Da: "Vladimir Krsljanin" <slobodavk@ yubc. net>
Data: Lun 30 Ago 2004 15:54:37 Europe/Rome
Oggetto: Vazno obavestenje: Najvazniji dani u Hagu i intervju advokata
Tapuskovica

HASKI TRIBUNAL: NAMETANJE ADVOKATA MILOSEVICU?

Intervju Branislava Tapuskovica nemackom dnevnom listu "junge Welt",
30. Avgusta 2004.

Razgovarala: Ana Gutenberg

P: Sekretar MKTJ Vas je nedavno molio da se saglsite da budete na listi
advokata koji bi potencijalno mogli biti odredjeni za nametnute
branioce g. Milosevicu. Da li ste bili iznenadjeni sto se sudije
vracaju tom pitanju posto se g. Milosevic uspesno branio sam u prvoj
polovini procesa? Odnosno, sta ste u stvari pomislili?

O: Jesam, bio sam iznenadjen. Jer, ako je Slobodan Milosevic bolestan,
cak i da je sve vreme imao branioca, sudjenje se ne bi moglo odrzati
sve dok bolest traje. Predlog tuzilastva da se koristi video link je
besmislen: video link bolesnog coveka ne moze uciniti procesno
sposobnim.

P: Zasto ste to odbili?

O: Postovao sam odredbu cl. 21, tacka 4/d Statuta medjunarodnog
tribunala za bivsu Jugoslaviju prema kojoj je svakom optuzenom
zagarantovano pravo DA MU SE SUDI U NJEGOVOJ PRISUTNOSTI I DA SE BRANI
LICNO.

P: Secam se da su se sudije povremeno vrlo grubo odnosile prema Vama
kada ste uspesno povezivali cinjenice tokom svedocenja svedoka optuzbe.
Jednom su Vas cak optuzili da branite g. Milosevica. Kakav je Vas
komentar?

O: Ja to nisam tako doziveo. Moja duznost je bila da narocito
insistiram na oslobadjajucim cinjenicama koje su proizlazile iz
pismenih dokaza koje sam dobijao od tuzilastva. Zaista, nije moj
problem kako su se sudije drzale prema meni.

P: Sta mislite o stavu da je optuzeni suvise bolestan da se sam brani,
a dovoljno zdrav da izdrzi sudjenje? Da li je to uobicajeno?

O: O stanju zdravlja odlucuju iskljucivo lekari i po mom misljenju to
je obavezujuce za sud. Ako lekari utvrde da je Slobodan Milosevic
bolestan i da nije sposoban da se sam brani i da prisustvuje sudjenju
sudjenja ne moze biti. Jednostavno: tuzilastvo tada nema slucaj.

P: Kriticari kazu da je nametanje branioca g. Milosevicu u stvari
pokusaj da se on onemoguci da izvede svoje cinjenice i svedoke. Molim
za Vas komentar.

O: Sudjenje ne moze biti regularno ukoliko Slobodan Milosevic ne izvede
svoje dokaze.

P: Sta mislite o cinjenici da je bivsi drzavni sekretar SAD Medlin
Olbrajt posetila tribunal upravo istog dana pocetkom jula kada su
sudije prihvatile mogucnost nametanja branioca?

O: Moze se samo nagadjati, moj stav je uvek bio: politika ne sme da
utice na rad bilo kog suda.

P: Mnogo Vam hvala.


Den Artikel finden Sie unter:
http://www.jungewelt.de/2004/08-30/018.php

(c) Junge Welt 2004
http://www.jungewelt.de


***************************************************************
**************************************************************
BITKA ZA ISTINU PREDSEDNIKA MILOSEVICA JE BITKA ZA NASU BUDUCNOST.
ISTINA CE POBEDITI SAMO UZ VASU POMOC.
POMOZITE ODMAH!
http://www.icdsm.org/battle.htm
**************************************************************
***************************************************************
VAZNO OBAVESTENJE
===================

ISTORIJSKI ZNACAJNA UVODNA REC SLOBODANA MILOSEVICA PRED NATO
TRIBUNALOM U HAGU BICE IZRECENA U UTORAK, 31. AVGUSTA 2004. GODINE SA
POCETKOM U 9:00 CASOVA UJUTRU.

SLEDECEG DANA, U SREDU 1. SEPTEMBRA, TRIBUNAL CE RASPRAVLJATI O
MOGUCNOSTI NAMETANJA BRANIOCA PREDSEDNIKU MILOSEVICU, SUPROTNO NORMAMA
MEDJUNARODNOG PRAVA I SAMOG TRIBUNALA.

UDRUZENJE SLOBODA I MEDJUNARODNI KOMITET ZA ODBRANU SLOBODANA
MILOSEVICA POZIVAJU SVE PRIJATELJE SLOBODE, SRPSKOG NARODA I
JUGOSLAVIJE DA TIH DANA BUDU U HAGU ILI DA NA DRUGI NACIN IZRAZE SVOJU
SOLIDARNOST SA NAJVECIM BORCEM ZA SLOBODU, RAVNOPRAVNOST I NACIONALNO
DOSTOJANSTVO.

U SREDU, 1. SEPTEMBRA, PO ZAVRSETKU ZASEDANJA TRIBUNALA, MEDJUNARODNI
KOMITET ZA ODBRANU SLOBODANA MILOSEVICA SE ODRZATI KONFERENCIJU ZA
STAMPU NA KOJOJ CE GOVORITI:
- KLAUS HARTMAN (Nemacka), Potpredsednik Medjunarodnog komiteta za
odbranu Slobodana Milosevica i
- TIFEN DIKSON (Kanada), advokat Medjunarodnog komiteta za odbranu
Slobodana Milosevica.

SVI KOJI NE BUDU U STANJU DA TIH DANA BUDU U HAGU, MOGU PRATITI PRENOS
PREKO INTERNETA, BIRAJUCI ODGOVARAJUCI LINK (video ili audio, na
srpskom ili na
engleskom jeziku - za pracenje je potreban besplatni program Real
Player, koji se takodje moze "skinuti" sa Interneta) NA GLAVNOJ
STRANICI VEB SAJTA SAMOG TRIBUNALA:

www.un.org/icty

Prenos je u vremenu "pomeren" za pola casa, dakle pocinje u 9:30.

*************************************************************

SLOBODA urgently needs your donation.
Please find the detailed instructions at:
http://www.sloboda.org.yu/pomoc.htm

To join or help this struggle, visit:
http://www.sloboda.org.yu/ (Sloboda/Freedom association)
http://www.icdsm.org/ (the international committee to defend Slobodan
Milosevic)
http://www.free-slobo.de/ (German section of ICDSM)
http://www.icdsm-us.org/ (US section of ICDSM)
http://www.icdsmireland.org/ (ICDSM Ireland)
http://www.pasti.org/milodif.htm (ICDSM Italy)
http://www.wpc-in.org/ (world peace council)
http://www.geocities.com/b_antinato/ (Balkan antiNATO center)

[ E.S. Herman - professore alla Universita' di Pennsylvania e tra
l'altro collaboratore della nota rivista progressista "chomskiana" Z
Magazine - presenta in questo articolo una dettagliata disamina dei
casi piu' eclatanti di falsificazione delle cifre delle vittime di
"massacri" e "genocidi" nelle recenti guerre imperialiste. Il caso
jugoslavo, ovviamente e purtroppo, occupa una posizione preminente
nella casistica della disinformazione strategica in materia... ]


http://musictravel.free.fr/political/political21.htm


"BODY COUNTS" IN IMPERIAL SERVICE:
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere

By Edward S. Herman


It is really impressive how efficiently the intellectual and propaganda
resources of the imperial state are mobilized to meet its need to
demonize its enemies and put its own and its client state's actions in
a benevolent light.
This is especially important for an imperial power that retains its
democratic forms as it kills lavishly and on a global basis, and
justifies these killings, and its enormous "defense" expenditures, on
grounds of "human rights" concerns as well as "national security."
Getting its message across requires not only a compliant media and
"journalists of attachment" who will follow the official agenda, but
also an intellectual community of experts, academic and think-tank
specialists, New Humanitarians, human rights group officials, and
former leftists who have finally seen the light, who serve as
"independent" commentators and guide the public toward the official
truth. They constitute an ideological and propaganda collective that
provides a gigantic echo chamber in which the official agenda
resonates, and which helps get the public on the killing bandwagon.

The operation of this collective, and its techniques, are well
illustrated by its treatment of "body counts" in comparable wars and
atrocities throughout the world. Where there is an official and
imperial demand for a high body count and great indignation, as in the
case of Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 (earlier in Bosnia in the years
1992-1995, Kuwait in 1990-1991, still earlier in the case of Cambodia
under Pol Pot, 1975-1978), the collective will be deeply concerned with
civilian casualties, will pursue refugees relentlessly to get details
of their suffering, and will search eagerly for dead bodies. Given that
they know the truth in advance -that "another Hitler" is committing
genocide, they will not look at evidence very critically, and will be
happy to accept any congenial story and any inflated account of numbers
of bodies, however biased the source. They will also explain away the
ex post findings that "another Hitler's" body count had been inflated.

On the other hand, where the imperial power and/or its proxies are
doing the killing, as in Afghanistan from October 7, 2001 onward, or in
Panama in 1989, or in Iraq from January 1991 to the present; or where
client states like Israel, Turkey and Indonesia in East Timor are doing
the killing, the establishment collective has little interest in
civilian casualties [exception: ISRAELI civilians], fails to pursue
refugees to get their stories of suffering, and does not engage in any
search for dead bodies. In fact, its members tend to be sceptical of
stories of suffering and estimates of dead bodies made by others, in a
direct reversal of their position on such stories and estimates for
"worthy" victims of "another Hitler."

This same contrast applies to larger body counts such as in the famous
100 million death toll of Communism in the Black Book, which includes
millions who died in Chinese and Soviet famines. But it would be
unthinkable for writers in the mainstream to count in the death toll of
Capitalism those who have died of exposure, hard labor, starvation, and
preventable diseases resulting from economic structures and policies,
which would run well over 100 million; or the aggregate of
"disappeared" in Latin America during the National Security State
years; or the "collateral damage" deaths from sanctions and bombing in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other places. AOL Time Warner is not likely
to be interested in publishing a Black Book of Capitalism.

Bosnia and Kosovo: Give Us Bodies!

With Milosevic "another Hitler" and the Serbs "willing executioners,"
by NATO-power determination in the early 1990s, the quest for bodies
was early and intense. But only Bosnian Muslim bodies were sought, not
victims of the Bosnian Muslims or Croatians, although there is
extensive evidence of repeated massacres of Serbs in Bosnia in the
years 1992-1995. In 1994 and 1995, Muslim commander in Srebrenica,
Naser Oric, proudly showed journalists videotapes of his "war
trophies," including severed heads and heaps of bodies of Serbs, but
these were not the bodies the collective was seeking. (The NATO
establishment, including New Humanitarians and genocide hustlers David
Rieff, Susan Sontag, Aryeh Neier, Christopher Hitchens, Ian Williams et
al., have been exceedingly quiet on the implications for likely source
of massacres of the fact that thousands of bin Laden's troops and
allies had been imported to fight the Bosnian Muslim cause in those
years).

In his book Slaughterhouse, David Rieff says there were more than
250,000 Bosnians killed--and Rieff uses the word Bosnians to mean
Bosnian Muslims only--but he gives no source, and he is clearly
regurgitating claims of Bosnian Muslim officials, notably Foreign
Minister Haris Silajdzic. The propagandists on his side are
truth-tellers. For Rieff, his mother Susan Sontag, Hitchens, et al.,
this was "genocide," but the thousands of Serbs killed by Naser Oric
and Bin Laden's cadres was not genocide; in fact, those slaughters and
mass graves (at least 53 claimed by the Bosnian Serbs) never show up on
the screen of the collective or reach the U.S. public.

According to George Kenney, who worked on Yugoslavia in the State
Department during the Bosnian war, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) estimates 20-30,000 dead in Bosnia, and U.S.
intelligence community estimates "run to tens of thousands." Only a few
thousand bodies have been found in Bosnia attributable to the
Bosnia-Herzegovina wars, and the ICRC says "more than 20,000" are
unaccounted for, which, again, doesn't get us near 250,000 and
"genocide." In Srebrenica, there have been only 473 bodies recovered,
and there is absolutely no credible evidence that 7,500 men and boys
who allegedly disappeared in this area in July 1995 were murdered. The
absence of bodies, despite an intense search and strong incentives to
produce them, hasn't interfered with the conclusion that 7,500 were
slaughtered there.

One claim of course was that the Serbs removed the bodies. This is not
credible, as removing thousands of bodies would not only require
significant human and capital resources, not likely to be a high
priority in times of intense warfare, but it would also be a project
readily observable in satellite photos. U.S. satellite observations of
this area never came up with any photos of killing, digging, or
removal. The removal theory was also popular for Kosovo, especially
after the Tribunal produced fewer than 4,000 bodies (on all sides,
including dead soldiers). Long after the war, but timed well to provide
a suitable context for bringing Milosevic to the Hague, a story was
widely circulated about a Mercedes refrigerated truck dumped into the
Danube with a load of bodies, the inference being that maybe many such
trucks with bodies were dumped into the river. Needless to say no such
evidence has been forthcoming.

The search for bodies intensified during the 78-day bombing war, and
then in its aftermath, in NATO-occupied Kosovo. This was urgently
needed by NATO's war-makers, as the really severe refugee flight and
escalated killing FOLLOWED the NATO bombing; before that, a
Belgrade-NATO agreement had seen the drawing back of the Serbian army,
the return of many of the refugees, admission of a sizable OSCE
observer presence, and reduced killing, despite KLA provocations. A
pre-bombing German Foreign office assessment even denied any ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, describing Serbian army actions there as targeted
against KLA forces and strongholds. Furthermore, it eventually entered
the public domain that the United States had actually aided the KLA
before the bombing, so that the KLA's provocations aimed at inducing
Serbian retaliation to help bring NATO into war could be said to be
U.S.-sponsored. The indignation at Serbian retaliation was therefore
cynical and hypocritical.

The NATO propaganda machine needed to ignore this history, as well as
the military collaboration of NATO and the KLA during the war, and
blame the refugee crisis and killings entirely on the Serbs. This was
helped by a claim of an "Operation Horseshoe" plan to expel the Kosovo
Albanians even without a NATO war. The establishment collective's
cooperation in this task was exemplary, including the suppression up to
this day of the evidence that the alleged Operation Horseshoe was a
propaganda fabrication (exposed in a book by retired German Brigadier
General Heinz Loquai, The Kosovo Conflict: A War That Could Be Avoided).

A final problem was the absence of enough bodies in Kosovo after the
June 10, 1999 NATO-occupation to satisfy the frenzied propaganda claims
of genocide. During the war, NATO propagandists had made wild claims of
100,000 and even 500,000 killings and the word "genocide" was used
freely to describe Serb actions. After the war, NATO and its agents
organized what must have be the largest forensic search in history, and
the media descended on the conquered province like an invasion of
locusts, interviewing refugees, looking for and examining grave sites,
insatiable for stories of abuse and bodies. They got painful stories
from the refugees, many no doubt true, but there was much
disappointment that the Trepca mine, for example, which Kosovo Albanian
informants had claimed had been the site of mass cremation, showed no
signs of any bodies having been burned there, and the Tribunal's final
count was under 4,000 dead--from unknown causes and on all sides.
According to the ICRC, there were some 3,500 Kosovo residents still
missing in May 2001, a figure that included some 900 Serbs, Roma and
other non-Albanians. Whether these were all genuinely missing or had
died is unclear. With the body count numbers clearly inadequate,
instead of pointing out that NATO officials had lied and admitting that
they had been gulled, the media and other members of the propaganda
collective simply dropped the subject. Having exploited the inflated
claims and squeezed all they could out of refugee testimony, and having
failed to mention that the claim of an Operation Horseshoe had been
refuted, the collective's abandonment of the subject meant that they
left a system of convenient lies intact. This would allow them to
support the Tribunal in anything it did, as the Tribunal worked with a
closely related system of politicized and biased "information."

The New Humanitarian members of the collective, who had swallowed and
disseminated the inflated numbers, also never recanted based on the
actual body count. None of them have ever mentioned the evidence that
the United States had secretly aided the KLA before the bombing war and
was in active contact with them during the war. None has conceded that
"Operation Horseshoe" had been demonstrated to be a propaganda
concoction; Christopher Hitchens repeats that "a plan of mass
expulsion...was in train," and Michael Ignatieff says that "Milosevic
decided to solve an 'internal problem' by exporting an entire nation to
his impoverished neighbors."

For Ian Williams and Ignatieff, those who point to the absence of
bodies consistent with the inflated claims of NATO propaganda are
"revisionists"! Both cite Tribunal estimates as the last word--
Williams says Carla del Ponte's estimate of 11,334 dead based on
"eyewitnesses" "should have put questions concerning the death toll to
rest," but no--"the downward revision of the numbers murdered in Kosovo
is proving very fashionable--even in the New York Times," which to
Williams' outrage put up a headline "Early Count Hints at Fewer Kosovo
Deaths." The actual body count was under 4,000, but for Williams, del
Ponte's estimate of how many she EXPECTS to be found is the only
relevant number, given the Tribunal's known objectivity. (In dismissing
the need for investigating NATO's war crimes in bombing Serbia, del
Ponte acknowledged taking NATO press releases as an authoritative
source of information, but Williams probably wouldn't find this
problematic either.)

Williams does the New York Times an injustice. In addition to never
finding the U.S.-KLA connection of news interest, nor the collapse of
the Operation Horseshoe claim, nor the contesting evidence concerning
the Racak massacre, the paper called upon Michael Ignatieff to give the
authoritative word on "Counting Bodies in Kosovo" (Nov. 21, 1999).
Like, Williams, Ignatieff has the "revisionists...getting their facts
wrong." The NATO leaders didn't exaggerate the killings. While U.S.
Defense Secretary William Cohen claimed that 100,000 Kosovo Albanian
males were "missing," he "also clearly stated that his reports showed
that 4,600 Kosovars had been executed, a claim that has been confirmed
by the forensic trail of evidence uncovered by war crimes investigators
since June." But Ignatieff eventually admits that the Tribunal had up
to then found only 2,108 bodies, so that "forensic evidence" based on
discovered bodies could certainly not demonstrate that 4,600 people had
been executed. Of course, Ignatieff talks about a forensic "trail of
evidence," but this rhetorical trick cannot cover up the fact that he
is engaging in deliberate deception. He also doesn't discuss Cohen's
use of "missing," in the midst of a war when such number was a
meaningless propaganda ploy, and used to suggest the likelihood that
100,000 had already been murdered.

The Tribunal estimated that 11,334 bodies will be found, so Ignatieff
says whether they will be found "depends on whether the Serb military
and the police removed them." That the Tribunal's estimate might be
inflated for political reasons, or be simply mistaken, is ruled out by
ideological premise. The Tribunal hasn't found more than 4,000 bodies,
but neither Ignatieff nor the Times has noticed, and by ideological
assumption any missing bodies must have been removed by agents of
another Hitler! This is bias running wild.

Afghanistan: What Bodies?

The contrast between the media and collective's treatment of civilian
casualties and body count in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan after September
11 couldn't be more dramatic. The media's disinterest in questioning
Afghan refugees is especially noteworthy as there were large numbers
put to flight by the bombing, and this new burden of war was imposed on
a population already in a starvation crisis. Elementary humanity would
make their condition and plight of interest. But, on the other hand,
U.S. policy success depended on minimizing the effect of the bombing
war on civilians. A good propaganda system will therefore make Afghan
civilian victims "unworthy," and their plight will be ignored. The U.S.
media and collective responded at least as well as Pravda or Izvestia
responded to the demands of the Soviet state when IT was doing damage
to Afghan civilians.

For the U.S. media, it was "A Nation Challenged" and a "War On Terror."

The focus has been on U.S. war plans, war actions, successes in
attacking the enemy, coalition organization, and reactions on the home
front. Considerable attention has been paid to civilian casualties and
the pains of death, but only as regards the victims of 9/11; in fact,
the New York Times has been providing humanizing accounts, day after
day, of each and every victim of the World Trade Center bombings. But
you would have to look hard in the massive coverage of the war to find
U.S. media reports that even touched on civilian casualties from the
intensive U.S. bombing raids on Afghanistan, or the war's effects on
refugee generation and starvation. In an enlightening contrast, whereas
The Guardian (London), reports "Refugees left in the cold at
'slaughterhouse' camp: 100 Afghans perish daily as strained network
collapses under flood of new arrivals" (Jan. 3, 2002), the Washington
Post features success in averting famine and averts its eyes from the
Afghans in travail ("Massive Food Delivery Averts Afghan Famine," Dec.
31, 2001).

Even when U.S. bombs repeatedly hit marked Red Cross facilities in
Kabul, and U.S. officials admitted that this was intended, the U.S.
media reported this with brevity and without the slightest indignation,
and it did not impel them to look at U.S. bombing strategies more
closely. Even the open admission of an intention to harm civilians, as
in British Admiral Sir Michael Boyce's statement that "The squeeze will
carry on until the people of the country themselves recognize that this
is going to go on until they get the leadership changed" (NYT, Oct.
28), does not move the U.S. media. Investigative zeal on this subject
is non-existent. When the academic Mark Herold went to the trouble of
carefully studying news reports at home and abroad, and came up with a
tally of over 3,700 civilians killed by U.S. bombs from October 7th to
December 7th ("A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States Aerial
Bombing of Afghanistan"), no major U.S. news institution bothered to
report this finding.

Equally interesting has been the silence and/or apologetics on civilian
casualties on the part of the New Humanitarians who were so deeply
concerned with the officially approved victims in the Balkans. Writing
and reporting on the Afghan war, Timothy Garton Ash, David Rieff,
Michael Ignatieff, and Bernard Kouchner have expressed not a word of
concern over the civilian bombing casualties, or the enhanced
starvation threat resulting from the war, or possible "war crimes."
Chistopher Hitchens has been positively enthused over the war, and
KNOWS by intuition and faith in his leaders that there has been "no
serious loss of human life" from the bombing and that the Bush
administration has followed "an almost pedantic policy of avoiding
'collateral damage'" (Nation, Dec. 17, 2001).

Hitchens' Nation colleague, Marc Cooper, was indignant at a citation to
Mark Herold's study of civilian casualties, claiming that Herold's body
count is "totally unverified and unscientific." Cooper, who was never
outraged over the much less scientific claims of Kosovo Albanian deaths
by William Cohen and other NATO spokespersons, is no doubt waiting for
the Bush administration to "verify" the Herold body count. It is
noteworthy that Cooper doesn't express indignation that neither the
government nor media seem to have made an effort to study civilian
casualties as Herold has done, a failure that clearly facilitates the
killing of civilians--but his arguments are perhaps understandable
given that the war itself strikes him as a "just cause," making the
Afghan civilians correspondingly unworthy. His, Hitchens', and the New
Humanitarians' stance toward these civilian killings makes them
facilitators of de facto war crimes.

Body Counts in East Timor, Turkey, and Israel

It goes almost without saying that the U.S. mainstream media have not
sought out refugees and pursued body counts of East Timorese victims of
Indonesia, Kurdish victims of Turkey, or Palestinian victims of Israel.
There is no way the U.S. public could know that Turkey had been killing
Kurds and producing refugees during the 1990s on a scale that exceeded
Serb operations in Kosovo by a large factor. Similarly, as regards
Israel and the Palestinians, the media have continued their long
tradition of making the Israelis the victims, the Palestinians the
aggressors and terrorists, the numerical body count on the ground the
inverse of the impression of body count conveyed in the media (see
Herman, "Israel's Approved Ethnic Cleansing, Part 3, How the U.S. Media
Protects It," Z Magazine, June 2001).

It was a telling fact that as Indonesian killing in East Timor reached
a peak in 1977 and 1978, New York Times coverage of that area fell to
zero. This was possibly the closest thing to genocide we have seen
since World War II, but the word is not applied to this case (in
contrast with its lavish use for Kosovo), and veteran New York Times
reporter Henry Kamm even explicitly denied its applicability to East
Timor (Feb. 15, 1981). That was what Times reporters call a "complex"
case, as a good genocidist (Suharto), long supported by the United
States, who brought "stability" to the area, was in charge.

In 1998 and 1999, when Indonesia attempted to prevent and subvert the
U.N.-sponsored independence referendum in East Timor, the Indonesian
army and paramilitary forces killed over 5,000 defenceless civilians
even before the August 30, 1999 vote, according to Church estimates
(John Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom). This was far more than
died in Kosovo in the year before the bombing war, estimated by UN
human rights rapporteur Jiri Dienstbier at some 1,800, and more than
the number of bodies found in Kosovo even after the war. But the
disinterest of the U.S. mainstream media in refugees or body counts was
close to complete, and when on the rare occasion numbers killed have
been offered, they are low. Seth Mydans suggested that "as many as
1,000 people" died in the independence struggle, with no citation to
source, an estimate that fits well the paper's durable coverup of
Indonesia's abuse of these unworthy victims ("Bones Offer Testimony Of
Killings In East Timor," Sept. 30, 2001).

The New Humanitarians have follow the same pattern, attending with
great indignation to the "genocide" in Bosnia and Kosovo, and somehow
never getting around to the frequently far more numerous unworthy
victims of their own state and its clients. In a recent study that
David Peterson and I did on "The New Humanitarian Crusaders" for a
forthcoming book on Human Rights: Challenging the New Consensus (edited
by David Chandler), we found that in a sample of 101 recent mainstream
media articles on human rights written by a dozen leading New
Humanitarians (Rieff, Sontag, Kouchner, Havel, Hitchens, Ignatieff,
Ash, Kaldor, Aryeh Neier, Geoffrey Robertson, Tim Judah and Kenneth
Roth), the Yugoslav conflicts were discussed in detail in every
article, but human rights issues in East Timor, Turkey and Israel were
mentioned briefly in only three.

The New Humanitarians' lack of interest or concern with victims deemed
unworthy by their state was well captured by Christopher Hitchens'
treatment of East Timor, where he credits the new interventionism in
Kosovo for having helped the East Timorese. Although the intervention
was belated, in the end "The Indonesian occupiers sailed away"
("Genocide and the Body-Baggers," Nation, Nov. 29, 1999). He omits
mentioning that the United States and its allies knew, and watched
without doing anything about it, while many more innocents were killed
than died in Kosovo before the bombing war; that in addition to the
large numbers killed, the destruction was immense and 85 percent of the
population was made refugees; that no food drops were implemented on
behalf of the refugees; that nothing was done to help the more than
100,000 refugees under Indonesian control in West Timor; that no
forensic teams were rushed to check out war crimes and no war crimes
trials are pressed by the West.

That was Hitchens' last word on this subject, as he sailed away to
focus on the villainy in Kosovo, and then the just war against fascism
in Afghanistan.

Conclusion: Body Counts in Imperial Service

The beauty of this system is that it works without coercion-- the media
and New Humanitarians display great energy in pursuing the mistreatment
of the worthy victims of Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein or Milosevic, and
their indignation seems entirely spontaneous; and their disinterest and
absence of indignation at the abuse of the unworthy victims of Suharto,
the Turkish generals, Ariel Sharon, or U.S. bombers in Serbia, the
Sudan, and Afghanistan seem equally natural. Both their benevolence and
indifference are channeled perfectly to serve the demands of the
imperial state as they quickly internalize the patriotic agenda. Thus
they can pay little or no attention to Saddam Hussein's victims while
he is in imperial service (before August 2, 1990), but quickly begin
the aggressive search for bodies after he becomes another Hitler (from
August 2). This is the way a model propaganda system should work.


Edward S. Herman is Professor Emeritus at the Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania.

Slovenia/Croazia: quali sono i confini della UE?

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http://www.edit.hr/lavoce/index.html
"La Voce del Popolo", Rijeka - Fiume, 10.8.2004

La stampa slovena sulla situazione nel Golfo di Pirano

Gli incidenti fomentano lo spirito antieuropeo

LUBIANA - Non accenna a diminuire l'interesse dell'opinione pubblica
slovena in merito all'inasprimento dello scontro relativo alla
sovranità territoriale nel Golfo di Pirano e al conseguente diritto
alla pesca nelle acque contese. Parimenti, numerosi continuano a essere
anche i commenti e gli articoli pubblicati a riguardo dai giornali
sloveni. Immediatamente dopo l'incontro della presidenza della
Commissione mista per il traffico frontaliero tra la Croazia e la
Slovenia tenutosi venerdì scorso Otocec non sono tardati i commenti che
non facevano mistero della mancata riuscita dell'incontro. Nel corso di
questo, infatti, non era stato possibile giungere a un accordo
riguardante il codice di comportamento dei pescatori in quanto la parte
slovena aveva valutato inaccettabili le modifiche al testo prestabilito
richieste dalla parte croata. In aggiunta, a sottolineare il fallimento
dell'iniziativa il quotidiano di Lubiana "Delo" informava che a
incontro concluso il Ministero degli Affari Esteri sloveno aveva
inviato a Zagabria una nota diplomatica, la seconda riguardante gli
ultimi sconfinamenti. In questa si faceva presente che la Slovenia
considera le acque nelle quali si sono verificati gli incidenti che
hanno coinvolto i pescherecci croati e le motovedette della polizia
slovena acque territoriali slovene e protestava contro l'uso del nome
"Savudrijska vala" in quanto internazionalmente riconosciuto sarebbe
soltanto quello di Golfo di Pirano. Stando all'articolo le ragioni
fondanti dello scambio di note riguarderebbero ancora una volta la zona
ittico - ecologica con la quale la Croazia a partire da ottobre
prossimo allarga la propria giurisdizione nell'Adriatico in quanto
stando all'accordo raggiunto alcuni mesi fa con Bruxelles la zona entra
in vigore nei confronti dei Paesi che non fanno parte dell'UE. Ciò, a
causa dell'irrisolta questione del confine marittimo tra la Croazia e
la Slovenia mette in forse la fiducia reciproca tra i due Paesi
confinanti. Proseguendo lungo questa linea di pensiero lunedì il
quotidiano ha riportato che le proposte croate vertevano
all'imposizione della "linea mediana" richiamandosi all'art.15 della
Convenzione dell'ONU sul diritto del mare impossibilitando così la
parte slovena a dare il proprio consenso al codice di comportamento per
i pescatori. Infatti, il diritto internazionale prevede il ricorso alla
"linea mediana" soltanto quando non sussistono "ragioni storiche o
altre circostanze particolari".
Queste sussisterebbero nel caso del Golfo di Pirano in quanto "la
Slovenia ha amministrato il Golfo dal punto di vista turistico,
economico ed ecologico senza interruzioni di alcun genere. Inoltre, la
polizia slovena controllava tutto il Golfo in data 25 giugno 1991, data
in riferimento alla quale vanno prese tutte le decisioni riguardanti il
confine sul mare". Stando a quanto riportato dal "Delo" alla luce di
detti fatti risulta chiaro che le acque del Golfo vanno considerate
"parte delle acque interne slovene" nelle quali, a differenza di quanto
avviene nelle acque territoriali, gli stati hanno gli stessi diritti
sovrani garantiti anche sulla terraferma.
Il giornale di Maribor, "Vecer", ha invece portato la questione sul chi
può aver interesse a un eventuale inasprimento dei rapporti croato -
sloveni. "Entrambe le diplomazie si dichiarano di essere orientate ad
assicurare i rapporti di buon vicinato e a migliorare lo spirito
europeo di collaborazione. Il codice è scaduto con l'ingresso della
Slovenia nel'UE. Ora ci si chiede se il mancato rinnovo è dovuto alle
elezioni in programma a settembre o al fatto che le tensioni vanno a
favore di quanti propagano la mentalità antieuropea in entrambi gli
stati", si legge nelle pagine del "Vecer".
Per quanto riguarda le reazioni dei partiti che immancabilmente
introducono l'argomento "confine sul mare" tra i temi trattati nel
corso della campagna elettorale le opinioni sono fortemente divise
suscitando di conseguenza anche divisioni tra gli analisti che stilano
previsioni riguardo al risultato elettorale. Mentre uni ritengono il
tutto vada a favore dell'attuale opposizione di centro - destra, altri
si dicono convinti che le attuali forze governative sapranno sfruttare
l'argomento per assicurarsi il voto degli elettori "più attenti agli
interessi nazionali".
Comunque sia, una soluzione diplomatica alla crisi continua a rimanere
lontana anche perché dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri sloveno hanno
fatto sapere che un incontro tra i capi delle diplomazie, Miomir Zuzul
e Ivo Vajgl non può attendersi a breve termine.

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http://www.edit.hr/lavoce/index.html
"La Voce del Popolo", Rijeka - Fiume, 11.8.1994

La TV di stato sui motivi del mancato accordo sulla pesca

La Slovenia non cede sui diritti di sovranità nel Golfo

LUBIANA – Codice di comportamento dei pescatori nel Golfo di Pirano: la
diplomazia slovena espone le ragioni del mancato accordo. Venendo
incontro al forte interesse dell’opinione pubblica in merito
all’argomento la TV slovena ha dedicato ieri, all’interno del
telegiornale della sera, un ampio servizio alla questione riguardante
il confine sul mare. Nel servizio, che si richiamava a fonti
diplomatiche di Lubiana, come motivo dell’insuccesso dell’incontro dei
membri della presidenza della Commissione mista per il traffico
transfrontaliero tra la Slovenia e la Croazia veniva indicata la
richiesta avanzata dalla parte croata che per la Slovenia avrebbe
significato "la rinuncia a una parte della sovranità sul mare".
Stando alla dichiarazione rilasciata in merito da Aleksander Geržina,
il membro sloveno della presidenza della Commissione, "la Croazia ha
proposto la sottoscrizione di un accoro in base al quale alla polizia
verrebbe tolta la competenza a controllare i pescatori che effettuano
la loro attività commerciale nella zona di confine. Per Lubiana ciò
significherebbe rinunciare a una parte della sovranità nel Golfo di
Pirano". Richiamandosi a questa dichiarazione il comunicato diffuso
dall’agenzia STA ha adotto tra le ragioni del rifiuto sloveno a
sottoscrivere un siffatto accordo anche il fatto che la Slovenia non ha
intenzione di rinunciare a quanto previsto nell’accordo Drnovšek-Račan.
Illustrando la proposta di accordo precedentemente stilata Geržina ha
detto che “questa prevedeva nelle acque un controllo congiunto delle
polizie slovena e croata per quanto concerne tutti gli elementi che
possono essere ricondotti alla pesca. Per quanto riguarda invece la
pesca intesa come attività commerciale, regolata nel codice di
comportamento, questa sarebbe diventata competenza dell’ispettorato
composto da rappresentanti sloveni e croati".
Il sottosegretario presso il Ministero dell’agricoltura, Franc
Potočnik, ha dichiarato che “i pescatori possono continuare
indisturbati la loro attività nella zona controllata dalla polizia
slovena, vale a dire fino a circa 300 metri dalla costa occidentale del
Golfo di Pirano".

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http://www.edit.hr/lavoce/index.html
"La Voce del Popolo", Rijeka - Fiume, 29.8.2004

Janez Drnovšek affronta il tema del contenzioso con la Croazia

«Plovania, valico inventato da Zagabria»

Le tesi di Stjepan Mesić sono una semplice «chimera»

LUBIANA – Il presidente sloveno, Janez Drnovšek, ha affermato ieri che
stando all’accordo “Drnovšek-Račan” del 2001, quello in base al quale a
Lubiana spetterebbe la maggior parte del Golfo di Pirano e lo sbocco al
mare aperto, gli ultimi sette chilometri del confine continentale fra
Croazia e Slovenia in Istria appartengono alla Croazia. “In conformità
a quell’accordo gli insediamenti a meridione della Dragogna
spetterebbero alla Croazia, ma ciò costituisce una contropartita per lo
sbocco della Slovenia al mare aperto, e per la linea di frontiera nel
Golfo di Pirano che spetta a noi per la maggior parte assieme a una
parte adeguata del mare territoriale”, ha dichiarato il capo di Stato
sloveni ai giornalisti del quotidiano di Maribor “Večer”, dal quale è
stato invitato a commentare gli ultimi eccessi di Joško Joras e le
recenti dichiarazioni rilasciate dal presidente croato, Stjepan Mesić,
in relazione ai confini terrestri tra Lubiana e Zagabria.
Secondo Drnovšek la tesi del presidente croato, il quale sostiene che
la frontiera terrestre è stata determinata e ora rimane da stabilire
unicamente quella marittima, costituiscono solamente un suo
“desiderio”. “Questo presunto fatto rappresenta soltanto un auspico,
giacché non ci sono i presupposti necessari, in nessun accordo o atto
giuridico. Gli ultimi sette chilometri del confine terrestre sono
rimasti in dubbio nel corso di tutto il tempo delle trattative sulle
frontiere, cioè dalla nostra indipendenza”, ha chiarito Drnovšek. Il
presidente sloveno ha fatto presente che Lubiana dispone della
documentazione inerente alle trattative sulle frontiere e allo status
dei quattro villaggi situati a Sud del fiume Dragogna. Egli ha spiegato
che in base ad alcuni elementi insorti nel 1991 scaturiva che fosse
corretta la tesi croata e in base ad altre circostanze che lo fosse
quella slovena.
Drnovšek ha collegato il dilemma inerente agli ultimi sette chilometri
del confine terrestre in Istria all’accordo Drnovšek-Račan, che per la
Slovenia è tuttora attuale (lo ha dichiarato in questi giorni pure il
ministro degli Affari esteri di Lubiana, Ivo Vajgl) e all’ottenimento
dello sbocco alle acque internazionali. “Se la Croazia desidera la
linea di confine sancita dall’accordo, allora lo deve accettare nel suo
insieme e non può avvalersi solo di quei punti che le fanno comodo”, ha
rilevato Janez Drnovšek. Secondo il presidente sloveno, il valico di
frontiera di Plovania è stato realizzato da Zagabria di testa propria.
Egli ha ricordato che la Slovenia in tale senso ha trasmesso una nota
diplomatica. Le polemiche riguardanti il confine in Istria sono tornate
d’attualità in seguito alle gesta di Joško Joras che aveva bloccato il
traffico al confine tra i due paesi. Joras sostiene che il valico di
Plovania non rappresenti un confine bensì un semplice check point.

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http://www.edit.hr/lavoce/index.html
"La Voce del Popolo", Rijeka - Fiume, 29.8.2004

Stjepan Mesić commenta le ultime considerazioni di Janez Drnovšek

«Confine terrestre? Commissione Badinter docet...»

Secondo il presidente croato non ci sono dubbi in merito

LESINA (HVAR) – Il presidente della Repubblica, Stjepan Mesić, non ha
mancato di commentare – sabato durante la sua visita a Lesina (Hvar) –
le dichiarazioni rilasciate il giorno prima dal presidente sloveno
Janez Drnovšek al quotidiano "Večer" di Maribor in merito ai confini
tra Croazia e Slovenia. Secondo Drnovšek, infatti, la convinzione di
Mesić che la frontiera terrestre è cosa fatta e risolta, rappresenta
una "chimera", una "pura illusione del mio collega croato". La
determinazione degli ultimi sette chilometri del confine terrestre,
aveva affermato il capo di stato sloveno, è rimasto un problema aperto
per tutto il tempo delle trattative sulle frontiere, ossia
dall'ottenimento dell'indipendenza della Slovenia. Drnovšek, inoltre,
aveva collegato il dilemma su questi ultimi sette chilometri in Istria
all’accordo Drnovšek-Račan, aggiungendo che il valico di Plovania non è
altro che un'invenzione di Zagabria.
Commentando la dichiarazioni di Drnovšek alla Radio croata, Mesić si è
limitato a ricordare il responso della Commissione Badinter, secondo il
quale i confini terrestri tra le repubbliche socialiste dell'ex
federazione jugoslava rappresentano ora i confini di stato tra le nuove
entità statali sorte sulle rovine della RSFJ, mentre ai nuovi stati
rimane soltanto di definire i confini marittimi. "Il confine marittimo
– ha detto Mesić – dipende da come sono stabiliti quelli terrestri. Se
in qualcosa dovessi dare ragione al presidente sloveno, lo farei
certamente per la sua dichiarazione che i confini terrestri tra i
nostri due paesi non sono stati identificati, ma questi stessi confini
sono eccome ben definiti. La Commissione Badinter ha definito i
confini, e ora spetta a noi identificarli metro per metro".

---

Ti, 'ex'-jugoslavenu/ko,
odgovori!
1) Koje si nacionalnosti? Da li znas - ili ne znas?
2) Daju li ti pasos?
3) Kuda prolaze nove granice?
a. izmedju tebe i tvoga supruga/e?
b. izmedju tebe i tvoj djece?
c. izmedju tvoje i susjedove kuce? ...

(Milena Cubrakovic, 1994)


Tu, 'ex'- jugoslava/o,
rispondi!
1) Di che nazionalita' sei? Lo sai - o no?
2) Ti danno un passaporto?
3) Dove passano le nuove frontiere?
a. fra te ed il tuo coniuge?
b. fra te ed i tuoi figli?
c. fra la tua casa e quella del tuo vicino?
Chi ti rilascia il visto sul passaporto per
andarlo a trovare? ...

(Milena Cubrakovic, 1994)

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