinner ha detto alla redazione del portale internet german-foreign-policy.com che dopo l’annessione “un capo europeo si occuperà della politica estera e di difesa” del Kosovo. Questo lavoro potrebbe forse farlo l’eterno traffichino Guido Westerwelle. O forse si dovrebbe lasciare la piccola repubblichetta musulmana sotto la protezione della nuova nazione membro dell’UE, la Turchia? Le proposte sono tante. Il fatto però è che i serbi danno ancora fastidio. Ma per questo abbiamo gente come Xhezairi.

[trad. di M. Jovanovic Pisani, rev. di A.M. per CNJ-onlus]

Syria, Sarin, and Casus Belli   

by Michael Parenti

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced that on August 21 the Assad government slaughtered 1,429 people, including 426 children, in a sarin chemical attack in Ghouta, a Damascus suburb. (Doctors Without Borders put the total at about 300.)  Secretary Kerry insisted that now the United States had no choice but to launch U.S. bombing attacks against President Bashar al-Assad, devolving into another of America's "humanitarian wars."

The Sarin Mysteries

Following Kerry, President Obama announced that the situation in Syria had changed irredeemably since August 21. The United States would have to attack. But, on second thought, Obama decided to leave the decision up to (a seemingly reluctant) Congress.

A few weeks later, Turkish prosecutors issued a lengthy court indictment charging the Syrian rebels with seeking to use chemical weapons. The indictment suggested that sarin gas and other "weapons for a terrorist organization" were utilized by the opposition and not by the Assad government.

The "Syrian freedom fighters" include men who are not even Syrian, much like the many mujahedeen who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan but who were not Afghani. As reported in the Wall Street Journal (September 19, 2013),  the ISIS, an Iraqi al Qaeda outfit operating in Syria, "has become a magnet for foreign jihadists" who view the war in Syria not primarily as a means to overthrow Assad "but rather as a historic battleground for a larger Sunni holy war.  According to centuries-old Islamic prophecy they espouse, they must establish an Islamic state in Syria as a step to achieving a global one."

The United States claims it provides military assistance only to "vetted" rebel groups, "free ones" that are friendly toward America and are not Islamic fanatics. (Although, as Senator Croker, Republican from Tennessee, admitted: we sometimes make "mistakes" and give weapons to the wrong rebels.) On September 17, President Obama waived a provision in the federal law that prohibits supplying arms to terrorist groups. To many of us this was an unspoken admission that Washington was giving aid to extremist Islamic groups, of which al Qaeda was only the best advertised.

Remember the Casus Belli

It is difficult for me to accept the charge that on August 21 the Syrian government waged a chemical onslaught in Ghouta against its own people in a situation that was bound to backfire in the worst possible way---by handing over to the U.S. war hawks a casus belli, a perfect  excuse to wreak retaliatory "humanitarian" death and destruction upon Syria. This is the last thing the Assad government wants.

Remember how the Spaniards asked the Americans not to send the USS Maine to Havana Harbor in 1898. They feared that something might happen to the ship and the U.S. would use that mishap as a casus belli, putting the blame on Spain. Sure enough, the Maine blew up while sitting in the harbor, sending U.S. public opinion into a jingoistic fury against the Spaniards. But why would Spaniards perpetrate the very act that would give the Americans an excuse and an inducement to wage a war that Spain most certainly did not want and could not win?

And let us not forget the hundreds of imaginary Kuwaiti babies torn from incubators and dashed upon hospital floors by snarling, maniacal Iraqi soldiers. And remember the never-to-be-found weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that Saddam supposedly was preparing to use but never got around to doing so. And then there's that Serbian general---never identified or located---who purportedly told his troops (also never identified) to "go forth and rape." And Qaddafi who reportedly handed out Viagra to his Libyan troops so they could go forth and rape with a drug-driven vigor, a story so obviously fabricated that it was dropped after two days.

Choice: Satellite or Enemy

Why do (some) U.S. leaders seek war against Syria? Like Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya and dozens of other countries that have felt America's terrible swift sword---Syria has been committing economic nationalism, trying to chart its own course rather than putting itself in service to the western plutocracy. Like Iran, China, Russia and some other nations, Syria has currency controls and other restrictions on foreign investments. Like those other nations, Syria lacks the proper submissiveness. It is not a satellite to the U.S. imperium. And any nation that is not under the politico-economic sway of the U.S. global plutocracy is considered an enemy or a potential enemy.

The Assad government had social programs for its people, far from perfect services but still better than what might be found in many U.S. satellite countries. When Iraqi refugees fled to Syria to escape U.S. military destruction, the Assad government gave them full benefits. So with the Libyan refugees who crossed over a few years later. Generally Damascus presided over a multi-ethnic society, relatively free of sectarian intolerance and violence.

Syria has been ruled by the Ba'ath Party which has dominated the country's parliament and military for half a century. The party's slogan is "Unity, Freedom, Socialism." Socialism?  Now that gets us closer to why the trigger-happy boys in Washington will continue to pursue a "humanitarian war" of attrition and a prolonged campaign of demonization against Assad and his  "regime."

Weapons of Mass Destruction Redux

On September 10, the Syrian governmentwelcomed a Russian proposal calling for Syria to place all of its chemical weapons under international control and for the weapons to be destroyed.  Here was a chance to avoid false charges of mass murder by sarin. If Assad no longer had such an arsenal, no one could accuse him of using it. (In any case, the Syrian government's campaign against the rebels was going well enough using just conventional weapons.)

Instead of winning approval from the humanitarian warriors of the West, Syria's eager agreement to surrender its chemical arsenal set off a newly framed barrage of threats from U.S. and French leaders, with the irrepressible Secretary Kerry leading the charge.

Was this a ploy on Syria's part or a genuine offer? Kerry asked in a scoffing tone. How can we be certain that Assad would not sequester its enormous stock of chemical weapons? Kerry issued a whole barrage of tough-guy threats. Syria will be treated most harshly if it pursued a path of deception. French President François Hollande called for a United Nations Security resolution that would authorize the use of force if Syria failed to hand over its chemical weapons. One would think that Syria had refused to do so.

 The August charge had been that Syria had used chemical weapons , a claim that might be refuted. Now the new charge was that Syria possessed such weapons---which was true. And possession itself was suddenly being treated as a crime deserving of swift and severe retaliation.

Now Assad would have to demonstrate the indemonstrable. He would have to convince the western aggressors that he has handed over his entire stockpile of chemical weapons. At the same time, he asserts that a thorough inspection must not come at the expense of disclosing Syrian military sites or causing a threatto its national security.

Recall how the Saddam government in Iraq, hoping to avoid war, cooperated fully with U.N. inspectors hunting for WMDs. Every facility in the country was opened to investigation. Even after all of Iraq was occupied, the hunt continued. We were told that the WMDs could be anywhere, maybe out in some remote part of the desert. It was impossible to be sure.

I fear that the Syrian population is facing more years of painful attrition. The one faintly positive development is that the FSA and the ISIS and all the murderous, Allah-is-great grouplets continue to attack not only the government forces but each other. Dozens of rebels have been killed in clashes with each other within the last few months.

Meanwhile young Syrian children, now living in refugee camps in Lebanon, go every morning to work long days in the fields, earning the few dollars a day upon which their families depend for survival. Some are as young as 5. When asked what they miss most about Syria, the children say, "school."   

_________

Michael Parenti is the author of The Face of Imperialism and Waiting for Yesterday. See his website for more information: www.michaelparenti.org

In che direzione sta andando il Tribunale dell’Aja?

Scritto da Sense Agency

 L’Aja 11/07/2013

La Corte per il processo Gotovina

“Presunzione di infallibilità”,questa è la definizione che descrive i giudici in assenza di un’ulteriore istanza di appello alle loro sentenze, ma che non li dovrebbe proteggere dall’opinione pubblica preoccupata e critica nei loro confronti, che protesta contro il “nuovo corso” che stanno intraprendendo negli ultimi mesi presso il Tribunale dell’Aja e ad Arusha negli ultimi mesi.

Ha fatto scalpore la lettera del giudice Harhoff, che però fa passare in secondo piano lo sconcerto e le proteste contro la piega che sta assumendo il Tribunale dell’Aja, che sono state sollevate prima del 13 luglio 2013, data della pubblicazione della lettera, e che han avuto molta eco sui media danesi e poi nel resto del mondo.

Nelle battute di apertura della lettera che ha mandato a 56 fra amici e colleghi il 6 giugno, Harhoff fa riferimento a due recenti articoli, che “mettono a fuoco eventi che han causato molta preoccupazione sia per me che per i miei colleghi del tribunale”. Tenendo presente le date, possiamo presumere che si riferisse all’articolo intitolato “Cosa accade al tribunale dell’Aja” di Eric Gordy, pubblicato sul New York Times il 2 giugno e un post intitolato “Due sentenze sconcertanti all’Aja”, firmato da T.J. e pubblicato il 1° giugno sul sito dell’Economist.

Se avesse aspettato un altro giorno a mandare la lettera, avrebbe potuto citare un’altra fonte, cioè quella scritta dall’ex assistente al Segretario di Stato USA John Shattuck, un provato e fedele amico del Tribunale, che prese parte alla sua creazione. Nel suo articolo “Crimini di guerra insabbiati”, pubblicato il 7 giugno sul Boston Globe, Shattuck afferma che “se la maggioranza dei giudici dell’ ICTY fosse stata al processo di Norimberga, pochi, anzi pochissimi, capi nazisti sarebbero stati incriminati”.

Contrariamente a chi dice che il problema è stato ingigantito dal giudice “talpa”, piuttosto che dal presunto cambiamento di corso che lo stesso poneva all’attenzione, non è stato il giudice Harnoff a introdurre al pubblico dibattito i recenti sviluppi del tribunale. Negli ultimi mesi, centinaia, se non migliaia di articoli e analisi sono stati pubblicati sulla direzione intrapresa dal Tribunale. Sono stati più severi della lettera di Harnoff.  Sono state firmate petizioni, richieste inchieste, chieste dimissioni senza che ciò abbia portato a dei risultati. Nemmeno uno dei pezzi grossi del Tribunale ha prestato attenzione a tutto ciò. “Sarà dimenticato”, hanno detto. Tuttavia non lo è.

Il dibattito su quanto accaduto fu lanciato lo scorso novembre, dopo la prima controversa sentenza che assolse i generali croati Gotovina e Markac grazie ad una maggioranza risicata di voti (3 contro 2). Le prime “salve” del dibattito furono sparate dai giudici Pocar e Angius, che non han tenuto toni moderati nell’esprimere la loro opinione contraria. Hanno definito la ricerca della maggioranza (giudici Meron, Robinson, Guney) come “semplicemente grottesca” e “in contraddizione con ogni senso di giustizia”, hanno poi affermato con schiettezza che la maggioranza è stata guidata da motivi differenti da quelli che concernono la tutela della legalità.

Il dibattito è proseguito ininterrotto, per divenire sempre più acceso dopo l’assoluzione del generale dell’esercito jugoslavo Perisic, fino ad infiammarsi dopo l’assoluzione dei capi dei servizi segreti serbi Stanisic e Simatovic. Si sono visti simili sviluppi al Tribunale del Rwanda che ha in comune le camere d’appello, e che è stato oggetto di polemiche e proteste sul nuovo corso assunto dopo le recenti sentenze.

Sta agli esperti di diritto internazionale, che si stanno occupando del caso dallo scorso novembre, analizzare e capire se il Tribunale sta veramente prendendo un nuovo indirizzo, chi ne trarrà beneficio e che impatto vi sarà per la giurisprudenza. In questa sede vogliamo solamente porre in rilievo alcuni casi lampanti, circa il volta faccia della giurisprudenza del tribunale dell’Aja e di Arusha. I fatti indicano che vi sono cose che non vanno.

Nel giro di un ristretto lasso di tempo pari a tre mesi e mezzo, dalla metà di novembre 2012 alla fine di febbraio del 2013, la camera di appello del Tribunale dell’Aja e di Arusha, guidato dal giudice Meron, ha cassato a colpi di maggioranza tre sentenze di condanna di cinque alti ufficiali militari e civili che erano stati condotti in giudizio per gravi violazioni dei diritto internazionale umanitario della Ex Jugoslavia e in Rwanda.

I tre processi sono durati complessivamente nove anni, con 900 sedute di tribunale. La corte ha dato udienza a 453 testimoni e ha esaminato migliaia di prove. La sentenza che ha stabilito che le responsabilità riportate dall’accusa erano state provate al di la di ogni ragionevole dubbio, così come indicato nelle motivazioni della sentenza lunghe 2608 pagine: 1377 pagine per Gotovina e Markac, 595 pagine per Mugenizi e Muginareza e 636 pagine per Perisic. I cinque accusati sono stati condannati a 24 anni (Gotovina), 18 anni (Markac), 30 anni (Mugenizi), 30 anni (Muginareza) e 27 anni (Perisic): totale 129 anni.

Successivamente, nel procedimento di appello, fu trovato che tutto ciò fu sbagliato e gli accusati sono stati prosciolti da tutte le accuse. Le sentenze di appello hanno rispettivamente 56, 55 e 49 pagine, e sono tra le sentenze più corte della storia. Alcuni giudici le hanno beffardamente commentate come “sentenze da rotocalco”.

Può esser vero che, come per le altre cose della vita, “non è la lunghezza ciò che conta”. Però a tutto c’è un limite. Per esempio, la sentenza d’appello del caso contro Florence Hartmann è lunga quanto quella di Gotovina e Markac. Nel caso di lei il procedimento di appello durò 22 mesi, tre mesi in più del caso contro i generali croati. Forse la camera d’appello ci mise più tempo data la natura peculiare del caso, dove la camera d’appello giocava tre ruoli: quella della presunta parte lesa, di procuratore e di giudicante. Forse è questo il motivo per cui ebbero bisogno di più tempo per scrivere e motivare la sentenza rispetto al caso dei due generali croati accusati di crimini di guerra contro civili Serbi durante l’operazione Storm nell’estate del 1995. Vogliamo semplicemente ricordare che il crimine della Hartmann fu quello di pubblicare il fatto che la Corte d’Appello di un tribunale che è sotto l’egida delle Nazioni Unite classificava come riservati una serie di documenti prodotti dal Consiglio Supremo di Difesa della Repubblica di Jugoslavia, rendendo per quest’ultimi impossibile l’utilizzo dinanzi ad un’altra corte delle Nazioni Unite, la Corte Internazionale di Giustizia, nel caso portato avanti dalla Bosnia Erzegovina contro la Serbia.

Torniamo ora alle sentenze cassate dai tribunali dell’Aja e di Arusha. Una domanda sorge spontanea: com’è possibile per nove giudici di tre collegi (per la precisione otto, perché un giudice voleva assolvere Perisic già in primo grado), com’è possibile per otto giudici di rango internazionale, commettere un così grave errore e condannare cinque innocenti per un totale di 129 anni? Come è possibile dopo che han speso ben 900 giorni di udienze ascoltando centinaia di testimoni e studiando migliaia di prove? Com’è possibile dopo che han speso milioni di dollari di tasse di contribuenti di tutto il mondo? Solo per la camera d’appello si può sommariamente concludere che gli sforzi e le conclusioni dei giudici di primo grado non valgono nemmeno la carta su cui sono stati scritti?

E’ possibile che i giudici di primo grado dei tribunali dell’Aja e di Arusha, siano così privi di integrità e professionalità, così da poter scartare così alla leggera le lo ricostruzioni e le loro conclusioni? Chi ha dato loro l’incarico di giudici di livello internazionale, se davvero sono così inetti? Chi ha stabilito che loro avessero i requisiti previsti all’Articolo 13 dello Statuto, che stipula che “i giudici devono essere persone di alto valore morale, imparziali e integerrimi e devono avere i requisiti previsti nei loro paesi per poter esercitare il ruolo di giudice”? Chi di loro può ricoprire alti ruoli nella magistratura del proprio paese se poi le sue sentenze vengono fatte a pezzi in appello? Chi assegnerà loro nuovi casi, nuovi processi a giudici di così bassa reputazione? E per quale motivo? Per vederli umiliati un’altra volta in appello?

E’ possibile che vi sia una così alta differenza in termini di qualità, professionalità, integrità e temperamento tra i giudici di primo grado e di appello? Dopo tutto, fatta eccezione per una sentenza di condanna che fu revisionata dopo la sentenza d’appello, le sentenze della camera d’appello non vengono né revisionate né cassate. Se questo è dovuto all’infallibilità dei giudici d’appello o alla mancanza di un’istanza superiore, questo è ancora da chiarire. In assenza di ulteriore grado, i loro rilievi e le loro conclusioni sono protetti dalla “presunzione di infallibilità”.

Tuttavia, la “presunzione di infallibilità”, non deve essere per loro uno scudo che li metta al riparo da critiche e proteste contro “il nuovo indirizzo” che hanno progettato per il Tribunale dell’Aja e di Arusha.

Fonte: Sense Agency

Traduzione di Pacifico S. per Forum Belgrado Italia

THE HAGUE | 11.07.2013.

WHERE IS THE TRIBUNAL HEADING FOR?

Appellate judges at the Gotovina trial

“Presumption of infallibility”, enjoyed by the appellate judges in the absence of a higher instance for the review of their judgments, should not shield them against public expressions of concern, criticism and protests against the ‘new course’ that they have plotted for the Tribunals in The Hague and in Arusha over the past few months

In a major upheaval following Judge Harhoff’s letter one tends to overlook the fact that public expressions of concern, criticism and protests against the Tribunal’s‘new course’ had been voiced long before 13 June 2013, when the letter was published, first in the Danish media and then worldwide.

In the opening lines of the letter that he sent to 56 of his friends and colleagues on 6 June, Harhoff refers to two recent articles, which ‘focus on events that cause deep concern both for me and for my colleagues here in the corridors of the the Tribunal'. Bearing in mind the dates, we can assume that he means the article entitled ‘What Happened to the Hague Tribunal’, an op-ed piece by Eric Gordy, published in the New York Times on 2 June and the blog post, ‘Two Puzzling Judgments in The Hague’, signed by T.J. and published on 1 June on the Economist’s website.

Had he waited for just one more day to send his letter, Judge Harhoff could have included another reference, the one to the piece written by former US Assistant Secretary of the State John Shattuck, a tried and tested friend of the Tribunal, who had taken part in its establishment. In his article ‘War Crimes Whitewash’, published on 7 June in the Boston Globe, Shattuck says that ‘if the ICTY majority had been sitting at Nuremberg, few, if any, Nazi leaders would have been convicted’.

Contrary to the claims made by those who believe that the problem lies with the first whistleblower judge rather than the change of the course he points to,it was not Judge Harhoff who launched the public debate about the recent developments at the Tribunal. Over the past few months, hundreds, if not thousands of critical articles and analyses on the Tribunal’s new course have been published. They were much harsher than Harhoff’s letter. Petitions have been signed, investigations called for, resignations demanded… yet to no avail. None of the top brass at the Tribunal has paid any attention to all that. ‘It will blow over’, they were saying. However, it has not.

The debate on what happens with the Tribunal was launched last November, after the first controversial judgment that acquitted Croatian generals Gotovina and Markač by a tight majority of votes (3:2). The initial salvoes in the debate were fired by judges Pocar and Agius, who did not mince their words in their dissenting opinions. They labeled the findings of the majority (judges Meron, Robinson and Güney) ‘simply grotesque’ and ‘contradict[ing] any sense of justice’, bluntly suggesting that the majority could have been guided by motives other than legal.

The debate has continued unabated, only to get more agitated after the acquittal of the former Chief of the VJ General Staff, Perišić, and to reach its boiling point with the acquittal of the former heads of the Serbian Secret Service, Stanišić and Simatović. There have been similar developments at the Rwanda Tribunal that shares both the Appeals Chamber as well as the concern and protests over the new course assumed following recent judgments.

It is up to the international law experts, who have been dealing with the issue since last November, to provide critical analysis in order to see whether the Tribunal indeed took a new course, who will benefit from it and what will be the impact of this new course on the Tribunal’s legal legacy. Here, we will merely highlight some glaring, easy to see facts, about the ‘volte-face’ in the jurisprudence of the Tribunals in The Hague and in Arusha. These facts indicate that there is something wrong with this picture.

In a short span of only three and a half months from mid-November 2012 to late February 2013, the Appeals Chambers of the Tribunals in The Hague and Arusha, led by Judge Meron, quashed by a majority vote three judgments convicting five high military and civilian officials who had been on trial for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

The three trials lasted for a combined total of nine years, or 900 trial days. The trial chambers heard a total of 453 witnesses and admitted into evidence thousands of exhibits. The trial judgments that found that the guilt of the accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt, extended to a total of 2608 pages: 1377 pages for Gotovina and Markač, 595 pages for Mugenizi and Muginareza and 636 for pages Perišić. The five accused were convicted and sentenced to 24 years (Gotovina), 18 years (Markač), 30 years (Mugenizi), 30 years (Muginareza) and 27 years (Perišić): a total of 129 years.

And then, in the appellate proceedings, it was found that all this was erroneous and the accused were acquitted of all charges. The appellate judgments have 56, 55, and 49 pages respectively, and are among the thinnest judgments in the history of both tribunals (not only in volume). Some judges sneeringly describe them as ‘magazine judgments’.

It might well be true, just as for some other things in life, that it is not the ‘size that matters’ for appelate judgements. However, there should be a limit. For instance, the appellate judgment in the case against Florence Hartmann is as long as the Gotovina and Markač appellate judgment. In her case, the appellate proceedings took 22 months, three months longer than in the case against the Croatian generals. Perhaps the Appeals Chamber took more time to deal with it because of the peculiar nature of the case, where the Appeals Chamber played the triple role: that of an alleged injured party, the prosecutor and the trier. Perhaps that is why they needed more time to deliberate and produced a longer statement of reasons than in the case of the two generals charged with the war crimes against Serb civilians during and after Operation Storm in the summer of 1995. Let us justremind here that Hartmann’s ‘crime’ was to publish the fact that the Appeals Chamber of a UN court granted confidentiality to a set of documents produced by the Supreme Defense Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, thus making it impossible for them to be used before another UN court, the ICJ, in the case brought by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia.

Let us go back to the quashed judgments of the Tribunals in The Hague and in Arusha. They beg the question: how is it possible for nine judges in three trial chambers (or, in fact eight, since one of the judges wanted to acquit Perišić at trial), so, how is it possible for eight professional international judges, to make such a grave mistake and put away five innocent generals and ministers for a total of 129 years? How is all of that possible after they had spent a total of 900 trial days hearing hundreds of witnesses and studying thousands of exhibits? How is it possible after they had spent untold millions of dollars of taxpayers’ money from all over the world? Only for the majority in the Appeals Chamber to summarily conclude that the efforts and the conclusions of the trial judges were worthless, not worth the paper they were printed on?

Is it possible that the members of the trial chambers of the two Tribunals, in The Hague and in Arusha, are so lacking in professionalism and integrity, that their findings and conclusions can be set aside so lightly? Who has appointed them as international judges, if they are really so inept? Were they appointed after they had pulled some strings ? Who looked at them and made a decision that they met the criteria set in Article 13 of the Statute, stipulating that ‘[t]he judges shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices’? What highest judicial office could be held by the judges whose judgments were so drastically torn to pieces on appeal? Who kept assigning new cases and new trials to the same judges who brought their profession into disrepute? Why? So that they could be humiliated on appeal again?

Is it possible that there is such a world of difference in terms of quality, professionalism, integrity and judicial temperament between the judges in the trial and appeals chambers? After all, with the exception of a single prison sentence that was revised following the appellate judgment, the appellate judgments still stand, unrevised and unquashed. Whether this is due to the infallibility of the appellate judges or to the lack of a higher instance for the review of their findings and conclusions… is an open question. In the absence of this higher instance, their findings and conclusions are protected by the “presumption of infallibility”.

However, the “presumtion of infallibility” should not shield them from public expressions of concern, criticism and protests against the ‘new course’ that they have plotted for the Tribunals in The Hague and Arusha.

Da Sense Agency

Si no fuera porque el número de los refugiados fallecidos en la costa italiana ha superado el techo de la “normalidad” que ronda sobre 60-70 personas, la tragedia de los tripulantes de esta patera hubiera pasado desapercibida. Hace dos años 61 refugiados –incluidos varios niños-, naufragaron en este mismo lugar al quedarse sin alimentos y combustible, mientras un portaaviones de la OTAN les miraba sin pestañear.

Sin nombre, ni historias de amor o de intriga, ninguna canción eternizará su viaje a la muerte, ni nadie hará una película de esos hombres y mujeres valientes capaces de arriesgar su vida no solo para cumplir su sueño, sino para ayudar a su familia y empujar de paso el carro de la civilización humana.

“Deshumanizar al otro” es una estrategia política que legitima el trato que se le da; el mismo que han recibido decenas de miles de asesinados bajo los bombardeos en Irak, en Afganistán o en Pakistán: mientras ellos carecen de identidad, nos enseñan en la tele la foto de la boda y de la esposa embarazada de aquel soldado de ocupación muerto a manos de un nativo “bárbaro y despiadado”.

¡Cómo esos cuerpos en el mar han puesto a prueba, una vez más, nuestra capacidad de no sentir vergüenza de votar a individuos que aprueban leyes antinaturales como la de castigar a quien ayuda al prójimo! Aún así, varios pescadores italianos siguiendo su instinto salvaron la vida de decenas de aquellas personas desesperadas, escupiendo a la cara de demonios disfrazados que hemos colocado en los sofás de los palacios.

Vidas no contadas

Entre las historias de vida de miles de personas, campeones olímpicos sin medallas que saltan las vallas de púas más altas con manos ensangrentadas, que se lanzan a los mares indomables huyendo de guerras, hambrunas, persecuciones políticas, étnicas, religiosas, de género, víctimas de políticas de sus gobiernos o del pulso de las grandes potencias mundiales por expolio de sus inmensos recursos naturales, podemos conocer las siguientes:

-Fátima, mujer somalí de 26 años que viajaba junto con su hijo Ahmed de 5 años. Su país, ubicado sobre un lago de petróleo no explotado, ha sido declarado por Occidente  como “Estado fallido” – contraseña del “país poseedor de recursos naturales o ruta de su tránsito, ya apto para ser dominado”-, desfallece de hambre sobre inmensas reservas de uranio, oro, petróleo, gas, bauxita y cobre. El escándalo fabricado sobre los “piratas” de pocamonta en 2009, -si bien estaba al servicio de militarizar el Cuerno de África y el Golfo de Adén, uno de los corredores más estratégicos del planeta que conecta el Golfo Pérsico, el Mar rojo y el Canal de Suez y por donde pasa el 30% del petróleo del mundo-, revelaba además que el pescado y el marisco de sus caladeros –lo poco sustento que les quedaba-, acababan en las mesas de los hoteles españoles y franceses, y que los verdaderos “bandidos del mar” de guantes y tez blancos, de paso vertían toneladas de desechos tóxicos en sus costas.

- Ahmed, niño de ojos grandes de 10 años, otra víctima, era huérfano al igual que varios millones de pequeños somalíes. No quería convertirse en uno de los 500.000 niños que viven en las calles del país, o verse obligado a trabajar jornadas interminables a cambio de un plato de comida, con palizas y abusos sexuales de postre, o convertirse en soldado o esclavo en el “mercado libre” del capitalismo global que ofrece “niño a la carta” a las empresas de todo tipo. Ahmed, que al embarcarse pensó que se había librado de tal destino, se encuentra ahora en el fondo del mar.

De Etiopia y Libia

- Abeba, mujer de la tierra del café, Etiopía, había conseguido junto con otras activistas que la Constitución prohibiera la ablación. Todo un logro. Para la luchadora de las batallas imposibles era más difícil, sin embargo, derrotar el sistema económico, político y social capitalista que bendice una violencia patriarcal estructurada. Su espalda, destrozada por llevar cargas pesadas durante horas de camino, ya no aguantaba. Se echó a esta aventura llevando consigo a su sobrina Hakima, de 7 años, una de los cuatro millones de niños huérfanos etíopes. El sueño de Abeba era salvarle de la desnutrición severa que mata a miles de pequeños en este país, que un día de 1974 se declaró socialista tras derrocar al dictador zombie Haile Selassie, gobernante de una población literalmente moribunda, enferma y analfabeta. El Gobierno militar de Haile Mariam, con el apoyo de la Unión Soviética y Cuba realizó reforma agraria, declaró universal y gratuitas la educación y la sanidad, y miró por los derechos de la mujer y de las minorías étnicas. Sus recursos como el oro, gas natural, tantalio, y mármol, por fin iban a servir al rescate de sus propietarios. Los errores del Gobierno, las terribles sequías de los años 80 que mataron a cientos de miles de personas, junto con las provocaciones de EEUU desde Eritrea que armaba a los rebeldes (quienes destinaban las ayudas internacionales contra el hambre a la compra de armas) ralentizaron este avance hasta ser paralizado con la caída de la URSS. Una situación parecida a la de Afganistán, país del que han huido unas 6 millones de personas en las últimos tres décadas.

Al final el Mar “rojo” no hizo gala de su nombre y Washington consiguió apoderarse del control del país y su privilegiada ubicación. Hoy, a pesar de ser una economía en bancarrota, y con medio millón de niños en riesgo inminente de morir, el Gobierno gasta 100 millones de dólares en la compra de 200 tanques a Ucrania.

- Ebrahim fue un arquitecto libio que dejó a su esposa y los dos hijos, y siguió la ruta del transporte que lleva los recursos de su tierra y se dirigió a Italia. Pensaba hacerse con un sitio allí y luego solicitar la reagrupación familiar. La situación tras el asesinato de Gadafi es caótica y deja en nada la promesa de la OTAN de democratizar el país. Es la misma Alianza militar que descargó toneladas de bombas sobre la población civil, sepultando miles de vidas y destruyendo las infraestructuras, para luego reconstruirlas con el dinero de las propias damnificadas (Libia: un negocio de guerra redondo). Se equivocó Ibrahim si pensó que los gobiernos occidentales beneficiarios de aquella infame agresión, a cambio, atenderían a los ciudadanos libios en Europa. ¡Había 65.000 millones de dólares líquidos libios en los bancos italianos! Por su parte, la Fiscalía de París investiga la posible financiación de la campaña electoral de Sarkozy en 2007 por parte de Gadafi. Los juegos sucios alcanzan puntos insospechados: Sarkozy luego pactó con los rebeldes del Consejo Nacional de Transición el derrocar al Coronel a cambio de que las empresas galas obtuvieran el 35% de las participaciones en el negocio de fuel. Hoy, el desgobierno, una cruenta lucha entre grupos armados por hacerse con el control de lo que es la mayor reserva petrolífera de África (la doble que las de EEUU), y una huelga intermitente de los trabajadores del petróleo han paralizado la economía. El colapso del Estado libio y la baja productividad de su industria petrolífera son parte de los motivos que impiden a los europeos apuntarse a la guerra de EEUU contra Siria.

Política de empobrecimiento

Condenar a los países ricos al subdesarrollo es una estrategia política que se ejecuta con la complicidad de las oligarquías y regímenes locales neopatrimonialistas ligados a negocios de todo tipo. Es la esencia de las recetas cocinadas por las instituciones financieras que obligan a los Estados a realizar reajustes estructurales y privatizar sus recursos naturales (¡como bosques de Tanzania!), con el fin de facilitar inversiones extranjeras. Una parte de la liquidez de los bancos occidentales ( Banco de Crédito y Comercio Internacional, por ejemplo) proviene del contrabando de piedras preciosas, tráfico de drogas y de armas de un África que mueve dinero dentro y fuera pero no deja nada para su desarrollo.

En nuestro cayuco imaginario también estaban gente de Malí, país invadido por la OTAN , tierra de petróleo, oro y uranio, donde la esperanza de vida es sólo de 37 años, o de Nigeria, el séptimo productor mundial del petróleo…

Es la misma historia de los iraquíes: atacados y masacrados por EEUU y sus aliados, unos 5 millones de los habitantes de la antigua babilonia, se han refugiado en los países vecinos, donde empiezan otras guerras (la de Siria) y deben volver a recoger sus bártulos huyendo hacia ninguna parte.

En 2012 se contabilizaron unos 230 millones de inmigrantes.

Ninguna vigilancia aérea y marítima, ni siquiera hundir las pateras en el mar a cañonazos, como proponía el ultraderechista italiano Umberto Bossi , podrá detener a millones de seres humanos a que huyan a de su tierra.

Ya no funciona relacionar la inmigración con la delincuencia: ¡que miren los juzgados en España! Tampoco es tarde que los ciudadanos corrijan su mirada hacia los refugiados e inmigrantes cuando tienen hijos que con dos títulos universitarios, viven en un piso patera en Londres o Berlín, y limpian los WC. Aun así, España desde el 2013 ha deportado a 6.056 inmigrantes, y seguía deteniendo al desgraciado transportista de una patera o de un camión, quizás para desviar la atención a los verdaderos causantes del tráfico de seres humanos o quizás para que nadie ponga en entredicho su idea brillante de pagar a los gobiernos, como al senegalés, para que admitan la repatriación de los refugiados detenidos, pisando las leyes internacionales. No nos dicen que las autoridades corruptas de éste mismo país conceden licencias especiales de pescar a empresas extranjeras, elevan las tasas de estos permisos para los nativos, forzándoles a lanzarse al mar para llegar a España.

De África se están llevando el oro, el coltán, el hidrocarburo y otros recursos, y a cambio se les envía aviones cargados de armas y muchos misioneros para que les invite a paciencia y vivir el sueño de tener una vida mejor en el “otro mundo”.

Fonte 
Odnako (Russia)
Settimanale d’informazione generale. Redattore capo: Mikhail Leont’ev. 

[1] Sito della MANUL.

[2] “Tortura e morte nelle carceri della Libia“, relazione Unismil, ottobre 2013.

[3] “La ‘nuova Libia’: la regione del Fezzan dichiara la sua indipendenza“, Irib, 27 settembre 2013

[4] “Ливии официально больше нет. Восток объявил “нефтяное государство” “(la Libia è ufficialmente finita, l’oriente si dichiara petro-Stato) Odnako, 7 marzo 2012.

From Kosovo To Syria

Višeslav Simić (Вишеслав Симић)
2do Seminario Internacional "Análisis e incidencia de las políticas públicas" - EGAP - Tecnológico de Monterrey - 25 y 26 de Septiembre 2013 - México

As the so-called Kosovo "war"(1) is being used by the United States of America as a blueprint(2) for how the euphemistically(3) called "international community"(4) should militarily resolve the crisis in Syria without a mandate from the U.N. (in spite of the U.S. persistently insisting that it was a sui generis case), it is becoming increasingly more important not only finally independently to study the "mob or sole assailant"(5) aspect of the contemporary U.S. international approach but, even more, to dedicate particular attention to the post- and extra-combat involvement (or the lack of it) of the "international community" in the management(6) of the territories and the people "liberated"(7) by it.

While the U.S. President announces(8) a possible attack on a sovereign nation of Syria without the authorization by the U.N., citing the precedent of Kosovo as justification for it, the U.S. Secretary of State (accused by some of being le ministre étranger aux affaires) assures U.S. citizens that rich Arab nations would foot the bill(9) (attempting to relieve concerns about the system's impending bankruptcy(10)), and a multitude of the West's "corporate intellectuals"(11) (especially the ones from the so-called La Gauche Caviar) are soothing the moral and psychological worries of its ever-conscientious public, there are legitimate and reliable voices who give us different points of view about this issue, from the warnings to the U.S. leaders that aiding a declared enemy(12) of the U.S. would be treason(13), that Syria's socialist secular economic/political system(14) is the main problem for both the neo-liberal West and the reactionary, fundamentalist Islamist Arab regimes, to those that the so-called opposition in Syria are "a bunch of criminals" and not "revolutionaries."(15)

Just a part of this list of concerns should create a grave apprehensiveness about the "international community's" capacity to act in Syria militarily, but even more about its competence to be the leader of the supposed post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Taking into consideration the "international community's" aggressive and criminal March 1999 record in Serbia, November 2001 in Afghanistan, March 2003 in Iraq, and March 2011 in Libya, its involvement, and especially the U.S. leadership role, should be extremely questionable(16).

It is certain that the U.S. global position was dominant in the post-Soviet period, and that the phrase "international community" became synonymous with the U.S.—the main formulator of what were dogmatically(17) believed to be liberal(18) privatization-centered(19) pro-democratization and economic growth policies during the 1990s and the early 21st century. Yet, as these policies' truthfulness and efficacy became increasingly questioned and challenged(20), due to their failures and catastrophic consequences in practice(21), and as the U.S. increasingly turned into a defender against charges of imperialism and aggression(22), and a coercer of unwilling allies(23) into arrogant violations of international law(24) than it remained a leader of any true community of states, great questioning(25), strong confirmations(26), and new understandings and opinions(27) of the term "international community" appeared.

Although there had been a few U.N. missions in the disputed/non-sovereign territories before the Kosovo mission was established, the fact is that all of them were initiated properly in the U.N., and implemented by it, including military forces of various member states, that willingly lent them, working in close cooperation with the world organization.

Kosovo was a crucial turning point and the precedent that nullified the old rules by force, without establishing any clear and agreed upon new ones for the future.

As the Kosovo precedent allowed for the creation of new states, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and for the establishment of new "international communities", who justified and implemented such acts, it became obvious that a trend is being set and that the organization of the United Nations is increasingly either serving the purposes of one of the "international communities", or that it is being ignored by either of the "international communities"(28) or by all of them(29). The multitude of the small states for decades has been pointing out the fact that they are not even considered by the "international community" if they disagree with its policies, or are used to shore up its "moral imperative" when they do, but their plight is not as important in the "realpolitik" world as the latest warnings by one of the greatest powers—China—about the "improper comments in the name of the 'international community'"(30) by some Western politicians.

Although there are some Western intellectuals(31) and popular commentators(32) who point this out, a blindness to these facts, and a dogmatic, quasi-religious faith in the only true "international community" is very noticeable in the so-called West—not only among its political classes but in academia as well, where it should be happening the least, especially taking into consideration the plenitude of analysis of international politics(33).

The pattern has already become a common place: a regime is declared "rogue" for not accepting the "international community's" dictates and not opening its economy for a neo-liberal takeover, and an adequate "endangered" minority is designated a victim within the "rogue" regime's borders, and the minority's criminal sub-population is trained and equipped to be the "legitimate and justified" opposition to the regime and the future "guarantor of democracy and economic development" of the "liberated" nation, and an ally in mutually beneficial money laundering operations(34). Then, cases of "human rights violations" are exaggerated or, if necessary, fabricated, and an insurrection by the "democratic, free-market oriented, and Westernized and moderate" guerrilla is legitimized, and a "red line" is drawn, after which a military intervention by the "morally indignant" "international community" becomes a must in order to save face and show the world its dedication to peace and international cooperation.

The "international community's" interests in the Middle East are obvious: preventing China from obtaining cheap oil for its economic growth and military development; getting closer to Russia's "soft southern belly", and increasing the possibility of destabilizing the E.U. through strong control and manipulation of its Moslem population, making the "allies" long term dependant on the "international community".

With Kosovo, it was not so obviously clear why the "international community" got so deeply and expensively involved in that oil-deprived region(35). Although the territory known as Kosovo is a landlocked, economically undeveloped, and socially backward land of 10,887 sq. km.(36), populated by anywhere between 1.5 to 2 million people(37), it is of a significant geo-political and strategic importance. 
Its position at the ancient surface crossroads—Via Militaris and Via Egnatia(38)—was made very obvious by the placement of the U.S. military base Bondsteel near that crucial intersection of the roads that connect Europe and Asia. Taking into consideration that the planned American-backed "Nabucco"(39) pipeline, as well as the Russian natural gas and oil pipeline, "Southern Stream"(40), were to pass through that area, supplying Europe with Russian and former Soviet Central Asian states' oil and gas, the geostrategic importance of Kosovo becomes more prominent.

The post-intervention international administration of a territory "liberated" by the "international community" brings many advantages both to the allied governments and the private businesses from the "cooperative" nations.

The case of Kosovo is an excellent example: it has been declared an investor's dream and a venture capitalist's heaven(41) by its new rulers.(42) Its labor market offers one of the cheapest labor forces in the world. With official unemployment rates in Kosovo reaching 50%(43), once the means of production are secured(44), and access to global markets are guaranteed, the investors will be attracted to the profit-making opportunities unparalleled in the developed world.

At the same time, the natural resources of Kosovo are legendary–according to the World Bank(45), 13.5 billion Euros are laying there, waiting for investors brave enough to acquire them: the richest lignite reserves in South Eastern Europe, which provide for a powerful electricity production for the whole region, as well as abundant reserves of zinc, cadmium, magnesium, kaolin, quartz, asbestos, chrome, bauxite, and lead(46), along with silver and gold–all of that under the watchful eye of the "international community"(47), eager to help set it to production and profit.
Yet, there are overwhelming problems and obstacles to that. They range from linguistic, through socio-cultural, historical and political, to legal—especially in terms of property law.

Thus, understanding the meaning and history of the names in Kosovo is only the beginning of the difficulties related to such problems.

The official and full name of the territory is Kosovo and Metohija. The land was always (as it still is today) known as Old Serbia(48) as well. Kosovo, just as Metohija did, emerged as a symbol, a reminder, a warning, and was almost accidentally used as a territorial designation only by the end of WWII, by the Communist party of Yugoslavia.

The word Metohija remains as another reminder, a public declaration by the rightful owner that the theft hasn't been forgotten, and as a subtle warning that order and justice shall be restored. That is why all false claimants to the land have insisted on the elimination of the word Metohija from the land's name.

Kosovo, as a word, means something only in the Serbian language(49)—the possessive adjective of the word kos, the American robin, a black bird, turdus merula, that flies in the skies over the famous battlefield of 1389(50).

The meaning of Metohija is clear and recognized easily by the Orthodox Christians. Being of Greek origin (μετόχια), the word is a legal and official term used to demarcate the earthly possessions of the Orthodox Church, in this case of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

It is very common in the West to dismiss all factually supported Serbian historical claims to Kosovo, while the most incredible, evidence-less Albanian claims to the antiquity of their possession and presence in the same territory are accepted as valid. Very often a question is asked by independent and reasonable observers how far back in time should the "international community" go, and what kind of mythical or spectral evidence(51) would be acceptable to lay a claim so that the matter could be settled. The situation is very similar to the one in Palestine at the time of the Jewish resettlement there, when the famous British writer H. G. Wells said: "If it is proper to 'reconstitute' a Jewish state which has not existed for two thousand years, why not go back another thousand years and reconstitute the Canaanite state?"(52)

Yet, Kosovo and Metohija became an official U.N. Protectorate, with NATO as the power that guarantees it remains so for the time being. Although the Albanians declared independence in 2008 and the "international community" recognized its "sovereignty"(53), it is still NATO that has the final authority there(54), along with the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General. Simultaneously, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 guarantees the territorial integrity of Serbia, although some of the powers that voted for that resolution, in a paradoxical bipolar opposition to themselves, recognized the self-declared independent Republic of Kosovo. 
A matter of great interest for the scholars of international law and politics, and international management of territories and peoples, should be the evolution of the post-"liberation" fate of the leaders of the territories under "international community's" control, especially the speed and the degree of the degradation of their status and life. 
Slobodan Milošević, the leader of Serbia, was captured and put on a long-term trial by a special "international community's" tribunal(55), which terminated in his highly suspicious death after it became increasingly obvious that the evidence necessary for his conviction was not going to materialize. 
In Afghanistan, the Taliban were simply scattered and replaced by a puppet government, which still fully depends on the U.S. occupying forces in the country. Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, was also chased away from his seat of power, and later captured and put on trial, but not by an international tribunal. The experience with Milošević most certainly taught the "international community" the risks of exposing its own alleged crimes before the increasingly judgmental world. The Iraqi court expressly found him guilty and he was executed by hanging, giving the impression that no appeal was permitted, or a chance for a pardon either. 
Libya's Moammar Gadhafi experienced no official capture or trial. The democratic and freedom-loving "opposition" to his regime was allowed by the "international community" to hunt him down like a wild animal and his slaughtering was filmed and widely distributed on the internet. A U.S. apparatchik to the new friendly and allied regime of Libya was murdered in a very similar manner a few months later. Then, the "international community" expressed an absolute outrage at the shocking and brutal treatment of a human being by the, now-legitimized, subject of international affairs.
The "post-conflict" status of the 'liberated" territories also differs significantly:
Kosovo seems to have been the experiment that set too high the bar for the future, causing extraordinary complications and embarrassing need for legal and moral "creativity". Following its lessons, a degradation and de-internationalization of the status of any new territory whose sovereignty(56) was altered has become noticeable. There has happened a lowering and limiting of the prerogatives of the "governor" in the field, and, with each new case, a gradual elimination of a significant portion of the U.N. membership from the pool of legal international subjects with a right to be involved in the governing and/or supervision of the territory.
In Kosovo, it was still the Secretary General of the U.N. (through his Special Representative) who was the highest civilian authority in the official U.N. protectorate(57), although the NATO military commander on the ground was the highest authority "in the theater", with a right to declare anything or anyone of "military significance" so as to grant himself the power to outrank the civilian authority of the U.N. at any time.
In Afghanistan, "full sovereignty" was gradually "restored" to the local government after the U.S.-lead international invasion and occupation of the land, and after the U.N. Security Council post factum established the International Security Assistance Force. The U.N. Assistance Force's mandate was to oversee the security in the country, but the Afghan "authorities" couldn't move freely even within the capital without full military escort by the mostly NATO troops, while the provinces were the realm of local warlords and, almost exclusively, of U.S. military commanders, who had most of the U.S. troops under their direct and separate command. 
In Iraq, the U.S. attacked that sovereign U.N. member without a declaration of war and invaded its territory under what was later proven to be a false pretext. After a quick military conquest, the country was occupied by U.S. troops. A "sovereign" puppet government was established, but the U.S. military was in charge of the land. The U.N. Security Council then established a mission in Iraq, which recognized "the responsibilities and obligations" of the U.S. occupying force, giving legitimacy to the illegal and criminal invasion of a sovereign member of the U.N. The Mission still supervises the work of the Iraqi government. The U.S. military combat operations and occupation of Iraq were officially declared finished by the end of August 2010, but U.S. troops still remain in Iraq (under separate U.S. command), together with the troops from other nations, which are under U.N. command.
In Libya, there was neither a U.N. mission set up after its destruction by NATO, nor was there an occupation of any kind by the "international community's" military forces. The early 2011 conflict was declared a civil war, in which the "rebels" refused all attempts, both by their government and by the African Union, to stop fighting. The "international community" secured a U.N. Security Council resolution (1973), which was to protect civilians and which allowed the use of force against the government of Libya, but did not allow a foreign occupation of the country. The "international community", led by the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, secured the supply of arms to the rebels. The Resolution stated that in order to "protect civilians" "all necessary measures" were allowed, thus, the supply of arms was unilaterally declared permitted in spite of the arms embargo imposed on "everyone" in Libya (Paragraph 9). The French Air Force bombarded the government troops, as did the U.S. and U.K. submarines. Soon, 17 countries participated in the military operations against the government of Libya, with NATO taking over the command of the operations. The "international community" thus became the air force of the rebels, providing them with some ground troops as well, violating its own U.N. resolution and not allowing for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. After the rebels took over the capital city of Tripoli, the U.N. recognized them as the legitimate government of Libya. An ad hoc local government, the National Transitional Council, was set up and recognized by the "international community" and left in power to run the country as it saw fit, as long as the oil exploitation was opened to the corporations from the "international community's" realm—the Chinese and Russian companies were not allowed in the competition in the "free market" and "globalized economy" (just as they were kept out and away by the U.S. occupying authorities from the once open-to-international-competition oil fields of Iraq).
The U.N. Protectorate of Kosovo has proven itself to be the "international community's" experiment that set the standard for the amount of sovereignty which were to be accorded the inhabitants under the "international community's" domination—none!
Thus, the sovereignty over the territory of Kosovo was altered and the whole international system thrown into a disarray. The overlapping and cancelling-out of sovereignties is blatant: the United Nations Resolution 1244 (which is still in effect and is recognized even by the powers(58) that officially recognized Serbia's Albanian minority's self-declaration of independence) recognizes the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia over the territory of Kosovo(59). So does, of course, the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia(60). At the same time, Serbia's Albanian Moslem minority in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija had declared the province's independence from Serbia and claimed sovereignty over the territory, calling it the Republic of Kosova. It has been officially recognized by the U.S. and many of the individual great powers, which are members of the European Union, although the international organization called the European Union itself has not recognized the self-declared independent Republic of Kosovo, and works closely with the U.N. on administering the Serbian province as a U.N. protectorate(61). Simultaneously to all this, the Constitution of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, by its articles 147 and 153, clearly renounces its own sovereignty and states that the final authorities in Kosovo are the U.N. civilian administrator and NATO military force commander, making those who command NATO the ultimate sovereigns over Kosovo(62).

The "international community" did the same thing, which it did in the previously legally established U.N. protectorates, and in the many historical instances before the current supposed internationalization of protectorates—the "international community" ensured its own fiat(63) to be the legal basis and norm for any activity.
The first U.N. protectorate, an innovative and an ad hoc approach to resolving international problems insolvable by the then-current international law, was the U.N. Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)/U.N. Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), established in October 1962(64) in order to administer the Dutch colony of West New Guinea until it was transformed into a province of Indonesia on May 1, 1963. 
The following one was established in February 1992 for Cambodia, as the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), in order to implement the Paris Accords, which ended the civil war in that country. The U.N. was not to have direct control of the country but was supposed, during the 18 months of its mandate, to foster "a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair general elections"(65). It was the most extensive and costliest U.N. operation up to that time.
On December 21, 1995(66), the U.N. International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a U.N. civilian office in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) were established, known as the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). It was terminated on Dec. 31, 2002. It invented a new supra-sovereign office—The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (on December 14, 1995)—by the Peace Implementation Council(67). It was not a U.N. mission. SFOR, a NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force in BH, was established by the U.N. S.C. Res. 1088, on Dec. 12, 1996, and it lasted until Dec. 2, 2004. It was replaced by the E.U. EUFOR Althea mission, which is still in BH, as is the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who still possesses his supra-sovereign powers and is the final authority in that supposedly sovereign nation.
The U.N. S.C. Resolution 1037 (Jan. 15, 1996) established the U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) to monitor the demilitarization of these regions and to ensure the peaceful reintegration of these territories of the Republic of Serbian Krajina into Croatia. It ended on Jan. 15, 1998, after allowing the new country of Croatia to take over these, formerly Serb-majority but then Croat- and NATO-ethnically cleansed, lands. Eventually, the newly sovereign Croatia was fully integrated into NATO (2009) and E.U. (2013), thus firmly and unquestionably putting these territories under the "international community's" control. 
In 1999, the "international community" established its most ambitious and authoritative grasp on a territory—the U.N. Protectorate of Kosovo. 
The U.N. administration took upon itself the public policy mission, traditionally reserved for a sovereign state alone, to make local laws and to enforce them, to appoint and supervise local officials, to collect and manage local revenue, to run local educational, health and other social services, to supervise the economy and finances, and even to decide in the disputes related to the very basis of any society—property matters.
The most illustrative example of the “international community’s” incompetence and, if the criteria used for ordinary people were applied to it, all out criminality, is exactly this area of public policy¬—privatization. Contrary to its U.N. S.C. mandate, the U.N. Administration of the Serbian province designed and partially implemented a public policy of privatization of the socially owned property there. It was very clear that such a policy could not be implemented(68) as the “international community” wished it, due to its basic illegality(69). The province’s chief U.N. administrator, Soren Jessen-Petersen, on April 22, 2005 (UNMIK Regulation No. 2005/18), simply decreed a fundamental change in UNMIK rules(70) and property law(71) (undocumented in human history, except during conquests and pillages of ages past), providing for the privatization agency to make “clear and final ownership determination after a sale of assets” and not before it, as has been the practice throughout human history. Although Mr. Jessen-Petersen gladly announced that “now with this change… we no longer have to establish ownership before the sale of the socially owned enterprise”(72), the process of privatization in Kosovo has been disastrous. Not even the local criminals wanted to participate in it since it didn’t provide them with a clear and legal title to the property. There are many accusations that through the process of privatization they laundered the illegally earned funds. Knowing that such practice would create legal problems(73) for the U.N. staff in both the field and in the New York City headquarters, the U.N. ensured its employees’ immunity(74) from legal prosecution but the local Albanians were left to the mercies of “the market”-causing a number of highly suspicious deaths(75) of both high level officials in Kosovo and key witnesses in Western countries over the last couple of years, all of which were ruled suicides(76) by EULEX and Western medical examiners.
This extent of legislative, executive and judicial authority, exercised with basically no scrutiny by anyone, with no supervision by independent monitors, and with no accountability to any single or collective sovereignty (especially that of the local population(77)) is substantially higher than that which the colonial governors had in the past, and which were the main reasons why the colonized peoples fought wars of liberation. It was expected, even by analysts from the "international community", that even the most "benign" protectorate of this kind would eventually turn itself into an "oppressor-ate" that would be hated by the population it was established to protect in the first place. 
Yet, there are no open anti-U.N. movements in Kosovo. It seems that while the ethnic cleansing of its Serbian citizens is yet unfinished, and while the lucrative and unmolested businesses of human trafficking, drugs and arms smuggling, and "privatization" of the Serbian state, social, Church and private property are still underway, there is no rush to end the unnatural and contradictory parallel existence (but a long-term partnership and symbiosis) of "local sovereignty" and "international community's" protectorate there.
Yet, this unnatural symbiosis only seems to be lucrative to those with a short-term vision and with a superficial understanding of economy and politics. 
An interesting testimony of the development falsehood was, most likely unintentionally, offered by a German KFOR Colonel, Günter Bonn, published by Politika, and reported by an ethnic Slovenian military analyst, Miroslav Lazanski, in a report on his visit to the U.S. (KFOR) base Bondsteel in Kosovo. It says: "There is no industry here, no production. Only gas stations are being opened, shopping centers and night clubs."(78) The Colonel is reported to have openly wondered from where all the wealth in Kosovo was coming, comparing the apparent high-life style of the Kosovo Albanians to his modest life in the highly industrialized (and yet only second tier international community's member) Germany, especially considering his socio-economic status as a high level military officer of the military forces of the only stable and growing E.U. economy. Aware that he drives a small car there (in Germany), and doesn't own a house there, the new, big homes, daily built in Kosovo, and new, expensive cars driven on the same roads he patrols in a military jeep, make him wonder how surreal is his task of making sure that there wouldn't be any more suffering in the U.N. Protectorate of Kosovo.(79)
In addition to that, it is the "international community" that very quickly realized the true pitfalls of such an arrangement, and the long-term dangers to its control and welfare. The U.N. Protectorate of Kosovo, being under the formal legal authority of the U.N. Security Council, could not be controlled, modified, or terminated without Russia and/or China. Both powers were unable to prevent its establishment in 1999, but, since then they have grown and strengthened their international positions, creating a parallel and highly visible alternative "international community", and have created unforeseen problems for the U.S. and its allies in Kosovo (and in other parts of the world), especially regarding the public policy of privatization designed and attempted to be implemented there by the "international community".
The Protectorate of Kosovo was most likely designed as the ultimate triumph of the West, but it quickly turned into its most problematic product. With Russia and China sitting on the U.N. Security Council, with their veto powers, it proved impractical to set Kosovo as a blueprint for future invasions, takeovers and management of lands, peoples and resources, and, thus, all evidence suggests, it was forgone as a model. 
Ever since, we have witnessed the abandonment of the U.N. or truly international models of behavior by the "international community", observing the increased acting either unilaterally (the U.S. in Iraq) or as a group of military allies (NATO in Libya), with very limited and vague authorization by the U.N., or with none at all. 
It is worth remembering that already in 1996, in Buenos Aires, Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, officially announced that a "silent revolution" was taking place, and that "as regards the role of the state, it is now nearly universally accepted that the most effective economic strategies are private sector-led and outward-oriented"(80), and that "governments must demonstrate that they have no tolerance for corruption". Yet, it seems that the "international community" in the end, after its post-Kosovo experience, decided that it is much easier and more profitable to avoid the (semi-)state and its many layers of corrupt officials all together, and to let the West's private sector(81) (backed up by NATO) deal directly with the warlords(82) in the resources rich territories, whose sovereignty was altered, allowing certain allies in(83), and securely eliminating Russian and Chinese competition(84).
Although the 1989 informal Washington Consensus by the West's economic thinkers has been replaced by the 2010 G20 formally endorsed Seoul Consensus for "shared growth"(85), it seems that the "international community" has decided to undermine the Consensus' main goal of greater state intervention in economy and finances by simply eliminating the state from the equation and continuing with the old mantra of "stabilize, privatize, and liberalize"(86)—having already initiated that policy in Kosovo, and persisted with it in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, attempting to press on with it in Syria today.
For the end, another reminder: The New York Observer warned, in 2007, "The smart money these days is in catastrophe: Hurricanes, tsunamis, political upheavals and wars have become the new profit points in the age of 'disaster capitalism,' which sees cataclysms 'as exciting market opportunities.'”(87)

Višeslav Simić (Вишеслав Симић)
2do Seminario Internacional "Análisis e incidencia de las políticas públicas" - EGAP - Tecnológico de Monterrey - 25 y 26 de Septiembre 2013 - México

Footnotes:

1. Strictly legally speaking, no war was declared by the aggressors (the U.S. called it "hostilities" and "military operations in Kosovo"). The government of the attacked sovereign founding member of the U.N. didn't denounce the aggression as war (only after the November 2012 Strasbourg Court ruling that "war veterans" must be paid for the time served in the "war of 1999" did Serbia implicitly recognize NATO aggression as a war). The U.N. itself kept silent about the grossest violation of its Charter since its founding (the silence forced upon the U.N. by the U.S. blocking any move in the U.N. Security Council to condemn the attacks or to order their cessation).

2. Air War in Kosovo Seen as Precedent in Possible Response to Syria Chemical Attack; Landler, Mark and Gordon, Michael; The New York Times; August 23, 2013- http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/air-war-in-kosovo-seen-as-precedent-in-possible-response-to-syria-chemical-attack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&

3. If asked what the priority in today's world would be, Confucius would most likely repeat what he said about 2500 years ago: "'What is necessary is to rectify names.' […] 'If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.' […] 'Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect.'"-The Analects of Confucius; The Chinese Classics; Translated by James Legge; Book XIII, Chap. III, 2-7; Kindle location 625-626.

4. "To the extent that there is such a thing as an international community, it owes much to NATO." - Norris, John; Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo; Greenwood Publishing Group, Preager, NY; 2005; Forward by Strobe Talbott; page ix.

5. ”The Democrats prefer allied lynch mobs, whereas the Republicans are more willing to intervene without outside help. The difference is basically the same. At the end of the day, both Democrats and Republicans remain committed to the same "values" of forcing political change on foreign regimes.” - Deliso, Christopher; Kosovo, 1999: An Insider’s View; June 17, 2005 - http://antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=6338

6. "...To put it in a terminology that harkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires, the three grand imperatives of imperial (American-ed.) geostrategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together." - Brzezinski, Zbigniew; The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives; Basic Books; New York; 1997; p. 40.

7. See: The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:H.R.4655.ENR:], or George, Amir; Liberating Iraq: The Untold Story of the Assyrian Christians; Cardinal Publishing Group; 2013, or Crucified Kosovo [http://crucified-kosovo.webs.com/], or Redmond, Helen; Their empty talk of liberating Afghan women; SocialistWorker.org; March 23, 2011- http://socialistworker.org/2011/03/23/empty-talk-about-liberation

8. Air War in Kosovo Seen as Precedent in Possible Response to Syria Chemical Attack; The New York Times; Aug. 23, 2013 - http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/air-war-in-kosovo-seen-as-precedent-in-possible-response-to-syria-chemical-attack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

9. Arab nations ready to pay for Syria strike: Kerry - The News; Sept. 6, 2013 - http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-25265-Arab-nations-ready-to-pay-for-Syria-strike-Kerry

10. Just as Standard & Poor's and Moody's maintained the illusion of Lehman Brothers' solidity up to six and one day respectively, before its collapse in 2008, it seems that it is being done for the whole West's financial system these days. See also: US borrowing authority to be exhausted by Oct. 17; AP - http://news.yahoo.com/us-borrowing-authority-exhausted-oct-17-151054701--finance.html

11. Such as the ever-ready Frenchman Bernanrd-Henri Lévy, calling the other international community—the governments who actually respect the international law and the U.N. rules—"gangster states, led by their godfather, Russia". See: ¿Qué quiere Rusia?; El Pais, Sept. 2, 2013 - http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/08/29/opinion/1377787206_916631.html

12. Syria: nearly half rebel fighters are jihadists or hardline Islamists, says IHS Jane's report [by analyst Charles Lister]; by Ben Farmer, defence Correspondent, and Ruth Sherlock, in Beirut; The Telegraph; Sept. 15, 2013 - http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10311007/Syria-nearly-half-rebel-fighters-are-jihadists-or-hardline-Islamists-says-IHS-Janes-report.html
13. "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States."-18 USC § 2381 - Treason - http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2381

14. "We trouble the West and the extremists because we are a socialist country." - Syrian ambassador to Serbia, H.E. Suleiman Abu-Dijab to V. Radojević; in an interview for the Communist Party of Serbia on Sept. 3, 2013, in Belgrade, Serbia - http://www.kps.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1136:intervju-ambasadora-sirije-u-beogradu-gospodin-sulejmana-abu-dijab&catid=65&Itemid=574

15. "[The West calls it] a revolution, but in fact it has nothing to do with revolutions. A revolution needs thinkers. A revolution is built on thought. Where are their thinkers? A revolution needs leaders. Who is its leader? Revolutions are built on science and thought not on ignorance, on pushing the country ahead not taking it centuries back, on spreading light not cutting power lines. A revolution is usually done by the people not by importing foreigners to rebel against the people. A revolution is in the interest of people not against the interests of people. Is this a revolution? Are those revolutionaries? They are a bunch of criminals." - Syria's President Bashar al-Assad; Damascus; June 1, 2013.

16. Although these words were written with a different context in mind, they seem prophetic: “Every friend of freedom must be as revolted as I am by the prospect of turning the United States into an armed camp, by the vision of jails filled […] and of an army […] empowered to invade the liberty of citizens on slight evidence.” - Milton Friedman; An Open Letter to Bill Bennett; The Wall Street Journal; September 7, 1989 - http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/open-letter-bill-bennett/

17. "Today we see how utterly mistaken was the Milton Friedman notion that a market system can regulate itself. We see how silly the Ronald Reagan slogan was that government is the problem, not the solution. This prevailing ideology of the last few decades has now been reversed." - Samuelson, Paul (Nobel Prize in Economics, 1970); Don't Expect Recovery Before 2012 - With 8% Inflation; Global Economic Viewpoint; January 16, 2009 - http://www.digitalnpq.org/articles/economic/331/01-16-2009/paul_samuelson

18. ”Milton Friedman is the Establishment’s Court Libertarian.” - Rothbard, Murray N.; Milton Friedman Unraveled; Journal of Libertarian Studies; Vol. 16, no. 4 (Fall 2002); pp. 37-54 - http://mises.org/journals/jls/16_4/16_4_3.pdf

19. "It turns out that the rule of law is probably more basic than privatization. Privatization is meaningless if you don’t have the rule of law. What does it mean to privatize if you do not have security of property, if you can’t use your property as you want to?" - Milton Friedman. See: Gwarney, James and Lawson, Robert; Economic Freedom of the World: 2002 Annual Report; Preface: Economic Freedom behind the Scenes, by Milton Friedman; The Fraser Institute; Vancouver, B.C.; 2002; page xviii.

20. Boas, Taylor C & Gans-Morse Jordan; Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan [http://people.bu.edu/tboas/neoliberalism.pdf]; Harvey, David; Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction; The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science [http://ann.sagepub.com/content/610/1/21.abstract]; Weyland, Kurt Gerhard; Assessing Latin American Neoliberalism: Introduction to a Debate; Latin American Research Review; Vol. 39, Number 3, 2004; pp. 143-149.

21. See: The Neoliberal Deluge-Hurricane Katrina, Late Capitalism, and the Remaking of New Orleans; Cedric Johnson, editor; 2011; University of Minnesota Press; Minneapolis; or, Klein, Naomi; The Shock Doctrine-The Rise of Disaster Capitalism; Henry Holt & Co.; New York; 2008; or, Saltman, Kenneth J.; Schooling in Disaster Capitalism; Teacher Educational Quarterly; Spring 2007; pp. 131-156.

22. Watts, Carl P; Is globalization another name for US imperialism?; Politics Review Online; Vol. 20, No. 3 (Feb. 2011).

23. Outrage at 'old Europe' remarks; BBC News; January 23, 2003- http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm

24. Pritchard, Claire; Who Cares if We Violate the Geneva Convention?; Chicago Policy Review; May 31, 2013- http://chicagopolicyreview.org/2013/05/31/who-cares-if-we-violate-the-geneva-convention/

25. Golub, Philip S; Conflict in the Balkans: An International Community?; Le Monde Diplomatique; June 1999- http://mondediplo.com/1999/06/06golub

26. "The international community does exist. It has an address. It has achievements to its credit. And it is the only way forward."-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan; The Address to the 52nd DPI/NGO Conference in New York City; September 15, 1999- http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990915.sgsm7133.doc.html

27. Ralph, Jason; Tony Blair's 'new doctrine of international community' and the UK decision to invade Iraq; POLIS Working Paper No. 20; School of Politics & International Studies; August 2005- http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/working-papers/wp20ralph.pdf

28. Created ad hoc after the declarations of independence by Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their subsequent international recognition by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu, Tuvalu (although Vanuatu, in a horribly embarrassing manner, later withdrew it).

29. As in the case of Russia and the other states recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in the case of the NATO states' attack on and destruction of Libya, which went far beyond the U.N. mandate of ensuring a no-fly zone over the territory of that member of the U.N.

30. "Since the Industrial Revolution in Britain, the self-centered way of thinking that long formed in Western powers has been swelling with the constantly consolidated powers. One of the performances is that some Western politicians often make improper comments in the name of 'international community' when they talk about the international affairs or in the Western media reports. In their eyes, they are the 'international community'" - How the world opinion is kidnapped by West's "international community" rhetoric; People's Daily Online; September 1, 2013- http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/7932499.html

31. See: Letter by Adolfo Pérez Esquivel to Barack Obama (accessed on Sept. 8, 2013)- http://www.democraticunderground.com/10023621013

32. "When you next hear the term, what is being referred to is not the international community at all - understood as all the nation-states that make up the world - but just a small sliver of it, our bit. The great majority of the world, indeed - the west constitutes less than one-fifth of the world's population - is, in fact, being tacitly ignored: unless, of course, it happens to agree with the west, in which case it is implicitly tagged on the end as a good old western fellow-traveler."-Jacques, Martin; What the hell is the international community?; The Guardian; Aug. 24, 2006 -http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/24/whatthehellistheinternati

33. Modelski, George (Jerzy), Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington Press, 1987; Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Columbia University Press, 2002; Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law, Stevens, 1949; Juraj Andrassy, International Law, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 2010.

34. Documented widely, from The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations [http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/nsaebb2.htm], through Albanian Mobsters: Albanian Mafia, Rudaj Organization, Princ Dobroshi, Ismail Lika [http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/albanian-mobsters-books-llc/1103425185?ean=9781158328673], to Syrian Rebels Funded by Afghan Drug Sales [http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130411/180581557.html]

35. "It was Yugoslavia's resistance of the broader trends of political and economic reform--not the plight of the Kosovar Albanians--that best explains NATO's war." - Norris, John; Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo; Greenwood Publishing Group, Preager, NY; 2005; p. xxiii.

36. Smaller than the Sea of Marmara (11,350 sq. km.), between the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles straights in Turkey, the U.S. state of Connecticut (14,357 sq. km.), or the U.K. county of Yorkshire (11,903 sq. km.), about half the size of the State of Mexico and a bit smaller than the State of Queretaro.

37. Reliable and complete census data haven't been available for Kosovo and Metohija for at least three decades.

38. See: Külzer, Andreas; The Byzantine road system in Eastern Thrace; 4th International Symposium on Thracian Studies, April 2007; Verlag Adolf M. Hakkert; Amsterdam; 2011., or: Tafel, Gottlieb L. F.; Via Militaris & Egnatia; 1841; Columbia University Libraries, Preservation Department; Master negative #: 91-80058-10; - http:// ia600804.us.archive.org/6/items/viamilitarisroma00tafe/viamilitarisroma00tafe.pdf

39. The "Nabucco" pipeline project was aborted in the summer of 2013. - https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/07/13/nabu-j13.html

40. http://www.south-stream.info/en/pipeline/route/

41. Untrue, as the still non-existent economy shows, just as in Libya today, in spite of the positive propaganda about its "anticipated boom in natural resources". - See: Cockburn, Patrick; Special report: We all thought Libya had moved on - it has, but into lawlessness and ruin; The Independent; September 3, 2013 - (accessed on Sept. 8, 2013) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/special-report-we-all-thought-libya-had-moved-on--it-has-but-into-lawlessness-and-ruin-8797041.html

42. "Invest in Kosovo. Ignite your success!" - Publication by the Investment Promotion Agency of Kosovo; Ministry of Trade and Industry; March 22, 2013 - http://www.bitkom.org/files/documents/IPAK__PPT_General_22_03_13.pdf

43. http://www.indexmundi.com/kosovo/unemployment_rate.html

44. And the U.N.'s Mission in Kosovo Privatization Policy made it easier than anywhere else in the world–means of production and real estate may be bought disregarding their deeds.

45. “Kosova [Kosovo] mine [mineral] resources are worthy of 13.5 billion Euros, according to a joint survey conducted by the Directorate for Mines and Minerals and the World Bank.” - http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2005/01/world-bank-survey-puts-kosovos-mineral.html

46. Vickers, Miranda; Between Serb and Albanian-A History of Kosovo; Columbia University Press; 1988; page XV.

47. George Soros, a billionaire financier/amateur politician, eager to acquire the Trepča mines [http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/Johnstone/howitis.htm], vying for it with H.R.H. Prince Michael of Kent, according to the Kosovo Privatization Agency Director Shkelzen Luka [as reported by www.economy.rs/vesti/18697/Kosovo--Vojvodina-izgradila--Princ-od-Kenta-dobija-na-poklon.html]. Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State at the time of NATO war on Yugoslavia, is contending for mobile phones and internet opportunities in Kosovo [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/world/europe/ex-us-official-pulls-bid-for-kosovo-telecom-stake.html?_r=0], while Wesley Clark, the Supreme Commander of NATO during the "Madeleine's War" in 1999, is "seeking a license to explore Kosovo's underground coal deposits to use to make synthetic fuel for cars and planes." [Marketplace; Oct. 26, 2012- http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/wesley-clark-puts-name-behind-kosovo-coal-project]

48. "[It] also included the Serbian province of Sandzak and the northwestern part of today's Macedonia." - See: Joksimovich, Vojin Ph.D.; Kosovo is Serbia; gmbooks.com - http://www.gmbooks.com/product/Kosovo-GM.html

49. "Proof of the Serbian origin of the name and the loanword status of the immigrant Albanian term is that the word "kosovo" has a clear etymology to anyone who knows a Slavic language, while Albanian "Kosova" is an opaque, meaningless place name in the Albanian language." - Maher, J. P.; Professor of Linguistics, Emeritus; Northeastern Illinois University; "Kosova" or "Kosovo"? - What's in a Name?; http://emperor.vwh.net/articles/JP%20maher/InAname.html

50. Although many scholars in the West publish linguistically baseless claims that the word is of "Turkish-Albanian origin", in spite of the fact that it doesn't have any meaning at all in either of them. See: Vickers, Miranda; Between Serb and Albanian-A History of Kosovo; Columbia University Press; 1988; page XIV.

51. “Spectral evidence refers to a witness testimony that the accused person’s spirit or spectral shape appeared to [the] witness in a dream at the time the accused person’s physical body was at another location. It was accepted in the courts during the Salem Witch Trials.” [June-September 1692] - http://definitions.uslegal.com/s/spectral-evidence/ - It reappeared in the U.S. in 2013: “Jurors at the Jacko trial heard testimony from a surprise witness yesterday — the ghost of Michael Jackson! [...] In the supernatural tête-á-tête, Jacko’s ghost allegedly absolved Dr. Conrad Murray of any guilt in his death and admitted he “accidentally killed himself.” - “Ghost” of Jacko stars at LA trial; New York Post; June 12, 2013. - http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/ghost_of_jacko_stars_at_la_trial_Flr5EJeWiSLJQsCT9djE9L

52. Sakran, Frank C.; Palestine Dilemma: Arab Rights versus Zionist Aspirations; Public Affairs Press; Washington; 1948; p. 204.

53. See at least the1932 U.S. Stimson Doctrine (on non-recognition of international territorial changes executed by force), and Articles 3 and 11 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention, on the rights and duties of states (prohibition of creation and recognition of puppet states) and the prohibition of the use of force in order to obtain sovereignty. The "international community" claimed they were obsolete until the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

54. As late as July 28, 2013, the KFOR Commander, German General Walker Halbauer, stated that "As far as military matters are concerned, [I] decide who may enter Kosovo. […] I want to emphasize that in Kosovo, both the U.N. Resolution 1244 and the Kumanovo Agreement, are in force." ("Када је војска у питању ја одлучујем ко може да уђе на Косово. […] Хоћу да нагласим да је на Косову и даље на снази и Резолуција УН 1244 и Кумановски споразум.") - See: Lazanski, Miroslav; I understand the Serbs from the Ibar River area; Politika; July 28, 2013. -